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He recollects that he could repeat it; he attempts to do it, but his memory fails him. He remembers the place in which his volume of Milton is; he rises, and takes it down, resumes his place, and reads over the lines, closes his book, and finds that the lines have resumed their place in his memory, and that he can repeat them. This simple and every day occurrence is full of mysteries. What is that power of muscular motion which is so perfectly obedient to the will; the faculty of memory; the recurrence of former impressions; the connexion between thoughts recalled, or any thoughts, and the power of speech? and whence, and what, is that emotion of pleasure, found in the imaginary language of tenderness, and piety, which existed only in the mind of the poet? All this is incomprehensible, as to its causes and nature; but, it is so, and this is all that can be discerned.

107. Let such a person employ himself in calling to mind the events of his past life.

Suppose him to have arrived at the age when manhood begins. He can call to mind many events of the last year, and so can go back from year to year, till he comes to the earliest circumstances, and events, which he can remember. It is probable that such an exercise of the mind will bring to his view persons, and facts, which he has not thought of for many years; and that he will seem to see them again, with all the freshness of the first impressions. In this exercise of the mind, he cannot doubt that it was himself, and not another, who witnessed these things which he so recalls. He may be able to recollect, that in his school exercises he recited some piece of poetry, or prose, and with some effort may be able to recall it, and the very book from which he learned it, and that he can repeat the whole again. By this exercise of. the mind he satisfies himself that he has one quality, or power of the mind, to which he gives (in common with all other persons) the name of memory. He may know also, that the memory can be charged with remembering, and with preserving

what is committed to it; that by frequent calling on it to perform duties, and tasks, it will perform them more easily and effectively. There is, then, a faculty of the mind called memory, which is the subject of discipline and habit.

108. When he has thus made himself acquainted with memory, he will have attained to a certain degree of knowledge of this intellectual faculty. But what does it amount to? No more than this, viz. that he has such faculty, and can exercise it. But what it is in itself, he is no better informed than before he exercised its power. Where were those impressions stored up, which he has called to his view? How is it that he recalls them? And how is it that they do not come instantly, but often slowly, and after repeated efforts? And how is it that the memory serves him as to some things, and not as to others, which he cannot but know to have happened in relation to himself? How is it that some of his impressions are so very vivid, and clear, that by closing his eyes he seems to see the original objects again; while of others, he has only a very indistinct recollection, as though it were the fading away of a dream. All that one thus certainly knows is, that he has the faculty of memory, that it serves him for better or worse, probably from its original power, and from the discipline which he has bestowed upon it.

109. In such a process of recalling past events, one may find that his mind sometimes goes off from the proposed purpose, and engages itself in something which is incidental. Thus, if one should arrive at a point in retracing events, in which he recollects to have been one of a numerous audience, he may remember the impressions which some speaker made on him at the time, and also the subject spoken of. He may find that his mind, unbidden by him, engages itself upon the speaker, or the subject of the speech, and that the recollection of the one, or the other, or both, diverts him from following back the train of events in his own life, and that he has entirely forgotten himself, in this

new pursuit. After some time, his mind gives up this pursuit, and returns to that in which he was engaged and he will be surprised to find, how far he has wandered from the employment with which he commenced. But this incident teaches him another quality of the mind, that is, that thoughts are associated with other thoughts, and that the presence of the one introduces the other. This quality, faculty, or power, is called association of ideas.

110. This faculty of the mind has the strongest influence on human life and happiness. It is on this faculty, that intellectual eminence is principally founded. It may be divided into parts, that of having acquired the information, or knowledge, or experience, which gives to the mind the power of forming such associations; and, secondly, the readiness with which the mind makes its associations. In all intellectual operations, this principle of association takes a most active part. An act is to be done, or an act done, is to be judged of. All similar acts, and all similar judgments, have relation to these. Those who have had experience are skilful, because of the facility with which these. associations are formed in their minds. This faculty extends to all the vocations in life. Known truths, and inferences from these truths, are brought to bear on the subject to be acted upon. It is this faculty which has led to so many important discoveries in Natural Philosophy. It appears, eminently, in the mind of Sir Isaac Newton, and in that of the philosophic Lord Bacon. But it applies, alike, in all professional and mechanical employments. These associations are sometimes the fruit of laborious research, and continued labor; but repeated operations make them come uncalled for, no less in mental, than in muscular action. The principle is the same in the acts of a skilful surgeon, an extemporaneous orator, an adroit mechanic, a long practised musician, and a graceful rope-dancer. All the learning which has been devoted to intellectual operations, comes only to this result, that the mind

perceives, retains, and remembers. It applies what it has thus acquired to the acts in which it is engaged. This is common to all vocations, however varied the acts of human life may be, and however varied the knowledge with which these acts may be associated.

111. Another faculty of the mind will have been disclosed in making the proposed inquiry. The mind may, or may not be able to go back, without any deviation, in the straight line of one's experience, from manhood to infancy; and may refuse to go out of its way, or to permit anything to attract it from its direct course. This faculty of fixing the mind on the subject proposed, and excluding all things else, whatever be the subject pursued, is, in common phrase, minding what one is about; philosophers call it attention. It is very certain that those who mind, or attend to that which they undertake to do, are sure to do it sooner and better, than if the mind be often drawn off to other objects, and have to return to find where it was, and how employed when it deviated. If one have to go from one point to another on the earth, he may go in a certain space of time, or he may deviate to see every object that attracts him, and return to his path as often as he has left it, if he do not deviate so far, as to be unable to find it. It is a truth, for example, but not a self-evident one, that if one draw two triangles, having two angles of the one equal to two angles of the other, each to each; and one side equal to one side, viz. either of the sides. adjacent to the equal angles, or the sides opposite to the equal angles in each; then shall the other sides be equal, each to each; and also the third angle of the one, to the third angle of the other. But to prove that such equality exists, a process of reasoning must be gone through. To make out that proof, one must remember or associate with the demonstration he is engaged in, the elementary truths which are laid up in his memory, and which are intended to be applied in such mensuration, and he must have a faculty in associating these

truths, as he goes on, with his demonstration; and he must mind what he is doing; that is, he must give his exclusive attention to his object; for, if his mind flies off to something else, the chain of demonstration will be broken, and he will probably, nay necessarily, begin again, and form every link

anew.

112. Memory, association, and attention are all faculties of the mind, capable of discipline, education, and habits. Perhaps one could not hazard too much in saying, that the fruits of education are to be found in these three qualities, as to the ability of the mind. It is quite questionable whether these faculties are yet systematically and effectively disciplined, to their full extent. Nor is the best mode of disciplining them, probably, yet known. Memory is treated of very lightly in many schools; and whether cultivated in the best manner, in any, is very doubtful. Usually it is a painful effort to exercise the memory. Is there no way of making it pleasant, or, at least, tolerable ?

113. Every one knows, that the power of minding what one is about, or attending to that which is doing, can be subjected to obedience. If a master should be moving among his pupils, with a whip in his hand, and should make its lash felt by every inattentive boy, he would certainly fix attention on the lesson to be learned. But with older persons, and even with such pupils, other motives may be applied, and with far better effects. No one doubts that a habit of attention may be acquired, and is acquired. It is one of those qualities which enables the mind to do its best. It is sometimes considered the fair rival of genius; and to be capable of supplying its place. A man of singular eminence for intellectual power, was lately asked, by one of his familiar friends, which of the faculties of his mind had secured to him his remarkable distinction; He answered, modestly, that if he had any pretension to be superior to men, in general, in anything, it was in the ability to take up a subject, and to fix his mind on it as long as he pleased, to the exclu

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