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the salary of the judges of the eastern and southern districts of New York at $4,000. The statistics furnished by the Solicitor of the Treasury, and embodied in the last annual report of the Treasury Department, show that these judges in the city of New York do more than quadruple the work done by the judge in the district of California; and no one, I think, will claim that the expense of living in the city of New York is less than the expense of living in the city of San Francisco. There is evidently no propriety in exacting from the judges in the district of New York quadruple the labor performed by the judges in California, and yet allowing them but four fifths of the pay. The salaries paid to the judges of these two districts, who are men of the highest character for talent and industry, should bear some relation to the salaries paid to other judicial officers in the city of New York; and yet the ward justices in that city are paid at the present time $6,000 per annum, or more than the judges of the United States residing there, and more than this bill proposes to give them.

Mr. WASHBURNE, of Illinois. I ask the gentleman from New York [Mr. CHURCHILL] to yield to me for a few minutes.

Mr. CHURCHILL.

I will do so.

Mr.

Mr. WASHBURNE, of Illinois. Speaker, only a year or two ago Congress adjusted the salaries of all these United States judges upon what was deemed a fair, just, and equitable basis.

Mr. SPALDING. Only at the last session of Congress.

Mr. WASHBURNE, of Illinois. Only at the last session we adopted what was intended as a definite settlement of this matter; yet now it is proposed in this special bill to raise the salaries of the district judges in the city of New York. I have no doubt that these two gentlemen, Judge Blatchford and Judge Benedict, are good judges, and perhaps their salaries are not adequate, but I do protest against this special legislation. As the gentleman has spoken in regard to the amount of duty performed by these judges, I undertake to say that the judge of the northern district of Illinois, who gets precisely the same salary as these judges in New York now get, works as many hours as they; and I do not know any reason why a discrimination should be made between them. If these two district judges are to have their salaries raised, I insist that the salaries of other judges who have just as much to do

should also be increased.

Mr. CHURCHILL. In answer to what has been said by the gentleman from Illinois, I will inform him that while during the last year eight hundred and seventy-three suits in which the United States was a party were commenced in the southern district of New York, there were only two hundred and eighty-two in the district in Illinois to which the gentleman has referred. This bill, instead of requiring these judges to hold court as it is held by the judges in the State of Illinois, requires that they shall sit daily during the year, with the exception of Sundays and holidays and the summer vacation. The amount of labor of these judges is very great, and it is but fair they should have the inconsiderable increase of salary proposed for them by this bill. I call the previous question.

The previous question was seconded and the main question ordered.

The amendment of Mr. STEVENS, of Pennsylvania, was agreed to; there being on a division-ayes 56, noes 42.

The remaining amendments were agreed to. The bill, as amended, was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time; and being engrossed, it was accordingly read the third time, and passed.

PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICERS, ETC. Mr. BOUTWELL, from the Committee on the Judiciary, reported back House bill No. 1131, regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases for the protection of officers and agents of the Government, and for the better defense

of the Treasury against unlawful claims, with
sundry amendments.

The bill was read. The first section provides
that all the provisions of section eight of the
act of July 28, 1866, entitled "An act to pro-
tect the revenue, and for other purposes," and
the forms and modes by that section and the
twelfth section of the act of March 3, 1863,
therein referred to, prescribed for prosecuting
suits, withholding executions, and paying judg
ments against officers of the United States, or
other persons engaged in executing the acts
relative to captured and abandoned property,
shall extend and be applied to all suits and
proceedings (except those in behalf of the
United States) which have been brought, or
may hereafter be brought, against any officer
or agent of the Government, civil or military,
for acts done during the rebellion while acting
by virtue or under color of his office or employ-
ment; and every defendant in such suit or pro-
ceeding having made full defense thereto, and
having notified the Attorney General of the
United States to appear and defend the same,
shall be entitled to the full benefit and protec-
tion provided in said section for officers and
agents of the Government engaged in the col-
lection of the public revenue; and any de-
fendant being aggrieved by any order or direc-
tion, certificate, ruling, or judgment of any
court made or had in any such proceeding,
may except thereto and appeal therefrom to
the Supreme Court of the United States, and
have the questions arising there heard and
determined.

of private property taken by such person as an officer or agent of the United States, in virtue or under color of the act aforesaid, or the act approved July 2, 1864, entitled "An act in addition to the several acts concerning commercial intercourse between loyal and insurrectionary States, and to provide for the collection of captured and abandoned property, and the prevention of frauds in States declared in insurrection," the defendant may and shall plead or allege in bar thereof that such act was done or omitted to be done by him as an officer or agent of the United States in the administration of one of the acts of Congress aforesaid, or in virtue or under color thereof, and such plea or allegation shall be, and shall be deemed and adjudged in law to be, a complete and conclusive bar to any such suit or action.

The SPEAKER stated that the morning hour had expired, and the bill went over until

to-morrow.

LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. WASHBURNE, of Illinois. I am directed by the Committee on Appropriations to report back the amendments of the Senate to the legislative appropriation bill, and to move that they be referred to the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and the report of the committee be ordered to be printed.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. WASHBURNE, of Illinois. I give notice that I expect to-morrow after the morn

up and act on these amendments. It is a very long bill, and we ought to get it into the hands of a conference committee at the earliest practicable moment.

PURCHASE OF ALASKA.

Mr. BANKS. It was my intention, Mr. Speaker, before moving to go into the Committee of the Whole, to move there be an evening session for debate, but on the representation of the minority committee I am induced to forego that purpose.

Mr. ELIOT. I wish to offer an amendment. The SPEAKER. That will be in order in the committee.

The second section provides that no actioning hour to move to go into committee to take or suit shall be maintained in any court of the United States, or of any State thereof, in the name or in the behalf or interest of any alien, against the United States, or any person, for or on account of any act done or omitted to be done by such person as an officer or agent of the United States, in the administration of the act of Congress entitled "An act to provide for the collection of abandoned property and for the prevention of frauds in insurrectionary districts within the United States," and approved March 12, 1863, or of the act of Congress entitled "An act in addition to the several acts concerning commercial intercourse between loyal and insurrectionary States, and to provide for the collection of captured and abandoned property, and the prevention of frauds in States declared in insurrection," approved July 2, 1864, or in virtue or under color of the acts of Congress aforesaid, or any other acts of Congress relative to the said insurrectionary States, or to persons or prop erty therein; and to any action or suit which may have been heretofore, or shall hereafter be, instituted by any lien against the United States, or any such person as aforesaid, on account of any act done or omitted to be done as aforesaid, the defendant may and shall plead or allege in bar thereof that such act was done, or omitted to be done, in the administration of one of the acts of Congress aforesaid, or in virtue or under color thereof, and such plea or allegation shall be, and shall be deemed and adjudged in law to be, a complete and conclusive bar to any such suit or action.

Mr. WASHBURNE, of Illinois. I hope there will be an evening session. If this goes over until to-morrow I shall move to postpone it and take up the amendments of the Senate to the legislative appropriation bill.

The SPEAKER. There are several members not upon the committee who would be willing to speak this evening. The Chair has the names of ten gentlemen who wish to speak on this question.

Mr. BANKS. I move that the committee take a recess from four and a half o'clock until half past seven o'clock p. m.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. BANKS moved that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on the special order.

The motion was agreed to.

The House accordingly resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole on the state of the ceeded to the cousideration of the special order, Union, (Mr. GARFIELD in the chair,) and probeing House bill No. 1096, making an appropriation of money to carry into effect the treaty with Russia of March 30, 1867..

Mr. BANKS addressed the committee for an in the Appendix.] hour and a half. [His speech will be published

At four o'clock and forty-five minutes p. m. the committee took a recess until half past seven o'clock p. m.

The third and concluding section provides that it is hereby declared to have been the true intent and meaning of the act approved March 12, 1863, entitled An act to provide for the collection of abandoned property and for the prevention of frauds in insurrectionary districts within the United States," that the remedy given in cases of seizure made under said act, by preferring claim in the Court of Claims, should be exclusive, precluding the owner of any property taken by agents of the Treasury Department as abandoned or captured property in virtue or under color of said act from suit at common law, or any other mode of redress whatever, before any court or tribunal other than said Court of Claims; and in all cases in which suits of trespass, replevin, detinue, or any other form of action may have been brought and are now pending, or shall hereafter be The House then, under the order of the brought against any person for or on accountHouse, resolved itself into the Committee of the

EVENING SESSION.

At half past seven o'clock p. m. the Speaker took the chair, and stated that in the absence of the chairman of the Committee of the Whole, Mr. GARFIELD, he would ask Mr. ORTH to act in his place.

Whole on the state of the Union, (Mr. ORTH in the chair,) and resumed the consideration of the special order, being House bill No. 1096, making an appropriation of money to carry into effect the treaty with Russia of March 30, 1867. The CHAIRMAN stated that Mr. LOUGHRIDGE was entitled to the floor.

Mr. LOUGHRIDGE. Imove the following amendment in the nature of a substitute: Whereas the President of the United States, on the 30th of March, 1867, entered into a treaty with the Emperor of Russia, by the terms of which it was stipulated that in consideration of the cession by the Emperor of Russia to the United States of certain territory therein described, the United States should pay to the Emperor of Russia the sum of $7,200,000 in coin; and whereas it was further stipulated in said treaty that the United States shall accept of such cession, and that certain inhabitants of said territory shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights and immunities of citizens of the United States; and whereas the subjects thus embraced in the stipulations of said treaty are among the subjects which by the Constitution of the United States are submitted to the power of Congress, and over which Congress has exclusive jurisdiction; and it being for such reason necessary that the consent of Congress should be given to the said treaty before the same can have full force and effect; having taken into consideration the said treaty, and approving of the stipulations therein. To the end that the same may be carried into effect: Therefore,

SEC. 1. Be it enacted, That the assent of Congress is hereby given to the stipulations of said treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will inform the gentleman it was the agreement that no business should be done this evening, but the session should be devoted to debate on the Alaska purchase.

Mr. LOUGHRIDGE. I give notice, then, I will offer it at the proper time.

Mr. PRUYN. Cannot he offer an amendment?

The CHAIRMAN. That is business, and it cannot be done under the order of the House.

Mr. LOUGHRIDGE. Mr. Chairman, in view of the circumstances under which this question is presented to the House it is one of very great importance, and one which demands our most serious consideration, and my great fear is that in the pressure of business it may not receive that careful consideration at our hands that its importance demands. I rise to discuss it fully impressed with my inability to do justice to the subject, and yet I cannot remain silent and feel that I have done my duty as one of the Representatives of the people upon this floor.

