business habits. No other ground of estrangement is known to exist except that which he himself stated to Blackstone when he said "his children were such he didn't know whether the Lord wanted to have anything to do with them," and that, because they did not accept his views about faith, the Lord had bid him to leave them to themselves. He regarded himself as in business for the Lord, rather than for himself, and said he was directed by the Lord to give his money to the two institutions to which his will devoted his entire estate.

From this glance at the facts, it is apparent that the general sanity of the testator is not denied. Upon all subjects except one he seems to have acted as other men act, and to have entertained opinions such as many admittedly sane men hold. The alleThe allegation is that upon one subject he was under a delusion which for many years controlled his actions, and which led him at last to disinherit his children. The point is a narrow one. His views about faith were extreme, but they are substantially held by many persons whose sanity is not questioned. His belief in the possibility of cures as the result of the exercise of faith on the part of patient or healer, or both together, is a belief practically identical with that held by many other persons who reject all remedies when sick, and rely on what is variously called "faith cure," "mind cure," "Christian science," or the like. The question is not so much what he believed on these subjects, as what effect had his be liefs on his mental condition. Did his be liefs unsettle his judgment, and leave him under the influence of a delusion that usurped the place of reason and controlled his will? If this was his condition, then, as to this subject, he did not have a "sound disposing mind and memory," although as to every other subject his soundness be conceded.

A

Partial insanity, is enough to defeat a will when the will is the result of such mental condition. Williams, Ex'rs, 33; Tawney v. Long, 76 Pa. St. 106. By partial insanity is meant, not some intermediate stage in the development of mental derangement, but disturbance at some particular point not involving the mind at any other point. person thus affected is said to be under the influence of a delusion. Cassoday, Wills, 467. A will made under the influence of such delusion is the result of the peculiar form of insanity generally spoken of as partial insanity; and, when the fact is clear that the will was so made, its probate should be refused. What shall amount to a delusion is not easy of statement. Redfield speaks of a delusion as "a creation purely of the imagination, such as no sane man could believe." Redf. Wills, 67. In Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence (chapter 62) it is described as "a belief in the existence of something that does not exist." The

proof of the existence and influence of delusion in any particular case may be found in the surrender of the will to imaginary directions regarded by the victim as the directions of God, or of spirits, speaking to him from another world, or to the control of an impulse due to an imaginary state of facts. The mental processes of such a person may be orderly and logical, but they rest on false assumptions. A leading case on this subject is Dew v. Clark, 3 Addams, Ecc. 79, in which Sir John Nicholl distinguished between partial and general insanity, and showed that, where partial insanity was said to exist, this did not mean that a man could be partly sane and partly insane on the same subject, but that he could be insane on one or more subjects, and sane on all others. In such a case, action upon one subject might be the result of an insane delusion, while upon another subject action might be sane and well considered. Partial insanity, according to Dr. Hammond, is a derangement of one or more faculties of the mind, which prevents freedom of action. Ham. Insan. 9. The question in any given case is therefore whether the act under investigation was done upon consideration of existing facts, or under the influence of a delusion that controlled the will of the doer, and destroyed his freedom of action. We think the learned trial judge fully comprehended this distinction, and that his charge, taken as a whole, presented it fairly to the jury. There are sentences, such as form the basis of the third and seventh assignments of error, that, standing alone, would be wanting in clearness and definitiveness of statement; but, when the charge is considered together, it cannot be said to be misleading. In summing up his discussion of the capacity of the testator, he said to the jury that they were not to decide upon the soundness of the peculiar views entertained by him, "but simply whether or not they so impressed his mind-became, as it were, incorporated into his mental constitution-as to control his judgment in regard to the use and disposition of his property, so as to prevent his perceiving or appreciating the ordinary duty he owes to his family, or their claims upon him as a father in that respect." He then added that if they found "this will was made under a controlling influence," such as he had described in his charge as the result of delusion, they should find against the will. On the other hand, he said to them, if the evidence did not fairly lead to the conclusion that the testator's mind was overpowered and controlled by his peculiar views, so as to prevent him from exercising a reasonable or rational judgment in relation to the disposition of his property, their verdict should be in favor of the will, "however absurd, ridiculous, or unfounded you may individually or collectively believe his peculiar views on faith and its effects to have been." The distinction was

clearly taken between the absurdity of the views or delusions to which the testator might hold and their effect in overturning his judgment and directing his conduct; and the jury was told, in effect, that the views or delusions were in themselves harmless, unless they had unsettled the testator's mind, and controlled his will in the disposition of his property. This was a correct statement of the rule, and the assignments of error to the charge of the learned judge are not sustained.

