ulating effect necessary to complete the product is furnished by the addition of water which was in fact the coagulating agent found in the ethyl alcohol in the first Schaub patent. Since the patentee is the same in both instances, the second Schaub patent is not invalidated by the application for the first. Deister Concentrator Co. v. Deister Machine Co. (C. C. A.) 263 F. 710. It is true in the case at bar, as in the case cited, that, although the claims in the second patent might have been joined with the claims of the first, no damage to the public resulted from their separate presentation, in view of their simultaneous issuance, and it is quite clear that no fraud was practiced or intended by the applicant. Century Electric Co. v. Westinghouse E. & Mfg. Co., 191 F. 352, 112 C. C. A. 8; Toledo Plate & Window Glass Co. v. Kawneer Mfg. Co., 237 F. 364, 150 C. C. A. 378. [6] The second Schaub patent is also infring ed by the defendants' process. The product. claim refers to nitrocellulose, methyl alcohol and water. The defendants' product includes the same substances, and in addition ethyl alcohol, but the addition of this ingredient to the ingredients specified in the claim does not avoid infringement. Walker on Patents, § 347. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that methyl alcohol and ethyl alcohol are recognized equivalents as fuel. Process claim 3 is also infringed, as is apparent from the discussion above in regard to the infringement of the process claims of the first Schaub pat ent. [7] Minor objections of the defendants relate to the sufficiency of the specifications and to the ignorance of the inventor. The argument with regard to the sufficiency of the specifications is based largely upon the fact that the specifications of the Schaub patents call for a cellulose having a nitrogen content which renders it soluble in methyl alcohol, "preferably cellulose penta-nitrate." The evidence shows that cellulose penta-nitrate is a theoretical or laboratory product, unsuitable for the manufacture of solid alcohol. However, cellulose penta-nitrate is not mentioned in any claim in issue, all of which specify nitrocellulose soluble in methyl alcohol. This is a sufficient description, since it enables an operator to select the proper substance. The fact that certain of the claims specify cellulose penta-nitrate does not justify the court in giving the other claims the same meaning. Automatic Recording Safe Co. v. Burns, 231 F. 985, 146 C. C. A. 181. Nor does the fact that the specifications declare that cellulose pentanitrate is preferable require that it be read into the claims. Sewall v. Jones, 91 U. S 171-185, 23 L. Ed. 275. The defendants' expert himself conceded that the disclosures of the patent were sufficient, if addressed to one skilled in the art. Nothing more is required. Minerals Separation Co. v. Hyde, 242 U. S. 261-270, 37 S. Ct. 82, 61 L. Ed. 286. [8] It is likewise unimportant that the inventor did not understand the reactions which took place in the course of his process, for it is well settled that a patentee need not understand the scientific principles underlying his invention. Diamond Rubber Company v. Consolidated Tire Company, 220 U. S. 435, 31 S. Ct. 444, 55 L. Ed. 527. [9] Finally, the Brigham patent, which was applied for February 23, 1918, and granted August 26, 1919, is to be considered. Brigham was the attorney for Schaub in the applications for the first and second Schaub patents, and conducted the correspondence with the Patent Office. His patent differs from the Schaub patents only in that he omits methyl alcohol and specifies dehydrated ethyl alcohol, commercial ethyl alcohol, containing about 5 per cent. of water, acetone, and nitrocellulose as the constituents of the product. Eight parts of cellulose are dissolved in a mixture of 92 parts of dehydrated ethyl alcohol and 14 parts of acetone. Commercial ethyl alcohol, containing about 5 per cent. of water, is added until the colloid is brought to a certain degree of viscosity, and it is then solidified by the addition of water or commercial ethyl alcohol which contains a percentage of water. The process claims are substantially set out in this description of the pro cess. The defendants claim that Brigham's only contribution was the disclosure that the solu tion of nitrocellulose in alcohol depends upon the presence of acetone, and that this matter was well known to the art, and was specifically called to his attention by the citations of the patent examiner, as shown by the file wrapper. This position is well taken. The plaintiff, indeed, concedes that there is no novelty or invention in the Brigham patent, unless it was in the suggestion of the use of dehydrated ethyl alcohol. There is no doubt that the