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And this is in general harmony with the northern district of Ohio by the Interstate thought underlying extradition. Commerce Commissioners against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Com
Entertaining these views, we answer the first question in the affirmative and the sec-pany. The railway company moved to disond in the negative.
Mr. Justice Harlan did not hear the argument and took no part in the decision of this case.
(197 U. S. 536)
UNITED STATES ex rel. MARTIN A.
LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTHERN
Mandamus-original jurisdiction of Federal
A Federal circuit court has no jurisdiction under the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 552, chap. 373), of original proceedings seeking relief by mandamus.
Jurisdiction, in a Federal circuit court, of an original proceeding by mandamus to compel an interstate carrier to make the report which the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized by the Act to Regulate Commerce to require, cannot be inferred from the grant of authority to the Commission to enforce that act, or from the direction to dis
trict attorneys of the United States or the
Attorney General to institute all necessary proceedings for the enforcement of its pro
miss the petition on the ground that the court had no original jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus. The motion was granted and the writ dismissed. A certificate was duly made showing that a question of jurisdiction was in issue, and recites that the court acted not only on the motion of the railroad, but on its own motion, in dis
missing the petition for want of jurisdic
The petition alleges that the railroad company is a corporation created by the laws of the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois, and has its principal place of business in the state of Ohio, and is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, and as such. is subject to the provisions of the Act of Congress to Regulate Commerce [24 Stat. at L. 379, chap. 104, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3154].
That under § 20 of said act the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to require any common carrier subject to the act to make reports of certain matters and things, and in pursuance thereof the Commission made an order on the 3d of June, 1903, prescribing the manner and form in which said reports should be made and the contents thereof, and directed each common carrier to file the same on or before the 15th. A copy of the order was served on the railroad company, but the company failed and neglected to make out and return a report in full, in that it failed to set forth in the report made and returned by it the data or information called for, namely, "the ton
Argued February 28, 1905. Decided April nage, ton-mileage, earnings, and receipts
N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio to review a judgment which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a petition for a mandamus to compel an interstate carrier to make the report which the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized by the Act to Regulate Commerce to require. Affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. L. A. Shaver and Assistant Attorney General McReynolds for plaintiffs in
per ton per mile on grain, hay, cotton, live stock, dressed meats, anthracite coal, bituminous coal, and lumber carried in carload lots; and that said data or information required by the Commission to be given in said report by respondent is necessary to enable the Commission to perform the duties and carry out the objects for which it was created, in the interest of the public, and that promptness by carriers in furnishing the same on or before the 15th day of September of each year, as required by the Commission, is essential for the purpose, among others, of enabling the Commission to make a full and complete annual report
Mr. George C. Greene for defendant in to Congress, which, by § 21 of said Act to
Regulate Commerce, is required to be transmitted to said body on or before December
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the 1st of each year." opinion of the court:
Petition for mandamus filed in the circuit court of the United States for the
It is also alleged that there is no adequate remedy except that afforded by mandamus. It is admitted that under the judiciary
act of 1789 (1 Stat. at L. 73, chap. 20) and But in what way? Manifestly only in the act of 1875, as construed by this court, such way as the courts have jurisdiction to a circuit court of the United States has no give. All powers are given in view of that jurisdiction of an original proceeding seek- jurisdiction, and the amendments of the Ining relief by mandamus. And counsel, not terstate Commerce Act are so framed. Juto minimize the admission, quotes the cases risdiction to issue mandamus is conferred in which that has been laid down and the by § 6 to enforce the filing or publishing by text books which have expressed the doc- a common carrier of its schedules or tariffs trine as settled. But it is suggested that of rates, fares, and charges. And such juunder the act of 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 552, risdiction is also given to the circuit courts chap. 373), a different ruling should be and district courts upon the relation of any made. No change in language is pointed person or persons, firm or corporation, alout which would justify such change in rul- leging a violation of any of the provisions ing, but we are urged to that radical course of the act, which prevents the relator from in view of the modern development of pro- having interstate traffic moved on terms as ceedings by mandamus, and the very great favorable as any other shipper. The remimportance of the remedy thereby. We are edy is expressly made cumulative of the not impressed by the invocation. We are other remedies provided by the act. It is anable to understand how language confer- clear, therefore, when Congress intended to ring jurisdiction on a court can take a new give the power to issue mandamus it exmeaning from the circumstances suggested. pressed that intention explicitly. Such Difference in remedies is conspicuous in our power cannot be inferred from the grant of Jurisprudence, and some remedies are of authority to the Commission to enforce the that nature that they can be enforced only act, or from the direction to district attorunder exceptional circumstances and under neys or the Attorney General to institute special grants of power. Of this kind is "all necessary proceedings for the enforcemandamus, and if Congress had intended by ment of the provisions" of the act (§ 12). the act of 1887 to confer power on the cir- The proceedings meant are, as we have said, cuit courts to issue mandamus in an orig- those within the jurisdiction of the court. inal proceeding, Congress would not have And special remedies are given. For inemployed the language which had been con- stance, by § 16 a summary proceeding in strued from the foundation of the govern-equity is authorized, and the form of the ment not to give such jurisdiction. We adhere, therefore, to the prior cases. 2. Congress has undoubtedly power to auess, mandatory or otherwise." thorize a circuit court to issue a mandamus
ultimate order of the court may be that of a "writ of injunction or other proper proc
Without attempting now to define the extent of that section, we may say, it seems adequate to enable the Commission to enforce any order it is authorized to make. Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented.
