fecting other parts of the system. The interior organs of the system, which minister to the digestive process, partake in the evil effects of this violent action of the blood. These also are choked, and constrained, in their natural and necessary action. Physicians and naturalists tell us, that the frequent action of anger generates stones in the gall bladder, makes the liver schirrous, (become hard) and deranging the indispensable flow of the bile, brings on jaundice and other diseases. (Such afflictions arise from various other causes also.) It is well known that there are instances of sudden death from violent anger. This is accounted for by the sudden rushing of the blood through delicate vessels, which are not strong enough to hold it. They give way, the human machine is ruined, and death follows. It is said that the theories, as to long life, are contradictory. By some, it is referred to temperance. But some persons have lived long, who were not remarkable for this virtue. It is rational to suppose that a naturally good constitution will endure long, if the rules of temperance be respected, and if the system is never subjected to violent passions. It is probable that those persons live longest, who are not only temperate in quantity, and quality, but who are also good natured, and cheerful.

265. Supposing the foregoing suggestions, as to the nature of anger, to be well founded, they are to be applied, by persons who are entrusted with their own rights and welfare, and whose great purpose is to obtain the greatest good from life, as a whole. It is admitted, that all persons may, and perhaps must be, sometimes angry, until all persons attain to a much higher state of moral perfection than has hitherto been known. But it seems to be of great importance to one's-self to learn, in what way he can govern the propensity to anger, so as to make it what it was meant to be; that is, means to his safety and welfare, and not, as too often it is, a cause of suffering and humiliation.

266. The causes of anger are supposed to be

these; first, by the law of nature, and of society, every one has rights in what he regards as his own property; second, one has a right to hold unimpaired, whatsoever he can justly acquire in reputation, and character; third, he has a right to have his feelings respected by others, if he do no wrong to their feelings; fourth, he has a right to have the like rights respected in those with whom he is necessarily connected, by family and social ties; fifth, he has a right to be treated with justice, and according to established laws, by those who are entrusted with power; sixth, he has a right to have those who are bound with him, in a common subjection to such laws, treated with justice. Whenever any one is offended by the violation of any of these rights, he may be justifiably angry. But in what manner, and to what end, he shall express his anger, so as to do himself the greatest justifiable good, is the thing to be known.

267. Every one who has had a violent fit of anger upon him, knows, that it was to himself, (independently of the cause, and object of his anger), a painful and even a very distressing sensation. No one ever looked back upon such a state of things, as to himself, with satisfaction; but generally with regret, and sometimes with remorse. He feels humbled, and grieved, in his own estimation of himself. He may too well remember that he used expressions, and did acts, which he is grieved to have resting in the memory of others, or in his own. It is probable, also, that no one ever saw another in a violent passion, without feeling that this angry person was degrading himself, and acting more like a brute, than a rational being. Whatever be the cause of such anger in another, cool spectators always regard the angry person, as under a temporary loss of reason, and in danger of doing some serious mischief, and are prompted to restrain him. Every one feels, in such a case, that the least that can happen to one so acted upon, and so acting, is, that he is preparing for himself hours of self reproach, and of bitterness. If no one likes to remem

ber that he was violently angry himself, and if he is offended in seeing others so, it must be admitted, that violent anger is contrary to natural law, as it most certainly is to Divine law. It is an abuse of the trust confided to us to promote our own welfare. 268. As to the cause and object of anger, there are certain cases in which sudden and violent anger is justifiable. The law of society permits the expression of it by violence, even to the destruction of human life. Thus, he who in violation of all law, human and divine, is attempting to take the life of a fellow being, may be justifiably slain by him who is in such peril. The same law justifies the like act in attempts to commit some grievous crime in relation to persons, or property. This justification occurs only when the offence is in the course of being perpetrated. These are extreme and rare cases, and more properly to be considered in another place. In most cases in life, where anger is felt, the causes are of far inferior grade to those which the law of the land notices. It is to those of common occurrence to which our attention is now directed