The tenth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error are more troublesome. The examination of the witnesses was conducted in a manner that was calculated to lead the jury to lose sight of the distinction on which the case rested, viz. the distinction between general and partial insanity. General mental disturbance was not alleged. In fact, sanity upon all subjects save one was admitted. The testator was competent to make a will, unless he was subject to a delusion that so dominated his judgment as to render him insensible to the considerations that controlled the action of persons not so afflicted. The questions for the jury were therefore: First. Was John Trich subject to a delusion amounting to partial insanity? Second. What was the character of his delusion, and to what did it relate? And, third, did it control his judgment, and direct a disposition of his property made by his last will and testament to any, and if so to what, extent? His will provided for the payment of his debts, for the marking of his grave by suitable head and foot stones, for the support of his wife during her life, for the sale of his real estate, and the execution of deeds therefor, by his executor, and the collection into one fund of the proceeds of his entire estate. All this is in accordance with a very common practice, and shows a very clear knowledge of the extent and character of his estate, and a recognition of his duty to his wife. It is only in his treatment of his children that his alleged delusion appears. He discards them, and gives his entire estate to two institutions alleged to be dependent upon the faith of their proprietors for their daily income. Was this disposition of his estate the result of a controlling delusion? This is the question upon which the contestants must stand. The course of the examination lost sight of this. The question put to Tilbrook was whether the testator "was competent to make a will and dispose of his property." The learned judge felt that this was not the proper question, and interposed the query whether the witness ought not rather to be asked whether the testator was sane or insane. But both forms of the question are subject to the same objection. They overlook the distinction between general insanity and the existence of an insane delusion. The witness Blackstone felt the difficulty of correctly answering the same general question. He said that the testator was competent to make a will pleasing v.30A.no.21-67

to himself. He was then asked if the testator's "ideas and opinions would or would not affect his judgment in the disposal of his property." The learned judge correctly excluded the question, for the reason, no doubt, that the fact that the judgment is controlled by one's "ideas and opinions" is an evidence of sanity rather than of the existence of insane delusion. The witness Codville was asked the same general question, whether John Trich "was fit and competent to make a will in February, 1882, disposing of his property." It was not denied that he was fit and competent except as to such subjects or persons as might come within the range of his delusion; yet the witnesses were allowed to give an opinion that he was not fit or competent in the same manner that would have been allowable if general insanity had been alleged. The learned counsel for the contestants hold that the case of Wogan v. Small, 11 Serg. & R. 141, was an authority for this line of examination; but that case is not in point. The allegation there made was that the testator was incompetent because of general insanity, and his general mental condition was therefore a proper subject of inquiry. Even in such a case the better form of question is that suggested by the learned judge of the court below on the examination of Tilbrook. The subject under investigation being the existence of general insanity, the question ought to be directed to the mental condition of the testator. Testamentary capacity is presumed, and the burden of proof rests on him who denies its existence in any given case. Grubbs v. McDonald, 91 Pa. St. 237. When the presence of insanity is shown, the presumption shifts, and incapacity is a legal conclusion. But, to show insanity, the witnesses must first testify to facts from which they reach the conclusion that the testator is insane. They may then give their opinions about his mental state or condition, and the general question whether he was sane or insane is proper. Dickinson v. Dickinson, 61 Pa. St. 401; Tit low v. Titlow, 54 Pa. St. 216; Shaver v. McCarthy, 110 Pa. St. 339, 5 Atl. 614; Elcessor v. Elcessor, 146 Pa. St. 359, 23 Atl. 230. Here general insanity was not alleged. The incapacity, if any existed, grew out of the existence of a delusion resulting in partial insanity. Was his last will, so far as it affected his children, the result of the peculiar delusion to which he was subject? Did he omit to make any provision for them for reasons resting on an existing state of facts, such as might influence the action of a sane man? Or did he overlook their relation to him and his own parental obligation under the influence of an insane impulse or the direction of an imaginary communication from God or from the spirits of the dead? There was evidence before the jury from which they might find the existence of a delusion, and that his children were disregarded under its influence; but whether their verdict

did in fact rest on such of the evidence as was properly before them, or was influenced by evidence that should have been excluded, it is impossible now to determine. We are compelled, therefore, although with great reluctance, to send this case back for another trial, in which the investigation may be confined to the questions on which the contest must rest, viz.: Was the testator the victim of a delusion? Did this delusion affect his position towards his children, and render him insensible to his parental obligations? Was so much of his will as gave his estate to the two institutions named in it, instead of to his own children, the result of his delusion? The judgment is reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.