nitrocellulose was more readily dissolved by the use of dehydrated ethyl alcohol in connection with acetone than would have been the case with the use of ordinary commercial ethyl alcohol containing a certain percentage of water, but, as the foregoing references to the literature will show, the art was already familiar with the fact that certain nitrocelluloses were soluble in dehydrated ethyl alcohol and insoluble when water was 14 F. (2d) 641 present. Taking into consideration these facts, and the further fact that the only practical method of manufacture of solid alcohol, containing the constituents specified in the Brigham patent, is that suggested in the first Schaub patent, it follows that Brigham disclosed nothing of value, and that his patent is invalid for lack of patentable invention. A decree will be signed in accordance with this opinion. In re SHIELDS & MATTISON. (District Court, S. D. California, S. D. December 24, 1925.) No. 6825. Bankruptcy 95-Question of right of single partner to institute bankruptcy proceeding cannot be raised on Incidental issue. The question of the right of a single partner to institute bankruptcy proceedings cannot be informally raised by an alleged partner on hearing of issue joined on his answer denying the partnership, by objection to the jurisdiction, after such issue has by stipulation been referred to a special master. In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Shields & Mattison, a copartnership composed of George E. Shields and A. E. Mattison, alleged bankrupt. On report of special master. Confirmed. the time of the filing of the petition, or that he had been a copartner at any time subsequent to the 17th day of October, 1924, on which date he alleged that the copartnership which had theretofore existed had been dissolved by mutual consent. Upon written stipulation, signed by counsel for Mattison and counsel for the petitioning partner, the question as to Mattison's association in the copartnership, as raised by his answer, was submitted to a special master to take evidence and report his findings and conclusions; it being stated in the stipulation that the only question to be by the master determined was "whether A. E. Mattison is a member of the partnership above named." The master heard the evidence submitted by the parties and filed his report, in which he reported the conclusion that Mattison was a member of the copartnership during the time in dispute. The report was presented for confirmation, and no objections were filed thereto. Counsel for Mattison, however, appeared and orally objected that the court had no jurisdiction to take any action in the matter because the petition, being against the copartnership, and being filed by one partner only, was not authorized by the Bankruptcy Act (Comp. St. § 9585 et seq.), citing Meek v. Centre County Banking Company et al., 268 U. S. 426, 45 S. Ct. 560, 69 L. Ed. 1028. the right of the single partner to institute a Under the decision cited, the question of bankruptcy proceeding may be well questioned. However, I do not think that that quesW. T. Craig, of Los Angeles, Cal., for re- tion should be permitted to be raised in an ceiver. informal way and in an incidental proceeding Lamy & Smith, of Los Angeles, Cal., for which has been carried on through the stipurespondent Mattison. JAMES, District Judge. A petition was filed on December 13, 1924, by George E. Shields, who represented that he was a member of a copartnership known as Shields & Mattison, and that the said copartnership was insolvent, and that it had permitted a judgment to be taken against it which would amount to a preference. In this petition Shields set forth that the other partner, A. E. Mattison, had refused to join in the petition. Mattison appeared, and in an answer denied that he was a copartner with Shields at 14 F. (2d)-41 lation of the person now raising the objection to the jurisdiction. Confirmation of the master's report will in no wise affect the right of Mattison to move to dismiss the proceeding or present the question of jurisdiction directly by appropriate motion. And a determination that he was a member of the copartnership is essential to give him standing from which to urge that his interests will be damaged. The report of the special master, determining that A. E. Mattison was a member of the copartnership at the time in issue under said Mattison's answer, is approved and confirmed. THE RUSSELL NO. 3. THE ATLANTIC 54. THE SAILOR JACK. Loomis & Ruebush, of New York City, for libelant. Alexander & Ash, of New York City, for (District Court, E. D. of New York. May 17, steam tug Russell. 1926.) No. 8602. 