(198 U. S. 45) JOSEPH LOCHNER, Plff. in Err., PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. Master and servant-validity of state regu
in an original proceeding. Kendail v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 9 L. ed. 1181; United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 378, 26 L. ed. 167. But has Congress done so, as contended, by §§ 12 and 20 of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended? Under § 12 the Commission is given the authority to inquire into the management of the business of common carriers subject to the act. and has the right to obtain from the carriers full and complete information to enable it to perform its duties. It is also authorized to enforce the provisions of the act. By 20 the Commission may require annual reports, and fix the time and prescribe the manner in which such reports shall be made. And it is made the duty of any disirict attorney of the United States to whom the Commission may apply, to institute in the proper court and to prosecute under the direction of the Attorney General all necessary proceedings for the enforcement of the provisions of this act. It is hence contended that the power of the Commission to require the report stated in the petition is undoubted, and, having power to order the report to be made, the Commission has the Argued February 23, 24, 1905. Decided power to enforce obedience to the order.
lation of hours of labor-ten-hour law for bakers-freedom to contract.
The limitation of employment in bakeries to sixty hours a week and ten hours a day, attempted by N. Y. Laws 1897, chap. 415, art. 8, § 110, is an arbitrary interference with the freedom to contract guaranteed by U. S. Const. 14th Amend., which cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power to protect the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
April 17, 1905.
IN N ERROR to the County Court of Oneida | mitted the crime of misdemeanor, second ofCounty, State of New York, to review a fense. fense. The plaintiff in error demurred to judgment entered pursuant to the mandate the indictment on several grounds, one of of the Court of Appeals of that state affirm- which was that the facts stated did not ing the judgment of the Appellate Division constitute a crime. The demurrer was overof the Supreme Court, Fourth Department, ruled, and, the plaintiff in error having rewhich had itself affirmed a conviction in fused to plead further, a plea of not guilty the Oneida County Court of a violation of was entered by order of the court and the the labor law of that state by permitting an trial commenced, and he was convicted of employee in a bakery to work more than misdemeanor, second offense, as indicted, sixty hours in one week. Judgments of all and sentenced to pay a fine of $50, and to the courts below reversed, and the cause re- stand committed until paid, not to exceed manded to the Oneida County Court for fifty days in the Oneida county jail. further proceedings. A certificate of reasonable doubt was granted by the county judge of Oneida county, whereon an appeal was taken to the appellate division of the supreme court, fourth department, where the judgment of conviction was affirmed. 73 App. Div. 120, 76 N. Y. Supp. 396. A further appeal was then taken to the court of appeals, where the judgment of conviction was again affirmed. 177 N. Y. 145, 101 Am. St. Rep. 773, 69 N. E. 373.
See same case below in Appellate Division, 73 App. Div. 120, 76 N. Y. Supp. 396,, and in Court of Appeals, 177 N. Y. 145, 101 Am. St. Rep. 773, 69 N. E. 373.
Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: This is a writ of error to the county court of Oneida county, in the state of New York (to which court the record had been remitted), to review the judgment of the court of appeals of that state, affirming the judgment of the supreme court, which itself affirmed the judgment of the county court, convicting the defendant of a misdemeanor on an indictment under a statute of that state, known, by its short title, as the labor law. The section of the statute under which the indictment was found is § 110, and is reproduced in the margin † (together with the other sections of the labor law upon the subject of bakeries, being §§ 111 to 115, both inclusive).
