ted, the "law of honor," which is the only law he ever had occasion to think of, forbids him frankly to answer, that he had no such intention; because, this would imply, that he is deficient in courage, and is unwilling to be shot at. He must, therefore, reply, that the inquirer must judge for himself, of the application of the remark. This must be understood to be, an application of the remark to the inquirer; who, thereupon, sends his "friend," to arrange with the "friend" of his foe, a "meeting." They meet, and some accident prevents the destruction of the one, or the other, or of both, but the matter of "honor" is thereby adjusted, and both are "honorable" men: That is, both of them have manifested a willingness to be shot, which is enacting a complicated LIE; and without settling anything which may be supposed to have been in controversy. What a reproach is it to the morals of any country, that a man cannot say, that he intended no reproach to another; or that he is sorry to have been unjust, if he has been so ! * * Washington was a man of ardent temper. He gave offence to a gentleman; and in the interval, which would have been consumed for the arrangement of a challenge, the offended person received a request from Washington, that an interview might be had, at an appointed hour and place. The offended party attended accordingly, properly armed. Washington appeared unarmed. "I came," said he, to acknowledge that "I did wrong, and to ask your pardon for my offence." Further to show that Washington was a man of honor, in the proper sense of that phrase, we extract from Ramsay's life of Washington, p. 237, (Chap. XIII.) the following ;-" He had religion without austerity; dignity without pride; modesty without diffidence; courage without rashness; politeness without affectation; affability without familiarity. He was punctual in all his engagements; upright and honest, in his dealings; temperate in his enjoyments; liberal and hospitable; systematical, and methodical in all his arrangements. He was the friend of morality and religion; a steady attendant on public worship; he encouraged, and strengthened the hands of the clergy. In all public acts, he made the most respectful mention of Providence; he carried the spirit of piety with him, in his private life, and public administration." Let "men of honor " compare themselves with this model ! CHAPTER XXXI. DUTIES. Actions which promote One's own good, whether affecting other persons, or not. PRUDENCE; IMITATION. 297. It has been shown, in former pages, that the system of being to which man belongs, is incessantly acting. It seems to be a general law, that all sorts of being must act, and be acted upon, in their respective relations. So man, as part of that system, must be active and passive, throughout his life. Although there are some few animals that seem to act with reference to the future, as the bee, the ant, the beaver, the distinguishing quality of the human race is, to prepare for the future, or to foresee. In every stage of life, from year to year, and from day to day, all reasonable beings are doing acts, preparatory to some expected state of things. If one were entirely severed from his fellow-men, he would not be exempt from the duty of providing for the future; but, dwelling in society, most of every one's actions have some reference to others, as well as to himself. Every considerate person conducts himself, in his affairs of business, pleasure, and all other employments, under the feeling, that he is to continue to act, and to be acted upon, as a member of society. Some persons consider themselves to be far-sighted in discerning the contingencies of the future, and are wise in preparing for them; while others are indifferent, or careless, taxing themselves with no thoughts beyond the current events. 298. It is self-evident, that such a being as man is shown to be, will essentially promote his own welfare by having rules of life for the government of himself, whether with regard to present, or expected circumstances; and whether circumstances be limited to himself only, or have reference also to others. The ancient moralists held thoughtfulness, and provision for the future to be virtues. They regarded prudence as the highest proof of wisdom. Plato calls this, the leading virtue; and a Roman, whose verses are familiarly known at this day, has sung, that he who has prudence needs no other guide. 