1. Collision 115-That lines holding boat to which tug ran a line in maneuvering grain elevator could not stand strain and parted held to impose no liability on such boat for resulting damage done by grain elevator while drifting within wind. Where steam tug, attempting to maneuver grain elevator to alongside steamer, ran line to boat tied alongside barge on opposite side of slip, so as to use her as a fulcrum around which to shift and warp grain elevator, fact that lines of boat holding it to barge would not stand the added strain and parted, permitting elevator to be carried across slip by the wind, to the damage of the steamer's propeller with which it collided, imposed no liability on boat 80 used. 2. Collision 115-Boat held not entitled to cut, without notice, line which she permitted tug to run to her in maneuvering grain elevator, though she was not liable for acts of third persons throwing off lines holding her, permitting her to drift. Where boat, made fast alongside barge, which in turn was made fast to steamer, without objection permitted tug to run a line to her to aid in maneuvering grain elevator, she had no right, without notice, to cut the line so made fast on her, on theory that tug was a trespasser, but was not liable for acts of third persons in throwing off lines from barge to her or from steamer to barge. Strictness of pleading required at common law is not required in admiralty. 4. Collision 119-Petition of libeled tug, impleading boat to which she ran a line in maneuvering grain elevator and barge to which boat was made fast, alleging "that some one threw off or slacked their lines," causing damage, held insufficient (admiralty rule 56). Petition of libeled steam tug, impleading under admiralty rule 56 boat to which it ran a line to aid in maneuvering grain elevator and barge to which boat was made fast, alleging "that some one threw off or slacked their lines,' causing grain elevator to be carried by wind across slip and inflict damage, held subject to exception, since boat was liable only if its lines were thrown off without warning by its captain or by his orders or with his consent, not for acts of third persons. In Admiralty. Libel by the Navigazione Libera Triestina Societa in Azioni against the steam tug Russell No. 3, which impleaded the boats Atlantic 54 and Sailor Jack. On exceptions of the boat Sailor Jack to the petition impleading it. Exceptions sustained, and petition dismissed. Leo J. Curren, of New York City, for claimant of Sailor Jack. CAMPBELL, District Judge. This is a motion to overrule the exceptions filed herein by the boat Sailor Jack to the petition filed by the steam tug Russell No. 3 to implead the Sailor Jack under the Fifty-Sixth rule in admiralty. The Sailor Jack contends that the facts averred in the petition are insufficient to constitute a cause of action against her. The facts as alleged, briefly, are that the Sailor Jack lay outside of the barge Atlantic 54, which lay alongside and was made fast to the starboard quarter of the steamer Chickasaw, which lay bow in with her portside to the pier. The Russell No. 3 brought in the grain elevator Oswego, and, in attempting to maneuver the Oswego so that she could be placed alongside the Isonzo II, a steamer that lay alongside the pier on the opposite side of the slip, ran a line to the Sailor Jack so as to use her as a fulcrum around which to shift and warp the Oswego. The petition alleges: "Instead of the Sailor Jack and the barge Atlantic 54 holding their positions alongside of the steamer Chickasaw, they shifted away therefrom, either by the fact that some one threw off or slacked their lines, or that the lines were improperly made fast or parted, as the result of which the grain elevator was carried by the then strong wind across the slip.". The Oswego came into contact with the propeller blade of the Isonzo II and damaged the same. [1] If the lines of the Sailor Jack were unable to stand the added strain of the Oswego, that would have imposed no liability on the Sailor Jack, as it was the duty of the Russell No. 3 to have ascertained whether the lines were sufficient when she ran the line from the McWilliams Oswego to the Sailor Jack. In any event the Sailor. Jack cannot be held liable for any act of the Atlantic 54. [2] I do not hold with the proctor for the Sailor Jack that the Oswego was a trespasser and that the Sailor Jack had the right, without notice, to cut the line which was made fast on her, but that the line having been made fast to her without objection on her part, the 14 F. (2d) 643 Oswego became a mere licensee and the Sailor Jack was not liable to the Oswego or Isonzo II for the act of third persons in throwing off the lines from the Atlantic 54 to the Chickasaw, or from the Sailor Jack to the Atlantic 54 or the Chickasaw. Carfloat C-4 (D. C.) 300 F. 757, 1924 A. M. C. 244, affirmed (C. C. A.) 300 F. 761; The Beeko (The May) (D. C.) 10 F.