under contract, and since the business of the company was classed as hazardous, all its employees would be covered by the act, the injured man in this particular instance being required to be on the premises in the discharge of his duties, even though not actually engaged in the physical operation of the plant. Other contentions to the effect that the injury was not an accidental one, and that it did not arise out of and in the course of employment, were rejected and compensation awarded.

In its application to the Reclamation Service the Federal statute of May 30, 1908, was limited to hazardous employment in work of construction or maintenance, and for two and one-half years the same limitation affected employees of the Isthmian Canal Commission.

In considering this phase of the act the general occupation of the injured workman was regarded as the decisive factor in some instances and in others his specific employment at the time of the injury. In the absence of statutory determination the rulings necessarily reflect an estimate as to the hazard, based in part on known facts as to frequency of accident and in part on conclusions reached from the particular circumstances. Thus in the Canal Zone the following employees were held to be in hazardous employments: A policeman; a hospital orderly, injured while catching an escaped insane patient; the driver of an ambulance; a time inspector whose duty required him to go upon the excavation and construction work; a messenger boy who had to cross tracks at a railroad yard; a water boy who stood on a high wall to serve the workmen; a laborer clearing ground by the use of a machete to cut small trees; a laborer attending a printing press; teamsters; a carpenter; a plumber and tinner; a hotel porter taking baggage to a station; a waiter injured while lifting supplies on a dredge.

The following were held not to be employed in hazardous employments: Laborers in the Quartermaster's Department; laborer on delivery wagon; acting postmaster struck by train while going for mail; cook; janitor; storeroom clerk, opening barrels; scavenger, sanitation department; laborers clearing ground by the use of scythes to cut grass, bushes, etc.; water boy serving water to crew clearing ground, who struck scythe hidden in the grass.

In the Reclamation Service a ditch rider, a quarryman, an iceplant attendant who fell from a ladder, and a gas-engine tender were held to be within the act, while a cook's helper was held not to be in a hazardous employment.

In so far as the rulings above noted relate to the Canal Zone they are not of current importance, since the question of hazard no longer affects the application of the law in that field, but they show the line drawn in an attempt to apply the test of hazard. Thus far no case has arisen in connection with the Bureau of Mines, the Forestry

Service, or the Lighthouse Service, but from the foregoing it is reasonably clear that all station or field work in carrying out the purposes of the services, not clerical and not strictly supervisory or administrative, would probably be included in the act.

Rulings on the question of hazard are obviously difficult, since they would seem to be practically answered by the fact of the occurrence of the injury which must befall before the case can come to consideration; and the fact of the injury is in itself proof that the occupation is at least in some degree hazardous. It is difficult, therefore, to avoid the impression of unfair exclusion in cases where a workman suffers injury in circumstances ordinarily giving rise to valid claims for compensation, but finds himself-or his dependents in case of fatal injuries-deprived of supposed rights, and, indeed, of all possibility of recovery, because the industry is reckoned by the courts or administrative commission as nonhazardous. Industrial protection is incomplete in such a state of affairs, besides the uncertainty that exists where the decision rests on opinion, statistics of accident rates in specific industries not being available in many cases to afford a real basis of determination.

In any view, the matter resolves itself into this that a given occupation is hazardous, so that those engaged in it may properly expect provision to be made in their behalf; or the risk is comparatively slight, so that the cost of providing for the occasional injuries arising in it is not burdensome on the employer, while ministering to the needs of the injured individual, which are none the less urgent because of the comparatively slight number of persons injured in like circumstances. It is of interest to note that after brief experience with its law New York has added (ch. 622, Acts of 1916) a considerable number of employments to its "hazardous" list, and made compensation available by election for all employments.

Casual employment.-The exception in many laws of persons whose employment is only casual and not in the usual course of the trade, business, etc., of the employer has been passed upon in a number of cases at hand. The California law requires for exception that the employment shall be both casual and not in the usual course; the Iowa industrial commissioner construes the law of that State to be of the same effect. In a California case, where an employee passing a creamery operated by his employer was requested to furnish aid for a short time in work outside the usual course of his employment and was injured while doing so, it was held that while his employment in this case was casual it was nevertheless in the usual course of his employer's business, so that he was entitled to compensation, which corresponds with the provisions of the British act. This commission has fixed an arbitrary term of one week as the standard,

employment for a less period being held per se casual, if not in the usual course of the trade or business of the employer. A plasterer doing less than one week's work for a rooming-house keeper was held excluded for both reasons, while a decorator who usually did his own carpenter work by regular employees was required to pay compensation to a carpenter hired for less than one week to do such work for him, as it was in the regular course of the employer's business. Where a locomotive engineer wished a garage built on his premises he engaged the services of a workman, who agreed to secure the services of another man and assured the employer that the job would not last more than five days, relying on which assurance the employer did not insure his liability under the compensation law. The failure of the workman to secure constant assistance prolonged the work beyond the period of one week, but the California commission held that the employer had a right to rely upon his employee's agreement to complete the work within a time which would have made the employment casual, so that no compensation could be demanded.

The law of Massachusetts originally excepted persons whose employment was but casual or not in the usual course of the trade, etc., of the employer, and under it a caterer was held not required to compensate for injuries to a waiter employed by him for a single occasion. (In re Gaynor, 217 Mass. 86; 104 N. E. 339.) As employment on occasion merely is the custom in this class of work, it is evident that service of this nature was by this decision excluded from the act, until an amendment of 1914 struck out the provision debarring casual employees from its benefits.

