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Embree v. Hanna, 5 Johns. 110, was recog- | against him, to Epstein, he certainly ought nized as correct. There are, as we have not to be compelled to pay it a second time, said, authorities to the contrary, and they but should have the right to plead his paycannot be reconciled. ment under the Maryland judgment. It is objected, however, that the payment by Harris to Epstein was not under legal compulsion. Harris in truth owed the debt to Balk, which was attached by Epstein. Hev had, therefore, as we have seen, no defense to set up against the attachment of the debt. Jurisdiction over him personally had been obtained by the Maryland court. As he was absolutely without defense, there was no reason why he should not consent to a judgment impounding the debt, which judgment the plaintiff was legally entitled to, and which he could not prevent. There was no merely voluntary payment within the meaning of that phrase as applicable here.
It seems to us, however, that the principle decided in Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 43 L. ed. 1144, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, recognizes the jurisdiction, although in that case it appears that the presence of the garnishee was not merely a temporary one in the state where the process was served. In that case it was said: "All debts are payable everywhere unless there be some special limitation or provision in respect to the payment; the rule being that debts, as such, have no locus or situs, but accompany the creditor everywhere, and authorize a demand upon the debtor everywhere. 2 Parsons, Contracts, 8th ed. 702 [9th ed. 739]. The debt involved in the But most rights may be lost by negli pending case had no 'special limitation or gence, and if the garnishee were guilty of provision in respect to payment.' It was negligence in the attachment proceeding, to payable generally, and could have been sued the damage of Balk, he ought not to be peron in Iowa, and therefore was attachable in mitted to set up the judgment as a defense. Iowa. This is the principle and effect of Thus it is recognized as the duty of the garthe best considered cases, the inevitable ef- nishee to give notice to his own creditor, if fect from the nature of transitory actions he would protect himself, so that the credand the purpose of foreign attachment laws, itor may have the opportunity to defend if we would enforce that purpose." The himself against the claim of the person sucase recognizes the right of the creditor to ing out the attachment. This duty is afsue in the state where the debtor may be firmed in the case above cited of Morgan v. found, even if but temporarily there; and Neville, 74 Pa. 52, and is spoken of in Chiupon that right is built the further right of cago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. the creditor to attach the debt owing by the 710, 43 L. ed. 1144, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797, algarnishee to his creditor. The importance though it is not therein actually decided to of the fact of the right of the original cred-be necessary, because in that case notice was itor to sue his debtor in the foreign state, as affecting the right of the creditor of that creditor to sue the debtor or garnishee, lies in the nature of the attachment proceeding. The plaintiff in such proceeding in the foreign state is able to sue out the attachment and attach the debt due from the garnishee to his (the garnishee's) creditor, because of the fact that the plaintiff is really, in such proceeding, a representative of the creditor of the garnishee, and therefore if such creditor himself had the right to commence suit to recover the debt in the foreign state, his representative has the same right, as representing him, and may garnish or attach the debt, provided the municipal law of the state where the attachment was sued out permits
given and defense made. While the want of
It seems to us, therefore, that the judg-writ of execution unless the plaintiff gave ment against Harris in Maryland, condemning the $180 which he owed to Balk, was a valid judgment, because the court had jurisdiction over the garnishee by personal service of process within the state of Maryland. It ought to be and it is the object of courts to prevent the payment of any debt twice over. Thus, if Harris, owing a debt to Balk, paid it under a valid judgment
bond or sufficient security before the court awarding the execution, to make restitution of the money paid if the defendant should, at any time within a year and a day, appear in the action and show that the plaintiff's claim, or some part thereof, was not due to the plaintiff. The defendant in error, Balk, had notice of this attachment, certainly within a few days after the issuing thereof
and the entry of judgment thereon, because | 3.