269. The cause of anger is some real or supposed wrong done, which prompts us to obtain reparation, and to punish the offender. It is consistent with reason for any one, who is under the influence of anger, to be prepared to ask, and answer, the question, whether the wrong is real, or only supposed; and whether he is himself free from the first imputation of having occasioned, by his own error, that which he regards as a wrong. If the offence be real, other questions arise, of this nature: What real good shall I secure to myself, by attempting to get a reparation; and in what respect shall I advance my own welfare by attempting to punish the offender? May I not, in either of these attempts, involve myself, by words, or acts, in some wrong; and give my adversary the advantage of finding me an offender, in trying to vindicate myself? If I could succeed in my attempt, what will it come to? Shall I not make the wrong done to me more noto

rious, and subject myself to the pity, and compassion of others? Is it not better to be silent, and quiet, and leave the offender to time, and his own Conscience, than to engage myself in a controversy, which is sure to be vexatious, and in which I shall run the risk of doing wrong, and in which I shall not be likely to get any good? If I succeed in humbling my adversary, I shall surely make him my enemy forever; for, in the nature of man, he is slow to forgive the wounds inflicted on his own self-love. When this matter is over, and time has dissipated the mists which now prevent a clear view of it, and when other feelings and sentiments have arisen, shall I like myself the better for having been silent and quiet, than if I shall have attempted to command justice, and to inflict punishment? It is probable, that young and ardent minds, and those who are looking back by the light of experience, will answer such questions very differently., But the experienced can tell the young, with sorrowful truth, that among the most painful sufferings of life, are to be numbered, those which have arisen from sudden impulses of anger, expressed in words, or acts. The experienced can also tell, with like truth, that in the common occurrences of life, angry words and acts, have seldom, if ever, accomplished the purpose for which they were intended; they have neither obtained justice, nor punished the offender; but, on the contrary, they have often converted the injured party into an offender himself, and involved him in bitter recriminations, keeping up an irreconcileable aversion, and even enmity, through life. We have, so far, supposed there to be a real, and justifiable cause of anger. But the case is very much stronger against the indulgence of angry feelings, when the cause is only imaginary. It is in many cases imaginary, especially among young persons. They take up sudden impressions concerning the supposed conduct, and words of their associates, and acquaintances, when no such conduct or words, have occurred; or, if any did, none with intention to wound,

or offend. If there be one case in which one feels himself peculiarly humbled, it is when he has manifested anger towards one, who has committed no offence, or who is entirely unconscious of having done so.

270. It sometimes happens, that an offended person can restrain himself from expressions, and words, when he has been seriously offended. But he cherishes a malicious sort of feeling against the offender, broods over the wrong done, and permits his imagination to inflame the sense of wrong, until he makes himself too unhappy under this excitement, not to express it in some mode, which will occasion pain or affliction to the offender. If there be any one who has fallen into such a condition, he may be asked, whether he knows of anything, in the nature of regret, or remorse for his own follies, and sins, which is so exceedingly burthensome, as to carry about with him the feeling of aversion, illwill, and malice, towards one who has offended? What, then, is to be done? angry words and acts are forbidden by the law of nature, by self-respect and by convenience; the memory of an unavenged wrong is intolerable. Is there no remedy? We think there is one, in every person's power. If the individual with whom one is at variance, can, by calm expostulation, or by mutual friends, be brought to a just perception of the case, that is the remedy. If that fail, there is another remedy. Will you pass your life, in humiliating bondage to such a one? Forget that there is such a person in the world. Never let him engage your thoughts for a moment. You do him no wrong by that. You do yourself a just and great good; you cut a moral cancer out of your own heart.

271. Among the sources of affliction in human life, is the uncalled for interference of third persons, in the angry collisions of others. It may sometimes be an unavoidable duty to take a part in an angry quarrel. When this duty is to be performed, it concerns every one who is mindful of the trust confided to him of taking care of himself, not to en