I shall leave the question of the physical character of this Territory and its value to others better informed than I am on that question. There is another question involved of far more importance, one before which the question of the value of this territory sinks into utter insignificance, a question a more important than which has never been discussed within these walls. That question, sir, is in relation to the rights, the powers, and the constitutional prerogatives of this House of Rep resentatives as one of the departments of this Government. That question is directly involved in this case, and to that I propose to direct my remarks; and so far as that question is concerned it makes no difference whether this territory is a worthless, frozen waste of eternal ice and snow, or whether it is a fertile, blooming, fruitful garden. Upon this question the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

has said but little in his remarks in favor of this bill, and I say in all candor that I am unable to gather from the report of the committee or from the speech of the chairman what the opinion of the committee or of the chairman is in relation to the extent of the treaty-making power as vested in the President, or in relation to the constitutional rights and prerogatives of the House in connection with treaties.

Did the President, in the purchase of this territory, the execution of an obligation purporting to bind the Government for the amount of the purchase money, and the taking possession of the territory without the consent of Congress, exceed his constitutional powers? If not, let the world understand it. If he did, then by all means we should at once repudiate his unauthorized assumptions of power; other

wise we will be bound by like acts in the future by adopting these without protest.

An attempt is being made, through the means of the treaty-making power, to concentrate almost all of the power of this Government in the hands of the President, subject only to the advice and consent of the Senate. And this proposition is, if adopted, a long step in that direction. I hesitate not to say, sir, that if, without any explanation, disaffirmance, or protest, we make this appropriation, we shall, so far as this House can do it, have surrendered practically all the power of the Government into the hands of the treaty-making department, and reduced this House to the position of an involuntary agent of that power with no discretion but to carry out its expressed will. That we are rapidly drifting in that direction it seems to me must be apparent to the most casual observer. By substituting a foreign Government or an Indian tribe in place of this House, on the principle claimed by the Executive, there is nothing within the whole scope of the legislative powers of the Government that cannot be done without the consent or intervention of this House. I defy any gentleman to point out a single act of legislation that cannot be done through and by the treatymaking power, if we admit that power to the extent claimed by the Executive.

Why, sir, but a few months since, through the means of this treaty-making power, eight hundred thousand acres of the most beautiful land on the continent has been transferred to the ownership of a private citizen without the consent of this House or the legislative department of the Government. And still more recently a vast section of our country, containing eight million acres, has been through this same means transferred from the Government to a private corporation, who thus become the absolute owners of this vast territory, equal in extent to the three States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island-and this not only without the consent but against the protestations of this House-and all this right in the face of the constitutional provision that "Congress shall have power to dispose of the territory belonging to the United States."

It is true this last transaction has not yet received the consent of the Senate, and it may

not.

This House in its new position as a petitioner or memorialist at the bar of the Senate may have sufficient influence with that body to prevent this consent being given. That this House still has the right of petition left to it is an exceedingly pleasant reflection; and I hope we shall at least insist upou retaining that right. I trust the Committee on Foreign Affairs will never consent to the surrender of the right of the House to petition the Senate in relation to treaties which rob the House of its prerogatives and the people of their rights.

But, sir, whether the Senate consent to this last outrage on the Constitution and the rights of the people or not makes no difference in the force of the illustration afforded by the case. The power is claimed and exercised. And, sir, under this power, if eight million acres of the public domain can be given away, every acre of it can in the same way be dis

posed of; and the power is not confined to the disposal of the public lands, but by this new legis lative power the President, the Senate, and the Indian tribes have complete control over the Treasury of the Government, and can by treaty appropriate money for any purpose, and to an unlimited extent.

To show that this absolute power, exercised through the instrumentality of Indian treaties, was not claimed originally by the Executive, but is the result of gradual encroachment upon the powers of Congress, I refer the House to the first instance of a treaty made by the Government with Indians. On the 7th of August, 1789, the President in a message to Congress said:

"If it should be the judgment of Congress that it would be most expedient to terminate all differences in the southern district, and to ay the foundation for future confidence by an amicable treaty with the Indian tribes in that quarter, I think proper to sug

gest the consideration of the expediency of instituting a temporary commission for that purpose, to consist of three persons, whose authority shall expire with the occasion.'

In consideration of the subject Congress passed an act authorizing the appointing three commissioners and giving them the power to treat with the Indians, and appropriating $20,000 for the purpose. The President appointed the commissioners and gave them instructions, which were communicated to the House, in which instructions the following language was used:

"You will please to observe that the whole sum that can be constitutionally expended is $20,000, and that the same cannot be extended."

Why could the commissioners not expend more than $20,000 constitutionally? Because Congress had not authorized it. Notice the language of President Washington:

"If it should be the judgment of Congress that it would be expedient"

*

tiate a treaty with the Indians" "I think proper to suggest," &c.

*

to nego

Here was a direct admission by the President of the power and control of Congress over the Indian question. The commissioners appointed not having effected anything, the House of Representatives, in March of the same year, passed the following resolution:

"Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law for holding a treaty to establish peace between the United States and the Wabash, Miami, and other nations of Indians northwest of the Ohio river; also for regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes and the mode of extinguishing their claim to lands within the United States."

This resolution shows that the House of Representatives then thought that they not only ought to provide by law for holding treaties with Indian tribes, but that Congress had the power to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians, and to prescribe the mode of extinguishing their claims to lands within the United States. Now, the treaty-making power regulates these matters and takes charge of and disposes of the public lands without any reference to Congress whatever and in defiance of the protests of this House.

Thus we see that this treaty-making power, from being an instrument or agent in the hands of Congress in connection with Indian affairs, as it was originally, has now, by a series of encroachments, come to exercise absolute and unlimited control, not only to regulate Indian affairs, but through them to exercise vast powers of legislation.