Generally, though, the failure on the part of the garnishee to give proper notice to his
One of two corporations bearing the same name, but incorporated in different states, will be restrained by an ancillary suit from assailing the title of a purchaser under a decree of a Federal court, foreclosing a trust deed executed under the common corporate name and describing the property as lying in both states, by a suit in a state court, which proceeds on the theory that the real grantor was the corporation which was a citizen of the same state with the plaintiff, and therefore was not and could not have been made a party defendant without ousting the Federal court of jurisdiction, where the purpose of the double incorporation was the development of a single plant, and all the proceedings were had on the supposition that there was but a single entity, which was indebted, and gave the trust deed as security for such indebtedness.
creditor of the levying of the attachment Argued April 5, 6, 1905. Decided May 8, would be such a neglect of duty on the part of the garnishee which he owed to his creditor as would prevent his availing himself of the judgment in the attachment suit as a bar to the suit of his creditor against himself, which might therefore result, in his be-versed a decree of the Circuit Court for the ing called upon to pay the debt twice.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this court. Reversed.
N WRIT of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to review a decree which re
Northern District of Georgia, enjoining the further prosecution of a suit in the Chancery Court of the First District of the Northeastern Division, State of Alabama, and remanded the cause with instructions to dismiss the bill. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed, and that of the Circuit
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Day Court affirmed. dissented.
(198 U. S. 188)
ALABAMA & GEORGIA MANUFACTURING COMPANY and Huguley Manufacturing Company.
Federal courts-conclusiveness of judgments in state courts—ancillary jurisdiction— enjoining proceedings in state court.
See same case below, 62 C. C. A. 295, 127 Fed. 497.
Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: On February 7, 1866, an act passed the Alabama legislature incorporating five persons named, their associates and successors, as "The Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Company." On March 21, 1866, the Georgia als under the same name, "The Alabama & legislature incorporated the same individuGeorgia Manufacturing Company." The purposes of the two corporations were identical. Among others, the use of the water power of the Chattahoochee river, the boundary line between Alabama and Georgia, was contemplated, and the Georgia act specifically authorized the corporation "to carry on any of the business and manufactures, or 2. A Federal court which has decreed a fore- any branch or branches of the same, in this closure in a suit in which diverse citizenship state, that said charter authorizes them to was alleged and admitted, and the property was described as lying partly in the state, engage in or carry on in the state of Alamay, by an ancillary suit, restrain any at- bama." On January 2, 1884, the Alabama & tack on the title of the purchaser under the Georgia Manufacturing Company executed a decree by a suit in a state court, brought trust deed, conveying property, situate partby a party to the original suit, which pro-ly in Georgia and partly in Alabama, but
1. Judgments or decrees of a Federal court whose jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of diverse citizenship, which is alleged and admitted, cannot be collaterally assailed in a state court on the ground that there was in fact no diverse citizenship.*
ceeds on the theory that, by reason of his own untruthful admission of citizenship, the Federal court assumed a jurisdiction which in fact it did not have.†
practically only a single plant, to J. J. Robinson, W. C. Yancey, and W. T. Huguley, as trustees, to secure the payment of sixty-five
*Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 30, Cent. Dig. Judgment, §§ 1511, 1512. +Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 13, Cent. Dig. Courts, § 1418.
thousand dollars of the mortgage bonds. | was commenced by one of the trustees, J. J. There is nothing in the trust deed to indi- Robinson, in the United States circuit court cate whether it was executed by the Alabama corporation or the Georgia corporation, except it be the mention of West Point, Georgia, as the location of the company's of
for the northern district of Georgia; that the parties named as defendants therein were the Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Company, alleged to be a corporation organized under the laws of Georgia, the said Huguley Manufacturing Company, and W. T. Huguley. The bill set out with some detail the proceedings in the circuit court of Georgia, but alleged that they were null and void so far as concerns the title of the plaintiffs in that suit. The bill sought to redeem the property described from the lien of the bonds and trust deed. On June 10, 1901, this petitioner, a corporation which had acquired all the title to the property described in the trust deed, passing under the foreclosure proceedings hereinbefore referred to, filed in the circuit court for the northern district of Georgia an ancillary bill to restrain the further prosecution of the suit in the state court in Alabama. A temporary injunction was issued, which, on final hearing, was made perpetual. Thereupon defendants took an appeal to the circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit, which reversed the decree of the circuit court, and ordered that the case be remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss the bill. The case was then brought here on certiorari.