(2d) 884, 1926 A. M. C. 164. The Oswego being a licensee, the Sailor Jack would not have the right, without warning the Oswego of her purpose, to cast off her own lines and shift away from the steamer Chickasaw, carrying the Oswego across the slip, but she could only be held liable for the act of her captain or some one acting under his orders or with his consent. [3, 4] While I realize that the same strictness in pleading is not required in admiralty as at common law (The West Keats, 1924 A. M. C. 104), yet it does not seem to me that, where liability can be found as to the Sailor Jack only by showing that she was allowed to shift out without warning to the Oswego, by the act of her captain or some one acting under his orders or with his consent, and could under no condition be liable for the unauthorized acts of third persons, a good cause of action is not alleged when in the fifth allegation of the petition it is alleged, "that some one threw off or slacked their lines," because, in order to allege a good cause of action, it should be alleged that the line was thrown off by the captain of the Sailor Jack, or by his orders or with his consent, without warning to the Oswego. The motion to overrule the exceptions is denied, the exceptions are sustained, and the petition dismissed, without costs. RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA et al. v. SPLITDORF ELECTRICAL CO. (District Court, D. New Jersey. August 24, 1926.) No. 1669. Patents 328-Alexanderson, 1,173,079, for method and system for selecting electrical oscillations of given wave length in radio telegraphy, held valid and infringed. The Alexanderson patent, No. 1,173,079, for method and system for selecting electrical oscillations of given frequency from mixed oscillations held not anticipated and valid, and claims 1, 2, 3, 9, and 12 held infringed. In Equity. Suit by the Radio Corporation of America and others against the Split dorf Electrical Company. Decree for plaintiffs. Charles Neave, Stephen H. Philbin and Abel E. Blackmar, Jr., all of New York City, and Harry E. Dunham, of Schenectady, N. Y., for plaintiffs. Clifton V. Edwards and Lawrence K. Sa ger, both of New York City, and A. D. T. Libby, of Newark, N. J., for defendant. Walter G. Winne, U. S. Atty., of Hackensack, N. J., Herman J. Galloway, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Harry E. Knight, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., amicus curiæ. BODINE, District Judge. The patent in suit is United States letters patent No. 1,173,079, to E. F. W. Alexanderson, assignor to the General Electric Company. The specifications in part state: "The present invention relates to the selection of oscillations of a given wave length from mixed oscillations, and comprises systems suitable for tuning out interferences in radio-telegraphy. ⚫ "In accordance with the present invention, selective tuning is secured by the use of a plurality of resonant circuits arranged in cascade in such a manner that the selectivity of the system increases in geometric ratio with the number of circuits employed. The selective circuits are respectively interlinked by a relay controlling a separate source of energy to initiate oscillations corresponding to potential oscillations impressed upon the relay. As each tuned circuit is more or less opaque to disturbing oscillations differing in frequency from the oscillations to be selected, a certain percentage of the disturbances is eliminated in each circuit of the series, so that the purity of the incoming train of oscillations progressively increases as it is successively relayed. The relay preferably used for this purpose is an electron discharge tube having an incandescent cathode, an anode and a grid." The claims in suit are 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 9 to 12, inclusive. For convenience, the claims fall into two groups 1, 2, 9, and 12, and 3, 6, 7, 10, and 11. It was conceded by the defendant that 1, 2, 9, and 12 read upon its device. It was also conceded at the argument that claim 3 was substantially like claim 2. Counsel for the plaintiffs was content that the court should withdraw from consideration, without prejudice, claims 6, 7, 10, and 11. Claims 1, 2, 3, 9, and 12 will be considered. The claims are as follows: "1. The method of selecting sustained oscillations of a given frequency from disturb ing oscillations differing therefrom in frequency which consists in impressing all the oscillations upon a circuit, resonant to the frequency of the oscillations to be selected, thereby reducing the effect of disturbing oscillations in accordance with the degree of tuning of the resonant circuit, and controlling by means of the oscillations in