I have referred to the matter of Indian treaties for the purpose of showing the necessity of strictly restraining that department within its proper sphere, and for the purpose of illustrating the extent to which it will go if left unchecked. The question now before the House is one connected with a compact with a foreign Government, and is important not only on account of the political question involved, but because it is claimed that our good faith with a foreign Government will be broken in case we refuse to make the appropriation asked.

It is important and truly desirable that all our negotiations with foreign Governments should be so conducted as to preserve the honor and the good faith of the nation untar

nished, and to maintain a national reputation for inviolable fidelity. That this should be the reputation and character of our Government I doubt not is the sincere desire of every patriotic American citizen; and to this end, sir, I regard it as of the very first importance that there should be a perfect and settled understanding and agreement between the several coordinate branches of the Government as to the powers and the prerogatives of each in connection with questions involved in negotiations with foreign Powers, so that the action of the different departments may be in harmony. Otherwise we will be continually liable to be involved in difficulties.

Our Government has been in operation eightyone years, and it would seem reasonable to suppose that by this time questions of the importance of this should have been definitely settled. And yet, sir, from the history of this case, we are forced to recognize the fact that

==

Senate, made a treaty of purchase with Russia,
whereby that Power agreed to transfer to the
United States certain territory, in considera-
tion of which territory the United States agrees
to pay Russia $7,200,000 in gold. This treaty
was ratified by both Powers and ratifications
exchanged. And Congress is now asked to
enact a law for the appropriation of the neces-
sary money and to carry the treaty into effect.
Now, if the doctrine I have referred to, and
to which I object, is correct, and if without any
legislation by Congress the treaty is effective,
clothed with vitality and the law of the land,
then no laws of Congress are necessary, and
the treaty itself is a sufficient law for the appro-
priation of the money. Sir, the application to
Congress for the passage of a law for the appro-
priation of the money and to carry the treaty
into effect is a clear and conclusive demonstra-
tion of the error and the unsoundness of the
doctrine claimed by those who regard this ne-
gotiation as perfected and binding without the
action of Congress.

there is a very wide difference of opinion
between the House of Representatives and the
executive department as now organized in
relation to the extent of the treaty-making
power and the jurisdiction of this House, going
upon the presumption, as I do, that the House
still adheres to the doctrine first declared in
1795, and which it has never yet surrendered
by any declaration or act. From the course
of the Executive in this case, it is clearly his
opinion, and that of his advisers, that Congress
has, in no case, any discretion in relation to
passing the laws necessary to carry treaties into
effect. But that when a treaty is made by the
President and ratified by the Senate it is the
duty of this House then to recognize it as the
supreme law of the land, and to pass all laws
necessary to carry it into effect, whatever may
be the nature or character of its stipulations and
regardless of the views of Congress as to its
expediency or its bearing upon the public good.
That the President has the power, with the con-
sent of the Senate, to purchase territory from
foreign Powers, to any extent, and annex such The great error of those who deny the
territory to and make it a part of this Govern- necessity of congressional action in any case,
ment, and make all its inhabitants citizens of and the right of Congress to exercise its dis-
the United States, and to appropriate for such cretion in passing laws to carry treaties into
purpose such sums of money as he may see fit; effect, is, in regarding the treaty-making power
that this may be done by secret treaty, without as granted to the President, with the advice of
any authority or consent from Congress, and the Senate, as unlimited and absolute in its
that after such treaty is consummated Con- character. In an absolute monarchy or an
gress has no control whatever over the matter, empire, where the power of the ruler is un-
but must, without question or hesitation, appro-limited, the treaty-making power, wherever
priate the money required, and pass all neces-
sary laws to carry the treaty into effect; and
there is no limit to the extent of this power-
it may extend to the purchase of the whole
continent, British America, Mexico, West
India Islands, and thus insure the destruction
of our Government.

Sir, as one of the Representatives of the people upon this floor I here enter my earnest and solemn protest against this monstrous assumption-this fatal political heresy. If this doctrine is to prevail, then, sir, this House is but a useless appendage to the Government, and for all practical purposes might as well be abolished. Can any gentleman upon this floor go home to his constituents and tell them that

he has agreed to the surrender of his rights, his power, and his dignity as a member of this House, and the surrender of the constitutional rights of the people through their Representatives upon this floor, to be heard upon as important questions as are involved in the unlimited extension of the jurisdiction of our Government, and the unlimited increase of our already crushing debt? And yet, sir, this is just what the President now demands at our hands, and I am sorry to say is what will be the result of the action recommended by the majority of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; the passage of this appropriation without any accompany ing declaration in relation to the unauthorized acts of the Executive in connection therewith, which will be in law and in fact a tacit admission of his right to exercise the powers he has assumed in this case, and will thus form a precedent for the future.

vested, is unlimited; but in a Government like
ours, where the powers of the Government are
limited and specified by a written constitution,
the treaty-making power is necessarily limited
by the provisions of such constitution. The
Constitution of the Republic defines and dele-
gates the powers of the Government, and
expressly provides that "the powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution
are reserved to the States or the people." In
such a Government the treaty-making power
cannot be absolute. How far and to what
subjects it extends depends upon the provisions
of the constitution. All we find in the Consti-
tution in relation to treaties is the provision

in article two, section two:

"The President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties,

provided two thirds of the Senators concur."

And this further provision in article sixth : "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution and laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

The Constitution in delegating the powers of Congress specifies the powers granted, while in delegating the treaty-making power it uses only general terms and makes no specifications. Will it be claimed that because the power is given in this general language that therefore the power is unlimited in its extent? This cannot be claimed, for most assuredly it must be admitted that the power is limited by the Constitution at least to this extent, that no law can be made by treaty contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. For instance, a treaty with a foreign nation, which provided that any particular form of religion should be established in this country and supported by the Government, although made with all the forms of law by the President, and ratified and consented to by two thirds of the Senate, would be void, because providing and stipulating for that which is forbidden by the Constitution.