On February 28, 1890, the Huguley Manufacturing Company was incorporated under the laws of the state of Alabama, and subsequently acquired by purchase all the property included within the trust deed. Default having been made in the payment of interest on the bonds, Robinson, one of the trustees, and a citizen of Alabama, on January 21, 1891, filed a bill of foreclosure in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Georgia against the Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Company, the Huguley Manufacturing Company, each of which was alleged to have been created under the laws of the state of Georgia, and a resident and citizen of that state, and against W. T. Huguley, also averred to be a citizen of the state of Georgia, and all three residing within the northern district of Georgia. In the bill the plaintiff alleged that Yancey, one of the trustees, was dead; that Huguley, the other trustee, was interested adversely to the bondholders, and that plaintiff was, therefore, the only one authorized to bring the suit. A vast amount of litigation concerning the property has followed the commencement of this foreclosure suit, as partially appears from the following references: Robinson v. Alabama & G. Mfg. Co. (1891) 48 Fed. 12, (1892) 51 Fed. 268, (1893) 6 C. C. A. 79, 13 U. S. App. 359, 56 Fed. 690, (1894) 67 Fed. 189, (1896) 19 C. C. A. 152, 30 U. S. App. 683, 72 Fed. 708, (1898) 89 Fed. 218; Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills (1899) 36 C. C. A. 236, 94 Fed. 269, (1899) 175 U. S. 726, 44 L. ed. 339, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1022; Riverdale Cotton Mills v. Alabama & G. Mfg. Co. (1901) 111 Fed. 431; Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills (1902) 184 U. S. 290, 46 L. ed. 546, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 452; Re Huguley Mfg. Co. (1902) 184 U. S. 297, 46 L. ed. 549, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 455; Alabama & G.pany. In the course of that litigation deMfg. Co. v. Riverdale Cotton Mills (1904) 62 C. C. A. 295, 127 Fed. 497.
On May 2, 1901, the Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Company of Alabama and the Huguley Manufacturing Company of the same state filed their bill in the chancery court of the first district of the northeastern division of the state of Alabama, in which they alleged that the plaintiff the Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Company was at one time the owner of the property included within the trust deed hereinbefore referred to; that it executed that deed to the parties named as trustees; that a foreclosure suit
Messrs. Louis D. Brandeis, Thomas H. Watts, and William H. Dunbar for petitioner.
Messrs. Marion Erwin, John T. Morgan, John M. Chilton, William S. Thorington, and Robert Porter Shick, for respondents.
Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:
For over ten years from January 21, 1891, the date of the filing of the original bill, litigation was carried on in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Georgia, and in appellate courts, in the foreclosure of a trust deed executed by the Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Com
crees were entered and reversed, sales were made and set aside, possession of property was transferred and retransferred, accountings had as to the proceeds of property in possession, and when it seemed that at last litigation was at an end, the foreclosure consummated, and the title established in the purchaser, we are told that it all amounted to nothing; that parties, lawyers, and courts have been spending their time and labor in simply beating the air, the title to the property conveyed by the trust deed being exactly where it was before the litigation commenced, and the party which had acquired
possession by that litigation subject to an obligation to account as a mortgagee in possession.