The indictment averred that the defendant "wrongfully and unlawfully required and permitted an employee working for him in his biscuit, bread, and cake bakery and confectionery establishment, at the city of Utica, in this county, to work more than sixty hours in one week," after having been theretofore convicted of a violation of the Ame act; and therefore, as averred, he com
Messrs. Frank Harvey Field and Henry Weismann (by special leave) for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Julius M. Mayer for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the foregoing statement of the facts, delivered the opinion of the court:
The indictment, it will be seen, charges that the plaintiff in error violated the 110th section of article 8, chapter 415, of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor law of the state of New York, in that he wrongfully and unlawfully required and permitted an employee working for him to work more than sixty hours in one week. There is nothing in any of the opinions delivered in this case, either in the supreme court or the court of appeals of the state, which
§ 110. Hours of labor in bakeries and con- or buildings. No cellar or basement, not now fectionery establishments.—No employee shall used for a bakery, shall hereafter be so occube required or permitted to work in a biscuit, pied or used, unless the proprietor shall combread, or cake bakery or confectionery estab-ply with the sanitary provisions of this arlishment more than sixty hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of making a shorter work day on the last day of the week; nor more hours in any one week than will make an average of ten hours per day for the number of days during such week in which such employee shall work.
"§ 112. Requirements as to rooms, furniture, utensils, and manufactured products.-Every room used for the manufacture of flour or meal food products shall be at least 8 feet in height and shall have, if deemed necessary by the factory inspector, an impermeable floor constructed of cement, or of tiles laid in ce"§ 111. Drainage and plumbing of buildings ment, or an additional flooring of wood propand rooms occupied by bakeries.—All buildings erly saturated with linseed oil. The side walls or rooms occupied as biscuit, bread, pie, or cake of such rooms shall be plastered or wainscoted. bakeries, shall be drained and plumbed in a The factory inspector may require the side manner conducive to the proper and healthful walls and ceiling to be whitewashed at least sanitary condition thereof, and shall be con- once in three months. He may also require structed with air shafts, windows, or ventilat- the wood work of such walls to be painted. ing pipes, sufficient to insure ventilation. The The furniture and utensils shall be so arranged factory inspector may direct the proper drain- as to be readily cleansed and not prevent the age, plumbing, and ventilation of such rooms' proper cleaning of any part of the room. The
strues the section, in using the word "re- | out due process of law. The right to purquired," as referring to any physical force chase or to sell labor is part of the liberty being used to obtain the labor of an em- protected by this amendment, unless there ployee. It is assumed that the word means are circumstances which exclude the right. nothing more than the requirement arising There are, however, certain powers, existing from voluntary contract for such labor in in the sovereignty of each state in the excess of the number of hours specified in Union, somewhat vaguely termed police the statute. There is no pretense in any of powers, the exact description and limitation the opinions that the statute was intended of which have not been attempted by the to meet a case of involuntary labor in any courts. Those powers, broadly stated, and form. All the opinions assume that there without, at present, any attempt at a more is no real distinction, so far as this ques- specific limitation, relate to the safety, tion is concerned, between the words "re- health, morals, and general welfare of the quired" and "permitted." The mandate of public. Both property and liberty are held the statute, that "no employee shall be re- on such reasonable conditions as may be quired or permitted to work," is the sub-imposed by the governing power of the state stantial equivalent of an enactment that in the exercise of those powers, and with "no employee shall contract or agree to such conditions the 14th Amendment was work," more than ten hours per day; not designed to interfere. Mugler v. and, as there is no provision for special Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 emergencies, the statute is statute is mandatory in all cases. It is not an act merely fixing the number of hours which shall constitute a legal day's work, but an absolute prohibition upon the employer permitting, under any circumstances, more than ten hours' work to be done in his establishment. The employee may desire to earn the extra money which would arise from his working more than the prescribed time, but this statute forbids the employer from permitting the employee to earn it.
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer and employees, concerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer. The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. Under that provision no state can deprive any person of life, liberty, or property withmanufactured flour or meal food products shall be kept in dry and airy rooms, so arranged that the floors, shelves, and all other facilities for storing the same can be properly cleaned. No domestic animals, except cats, shall be allowed to remain in a room used as a biscuit, bread, pie, or cake bakery, or any room in such bakery where flour or meal products are stored.
"§ 113. Wash rooms and closets; sleeping places. Every such bakery shall be provided with a proper wash room and water-closet, or water-closets, apart from the bake room, or
rooms where the manufacture of such food prod
uct is conducted, and no water-closet, earth closet, privy, or ashpit shall be within, or connected directly with, the bake room of any bakery, hotel, or public restaurant.
Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. ed. 519, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 34 L. ed. 620, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13; Re Converse, 137 U. S. 624, 34 L. ed. 796, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191.
The state, therefore, has power to prevent the individual from making certain kinds of contracts, and in regard to them the Federal Constitution offers no protection. If the contract be one which the state, in the legitimate exercise of its police power, has the right to prohibit, it is not prevented from prohibiting it by the 14th Amendment. Contracts in violation of a statute, either of the Federal or state government, or a contract to let one's property for immoral purposes, or to do any other unlawful act, could obtain no protection from the Federal Constitution, as coming under the liberty of person or of free contract. Therefore, when the state, by its legislature, in the assumed exercise of its police powers, has passed an act which seriously limits the ing places are on the same floor where such products are manufactured, stored, or sold, the factory inspector may inspect and order them put in a proper sanitary condition.