I hold the true doctrine and the law in relation to the treaty-making power to be that which the House declared in 1795. That while the treaty-making power is vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and while the House has no agency in making treaties, yet when a treaty contains stipulations in relation to subjects which by the Constitution are submitted to Congress, the treaty must depend for its execution upon laws to be passed by Congress, and that in all such cases it is the prerogative and the duty of Congress to delib-gated in general terms, without any enumeraerate, to take into view all of the considerations bearing upon the question, and to act upon it according to their judgment of the interests of the Government and the wishes of the people, and either pass the necessary laws and thus give the treaty vitality and effect, or refuse to pass them, as in their opinion the public good requires.

Take the case now before the House: the President, with the advice and consent of the

Again, the treaty-making power being deletion, if certain powers are specifically granted to another department of the Government, then by a proper rule of construction they would be denied to the treaty-making department, for the simple and apparent reason that in construing the Constitution all its parts must be taken together, and if possible made to harmonize. Among the powers granted to Congress is to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. Therefore, the treaty-making

power could not, without the consent of Congress, make a binding treaty stipulation that the emigrants from any foreign country should upon their arrival here be invested with full rights of citizenship, or make any stipulation by treaty in opposition to the laws of Congress on the subject of naturalization. Another of the powers granted to Congress is that of raising and supporting armies, and standing armies in time of peace being dangerous to the liberties of the people the framers of the Constitution with great care and caution provided in connection with this power that no appropriation of money for the use of an army should be made for more than two years, thus giving the House of Representatives, or the Senate, either of them, the power by refusing to agree to an appropriation to put an end to the Army establishment at the expiration of every term of two years. This power thus delegated to Congress was thus carefully guarded. Could it be claimed that the President, with the consent of the Senate, would have the power to stipulate by treaty with England, for instance, that the United States should maintain a standing army of one hundred thousand men for the security of peace along the borders, and that such stipulation would be binding on the Government of the United States without the consent of Congress? I think not, and only because the Constitution has vested in Congress this important power.

Again, and to come to the question directly involved in the case now before the House, the Constitution vests in Congress the control over the Treasury of the nation, and provides that no money shall be drawn therefrom but in consequence of appropriations made by law, and makes the further unusual provision that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, a provision not made as to any other class of laws. Evidently it was the intention of the framers of that instrument, careful as they were to guard well the interests and rights of the people, to throw around the Treasury as many guards as possible, and, therefore, they provided not only that no money should be drawn from the Treasury in consequence of a law passed through both Houses of Congress, but that such law must originate in the House of Representatives, the most numerous body in the Government, and more directly accountable to the people than any other department of the Gov

ernment.

Now, sir, looking at these provisions of the Constitution, what is the fair and reasonable conclusion? It seems to me there can be no difference of opinion that the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that no money should be taken from the Treasury of the United States but for some object which should first receive the sanction of the judgment of the people's Representatives in this House, and ultimately the sanction of Congress. Now, sir, it is claimed that it is the duty of this House to pass a bill making this appropriation, and that we have nothing to do with the merits or the propriety of the appropriation; and the case is compared with that of the appropriation for the payment of the salaries of officers, which salaries are fixed by law, and yet which cannot be paid without an appropriation, and it is claimed that this House has no more right to refuse an appropriation in the one case than in the other.

I do not admit, sir, unconditionally that the House has no right in any case where the law provides for an expenditure to refuse an appropriation for such expenditure. Where an office is established by the Constitution, such as the President or Supreme Court, I admit the House would have no right to refuse the appropriation that might be fixed by law for the salary of such office, for the simple reason that the Constitution, which is the highest law, by establishing the office requires the payment of the compensation, and expressly provides that they shall receive their compensation. there may be cases where the House would be justified in refusing to make appropriations for the payment of salaries provided by law, and

But

obtained.

Mr. MAYNARD. Does the gentleman from Iowa wish to he understood to assert that the previous assent of Congress was obtained to the acquisition of Louisiana before the treaty was made?

of Congress, and ought not to be done with- under consideration, which is entirely similar out that consent previously obtained, as in the in its character, and I claim that a just concluLouisiana and the Florida cases it was presion is that this case does not come within the jurisdiction of the treaty-making power, but is entirely and properly a matter for the legisla tive department of the Government; and that, while the negotiation for the purchase was carried on by the treaty making department, it was done without the authority of Congress previously given, and the whole question as to the propriety of the purchase is as fully open for the consideration and the judgment of the House and of Congress as if no treaty had been entered into; and it is our prerogative, and not only that, but our duty, to examine into the merits of the case, and to confirm or reject the purchase as in our judgment the public good requires.

