establish the law, and no one may dare to depart from it, without subjecting himself to the charge of vulgarity; or what is worse, to that of being unfashionable. With imitators, the question is not, what is becoming, proper, and really useful; but, how does such a one, and such a one, do, in the proposed case. Now, it is most certain, that all persons who have this exaltation, whether assumed or conceded, are under a grave moral responsibility. They are bound, by the solemn laws of morality, so to conduct themselves, as to set no example of a degrading, and ruinous character to their imitators. Such persons are invested with an honorable trust. If they are important enough to make laws for others, they should make good ones; they should make good ones for the highest and the strongest reasons: their laws are like those made in a republic; they are for the government, not only of those who are to obey them, but, for those who make them.

CHAPTER XXXII.

DUTIES.

Same subject continued.

CIVILITY; POLITENESS; CHARITY.

311. As men must have intercourse with each other, there must be modes of having it. As intercourse implies acts, there may be good or bad modes of acting. As men are necessarily social, and imitative, good and bad modes may be common to many. As classes in society are distinguished from each other, and as men covet distinction, modes of acting, is one way, in which they try to get it. If elements be considered, there are more things common to all classes, than are usually thought of. All civilized beings, eat, sleep, live in some building; all are clad, all speak, and are spoken to; all of them interchange property, labor, and services, or money

as the representative of these; all have associates, friends, kindred; all are pleased and displeased; and all have about the same degree of self-love, however variously manifested. All of them must act, and be acted upon, in these relations. That in which they are distinguished from each other lies in the materials of action and in the manner of it. There are some things which are precisely the same as to all these beings. They were all born, and they must all die. In the eye of their Creator, they are all equal, except so far as they have rendered themselves unworthy. They are all members of the same society, however differently they may be therein placed. They are all necessary to each other, for all of them must be counted in making up society. The inquiry is, in what manner these members of society, should conduct themselves towards each other, so that each one may secure to himself the greatest good, consistently with the rights of others. It will be said by some persons, perhaps, that if one do no wrong to another as to property, person, or character; if he pay his debts; perform his promises, and do not intermeddle in affairs wherein he has no concern; he is a good sort of man; and no more should be required of him.

These things are a part, and only a part, of mor al duty. The manner of doing, is as much a moral duty as to do. No small part of the convenience, comfort, and pleasure of life, depends on the manner. One may pay a debt, or perform a promise, fully, but may do it in a mode that will leave an impression (never to be removed) that he is little better than a brute. Modes of acting, or manners are, therefore, proper subjects to be treated of, among moral duties; because one's welfare is inseparably connected with these.

312. Civility. The well-being of society would be greatly promoted, if the nature and use of this Christian virtue were more generally known. We take this to be, in personal intercourse, the observance of the command, Do to others as you would

that others should do to you. The most rapid glance at any community, shows this: That some of its members are brought into contact in matters of business, necessarily; others meet, incidentally, who have no particular connexion; others meet for social purposes, in various forms; and that there is a large proportion who know, of each other, very little beyond the fact, that they are of the same country; and perhaps, not even that. There must be a best rule of deportment for all these classes; and no one will deny, that if this rule were defined, and faithfully applied, there would be much more of every day comfort, and complacency in the world, than there is well known to be. Civility is the manifestation of kind feelings, and of a desire to do all things which should be done under the influence of such feelings, and in a becoming and agreeable

manner.

313. If every person understood the true foundation of society, the common origin of all its members, their natural and necessary sympathies, their community of interests, their necessary action upon, and with each other, it might be supposed, that all who are reasonable, would be civil. They would be so, because they would promote their own good, because they would be doing what it is proper to do, to promote the good of others; and because they would know, that in so doing, they would conform to the design of their creation. We do not include under the term civility, the great duties of justice, acts of munificence, important personal services. These arise out of some special relation, which an individual bears to one or more other individuals. It seems to be limited to the manner in which the common, or accidental intercourse of the members of society, in general, should be carried on. This matter may be better understood by some examples. Thus, if one comes into the presence of another, as a beggar, servant, laborer, mechanic, trader, merchant, farmer, lawyer, physician, clergyman, or public officer; or if it be a female, or child of either sex; there may be very various

modes of receiving these different persons. Yet, certainly, by every one of the laws, which we are endeavoring to illustrate, these several persons are entitled to civility. Even the beggar, perhaps one should rather say the beggar in particular, if not de formed by voluntary transgression, should be received with civility. That is, gentleness, kindness, decorum are to be observed relatively to each one. Why? because no man can afford to be deemed insensible to the calls of reasonable humanity; nor a stranger to the decencies of life; nor ignorant of what is due from him, nor to him, in any of his proper relations.

314. We may find many illustrations, and fill ever so many pages with them. Let us take one which will concern the greatest number. In this country a stage-coach, and a steamboat, bring many persons into a small space, who may be utterly ignorant of each others existence, until they meet. They have a common object, that is, to be transported in the same vehicle, from the point of departure, to that of destination. Circumstances compel them to be very close to each other, and each one has the power of being very disagreeable to each one of the others, in a variety of well known modes. Let us suppose that each one consults merely his own interest, including in that, his own self-respect, the reasonable good will which each man desires from all others, and the ever present principle of doing as he would be done by. He shows that he is sensible of the presence of his fellow-men; that he thinks them of sufficient consequence to wish to have their good opinion; that he is attentive to their comfort, or convenience; that he is disposed to learn something from them, or communicate something; or to join with them in disposing of the time in which one has nothing to do, but to be carried. Take the other side of the picture ;-he puts himself in the best place; takes out his cigar, lights it from a pocket apparatus, and goes to smoking, without asking who likes, or dislikes tobacco smoke; he sees no one, speaks to no one, and endeavors to

hear no one; if spoken to, he answers in a coarse monosyllable, and in a tone which prevents all further attempt at intercourse with him. If he make his presence known at all, beyond his sullen sitting there, it is by some selfish exclamation; or contemptuous ejaculation, on what is passing within. his notice. Which of these two persons is civil; which of them is making the most of human life which of them is attracting good will; which of them ought to like himself the best; which of them will have the most to look back upon, with pleasure? Which of them is a rational, sensible, welldisposed human being, and which of them is a selfish brute?

315. There is one other consideration which operates on all men, who have had much experience in the world. Men and things change, and take new and unexpected relations. Persons who have been long, and even intimately connected, suddenly, or gradually, sever; persons who have known little of each other, and that little uninteresting or unfavorable, are brought in contact, by some unexpected turn of affairs. Sometimes one needs favors, or at least good will, from those, whom he never thought to be of the least importance to him. In such, and in a multitude of other circumstances, one may find the advantages of having been acquainted with the virtue of civility. There are other cases, in which one is called on by duty to do things disagreeable to himself, and exceedingly so to others. But there is no good sense in performing such duty morosely, and with inhumanity. As the laws now are, one may be authorized and required to put another to death. There is no reason why even such an act as that should not be done civilly.

316. Politeness. This word is derived from the Latin polio, to polish. The quality of politeness is one to which few persons attain, if the following definition of it (from a respectable writer) be a just one. "Politeness requires peculiar properties of the head and heart, natural and artificial; much