"§ 114. Inspection of bakeries.-The factory inspector shall cause all bakeries to be inspected. If it be found upon such inspection that the bakeries so inspected are constructed and con.
ducted in compliance with the provisions of this chapter, the factory inspector shall issue a cer
tificate to the person owning or conducting such bakeries.
the opinion of the factory inspector, alterations "§ 115. Notice requiring alterations.—If, in are required in or upon premises occupied and used as bakeries, in order to comply with the provisions of this article, a written notice shall be served by him upon the owner, agent, or "No person shall sleep in a room occupied lessee of such premises, either personally or by as a bake room. Sleeping places for the per- mail, requiring such alterations to be made sons employed in the bakery shall be separate within sixty days after such service, and such from the rooms where flour or meal food prod-alterations shall be made accordingly." [N. Y. ucts are manufactured or stored. If the sleep- Laws 1897, chap 415.]
right to labor or the right of contract in | can fix the hours of labor in other employregard to their means of livelihood between ments." persons who are sui juris (both employer and employee), it becomes of great importance to determine which shall prevail,-the right of the individual to labor for such time as he may choose, or the right of the state to prevent the individual from laboring, or from entering into any contract to labor, beyond a certain time prescribed by the state.
It will be observed that, even with regard to that class of labor, the Utah statute provided for cases of emergency wherein the provisions of the statute would not apply. The statute now before this court has no emergency clause in it, and, if the statute is valid, there are no circumstances and no emergencies under which the slightest violation of the provisions of the act would be innocent. There is nothing in Holden v. Hardy which covers the case now before us. Nor does Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 48 L. ed. 148, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124, touch the case at bar. The Atkin Case was decided upon the right of the state to control its municipal corporations, and to prescribe the conditions upon which it will permit work of a public character to be done for a municipality. Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 46 L. ed. 55, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, is equally far from an authority for this legislation. The employees in that case were held to be at a disadvantage with the employer in matters of wages, they being miners and coal workers, and the act simply provided for the cashing of coal orders when presented by the miner to the employer.
The latest case decided by this court, involving the police power, is that of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, decided at this term and reported in 197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358, 49 L. ed. —. It related to compulsory vaccination, and the law was held valid as a proper exercise of the police powers with reference to the public health. It was stated in the opinion that it was a case "of an adult who, for aught that appears, was himself in perfect health and a fit subject of vaccination, and yet, while re
This court has recognized the existence and upheld the exercise of the police powers of the states in many cases which might fairly be considered as border ones, and it has, in the course of its determination of questions regarding the asserted invalidity of such statutes, on the ground of their violation of the rights secured by the Federal Constitution, been guided by rules of a very liberal nature, the application of which has resulted, in numerous instances, in upholding the validity of state statutes thus assailed. Among the later cases where the state law has been upheld by this court is that of Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. A provision in the act of the legislature of Utah was there under consideration, the act limiting the employment of workmen in all underground mines or workings, to eight hours per day, day, "except in cases of emergency, where life or property is in imminent danger." It also limited the hours of labor in smelting and other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals to eight hours per day, except in like cases of emergency. The act was held to be a valid exercise of the police powers of the state. A review of many of the cases on the subject, decided by this and other courts, is given in the opinion. It was held that the kind of employment, min-maining in the community, refused to obey ing, smelting, etc., and the character of the employees in such kinds of labor, were such as to make it reasonable and proper for the state to interfere to prevent the employees from being constrained by the rules laid down by the proprietors in regard to labor. The following citation from the observations of the supreme court of Utah Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164, 44 L. in that case was made by the judge writing ed. 716, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666, was upheld the opinion of this court, and approved: as a proper exercise of the police power re"The law in question is confined to the pro-lating to the observance of Sunday, and the tection of that class of people engaged in case held that the legislature had the right labor in underground mines, and in smelters to declare that, as matter of law, keeping and other works wherein ores are reduced barber shops open on Sunday was not a and refined. This law applies only to the work of necessity or charity. classes subjected by their employment to the It must, of course, be conceded that there peculiar conditions and effects attending is a limit to the valid exercise of the police underground mining and work in smelters, power by the state. There is no dispute conand other works for the reduction and re- cerning this general proposition. Otherwise fining of ores. Therefore it is not necessary the 14th Amendment would have no efficacy to discuss or decide whether the legislature' and the legislatures of the states would
the statute and the regulation, adopted in