STANTON MANUF'G CO. v. McFARLAND et al.

(Court of Chancery of New Jersey. Jan. 22, 1895.)

ASSIGNMENT. OF PATENT FAILURE TO RECORD BONA FIDE PURCHASER-EFFECT OF ASSIGN

MENT-SUBSEQUENT IMPROVEMENTS.

1. A party who, from a strict observation, knows that a company is manufacturing an article which is patented, and that the patentee is a member of the company; declares that he took an assignment of an improvement on the patent because he found that there was no assignment whatever on record, and because he thought the company had not kept its contract with the patentee,-has knowledge of such facts as, if followed to their legitimate conclusion, would have led to the discovery of the unrecorded assignment under which the company claimed title, and cannot claim to have been a purchaser in good faith.

2. An assignment of an original patent, together with and "including any and all improvements for or about or in the same or pertaining to the art," carries with it all such subsequent inventions and patents as the assignor and patentee, in his application, distinctly calls "improvements.'

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Bill by the Stanton Manufacturing Company against William McFarland and others. Decree for complainant.

Francis C. Lowthorp, for complainant. James Buchanan, for defendants.

BIRD, V. C. The bill in this case is filed by the complainant to restrain the defendant McFarland from the use of a patent for manufacturing what is called "naphtha soap." The complainant shows that on the 1st day of December, 1891, one of the defendants (E. W. Stanton) was the owner of a patent, which he had obtained from the government, securing to him a secret formula for the manufacture of naphtha soap, and that on that day a company was formed, of which Stanton was a member, and that such company was formed for the express purpose of manufacturing and vending this soap. Such company was styled "The Stanton Manufacturing Company." One of the conditions upon which the company was formed was the offer upon the part of Stan

ton to sell and assign to the company his said patent. It does not appear that there was any other purpose in view than the manufacture of this soap. He at once made such an assignment. The assignment so made by Stanton to the company contained a very sweeping clause, as follows: "All rights and formulas which I have, or may have, pertaining to or about the combination or article now known as 'Stanton's naphtha soap,' and the making, mixture, and composition thereof, and any and all parts thereof, including all letters patent of the United States now granted or applied for the same, or that may hereafter be applied for in the United States of America, including any and all improvements for or about or in the same, or pertaining to the art of naphtha soap making." The company at once leased premises, and commenced the manufacture of soap, with the use of the appliances, and according to the formulas, of the Stanton patent. On the 31st of October, 1893, Stanton filed an application or claim for an improvement in his patent, or for a patent for an additional or other discovery. Whatever this may be,-whether an improvement or otherwise,-in my judgment, it is included in the assignment above referred to. In May, 1893, a further patent was granted to him, upon the application last referred to. This last patent, Stanton assigned to the defendant McFarland. The assignment of the original patent to the Stanton Manufacturing Company was not recorded at the time of the assignment of the last patent to McFarland. But the complainant claims that McFarland had notice of the assignment to the company, or of such facts as deprive him of the rights of a bona fide purchaser. This statement involves the principal point in controversy.

McFarland and Stanton had married cousins, and were intimately acquainted for over 40 years. They frequently visited each other, so often as two or three times a year. Stanton was so poorly supplied with funds that he was unable to pay the fees of the patent office, and the charges of his solicitor for procuring the last patent. These, being $606.15, were paid by McFarland as the entire consideration for the assignment to him. Besides this financial embarrassment, Stanton was, and had been for some time, physically disabled, to such an extent as to induce McFarland to make the charge that when the original patent was assigned to the company he was disqualified or incapacitated to such an extent as to render the transaction voidable. This feature of the case is worthy of no little consideration. Although not very much is said re specting it, yet I think it cannot be controverted but that it was Mr. Stanton's condition that brought him into nearer relations, with respect to these patents, to McFarland, than he otherwise would have come. McFarland's testimony alone is sufficient to make this clear. Hence, besides their inti