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Mr. LOUGHRIDGE. That is my understanding. An appropriation of $2,000,000 was made before any step was taken by the Pre sident. And yet, sir, while the treaty-making department may thus act in the premises, Congress has the power, without the coöperation of the treaty-making department, to enter into the necessary compact, and to consummate the purchase, as was done in the case of the annexation of Texas. Indeed, I apprehend that strictly the term "treaty' as used in the Constitution, where the power to make treaties is given to the President, does not include transactions or negotiations of the kind now under consideration, but that as used there it is limited to questions inter alios; that is, to ques tions between this Government and foreign Powers, which require negotiation to adjust and settle them, and that a single transaction of bargain and sale would not come within its scope. The definition of a treaty as given by Vattel in his treatise on the laws of nations is as follows:

I have already referred to one where I think the framers of the Constitution recognized the right of either House so to do; at least it is difficult to imagine any other reason for the pro-viously vision. I refer to the provision in relation to the standing army, that no appropriation shall be made for more than two years. It was evidently the intention to give either House the power by refusing to consent to an appropriation to put an end to the Army establishment, and this is the view taken of that clause by Mr. Madison and other great statesmen of that day. But aside from this, sir, the cases are not analogous. In all cases where appropriations are asked for salaries and for other purposes provided by law the propriety and the neces sity of the appropriation have already previ ously been passed upon and assented to by both Houses of Congress. The people's Representatives have, in all such cases, given the assent of their judgment that the public good requires such appropriations. But in this case there has been no provision whatever by law of Congress for the appropriation required; the purpose for which it is to be made has never received the assent of the people's Representatives; they have never decided that the public good required it, or would be enhanced by it, nor that the finances of the country are in such condition as to justify it; and we are told that we have no right now to take into view any of these considerations, but, regardless of our own convictions as to the propriety of the transaction, we must vote the amount of money asked. To-morrow we may have notice of some other treaty entered into by the treatymaking power with some foreign Government providing for some purpose or other an appropriation of a hundred millions, and on the same principle we are bound to foot the bill without question, and thus, by this doctrine, the President and the Senate would have absolute and unlimited control over the Treasury, inasmuch as the amount of money which might be expended by treaty is unlimited and the objects and ways in which it might thus be expended are also unlimited.

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A treaty, in Latin fœdus, is a compact made with
a view to the public welfare by the superior power,
either for perpetuity, or for a considerable time.
"The compacts, which have temporary matters for
their object, are called agreements, conventions, and
factions. They are accomplished by one single act
and not by repeated acts. These compacts are per-
fected in their execution once for all. Treaties re-
ceive a successive execution, whose duration equals
that of the treaty."

A single transaction, then, of bargain and
sale, which is not continuing, but is perfected
at once by its execution, does not come within
Vattel's definition of "treaty." The framers
of the Constitution I claim used the word in
that instrument in this same sense; and this
view is strengthened and made apparent from
the fact that a clear distinction is taken in the
Constitution between, "treaties" and "agree-
ments and compacts." Section ten of article
one provides that no State shall enter into any
"treaty," while further on in the same section
it provides that-

"No State shall, without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with a foreign Power."

If all agreements with foreign Powers are treaties, then the treaty-making power is not vested exclusively in the President, with the advice of the Senate, for Congress may author. ize States to enter into treaties. The only conclusion, then, is that while the power of making treaties is vested exclusively in the President, with the advice of the Senate, yet the term is used in the sense Vattel uses it, as contradistinguished from simple agreements, conventions, and compacts, which consist of a sin

I trust, sir, that but few will be found upon this floor willing to consent to a doctrine so dangerous, willing to yield up the authority and prerogatives of this House vested in it by the Constitution of the country, and which it has always beretofore persistently maintained. But there is another question involved in this case in addition to that of the appropriation of the money, and one of equal importance and interest; and that is, as to the power of the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and without the consent of Congress, or of the people of the United States, by treaty to extend the area of our Government, and bring into its jurisdiction foreign countries and foreign peoples. This power I deny. I do not claim that the Constitution has vested this power in Congress in express terms. As I read that instrument it is silent on the subject. Such power is not by that instru-gle transaction accomplished by one single act, ment given to any department of the Govern ment in express terms. I do not wish to be understood as denying this power to the Government. By the laws of nations all Governments have the right to add to their domain by purchase and by conquest, and I suppose that our Government has this right, by the laws of nature, the same as the right of self-defense; the right to do what is necessary for its own existence.

such as a transaction of bargain and sale. And this view of the Constitution has been sanctioned by all departments of the Govern ment. In the case of the compact between this Government and the republic of Texas, by which that republic ceded all its territory to the United States and became annexed to the United States, as I have before stated, the treaty-making power took no part in the transaction; it was done entirely by the legislative Jefferson, I believe, placed the power to department of the Government. The validity purchase Louisiana upon the law of necessity, of that transaction has never been questioned, of self-preservation. Many of our greatest but has been sanctioned by all departments of statesmen have placed it upon the clause in the the Government; whereas, if the compact with Constitution giving Congress the power to the foreign republic of Texas, which was thus admit new States into the Union. But from entered into, was a treaty in the meaning of whatever source the power is derived, I deny that term in the Constitution, then the whole that it belongs to or is vested in the treaty- transaction was without authority of law; for making department, but that it belongs strictly if the negotiation was a treaty, in the sense of to Congress. It may doubtless be properly the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the treatyexercised through the agency of the treaty-making power was exclusive; if not a treaty, making department, which in such case acts as the agent of Congress, yet it cannot properly be done without the authority and consent

then the treaty-making power had no jurisdic

tion.

Applying the same principles to the case now

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at.

But we are told that the emperor of Russia has delivered possession of the territory purchased, and that this Government has accepted and taken possession of it, and that for that reason we are estopped from refusing to carry out the contract. I am at a loss to know upon what principle of law this conclusion is arrived So far as this Government is concerned, I deny that there has been any legal or authorized taking possession of the territory. The act of the President in assuming to take possession was without authority of law, and was not the act of the Government, of which fact the emperor was presumed to be cognizant. I take it to be a well-settled principle of law that the conductors of all Governments are presumed to know the constitutions and public laws of all other Governments. The einperor of Russia is therefore held to know the provisions of the Constitution, the public laws and proceedings of this Government, and with this knowledge, if he relied upon an incomplete, inchoate negotiation, one not yet consummated, and which, by the Constitution and laws of this Government, required the consent of Congress before it could be carried into effect, and, so relying, made a formal transfer and delivery of the territory, he has placed himself by his own imprudence in a position where he would have no good cause of complaint if Congress, in the exercise of its rightful discretion, should refuse to carry the treaty into effect. In such case the Government of Russia could resume possession of the territory if it desired to do so.

