ment it was not of importance whether the consequences appeared natural and probable or abnormal and inconceivable, the only question being whether or not they actually resulted. (In re Sponatski,

108 N. E. 466.)

The question of sequence was also before the appellate division of the Supreme Court of New York (Plass v. Central N. E. R. Co., 155 N. Y. Supp. 854), in which a railroad sectionman was poisoned by contact with poison ivy, blood poisoning, bronchitis, congestion of the lungs, and death following. These facts found by the industrial commission were held not open to review by the court, there being "certainly some evidence to warrant them."

An interesting decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin (Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 154 N. W. 640) sustained an award as for accidental injury proximately resulting from the drinking of water furnished for the camp by the employer, in a case of death by typhoid fever. The same court denied compensation to a man who, when recovering from a hurt, engaged in a boxing bout which seems to have excited bacteria that were walled off so as to be harmless, but by blows received were brought into the circulation, resulting in blood poisoning. It was held in that case that the original hurt was not the proximate cause of the subsequent disability, but that it was superseded by an act not in the course of employment. (Kill v. Industrial Commission, 152 N. W. 148.)

Obviously the question of proximate cause is closely related to that of the preexisting condition of the employee in many instances, an illustration being found in a case cited by the compensation commission of New York, in which a man injured by burning developed delirium tremens while in the hospital and died. The ruling of the commission was in favor of the dependent claimant, on the ground that the primary cause of the death was the burning, the delirium tremens being contributory. The industrial board of Massachusetts took the same view in a case in which a fracture of the leg resulted fatally by reason of the low resistance of the injured man, due to regular use of alcohol. The chain of incidents was given as injury, sepsis, delirium tremens, death, the death being held to be connected with the injury. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed an award of compensation in a very similar case (Ramlow v. Moon Lake Ice Co., 158 N. W. 1027), the view being taken that the delirium tremens would not have developed at the time but for the injury. Under the Massachusetts law decisions are originally made by a committee of arbitration, and in a case passed upon by such a committee it was shown that liquor had been smuggled to the injured man while in the hospital, and the conclusion was reached that death was due to the delirium caused by such surreptitious use of liquor, and compensation was denied.

Pneumonia, regarded as the result of an accident, formed the basis. of awards by the commissions of New York and West Virginia, while the Massachusetts accident board on review denied compensation in a case where a janitor, overheated while stoking a furnace, became chilled while sweeping, the finding being that there was no personal injury in the course of employment, so that no compensation was due. In the New York case a watchman fell and broke his leg and developed static pneumonia and pleurisy, followed by death. In one of the West Virginia cases the injured man was kicked in the chest, while in the other the injury consisted of a fracture of the skull. Obviously the development of a case of inhalation pneumonia following an operation for compensable hernia would furnish a basis. for an award (Industrial Accident Board of Massachusetts).

That the injury was the proximate cause of death was determined by the industrial accident commission of California in a case in which a blistered heel, due to the wearing of boots, furnished by the employer, too large for the employee, was followed by blood poisoning, uremia, and death, it being held that the chain of causation was complete. Where a chauffeur's arm was broken, and unpadded splints led to the formation of an abscess, followed by blood poisoning and ankylosis of thumb and fingers, the Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed an award, as without the happening of the original injury none of the subsequent events would have taken place (Newcomb v. Albertson, 89 Atl. 928); and a district court judge of the same State allowed a claim for an upholsterer, whose death from cancer was held to be traceable to injuries to the tongue caused by his holding tacks in his mouth, according to the custom of the trade.

Somewhat stricter than the foregoing appears to be the ruling of the Supreme Court of Kansas in a case (Ruth v. WitherspoonEnglar Co., 157 Pac. 403) in which compensation as for total disability was disallowed on the ground that it was due, not to the original injury, but to the malpractice of the physician treating the The cause was remanded to the lower court for a determination of the extent of the injury due directly to the accident as distinguished from the subsequent malpractice.

case.

COVERAGE.

Under this head are considered a number of rulings and decisions determining the application of the acts to various classes of employment, and also the determination as to what persons are to be considered employees entitled to benefits.

Domestic and farm labor.-The common omission of domestic and farm labor, sometimes absolute and sometimes conditional, though ordinarily simple enough, raises questions requiring determination where there is a combination of duties or of industrial undertakings.

Thus the industrial accident board of California excluded an employee who was in regular employment in his employer's saloon, but whose injury was received while cleaning windows in the employer's apartment above the saloon, such employment being classed as household domestic service and not compensable. On the other hand, a horseman and general utility man about a house, caring for the garden, lawn, etc., was held to be within the compensation act while exercising horses belonging to the employer. The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected a claim on account of the injury of a carpenter received while building a crib for a farmer, the ground being taken that the farmer was not engaged in the business or occupation of building, the work itself not being extrahazardous and the business of farming being excluded from the act. (Uphoff v. Industrial Board, 111 N. E. 128.) The question is approached from the other side in a case before the industrial board of this State where a farm hand and teamster on the farm of a seedsman was injured, the employer maintaining a seed warehouse with an elevator subject to city ordinances and a storeroom, so that he was an employer within the hazardous class and had elected to accept the law. The employer was held bound as to all employees except those specifically exempted, this exemption including the claimant in the present case. The Massachusetts law was construed by the supreme court of that State so as to permit a farmer and market gardener to insure drivers and helpers, while omitting laborers whose duties were strictly agricultural, the court saying that such a classification is reasonable and valid and conforms to the spirit of the act. (In re Keaney, 104 N. E. 438.) The industrial board of the same State recognized similar distinctions in the case of an employer who insured his office force and other employees. The family chauffeur was held not to be included in the policy of insurance, as his work was not in the usual occupation of his employer, his principal duties being to drive the car of his employer on errands of pleasure. The industrial accident board of Michigan awarded compensation to a farm laborer where the employer was a corporation whose business it was to manufacture chemicals, serums, etc., incidental to which a farm was maintained, the injury being caused by a kick from a horse. It was held that the maintenance of the farm was in this case a part of the manufacturing business of the company, and further pointed out that the law of the State does not exclude farmers, but merely places them under no added burdens if they fail to accept the act. This was reversed by the supreme court of the State (Shafer v. Parke, Davis & Co., 159 N. W. 304) on the ground that the status of the employee was fixed by the work actually done by him, and not by the fact that his employer had other interests, not affecting the nature of his work.

Similar questions to the foregoing were passed upon by the industrial accident board of Texas in a case in which a partnership operated a farm and an irrigation plant. It was held that even though the management of the two undertakings was the same, if they were operated separately the irrigation plant could come under the statute while the farm and the laborers on it would be excluded. It was further said that the same workmen might be included or excluded according as they were employed in the one undertaking or the other. The same board in another case, however, excluded all the employees on a farm and ranch, though one man was a mechanician in charge of a considerable amount of machinery on the place. It was added that even if a different ruling should be made with reference to the mechanician it would not have the effect of bringing the farm laborers within the act.

Hazardous employments.-The question of hazard is made the basis of determining inclusions and exclusions in a number of the laws, enumerations being made by the acts in a number of cases, while in the others the matter is open to determination. The Supreme Court of New York, appellate division, has had before it a number of cases involving the definition of the term "hazardous" under the act of that State. Thus (Aylesworth v. Phoenix Cheese Co., 155 N. Y. Supp. 916), a laborer employed by a company at harvesting ice was held not to be within the act, since the harvesting of ice is not classed as hazardous (since included by an amendment of the law, 1916), and the employee was not working for the company in the preparation of foods, in which case he would have been included. A butcher or chef's assistant in a hotel who cut an artery while preparing a leg of mutton for cooking and died from the injury was held not engaged in the manufacture or preparation of meats or meat products, so that no claim on his account could be allowed (De la Gardelle v. Hampton Co., 153 N. Y. Supp. 162); so also of a driver for a packing house, who in his ordinary employment would be included within the act, but who was sent on foot to deliver a retail order and fell over a bucket of glass and received injuries from which he died, it being held that he was at the time not in hazardous employment. (Newman v. Newman, 155 N. Y. Supp. 665; affirmed by court of appeals.)

While the business of warehousing is covered by the statute, it was held that an employee injured while handling a barrel of vinegar for a wholesale produce merchant in his warehouse was not protected by the law, since the employer was not engaged in warehousing, that phase of his business not being for pecuniary gain. (Mihm v. Hussey, 155 N. Y. Supp. 860.) The act by amendment of 1916 now includes storage of all kinds. Another excluded case was that of a

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janitor whose general duties were not of the kinds classed by the law as hazardous, and who was injured while hanging out a flag, which was a part of his duties. It was held that in the case of such employees it must be specifically shown that the work in which the employee was engaged at the time of his injury was of the hazardous class, which was held not to be the case in the present instance, though the man fell and broke his leg. (Reisner v. Gross & Herbener, 155 N. Y. Supp. 946.)

Admitted to benefits by this court were a porter and elevator man in a manufacturing and wholesale drug house in which some parts of the work were hazardous, the court saying that an employee therein would be presumptively included in the act (Larsen v. Paine Drug Co., 112 N. E. 725); and a butcher's helper in a retail establishment who lost four fingers in an electric meat chopper, pneumonia and death ensuing, it being held that the injured man might be regarded as included in the work of manufacture or preparation of meats or meat products unless the employer showed specifically otherwise. (Kohler v. Frohmann, 153 N. Y. Supp. 559.) (Meat markets are now (1916) within the act.) A man injured while lifting glass from a cutting table in an establishment in which plate glass was polished, mirrors made, etc., was presumed to be engaged in the manufacture of glass, glass products, etc., unless specific facts to the contrary should be presented in the defense. It was said in this case that the employer's premiums were the same, whether or not the employee was engaged in hazardous employments at all times. (McQueeney v. Sutphen & Hyer, 153 N. Y. Supp. 554.)

The court of appeals of the State had before it a case involving the operation of an elevator, reaching the conclusion that this does not come within the protection of the law unless the business in connection with which the elevator is used is classed as hazardous. (Wilson v. Dorflinger Sons, 112 N. E. 567.) This reversed a judgment of the supreme court, appellate division, awarding compensation in the case named on the ground that elevators should be classed as vehicles "other than on tracks." An amendment of 1916 brings freight and passenger elevators within the scope of the act.

The compensation commission of the State ruled in favor of a hotel porter injured while at work in the hotel's ice-manufacturing plant, since, though his regular employment was not covered by the act, the work in which he was engaged at the time of his injury was held to be so, laying down the rule that employees in industries that are nonhazardous as a whole are protected under the act while engaged in occupations covered by it. In another case before this commission an employee of a mining company, whose duties were to act as policeman on the premises, was killed while making an arrest. It was found that he was an employee of the company