The laws of Connecticut and Minnesota agree with that of California in following the British act, so that even if the business is but casual, if it is in line with the employer's business, the employer is liable (State v. District Court of Rice County (Minn.), 155 N. W. 103); while in a Connecticut case (Thompson v. Twiss, 97 Atl. 328), an indefinite term of employment, though to last at least several weeks, was held not to be casual, even though the work was not in the main business of the employer, "yet a very substantial one." This viewpoint coincides with that of the compensation commission of Pennsylvania; in this State the law excludes persons whose employment is casual and not in the regular course of the employer's business. The commission rules that "the policy of the law is against the creation of any situation whereby a workman can be engaged in his occupation in the State of Pennsylvania and be deprived thereby of the benefits of the workmen's compensation act." It was said that if a farmer undertook to build a barn, hiring the men therefor, they would not be classed as agriculturists because employed by him; but if he hurriedly employed a workman to repair a suddenly discovered leak, that would be a casual employment. This accords with

an earlier ruling by a referee in this State who allowed the claim of a carpenter remodeling the residence of his employer, who was engaged in no trade, but was held for the occasion to be engaged in the business of reconstructing the home. It was said that if there was "time for premeditation, calculation, and design he must be considered to have engaged in a business, and the employee under those circumstances can not be considered as casual."

Where an employee came to the employer's house for one day each week to assist in domestic duties it was held that such employment was not casual but periodical, and injuries received during its continuance were compensable (compensation commissioner of Connecticut). Quite similar was the view taken by the Maryland Accident Commission in the case of an employee who received $2 per week from an employer in a market, with the privilege of rendering services to other persons having stalls in the same market. An injury received while at work for one employer was held not to be during the rendering of casual services. Where one renders occasional services, but is under no contract and has no agreement therefor, the defense of casual employment was held to apply in a Massachusetts case, even though the employment was in the line of the employer's business. This ruling by a committee of arbitration is in harmony with a decision of the supreme court of this State, where a teamster with team rendered services of a few days' duration once or twice a year. (In re Cheevers, 106 N. E. 861.) The accident board of the same State allowed a claim where an employee was supplied under a contract with a union, the men not being hired as individuals but as members of the union; the injured man was supplied as a substitute mailer, and was injured during the first day of his employment, though he had been pretty constantly at work in other offices in the city. The board held that his employment was substantially regular and not casual and that he was working under a contract, so that compensation must be allowed. The supreme court of that State passed upon another case in which a workman employed to trim trees to keep the wires of the employing company clear was directed by his foreman to trim the limbs of a tree through which none of the company's wires ran. The court held that as he was supposed to obey orders it was none of his business to inquire as to the right of the company to trim a particular tree, and that as he was doing what he had been hired to do the work was not casual. (In re Howard, 105 N. E. 636.)

The Minnesota commissioner of labor ruled that the length of service did not determine the nature of employment as casual in a case where a contractor who had no regular employees took on such men as he could obtain in a strange town for the purpose of a piece of work which he had contracted to do there.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey applied a principle already noted under this head in a case where a longshoreman was killed two hours after taking employment. Men in his line of service do not work regularly for one employer, but render services on the occasion of ships coming into port, being a regular class of employees for this purpose. The court held that such employment was not casual despite its irregularity. (Sabella v. Brazileiro, 91 Atl. 1032.) The industrial commission of Ohio holds the law of that State to cover public employees without distinction as to whether casual or not. The same view is taken of the Wisconsin statute by the industrial commission of that State and of the Michigan law by its board.

The status of a workman not employed in the business of the employer was considered by the Court of Appeals of New York in a case (Bargey v. Massaro Macaroni Co., 113 N. E. 407) in which a carpenter engaged in making alterations in the factory was injured while at work. It was held that under the act the company was an employer in its capacity as a manufacturer of foodstuffs, but as the carpenter was not engaged in that work he was not an employee, his work having no relation to the hazardous business of the employer. Recovery under the provision of the act covering the construction, demolition, and repair of buildings was also denied on the ground that the company did not carry on such occupation for pecuniary gain. An award of the commission of the State in the claimant's behalf was therefore reversed.

Other exclusions.-The Washington statute was held not to authorize the inclusion of elevators in mercantile establishments, the term 66 elevator,” where used in the act, referring to grain elevators, mercantile establishments not being among the extrahazardous places of employment contemplated by the act. (Guerrieri v. Industrial Insurance Commission, 146 Pac. 608.)

The law of Illinois includes occupations subject to statutory or municipal regulations. This was held by the appellate court not to cover occupations known not to be extrahazardous, so that the driver of a milk wagon was held not to be covered by the act, even though the dairy business was subject to municipal regulation; it was stated that transportation and warehousing were mere incidents to the conduct of the employer's business and were not of such nature as the act was intended to cover, and an award by the lower court was reversed. (Bowman Dairy Co. v. Noyes, N. E.-.) The Supreme Court of Washington in passing upon this phase of the law of that State rules that a merchant who has repair shops and employs mechanics in them is, as to such employees and mechanical departments, engaged in extrahazardous employment within the meaning of the act, though simply as a merchant he is not. (Wendt v. Industrial Insurance Commission, 141 Pac. 311.)