The President, acting without any authority of law, it seems, directed a military officer to take possession of the territory, which direction was complied with in form by such officer. The Russian flag was withdrawn and the flag of the United States substituted. The President might, with as much right and authority, have directed military officers to take possession of Canada or the British possessions.

The act was as unauthorized as it was unnecessary, and deserving of the severest condemnation. And here I desire to direct the attention of the House and the country to the difference in the course of President Jefferson in 1803, in connection with the purchase of Louisiana, and the present Administration in relation to the assumption and exercise of doubtful powers. Although the Louisiana territory, commanding as it did the mouth of the Mississippi, and its acquisition regarded as a pressing necessity, yet with a desire to keep within the bounds of his constitutional powers, Jefferson did not venture to enter into negotiations for its purchase until authorized to do so by Congress, and an appropriation was made by Congress for that purpose.

In this Alaska case the President, without any notice to, or authority from Congress, on his own motion, entered into a treaty for the purchase of a territory, for the acquisition of which by this Government there was at least no immediate or pressing necessity, a territory of but little value as compared with Louisiana. In the Louisiana case, after the treaty was consummated and ratified by the Senate, before attempting to take possession of the territory, Jefferson transmitted a copy of the treaty to Congress for the action of Congress,

in its legislative capacity, suggested to Congress that steps should be taken to take pos session of the territory, and awaited the action of Congress. An act was passed authorizing and empowering the President to take possession of the territory, and in obedience to such law of Congress the President afterward formally took possession of the territory.

In this case President Johnson, immediately upon the ratification of the treaty by the Senate, before any appropriation had been made by Congress for the payment of the price stipulated, before Congress had in any way had the matter under consideration, dispatched a brig adier general of the Army, with a vessel and a detachment of soldiers, with orders to take possession of the territory, which orders were formally obeyed. And now the Representa tives of the people in Congress are told that in consequence of such unauthorized act on the part of the President they are deprived of any discretion, and are under legal obligation to appropriate the money and pass the laws to carry the treaty into effect, and that if they refuse so to do Russia will have good cause of

war.

Sir, if this doctrine is correct, what security have we but that to-morrow, by virtue of some secret treaty, negotiated and ratified in regular form, without the knowledge of this House or the people, some military officer may hoist our flag over the halls of the Montezumas and take possession of Mexico, annex all that territory to the United States, and transform its ignorant and vicious population into citizens of this Republic?

I insist that if such an addition is to be made to our territory and our population that the people of this Government should have some voice in its consummation. It would seem reasonable, sir, that this should be; and the doctrine that would deprive them of this right is certainly unwarranted by anything in the Constitution or laws of the Republic. The necessity of congressional action to give full validity and effect to treaties of purchase and to treaties which include in their stipulations subjects which by the Constitution are granted to Congress has always been recognized from the organization of the Government. It has

always been claimed by this House, has been declared by the Supreme Court, and recog. nized, I think, by every Executive except Washington.

its execution as to such stipulations on a law or laws to be passed by Congress. And it is the constitutional all such cases, to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon as in their judgment may be most conducive to the public good."

This resolution was advocated by Mr. Madison in a speech of great power, and was passed by a vote of yeas 57, nays 35; and had all the members voted the vote would have been 63 yeas to 36 nays.

Thus at an early day the House of Representatives, by a decisive vote, settled the doctrine, so far as the House is concerned, settled it directly and deliberately, and with a full realization of the importance of the question. In the course of the debate Mr. Livingston, who was in favor of the resolution, remarked, "That it was the most important question that had ever walls of House."

The last instance to which I shall refer is the annexation of Texas in 1845. As I have already stated, the treaty-making department took no part in that negotiation whatever; it was consummated by a joint resolution of Congress, approved by the Executive. The question of the power of Congress without the intervention of the treaty making department, to enter into a compact with a foreign Government, and to negotiate for the annexation of foreign territory, was fully discussed in both branches of Congress, and the joint resolution was passed in the House by a vote of 132 yeas to 76 nays, and in the Senate by a vote of 27 yeas to 25 nays. Thus we have in that case not only the judgment of the House of Repre sentatives in accordance with its previous uniform action, but also the deliberate assent of both of the departments constituting the treatyand the

been agitated within the doctrine for itself, the making power, the Sonte ass has the power,

House, on a resolution declaring that laws should be passed to carry the treaty into effect, discussed the merits of the treaty for over two weeks, James Madison, Albert Gallatin, and John Livingston, and others of the most distinguished statesmen of the country opposing the resolution to carry the treaty into effect; and on the final vote the resolution was adopted by but three majority, there being 51 yeas and 48 nays.