299. Prudence, is from the Latin word prudentia, which is supposed to be derived from pro-videntia, meaning foresight. It implies knowledge of present facts, and sound judgment of what must, or can be made to follow, from present facts. If one fully understands his present condition, and can discern in what manner he shall act, so as to secure to himself the greatest good in expected circumstances, he will act prudently. This virtue, prudence, is thus seen to have a very comprehensive meaning. One acts prudently in availing himself of the means of acquiring a good education; in acquiring a good name; in providing for means of supplying his wants; in taking care of his health; in keeping his conscience in such order as never to feel reluctant to commune with it. This virtue, contemplates human life as a whole, and respects all its known, contingent, and even possible events. It must have been so considered when called the leading virtue; that virtue, which gives character to all other virtues. In common acceptation, prudence has a very limited meaning, and is dishonored thereby. A prudent man is commonly understood to be one, who is careful of his property, and who lives snugly within his means; so that to be called, significantly prudent, is to be spoken of, reproachfully. A prudent man should rather be esteemed as eminently wise, and one should be called imprudent who permits the love of money to tarnish his fame. A person is sometimes called prudent, who forbears to speak of others. In this sense, prudence is restored. to its proper place; for it is not easy to see, how one can do himself any real good, in discoursing on the faults, follies and failings of others. The per son spoken of, may not be injured; the party speaking, always is. 300. The ancient philosophers comprised their wisdom in short maxims. To have made a wise maxim, was to acquire renown. Thus, in discoursing on prudence, one of them shows his wisdom in uttering these precepts, "Begin nothing of which you have not well considered the end." "Take care of irrevocable deeds." Crito, one of the seven wise men of Greece, declared, that the highest human wisdom was that sagacity, which discerned in the present, that which the future would disclose. 301. Imitation. It is doubtful, whether this principle of action, has received all the consideration, and respect, to which it is entitled. It is supposed to be applicable to physical, intellectual, and moral being. In the first sense, it is supposed to apply to all animals. The word, imitation, is derived from the Latin, imito. A word is found in the Greek, which is compounded of two words, one of which signifies to mimic; and the other signifies, alike; and so compounded, they are said to mean, to do, or to make alike. There is something, like education, among the animals who are inferior to man. A bird may be naturally disposed to fly, when it is fit to leave the nest; but it may depend on imitation, to carry the disposition into effect. The young of animals have an instinctive direction to the objects proper for them to pursue ; but they pursue these objects the more promptly, it may be presumed, on the principle of imitation. It seems reasonable to suppose, that the natural instinct is not so strong, and directory, of itself, as to put every animal inferior to man, in the proper pursuit, independently of this principle. However this may be, it is quite certain, that among human beings, this principle has so powerful an influence, that the character of society is determined by it. Man was characterized, by an eminent Greek philosopher, as the 'imitative' animal. 302. The very first teachings addressed to the infant mind, are invitations to imitate. The first responses to these invitations, are attempts to do what the teacher proposes. If a child were left alone, from an early age, until advanced towards manhood, he would be destitute of language. This is proved by certain accounts of persons, who happened to be so placed, if these accounts are credible. It is also supposed, that the dumb are not defective in the organs of speech, but in the power of imitation. The acquirement of language is undoubtedly dependent on this faculty, as is clearly proved by those who attempt to learn, and to speak, another language, after attaining an adult age. It is probable, that the loss of a language, learned in one country, by going to another, in which it is not spoken, is not to be referred to the absence of habit, and the defect of memory only, but to the ceasing to imitate those who speak that language. Whether this be, right or wrong, is not very material to the main object, which is to show, the nature and consequences of imitation, in a moral view. See 303. It has been proved that every person has a natural propensity to action. In what manner, and to what end, he shall act, is suggested by nature. ing, as he necessarily does, other persons like himself, acting in pursuance of these natural suggestions, he obeys the impulse to act, by doing or attempting to do, as they do. The operation of this principle is seen in every relation, from the cradle to the grave. It appears in matters of business, and amusement, in things serious, and in things trifling; in armies, in schools, in work-shops, in legislative assemblies, in domestic life; in short, in virtue and in vice, and in all that pertains to good or ill, in which man is an agent. This principle of action is frequently involuntary. It is a common observation, that a person who yawns, (or, as it is commonly called, gapes) will occasion a similar action in those who see and hear him. It is well known, that disagreeable muscular contortions, more particularly of the face, are frequently taken by one child from another, especially in schools; so, also, are disagreeable tones of voice, and peculiarities of articulation. One may, * See note at the end of the volume, on Casper Hauser. |