said circuit an independent source of energy to initiate oscillations in step therewith and impressing the second set of oscillations upon a second circuit resonant to the frequency of the oscillations to be selected. "2. A receiving apparatus for electromagnetic waves comprising a plurality of tuned circuits largely opaque to oscillations of other than a given frequency, means linking adjoining circuits, said means comprising a source of energy and an energy transmitting apparatus varying in conductivity with impressed oscillations for initiating oscillations in step with received oscillations and means associated with the last circuit of the series for detecting the oscillations. "3. A tuned receiving system for detecting sustained oscillations of a given frequency comprising a plurality of circuits resonant to the frequency of the oscillations to be detect ed and arranged in cascade, relay devices joining each of said circuits to another comprising an evacuated envelope, an electronemitting cathode, a cooperating anode, and a grid, said device being connected to one of said circuits at the cathode and grid and to another circuit at the cathode and anode and a local source of energy in the second circuit." "9. The combination of an electrical discharge device comprising an envelope, a cathode adapted to emit negative charges, an anode and means for controlling a discharge between said electrodes, a circuit electrically resonant to variable current of a given frequency, electrical connections between said circuit and the discharge controlling means of said device, a second circuit resonant to variable current of the same frequency, a source of electrical energy in circuit with the electrodes of said device, and means for impressing a variable current initiated by said source of energy upon the second resonant circuit." "12. A system for selecting electrical oscillations of a given frequency from oscillations differing therefrom in frequency comprising a series of resonant circuits largely opaque to oscillations of other than the given frequency, and means linking adjoining circuits, said means comprising a source of electric energy and an energy-transmitting apparatus varying in conductivity in accordance with oscillations impressed thereon from one circuit whereby oscillations are set up by said source of energy in another linked resonant circuit of said series having the same frequency as the impressed oscillations." The questions for determination are, first, Is the patent invalid for lack of invention? and, second, Is the patent completely anticipated by the prior art? These questions are so closely related that they must be considered together. Broadly, the patent provides, in the radio art, for an arrangement of parts in such a way that the tuning is done in geometrical progression or by successive filtration, with audion tubes used in the way specified in the patent. Somewhat more specifically, Alexanderson repeats the signal currents tuned in the grid circuit into the plate circuit, by means of an audion system, and then selects in another tuned circuit, thereafter detecting. This selection by repetition may be in two tuned circuits so connected, or in three tuned circuits, separated by audions, as in Fig. 2 of the patent, shown below. The invention may be better understood if some slight reference be made to the wireless art Through the air electromagnetic waves are transmitted. These rapidly oscillatory waves are similar to light and have the same velocity. To receive them a metallic conductor is erected which intercepts the waves from all stations passing over a given region. The function of the receiving system is to render intelligible to the senses the waves received, and also to separate the waves from different stations. This is the problem which the patent in suit meets, and Alexanderson was the first to do it. The method of the patent is to receive the signal in a circuit of practical and operative sharpness and to repeat the signal and again select, and so on, repeating and selecting as many times as may be necessary to obtain the desired result. Mr. Frank Waterman, the well known engineer, stated the operation of the Alexanderson system as follows: "In the Alexanderson patent the idea of transference of the received energy from one circuit to another is entirely abandoned. Alexanderson proceeds on the theory that the thing necessary to obtain the result is that the received signal should be selected in a circuit of such selectivity, in accordance with the then knowledge of the art, as was suitable and convenient for the purpose, that that signal should then be repeated without abstracting energy from the circuit in which the first selection occurs, and that the so selected prod |