In 1803 the United States purchased from France the territory of Louisiana. But in that case the initiatory step was taken by Congress. The matter was discussed in secret session, and was referred to a committee which made a report in favor of the purchase of the territory, stating, among other things in their report, that

In the opinion of the committee the possession of that territory was not only required for the convenience of the United States, but would be demanded by their most imperious necessities." And recommended the adoption of a resolution appropriating $2,000,000, to be applied, under the discretion of the President, toward the expenses of the negotiation for the purchase of the territory, which resolution was adopted and the money appropriated, and afterward, having thus the express sanction of Congress, President Jefferson entered into negotiations for the purchase of the territory by treaty, which was made and ratified by the Senate; and on the 22d of October, 1803, the President transmitted a copy of the treaty to Congress, for the purpose (using his own language) of the consideration of Congress in its legislative capacity;" and after a discussion upon the merits of the treaty the usual resolution was adopted by a vote of yeas 90, nays 25, declaring that provision should be made by law for carrying the treaty into effect. Thus, in that case, Congress not only authorized the purchase in advance, but ratified and confirmed it after it was negotiated. And, as I have before stated, after this treaty was made and ratified, President Jefferson declined to take possession of the territory, awaiting the action

In the case of the treaty of 1795 with Great Britain, which was a treaty of commerce, amity, and navigation, the treaty was duly ratified in October, 1795, and the President promulgated the same and transmitted a copy thereof to the House of Representatives on the 1st of March, 1796, for the information of Congress. On the next day a resolution was offered requesting the President to lay before the House copies of the correspondence relative to the treaty. This resolution raised the question whether Congress had any right in connection with that treaty to deliberate upon the expedi-of Congress in their legislative capacity upon ency or inexpediency of carrying the treaty into effect, and to act thereon as, in their opinion, the public good required. Those who denied this power to Congress opposed the resolution; those who claimed it advocated the resolution. A debate of great ability followed, lasting three weeks, in which Mr. Madon and Mr. Gallatin took the lead in favor

of the power of Congress, when the resolution was passed by a vote of 55 yeas to 36 nays. To that resolution the President responded in a message denying the power claimed by the House, and declining to furnish the correspondence and papers requested. That message of the President was referred to the Committee of the Whole House, and the following resolution was offered:

"Resolved, That it being declared by the second section of the second article of the Constitution that the President shall have power, by and with the advice of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senate present concur,' the House of Representatives do not claim any agency in making treaties; but that when a treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitution to the power of Congress it must depend for

the treaty. And after Congress had resolved to carry the treaty into effect, and passed an act authorizing the President to take possession of the territory, and not until then, did Jefferson presume to exercise that authority.

What a pity, sir, that Jefferson had not lived to this day that he could have learned some

thing of the Constitution of the country and of

the power of the President. In the case of the purchase of Florida from Spain the treaty was concluded on the 22d of February, 1819, but was not ratified until February, 1821.

The treaty was then communicated by the President to Congress for the legislative consideration and action necessary to give it effect. The President, in that case, did not assume to take possession of the territory until after the assent of Congress had been given, but awaited that action; and on the 3d of March, 1821, an act was passed by Congress, as in the case of Louisiana, authorizing and empowering the President to take possession of the territory, and by virtue of such authority the President formally took possession of the territory.

without the intervention of the treaty-making department, to enter into a compact with a foreign Government for the acquisition and annexation of territory.

I submit, sir, that this action of the Senate and the House of Representatives in Congress assembled, and of the Executive, settles the doctrine which I claim to be correct, that a compact with a foreign Government for the purchase of territory, and which includes no other objects or stipulations, is not strictly a treaty in the meaning of the term as it is used in the Constitution, in article two, section two, where the power to make treaties is given to the President, with the advice of the Senate, but that it is a compact or agreement such as is men

tioned in section ten, article one, where a State is forbidden, without the consent of Congress, from entering into an agreement or compact with a foreign Power; and therefore not within the jurisdiction exclusively, if to any extent, of the treaty-making department.

The doctrine which I claim has been settled, so far as this House is concerned, by its own action, and by the unvarying practice of the Government, has received the assent of very nearly all the great statesmen of the country. Jefferson, Clay, Calhoun, Randolph, Madison, Gallatin, and Monroe all held that opinion, and advocated it on all occasions. Calhoun, in his treatise on the Constitution and Government of the United States, speaking of the treaty-making power, says:

"But although the treaty-making power is exclusively vested, and without enumeration or specification, in the Government of the United States, it is nevertheless subject to several important limitations. It is, in the first place, strictly limited to questions inter alios; that is, to questions between us and foreign Powers which require negotiation to adjust them. All such clearly appertain to it. But to extend the power beyond these, be the pretext what it may, would be to extend it beyond its allotted sphere, and thus a palpable violation of the Constitution. It is, in the next place, limited by all the provisions of the Constitution which inhibit certain acts from being done by the Government or any of its Departments; of which description there are many. It is also limited by such provisions of the Constitution as direct certain acts to be done in a particular way, and which prohibit the contrary, of which a striking example is to be found in that which declares that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations to be made by law.' This not only imposes an important restriction on the power, but gives to Congress, as the law-making power, and to the House of Representatives as a portion of Congress, the right to withhold appropriations; and thereby an important control over the treaty-making power whenever money carry a treaty into effect; which is usu

is required to, especially those of much importance."

John Randolph said on this question : "Where a treaty is made involving matters confided by the Constitution to Congress, the Representatives are as free as the President or the Senato were to consider whether the national interests requires or forbids their giving the forms and force of law to the articles over which they have this power."

And this was quoted and approved by Jef ferson in 1795. In a letter to Colonel Monroe, in 1796, Mr. Jefferson used the following language:

"The British treaty has at length been laid before Congress. All America is on tiptoe to see what the House of Representatives will decide on it. We cons ceive the constitutional doctrine to be that, though the President and Senate have the general power of making treaties, yet when they include in a treaty

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