aids. There are abundant proofs, that substantial merits need no aid from ancestral honor.

276. Speaking of others. It may be asked, whether one is to be entirely silent at all times, and on all occasions, as to the character and conduct of others? Certainly not. There are many occasions for speaking of others, and for speaking the truth of them, whatever that may be. All the members of any community are interested in knowing the true character of each other. The knowledge that this character may be known, is one of the most salutary correctives of erroneous conduct, and one of the strongest inducements to pursue that which is commendable. It is probably the case, that the members of every community are pretty well understood by all who have an interest in knowing them. We know not of any law, which holds it to be immoral to speak the truth of any one, from good motives, and for justifiable ends. It is all important that this principle should prevail in our country, where so much depends on public opinion. Surely one's arms are not to be folded, and his lips closed, when he sees one bent on mischief, public, or private. It may be one of the highest moral duties, to declare what men are, and what they are aiming at, in many supposable cases. There can be no surer guide, than the motive, and the end. Inquiries are sometimes made, in matters of greater or less interest concerning others, confidentially, and where the inquirer needs to be truly informed. The party inquired of, has a right to be silent, if he thinks he has good reason to be so; but if he answer, he is bound to state the truth. If he choose to speak, and wilfully conceal the truth, so that the inquirer is deceived, he subjects himself to the imputation of an intentional deceiver.

277. There may be also, and there frequently are, confidential discussions of character, especially concerning public men, and where, perhaps, there is no particular end in view. This does not seem to be wrong; such intercourse is not founded in malicious, nor unworthy motives. It is even, some

times, instructive and philosophical. This, perhaps, is the extreme limit. In all other imaginable cases, it is, probably, most consistent with one's own self-respect, and all truly respectable motives, to let other persons alone, and leave to them the care of their own characters.

278. Slander. This is a two-fold crime. 1. It is a breach of natural law, of divine law, and of the implied law of society, in relation to the party spoken of. 2. It is a breach of the same law, in rela tion to the party speaking. It has been commonly treated of in the first relation. It is now to be noticed in the second; and if it be shown why it is a breach in this, the other will take care of itself. We beg leave to ask a slanderer a few questions: Do you desire to be esteemed in society for your intelligence, your sense of justice, your knowledge of the decencies of life, and for the observance of them? If you happen to be ill-tempered, petulant, and disagreeable to your family connexions, and associates; if you make hasty and troublesome judgments, which you have to rescind or reform; if you happen to be ridiculous in your deportment, and remarkable for silly vanities; are you willing to have these things set forth in any, and every company, by any one who knows of them? Suppose there to be only some slight foundation for some one, or more of these things, which, if you could have an opportunity to explain, would be entirely cleared up; are you willing to have that slight foundation made the basis of a structure of reproach, which if true and real, ought to expel you from decent society? Suppose there to be no foundation at all, for any such accusation of yourself, and yet somehow, and unaccountably, it is afloat, and circulating; should you not think great injustice to be done to you? This is just what you do to others. You take away their good name, if they deserve to have one; you magnify their little faults and errors, and make them ridiculous or odious; you try them on indictments, for serious offences, on which they have no opportunity to de

fend themselves, and of which they are ignorant. Where did you get your information? What credit were they entitled to, from whom you had it? Did you understand them as they meant to be understood? Where, and how, did your informants learn what they communicated? Were they thoughtless, or malicious slanderers, like yourself? How much have you added to their slanders by way of recommending and making yourself agreeable? Have you broken any law by this conduct? We take the liberty to answer for you.

279. You have broken every law which an honest and honorable man, and a rational individual should respect. 1. You have made every person whom you have spoken to, fear you, and shun you. You have shown that you know not what the value of a good name is, and have forfeited your own, if you ever had any. You have shown, that you are a stranger to self-respect; that you have, probably, every one of the faults, follies, and errors, which you impute to others; and desire to bring them down to your own level. Thus you have broken that law which commands you to do no evil to yourself. 2. You have violated that principle of natural law, which commands you to do no injustice to your fellow-men. You know not what opinions you may entertain of the party you have slandered, if circumstances, (as they may,) should bring you into connexion with him. You may find him to be, on a better knowledge of him, an amiable and worthy person. You may find all that you have said, and helped to circulate, utterly groundless. If he be one whom you occasionally meet, and even ask to partake of your hospitality, how can you meet him, and manifest towards him, every sentiment of respect and esteem, when you have so spoken of him? One of two things must be true, either you act a lie, when you meet him in such a manner, or you spoke a lie, when you represented him as you did, to others. 3. You have broken the law of God. To this law, perhaps, you are a stranger, and know not what wrong you have done. If

so, the kindest thing that any one can do you, is, to urge you to find out what it is, and to learn there, the sentence of the slanderer.

CHAPTER XXX.

DUTIES.

Actions between One's-self, and others, which are common causes of dissension.

280. There are very serious questions arising out of promises, out of alleged violations of justice, of truth, and of divers forms of obligation, which are noticed, and settled, by judicial tribunals, according to the law of the land. There are many questions, of like nature, which are referable to no tribunal but that of conscience, and that of public opinion, so far as that may be found to apply; and it is the latter only, which are now to be considered.

They are of daily occurrence, among all classes; and are often causes of mutual reproach, and lasting bitterness. This arises from the different views, which the interested parties take, of the same transaction. Both may believe themselves aggrieved; and both may sincerely think each other, offenders. This is a very common evil, and is founded entirely in defect of moral education. It cannot be pretended, that such evils are inseparable from human life. If men better understood, than they commonly do, that the causes might be avoided, and that when these evils have arisen, they might be very differently disposed of, from what they usually are, surely, human condition would be greatly improved. Common differences or dissensions are believed to arise, from supposed, or real disregard of truth; or of sincerity; or of the obligation of gratitude; or of justice; or of promises; or of what is called, (in the language of the

world) the law of honor. And, sometimes, from particular relations of parties.

281. Truth and Falsehood. These two subjects relate to two parties; 1, that one who speaks truth or falsehood; 2, that one to whom it is spoken. This matter is to be considered only in relation to the first party, and as to him, in two views. 1. Whether there be any, and what law, which requires that the truth should be spoken; and 2. What good or evil one may do to himself by disregarding the truth.

1. One reason why truth should be spoken is, that the knowledge which any one person can have from the use of his own senses, is, in many things which it most materially concerns him to know, very limited. He must, therefore, often depend, for his knowledge, on what others say to him; and when the thing spoken of, is exclusively known to the party speaking, the other must rely entirely on what he says. If it be considered how great a part of the most serious concerns in life depend on declarations made by one person to another, if these could not be relied on, the affairs of mankind would be greatly embarrassed; and confidence, would be destroyed. As this matter of speaking the truth is one which concerns all persons, so all persons agree in holding liars in contempt. Even the very lowest persons consider themselves to be disgraced, when charged with the guilt of lying. They can endure charges which would subject them to public punishment, with more composure than they can endure this. A lie is always understood to be resorted to, to secure some advantage, or prevent some evil, to the person who resorts to it; or to occasion some disadvantage, or injury, to the person to whom, or of whom, the lie is told; sometimes both these purposes concur. The object in view is always an immoral one, and the means used are always regarded as disgraceful. It is obvious, that wilful falsehood is forbidden by natural law, which is intended to regulate our social relations; and is expressly forbidden by Divine law, which condemns