macy for many years, McFarland's sympathy was aroused in behalf of Stanton, and Stanton's necessities quickened his confidence in McFarland. These thoughts will help us to a better understanding of what transpired between Stanton and McFarland. As the application for the improvement in the patent was filed in October, 1892, according to McFarland's testimony, Stanton opened negotiations with him for the sale and assignment of the improvement to him in March, 1893, which negotiations were pending until the 25th day of May following. The circumstances and facts which go to establish notice upon the part of McFarland are the relations between him and Stanton, the knowledge that McFarland had of the use which the company was making of the machinery, tools, implements, and formula first invented by Stanton, and the direct admission of McFarland himself of knowledge of the original of the original assignment. While it is difficult to believe that persons so intimate as McFarland and Stanton were, met as often as they did, considering the financial stress under which the latter was laboring, without his freely communicating to the former the fact that he had obtained a patent which he regarded as valuable, and that he had formed a company for the purpose of determining that fact, yet perhaps no judgment has ever been pronounced where such a condition alone has been presented to the court. However, this consideration may properly have an impor tant bearing, when other facts are brought under review.

The intimate relations of these parties being considered, it becomes quite impossible to say that McFarland did not have actual information from Stanton himself of all the principal facts which resulted in the formation of the company, and the assignment of the patent to him, after his admission that he went with a son of Stanton to the plant where they were manufacturing their soap, and where all the machinery was, examining the plant and the machinery, though this examination may have been ever so slight. I think every one would reject the assertion of ignorance upon this point on the part of McFarland, from the circumstances surrounding this branch of the case, if he himself had not positively sworn that he never knew anything of such an assignment. And one is almost inclined to believe that his statement under oath must have been made with some technical reservation under which he justifies the statement, for he has been engaged in manufacturing operations all his business life. This company was styled "The Stanton Manufacturing Company." I think no one would believe him for an instant if he were to say that he did not know that Stanton, his friend, was the patentee, nor if he were to say that he did not know that the company who owned this plant and who was manufacturing this soap was not the Stan

ton Manufacturing Company, of which his friend was a member, nor if he should say that the other members of this company had engaged in this enterprise without in some way securing an interest in the patent which protected them in their investment, and in the enjoyment of the manufactured product. His visit to the plant with a son of Stanton, and the other circumstances above narrated, together with what follows, I think, show that he had notice of such facts as to put him on his guard, and to bring this case fully within that of Auburn Button Co. v. Silvester, 79 Hun, 611, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1140. The conclusion just arrived at is especially enforced in the light of the statement of McFarland that this company had imposed upon Stanton. His own language is that "I thought Mr. Stanton had been ill treated,that the parties he was with had not kept the contract." He also says that he went into this business for his own benefit, "but that incidentally it would help Stanton some." Fell says: "I said to him then that we had an agreement which I thought entitled my company to the patent,-an agreement with Mr. Stanton,-and he said he knew all about the agreement; that that was one of the principal reasons he had gone into the business at all; that he had plenty business of his own, and it was only because he thought Mr. Stanton had been treated wrong. ly he had gone into the soap business. He said Mr. Stanton had applied to him many times before to take hold of the business, but that he had always refused, but that when this agreement, and the reasons, were laid before him, he had a talk with Mr. Stanton; he came to the conclusion that Mr. Stanton ought to be protected, and that he was going to protect him. He said he had the matter fully looked into by competent legal authority, and that he had been advised that the patent was all right." With this full admission of McFarland, and the broad statement of Fell as to the manner in which McFarland enlarged upon the matter, before me, I cannot avoid deciding that McFarland had such clear, full, and direct information of circumstances, facts, and existing conditions as to put him upon inquiry, and that he could not neglect such inquiry, and claim to be a purchaser in good faith.

