tent of shallow water, is more properly limited by the points C and D. It might well be conceded, as appellant contends, that the A to B theory of the cove limits could not be sustained by the court, for an apportionment 525 upon that theory would result in cutting off several hundred feet of plaintiff's shore line from any access at all to water, navigable or not, thus infringing the dominant rule above stated. But it appears that he can secure both access to and proportionate frontage on the navigable water by the method prescribed in the Bigelow case if either C and D or C and E are adopted as the cove limits, and that all other shore owners within the cove, so limited, can be protected in similar rights. It also appears without dispute that in either such case the defendant's wharf is wholly outside of the lines connecting plaintiff's shore with the line of navigability. Thus it appears that, unless some other plan is absolutely required by law, plaintiff's riparian rights are not invaded by defendant's structure, and the judgment merely dismissing the complaint is right ultimately, whatever may have been the reasons inducing it. Some, though not very earnest, contention is made in favor of E and A as cove boundaries, from which would result a division line between plaintiff and defendant on which the wharf does infringe slightly; but to this arrangement there is the objection that no apportionment to all the shore owners is possible by straight lines, hence it is not to be adopted in presence of any other feasible theory. Appellant also contends that the true cove is limited by the points E and G, but that lines bisecting the shore angle at each of these points would intersect before reaching navigable water, so that no navigable water line would exist for apportionment under the rule of the Bigelow case; hence he argues that a method should be adopted which has sometimes, ex necessitate, been applied to shut-in or bottle-shaped coves, where direct lines could not be drawn from all parts of the shore to navigable water. That method is to draw a base line across the entrance or mouth of the cove, apportion that base line proportionately among the shore owners, and then run lines from the termini of each owner's portion of the base line out 526 to the line of navigability, which is divided proportionately to the respective shares of the base line: Rust v. Boston M. Corp., 6 Pick. 158, 168; Walker v. Boston etc. R. R., 3 Cush. 1, 24; Wonson v. Wonson, 14 Allen, 71; Tappan v. Boston W. P. Co., 157 Mass. 24, 29, 31 N. E. 703, 16 L. R. A. 353. While in some instances it may be necessary to the protection of riparian owners' rights to depart from the method of apportionment and delimitation prescribed by the Bigelow case, we have no inclination to vary or obscure that rule, unless such variation is necessary to substantial equality. The evidence fails to show any such necessity here. By adopting either C and D, or A and D, or C and E as the limits of the cove, a substantially equitable apportionment can be made by the rule of that case. Besides, there is nothing in the testimony to warrant the view that G can with any propriety be considered a headland or terminus of this cove, while the maps in evidence indicate quite the converse. From them it appears to be the very center or head of the indentation into the shore. We cannot avoid the conclusion that the record wholly fails to show that the trial court's decision was erroneous. By the Court. Judgment affirmed. Every Riparian or Littoral Owner has a right of access to the navigable waters in front of his land and a right to connect his land with such water by means of landings, wharves and piers: See the monographic note to Miller v. Mendenhall, 19 Am. St. Rep. 231; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 102 Am. St. Rep. 865; San Francisco Sav. Union v. Petroleum etc. Co., 144 Cal. 134, 103 Am. St. Rep. 72, and cases cited in the cross-reference note thereto. Rules for apportioning the rights of neighboring littoral owners where the shore line is irregular are discussed in Blodgett etc. Lumber Co. v. Peters, 87 Mich. 498, 24 Am. St. Rep. 175. See, in this connection, Scheifert v. Briegel, 90 Minn. 125, 101 Am. St. Rep. 399. INDEX TO THE NOTES. Bigamy, husband and wife are not competent to testify against each second or bigamous wife, when may testify against her husband, 769. Boundaries, streets and highways as, 238. Carriers, connecting and initial constituting a single system, lia- connecting and initial, joint liability of, 608. connecting and initial, respective liabilities of for baggage, 612. connecting, liability of initial carrier for, 604. connecting, liability of initial carrier of passengers for, 610. contracts by to deliver goods beyond their own lines, 606. 607. initial, agreement for through transportation by, 606. initial, American rule as to liability of, 605. initial and connecting, concurrent negligence of, joint liability, initial, contracting to carry goods beyond their own line, lia- initial, English rule regarding liability of, 604. initial, liability of where damage results from defective condi- initial, stipulation limiting liability of to their own lines, 612. passengers, respective liabilities of initial and connecting car- through transportation, initial carriers, when deemed to have through transportation of passengers, special contracts for, 610, 611. through transportation of passengers, what contracts deemed to import, 610. Coercion. See Criminal Law. Criminal Law, coercion as an excuse for crime, what amounts to, coercion as an excuse or defense for crime, general rule, 721. coercion as an excuse or defense in prosecutions for murder or coercion as an excuse or defense in prosecutions for robbery, 721. a criminal prosecution, 727. coercion of a wife by her husband, presumption of, 726. coercion of child by parent as a defense in a criminal prosecu. coercion of employé or agent by his principal as a defense in a criminal prosecution, 727. coercion, statutes making it an excuse for crime, 723. coercion, time and place of, 724. fear, effect of as a defense or in mitigation of crime, 723. Damages. See Vendor and Purchaser. Definition of estovers, 306. of precatory trusts, 508. of precatory words, 500, 501. of servitudes, 240. of trusts, 508. Deputy. See Officers. Equity, relief in from orders and decrees in probate, 640-647. classification of, 306. clearing land for cultivation, 308. common of estovers, 306. customs in respect to and their force and effect, 306. definition of, 306. new improvements, tenant may not cut timber for, 308. remedies of tenant for denial of right of by landlord, 311. Estovers, time when timber may be cut, 307. trees, when may not be cut, 307. uses for which right of may be exercised, 308. Executors and Administrators, accounts of, relief in equity from Guardian and Ward, accounts, relief in equity from orders settling, 641. Highways, abutting property owner, compensation of for additional abutting property owner, rights of in, 237, 238. additional servitude in, allowing tracks to be used by another additional servitude in, bicycle paths are not, 240. additional servitude in, change of county road into city street additional servitude in, change of motive power of railway does additional servitude in, change of track of railway from narrow additional servitude in, commercial railways are, 253-256. erty owner to, 242. additional servitude in, elevated street railways, when consti- additional servitude in, electric lighting system, poles and wires additional servitude in, electric railways, when constitute, 244-246. 240. additional servitude in, market places are, 240. additional servitude in, new mode of travel, when does not im additional servitude in, laying additional tracks of a railway, additional servitude in, obstructions which constitute, 241. additional servitude in, poles and wires for telegraph and tele- additional servitude in, reservoirs in, when are not, 240. additional servitude in, shade trees, removal of, whether con- additional servitude in, sewers, drains, and culverts, whether con- additional servitude in, street railways, change from single to Am. St. Rep., Vol. 106-64 |