manifest that he is envious, he must obey the suggestions of malice in the dark. He, therefore, intrigues, insinuates, and becomes adroit, in putting one thing for another; he secretly, and by covert means, undermines the object of his hatred. He whispers his doubts, suspicions, opinions, and belief. If the tenure of the hated object is too strong to be shaken, then the bad use which he makes of his advantages, are sought out. The base accompaniments of his fine qualities are brought forth, and placed in the strongest lights. She is beautiful; but she is vain, haughty, and silly. He is rich, but he got his wealth by frauds, and hoards it like a miser. He is able, eloquent, and popular; but he is selfish, and insincere, and would put a yoke on every neck in the republic, if he could. He is making a great flourish in the world, but it is all false and hollow; he came from nothing, and will go back to nothing.' It may be easily inferred, that one who has surrendered himself to the dominion of envy, not only deprives himself of the profitable use of what he has, or might have, but makes himself wretched in contemplating what he must know he cannot have; he is so wrought upon, that whatsoever seeds of crime he may have in his heart, are sure to start into luxuriant growth.

260. Can any rational being doubt, that this sort of suffering, and crime, are entirely of man's making? Can it be doubted that he can prevent them? These are violations of natural law, and Divine law; and no law comes from this source which cannot be understood and obeyed. Let us take an example, and seek out the unreasonableness and immorality of envy; and to do this effectually we must take a strong case, and in some degree, a fanciful one. Let us suppose that in a seminary of females there is one who is very beautiful; her parents are very rich, and are highly respectable; and that this young lady is distinguished by her genius, and her diligence, and good conduct, and is obviously in the receipt of the preceptor's unqualified approbation. Let us further suppose, that there are some of her

school fellows who envy her. Their countenances show what they feel. Every mark of favor manitested to this fortunate person, is a blow on every envious heart. Discontent, distress, and malignity, take up their abodes in these hearts, and enter into thriving partnership. But, the beauty, the genius, the diligence, the wealth, the parentage, the applause, are not among the dividends which these partners make; these remain where they were; and what dividends do they make! Let us suppose that the envious could do what they would; that is, annihilate the envied qualities, and make the possessor too low, and contemptible, to be more thought of; and let us suppose too, that the successful adventurers succeed to what is now the first eminence; is there no one below to pull them down?—They are soon down, and by like means; and thus the demolition would descend, until the sentinary became too low a place for even envy to find something to live on.

261. Is not this a fair example of what we continually see in all grades, and classes, of social life? and is not this passion of envy, earthborn, mischievous, and odious? What is the remedy? Common sense, and plain reason, point out the remedy. Generally speaking, every member in society is just as much in his own place, as he is in his own skin. No one can be in another's place. Every one has his place originally assigned to him, and his natural condition in it, by means, over which he had no control, and in making which he had no agency. What he will make out of himself, and of the circumstances in which he finds himself, must depend, (after the irresponsible state of infancy is passed) on his own thoughts, motives, and acts. He will find his greatest good, not in repining at the good of others (which he can never make to be his own, and which he cannot destroy without expecting retributive justice as to himself), but in making his own condition as good as he can, consistently with self-respect, and peace of mind. That which is given to others, and all that they can

lawfully acquire, is righteously their own. All that is given to one's-self, and all that he so acquires is, in like manner, his own. If he would have no injustice done to him, by those who are below him, he must do no injustice to those who are above him. We entertain no doubt that the day will come when youth will be so instructed, and men so self-disciplined, as to know, that the laws of nature, and the laws of society, when conformable to these, permit to every person a proper place; enjoin duties in that place; and insure happiness from the performance of those duties. When that day comes, envy will die.

262. Emulation. This has been sometimes classed with envy; but they have nothing in common. One would feel like a culprit in being known to be envious, but would rightly take praise to himself in being emulous. This motive to action was given to man for the best possible purposes; and upon the application of it, with justifiable views, and to commendable ends, the advancement of human welfare mainly depends. We understand it to mean, the desire to obtain excellence, in laudable pursuits. An envious man may be supposed to say, Your eminence distresses me; I cannot bear to see you sitting up there; and though I have not the shadow of hope that I can ascend to your place, if you were out of it, nevertheless, I must pull you down, if I can; and then we shall stand on the same level.' An emulous man may be supposed to say, 'I admit that you are where you should be. You have raised yourself by fair and just means. I have no desire to disturb you, nor to impede your further progress. You have done me no injustice; on the contrary, you have rendered me the important service of showing me how one may honorably rise. I shall follow your example, and endeavor to place myself by your side. If I can get there, we shall have a fair, good-tempered rivalry, and we may animate, and quicken each other's efforts. If you are able to keep always in advance of me, you will make me diligent, and enable me to excel oth

ers, if I cannot equal you.' There seems to be nothing immoral in this. In this view emulation is presented in its true and amiable character. Like all other things intrusted for good purposes, it may be perverted. It frequently excites very unworthy feelings, whence it has been often confounded with envy. Emulation is the principle on which instructers rest the inducement to be diligent in schools; and it is there that the perversion alluded to, is often noticed. When children are required to get and recite the same lesson, there must be a best, and a worst, among them. Excellence may depend on natural talent, or on industry, or on both. It deserves great consideration, in what manner, the stimulus of emulation should be applied. It must be applied in some manner, no doubt. If human beings were not naturally led to compare themselves with each other, and to obey the proper suggestions which arise from that comparison, life would be very still and stupid. But, what use should be made of the principle of emulation in schools, wherein the strongest desire, and the utmost effort to do well, may, (in some instances), fail of reward, and of self-satisfaction, requires more consideration than this matter has, hitherto, had.

CHAPTER XXIX.

DUTIES.

Wrongs, to One's-self and others, arising from the perversion of some good principle of action.

263. Anger. This word is derived from a Latin word, which means to choke, or strangle. In several other languages its root is found, and in all it has the signification of strangling, choking, constraining, or narrowing. In common understanding of its meaning, which is the true one, it is a violent passion of the mind, arising from some real

or supposed injury; and its natural tendency is to do two things, first to take satisfaction for the injury; second, to make the offender suffer. This passion does not appear to be wrong in itself. Like many other excitements, which are common to our nature, it was given to us for useful purposes; and is only wrong, when its dominion is injuriously submitted to, and unjustifiably obeyed. There is a principle of general operation among all animated beings, which reconciles the existence of anger with the wisdom and benevolence of the Deity. All animals are entrusted by nature, with the preservation of their own rights, and the promotion of their own welfare. But all animals are liable to have their rights infringed, and their welfare disturbed by others. If there were no sensibility to wrongs, the cunning and the strong would make all others obedient to their will. Anger is justifiable in selfdefence, and in exacting justice, and in making an offender suffer, within the limits of reason. It is only in the misdirection, and irrational use of anger, that men make this principle of their nature a cause of affliction to themselves. Certainly the indulgence of an irritable angry temperament, is one of the sorest troubles experienced in human life.

264. Anger has its seat in the mind. It is a passion which literally means an excitement of the human system, by the action of some external cause perceived by the mind. It is that passion which has the most immediate, and the closest connexion, with the material system. Every one who has experienced a violent fit of anger, knows, that the natural action of the heart is quickened, and that his blood courses through his veins with a feverish rapidity; he feels that his face reddens with this action of his blood; that his eyes are full and distended; that he has a sense of choking in the throat these emotions will gradually subside, as the fit goes off, and the blood will resume its accustomed flow. So far, this may be only a temporary physical evil. This, however, is not all the evil. Such an excitement can never occur without af