Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

regard death as is commonly done? Are not the fine feelings of our nature called into service to make of death, that which it is not? The innocent, the virtuous, and the pious, have no fear to die. Why, then, should it be dressed up in terrors, shrouded in mysteries, and made to be frightful, any more than other events, in the common order of the natural world? It is to the wicked and impious only, that death should be terrible.*

379. The following remarks may be well worth the attention of considerate persons.

'MOURNING APPAREL. A sensible writer in the Connecticut Observer states the following objections to the foolish fashion, which has so long prevailed in relation to mourning apparel :

1. As a general practice it is no real expression of grief for the loss of our friends, nor is it so considered. It is adopted by all classes; by the covetous heir, whose heart beats with joy at any event which puts him in possession of his idol, as well as by those who are affected with the purest emotions of genuine sorrow. An English writer has remarked that "the very time that a man shall mourn, and the very time that he shall half mourn, and the very time he shall cease to mourn, are fixed for him by the world, whatever may be the duration of his own sorrow!

[ocr errors]

2. It is no mark of respect for departed relatives. The dark habiliments are assumed, whether the deceased was virtuous or vicious, honest or fraudulent, sober or intemperate; whether he was a man or a fool, a Christian or an infidel, a blessing or a curse to society.

row.

3. It imparts no consolation to the bosom of sorIt alleviates not the wo which flows from a

* In one of the accounts of George Washington's last moments, the scene is represented thus: Every thing that professional skill could do having failed to relieve Washington, his attendants remained silent spectators at his bedside. Perceiving that they were painfully affected at his situation, and could not suppress their tears, he said, with a complacent smile, I am dying, gentlemen; but, thank God I am not afraid to die.'

bereaved heart. It offers no balm to its wounds. It equally fails to assuage excessive grief, and to excite that which is proper.

4. As a memento of departed worth it is superfluous. The heart of true friendship needs it not; the object of its affection is engraven there too deeply to be effaced. The mock mourner is unaf

fected by its sable hue.

5. It conveys no moral or religious instruction to the mind. It excites no mourning for sin; no submission to God; no parting with the world; no desires for heaven. Neither the solemn realities of the scene of death, nor the affecting and admonitory truths of the word of God, can be enforced by it.

'Our objections to the custom are founded principally on its positive evils :

1. It is extravagant, and absorbs a large amount of funds which might be appropriated to far more useful purposes.

2. It presents strong temptation to pride and dishonesty, and has often robbed the widow and fatherless of their bread, and the creditor of his due.

3. It is a violation of the command, "Be ye not conformed to this world."

4. It diverts the attention from the voice of the Almighty in his instructive Providence. It occupies the mind, as well as the hands in that solemn period, which is so peculiarly favorable for the soul to retire within itself and contemplate its character and destiny.'

If such changes should be made as the good sense of these remarks calls for, those who make the law of fashion, and who can decide as to what shall be imitated, must begin.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Civil Society.

DUTIES.

380. Why should one man have a better house, more land, better garments, and better food than another? Why should one man have things convenient, comfortable, or even luxurious, without labor, while another must work all the day to obtain things of the first necessity? Why should not any one take and use whatsoever he sees; why should one pay money to make roads which he never passes over; and to maintain schools to which he sends no child; or to support paupers, who are entirely unknown to him? Why should a few men assemble, debate, and make laws, which other men are to judge of, and apply; and still other men execute, or carry into effect? Can it be right that one, or three or four men, should have power to deprive hundreds, in the course of a few years, of their natural liberty, and even to condemn some of. them to death? Is it not much more agreeable to natural justice, that every one who thinks himself injured, should be his own judge of right and wrong, and inflict such punishment as he thinks proper, on the transgressor?

381. Writers on natural law, would answer such questions by saying, that all men are, by nature, free to do as they dare, or please to do; and that each one is independent of all others, and governed by no law but fear, or force. This, such writers call, the state of nature. That men, being in such state, found from experience, or anticipated, that it would be better for them to make a contract, or social compact, each one with all the others, to enter into a state of society, and give up some of these natural rights, and to become civilized. If this theory is sound, when did the people of Massachusetts, for example, leave the state of nature, and

enter into that of society? Was it when the Pilgrims landed? Were the Pilgrims in a state of nature? They were not when they left their native land, and they were undoubtedly civilized, while they were on the ocean, and after they found the shore. The contract must be sought further back. Was it made by those from whom the Pilgrims may have been descended, that is, by the Normans, the Saxons, the Danes, or the Britons, by each of whom England was (in whole or in part) successively possessed? Suppose one could arrive at a time when any barbarous people entertained an opinion, that it was best for them to change from their natural condition to a social one, how did they effect their object? What was the form, and substance, of the contract? It is difficult to suppose that authors so eminent, intended to be literally understood. It is more respectful to them to believe, that they intended only an illustrative fiction, which having been literally understood has led to some confusion.

382. It is not easy to comprehend what is intended by a state of nature as distinguished from a state of society. There cannot be a congregation of human beings, called a nation, a people, a tribe, or horde, however rude and barbarous they may be, who have not some sort of chiefs, rulers, and judges. The rudest horde have some sense of right and wrong as social beings; it has some rules, habits and customs, as between its members, and as between the whole horde, and similar congregations of persons. As a whole, the members must have some sense of the necessity of union to defend themselves from injury, and to obtain redress for wrongs, If the native Indians of our own country be taken for an illustration, every one will admit, that when our ancestors came over, these natives were in a state of nature, if there ever was such a state. But every one knows, that they had their rulers, their laws, their customs, their own sense of right and wrong, and of justice, and of property. If an Indian of one tribe, slew an Indian of another, justice demanded that the offender, or some one of his tribe

should die. There must be blood for blood. If the cornfield of one tribe was plundered by another, reparation must be made, or war ensued. The natives had their rules of making war, and of establishing peace. There were rules as to captives. It is not perceived why such a state of things does not make society. Hence it is inferred that society is natural to man, and that no human being ever did contract to pass from a state of nature, into a state of society, any more than he contracted for his share of the running waters to slake his thirst, or for his share of the atmosphere to keep his lungs in motion. He cannot prevent being in society, whether he contract to be so, or not. The difference between the rudest horde, and the most polished nation, is, that the one has made no perceptible improvement on original condition, while the other has made all the improvement which contrasts its present condition, with its original one. This change may have been gradually made, during many successive ages, and through numberless generations; millions may have appeared, and disappeared, while the change has been going on. Thus it seems that man, can make out of society, as he can make out of himself, whatsoever will, wisdom, means, and opportunities permit.

383. In every condition in which man has been seen, he has been found to have the like wants, desires, and passions, which are seen in the most refined nations. The means of gratifying these natural propensities are very different, in different stages of improvement. The love of ornament, and of personal decoration, which are observed in an Indian princess, is precisely the same passion which is disclosed in the dress of a belle in a Parisian saloon. The leading passions of the Indian Teecumseh, and of the French Napoleon, were the same. The one wanted as much empire over civilized nations as the highest improvement of the military art could give him; the other wanted as much empire over the inhabitants of the forest, as the scalping knife, and tomahawk, could give him.

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »