territory not included within the township of Cleveland, and that no township officers perform any duties in the city of Cleveland adjoining Newburgh Heights village as originally constituted.

Having cited these claimed violations of the law in the proceedings leading up to and consummated in said election of December 11, 1917, and which it is claimed render all of said proceedings invalid and of no force and effect, information is then given to the court that the county commissioners have given notice that an election will be held on February 2, 1918, for the purpose of selecting officers of Willow township, being that portion of the territory sought to be detached, and that the deputy state supervisors and inspectors of elections are preparing to and will prepare, unless enjoined by the court, ballots for said election, and will hold said election for the purpose of choosing the officers of Willow township; that said election will be of no force and effect and will be an unlawful expenditure of the funds of the county and of Newburgh Heights village.

It is apparent that if said election has not been held on said date it never will be held on said date, and we are somewhat of the opinion that this obvious fact should have some bearing upon the remedy which plaintiff's counsel should now attempt to pursue. In other words, it seems vain to ask us to enjoin a matter which must either already be an accomplished fact or else impossible of performance. This consideration should perhaps dispose of this whole case. Very evidently we can not enjoin an election which has already been held. This point while not raised necessarily disposes of the question as to whether or not we can enjoin this election.

Some further consideration upon our part of the facts plead is perhaps necessary on account of the other relief asked for in the petition. It is sought to enjoin the budget commissioners from fixing the tax rate for said Willow township, and from depriving Newburgh Heights Village of the taxes so fixed in said Willow township, and depriving Newburgh Heights village of the taxes payable on said property. It is apparent that this

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additional relief can not be granted to the plaintiff if the township of Willow has a legal existence. If, by the election of December 11th, and by the certification of its proceedings to the Secretary of State, it came into legal existence, if those proceedings were not utterly void, then the granting of this relief would be improper. The territory which attempted to detach itself from said village had under the law an apparent right to do so, provided it was contiguous to a township.

The facts contained in the supplemental petition referred to above do, we think, bring this case within the provisions of Sections 3577-1, 3577-2 and 3577-3 of the General Code of Ohio, being the act of May 7, 1915 (106 Ohio Laws, 301), and we so hold. The fact that the election date for the original election for the detachment of this property was changed from December 4th to December 11th, whether that latter date came within the twenty day period or not, does not make the election void. Persons interested in said election should have taken proper steps to see that it was legally held. They can not wait until long afterwards and then attack it collaterally when the new township so created seeks to operate under the powers and rights which were supposed to be secured by the election. The claim that the petition for the original election was invalid because the petitioners were induced to sign on the representation that the expenses incident to the election would be defrayed by other parties, must be overruled. The statute merely provides that the expenses shall be defrayed by the petitioners and that the election officials may require the payment of such expense in advance as a condition precedent to the taking by them of any of the steps provided for in the statute. It is a matter of common experience and common knowledge that such expenses are generally borne by some persons who are particularly interested, and we know of no rule or principle of law deciding that after an election has been held the same may be over-turned by reason of such conduct upon the part of interested parties. We decide against the plaintiff upon this point.

With regard to the claim that the provisions of the General Code under which this detachment was effected is unconsti

tutional, we think that in similar cases decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio that court has sustained the constitutionality of such statutes. We refer particularly to the cases of the State Board of Health v. City of Greenville, 86 O. S., 1; Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 O. S., 96; Metcalf v. State, 49 O. S., 586; State, ex rel, v. Cincinnati, 52 O. S., 419. We believe that these authorities establish the proposition that the entire subject-matter of the creation and organization of municipalities and of the enlargement and restriction of their boundaries has been unreservedly committed to the discretion of the Legislature by virtue of the constitutional provision that the General Assembly "shall provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages by general laws;" and that the extent to which the revenues and the future activities of a municipality may be affected by the detachment of a portion of its territory is a matter for the consideration of the Legislature and for it alone. We believe that the question of the wisdom of the legislation which permits this detachment of property has nothing to do with determining its constitutionality. The question of the wisdom of such legislation is for the Legislature. This court might think and per; haps does think that it is the most unwise kind of legislation, but this consideration can in no way control our action. It is solely a question of power. If the Legislature has constitutional power to enact a law, no matter whether the law be wise or otherwise, it is no concern of the court. Thus, in spite of the arbitrariness of the boundaries fixed for this detached territory; in spite of the damage that may be done to the remaining territory, it was within the province of the Legislature to enact the law under which this detachment occurred, and in our opinion the statute under which the detachment took place is constitutional.

We have no doubt that the situation which has occurred in this village is unfortunate, and we deeply deplore its occurrence, but our conclusion that the statute is constitutional deprives us of all power to consider the allegations of the petition to the effect that the line is arbitrary and unfair. Ail that we can say upon this point is that the Legislature did not see fit to define where such lines should run in its enactment and put no limita

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tions upon the same. All that the court can say from examination of this petition is, that the inhabitants of a certain territory wished to relinquish their village government and again become a township. The laws of Ohio provide for the gratification of this desire.

So far as we are able to ascertain the provisions of the statute have been sufficiently complied with so as to at least insure their validity against a collateral attack such as we must necessarily regard this suit to be.

We regard the petition and supplemental petition as insufficient in law in that it does not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants or any of them, and the demurrer to the same will be sustained at the costs of the plaintiff.

GRANT, J., and LAWRENCE, J., concur.

END OF VOLUME XXVIII.

11-20-18.

INDEX.