But, in addition to this, that which took place between McFarland and one Woodruff and one Fell, when regarded in the light of what has already been said, strongly corroborates the conclusions already expressed. As McFarland took this assignment on the 25th day of May, 1893, he moved to his summer home, at Point Pleasant, on the Atlantic coast, about the 1st of July. There he met Stanton and his wife, who remained with McFarland until about the 1st of October. A very few days after their so meeting, Stanton handed to McFarland a bundle of papers, saying, in the language of McFarland, "He thought I ought to have them." He

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Be

says that they were having an interview, but that nothing was said in the interview which led Stanton to go for the papers, and give them to him. The inference is, from his statement, that he was not enough concerned at this time to examine the papers so handed to him, or to inquire as to their nature or contents until a day or two afterwards. then discovered that in the bundle of papers was a copy of the assignment of the original patent to the complainant. He swears that this was the first that he knew of such an assignment. I cannot but remark that this delay, for a day or two, in ascertaining the contents of the bundle of papers so handed to him, is not agreeable to the habits of ordinarily prudent or cautious business men. I cannot explain this indifference in any other way than by the conclusion that McFarland well understood, in a general way, the contents of the papers so handed to him, although he might never have seen the identical papers before that time. And it is of no small consequence that, while the defendant McFarland was called upon to produce all of the papers in that bundle, his counsel answered the call by saying that they had been so mingled with other papers by him that he was unable to produce them. sides these observations, a reference to this bundle of papers is here made for the purpose of showing more clearly the reason that McFarland gives for the language which he made use of in his interview with Woodruff and Fell. Woodruff called upon McFarland, at Point Pleasant, for the purpose of learning from him what knowledge he had of the rights of the complainant when he took the assignment of the improvement from Stanton. He says: "I asked Mr. McFarland if he knew of this agreement between Mr. Stanton and the company, and he said he did. He said, before he had anything to do with it, he sent a man to Washington, to. see if it was recorded there, but he found no record of any agreement there; so after that he went ahead, and got the patent." In answer to a direct question, the witness says that McFarland told him he knew of it before he took the assignment. The witness Fell testifies to the same, in substance. The explanation by McFarland of these direct and emphatic statements above made to the witnesses Woodruff and Fell is that he knew of the agreement or assignment to the company of the original patent at the time of his interview with them, because of having read a copy of such agreement or assignment, which was in the bundle of papers referred to before his interview with them. Having read such copy, he was enabled to say that he did know all about it, not meaning thereby to say that he knew all about it before he had taken the assignment of the improvement. I am constrained to think that if McFarland had such knowledge of the rights of other parties, and of the necessity, for his own protection, of seeing that

the record was free, when he said, "Yes, I knew all about it," he would have added, "but I have just learned of it from reading a copy of such agreement handed me by Stanton since the 1st of July." But there is no expression of surprise upon the part of McFarland, to any one, when he learned the contents of this copy of the agreement or assignment to the complainant, which would have been most natural upon the part of every business man. But the absence of any expression of surprise upon his part when he reads for the first time, as he says, a copy of this assignment, or of dissatisfaction with the conduct of Stanton, in concealing from him the fact of the assignment, is all accounted for by his unequivocal admission, as well as by the testimony of both Woodruff and Fell, that he engaged in this enterprise for the purpose of helping Mr. Stanton, and because he thought that the company had treated Stanton badly, and had broken their contract with him.

It is contended upon the part of the defendant McFarland that, if the point above discussed be decided against him, nevertheless the judgment of the court must be in his favor, because, under the law, the invention which was secured by the letters patent to McFarland by virtue of the agreement and assignment of Stanton, dated May 25, 1893, is not embraced in the agreement and assignment to the complainant company, dated December 1, 1891. This argument proceeds upon the theory that the last invention is entirely distinct from the first, and has nothing whatever to do with it, in principle or practice, except in name. is admitted that the authorities are very comprehensive in their scope in this respect; so much so, indeed, that, whenever the invention produced may be regarded as at all being reasonably connected with or flowing from that which already had practical form and substance, it will pass under such an agreement or assignment. Manufacturing Co. v. Gill, 32 Fed. 697; Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 226; Annin v. Wren, 44 Hun, 352; Continental Windmill Co. v. Empire Windmill Co., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 428, Fed. Cas. No. 3,142; Manufacturing Co. v. Dice, 105 Ill. 649. On the other hand, it is urged that when the invention is an entirely new production of the mind, and in no way springing from or embraced in the thoughts or conceptions which have already been put in shape or form, and recognized by the government as the separate property of the individual, they cannot or will not pass by any previous assignment. This very reasonable view, I think, is admitted by counsel for the complainant. Manufacturing Co. v. Stebbins, 4 Fed. 445; Bunker v. Stevens, 26 Fed. 245; Appleton v. Bacon, 2 Black, 699; Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 23 Wall. 530. Admitting the law to be as stated, I am spared the necessity of following counsel in his very able argument, in his efforts to convince the