Upon what is this contention based? The respondents say that the property conveyed by the trust deed was all in Alabama, although the deed recites that part of it was in Georgia; that it originally belonged to the Alabama company; that that company executed the trust deed, although the resolution incorporated in the trust deed purports to have been passed at a meeting of the directors, held at the office of the company in West Point, Georgia; that the Alabama company was not made a party to the foreclosure proceedings, and could not have been, because the plaintiff was a citizen of Alabama, and making the Alabama company a defendant would have ousted the court of jurisdiction; that the subsequent owner of the property, another Alabama company, was also not made a party to those proceedings, and that therefore they were res inter alios acta, and in no way binding upon either Alabama company. It is also insisted by the respondents that the so-called ancillary bill filed by the petitioner was not, in any sense of the term, an ancillary, but in fact an original bill, and that under Rev. Stat. § 720, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 581, the Federal court had no power to restrain the further proceedings in the state chancery
of Alabama, never has been made a defendant thereto, and never appeared as a party to said cause, the president of said corporation, to wit, W. H. Huguley, himself likewise a citizen and resident of the county of Chambers, state of Alabama, never having been served with notice either of said alleged default of interest, as expressly required under the terms of the trust deed, or notice of said suit of foreclosure against said Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Company. No attempt was made, by either direct or ancillary proceedings, to subject the property lying in the state of Alabama to this suit. A portion of the property was erroneously described in the said mortgage as lying within the county of Harris, in the state of Georgia, while the orators aver that all of said property was and is situated within the county of Chambers, in the state of Alabama.
"The property was not advertised in the state of Alabama, nor was any sale or pretense of sale conducted in said state." And again
"The Huguley Manufacturing Company, a corporation, avers that it purchased and acquired all the property hereinabove described, subject to said mortgage, and is now the owner of the same, subject to said mortgage."
The answer filed to the ancillary bill alleges that both plaintiffs in the state court were corporations chartered under the laws of Alabama. It further states:
"That while said Alabama & Georgia Man
Prima facie, the United States circuit court had jurisdiction of the foreclosure bill. Diverse citizenship was alleged and admitted, and the relief sought was the foreclos-ufacturing Co. may have been incorporated ure of a trust deed covering property partially in Georgia and partially in Alabama. The bill in the state court challenged the decree in the United States circuit court, denied its efficacy to transfer title, on the ground that the Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Company (the grantor in the trust deed, and the original owner of the property) and the Huguley Manufacturing Company (a purchaser and subsequent owner) were both corporations of Alabama, and citizens of the same state with the plaintiff, whereby a case was presented of which the Federal courts could not take jurisdiction. The specific allegations were these:
in the state of Georgia, it was also incorporated in the state of Alabama prior to the incorporation in the state of Georgia. And these respondents aver that there never was, by the action of the state of Georgia and Alabama, any merger or consolidation of said two corporations. They therefore allege that said Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Company, incorporated under the laws of Alabama, was a distinct and separate legal entity from the Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Company incorporated under the laws of Georgia.
"That while said Huguley Manufacturing Company was alleged in said bill to have been incorporated under the laws of Georgia, the defendants aver that as a matter of fact it was never so incorporated."
It also avers that the property is all in the state of Alabama. The case was submitted on bill and answer.
"That a corporation known as the 'Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Company,' alleged to be a corporation organized under the laws of Georgia only, and said Huguley Manufacturing Company, together with the said W. T. Huguley, were the sole defendants to said bill, said W. T. Huguley being made defendant as cotrustee, alleged to be inter- It thus appears that a party carries on ested adversely. The Alabama & Georgia a litigation in a Federal court on its merits, Manufacturing Company, originally char- and, when beaten in that court, goes into tered and organized as a corporation under a state court, and claims that, by reason said act of the general assembly of the state of his own untruthful admission of citizen
ship, the Federal court assumed a jurisdic- | foreclosure proceedings. In the opinion it tion which in fact it could not take, and was said (p. 112, L. ed. p. 639, Sup. Ct. that all the proceedings in that court must Rep. p. 407): go for naught. Under such circumstances "If the sheriff is allowed to sell the very there can be no doubt that the Federal court property conveyed by the Federal decree, may inquire and determine whether its pro- such action has the effect to annul and set ceedings were a nullity, and such inquiry is it aside, because, in the view of the state not an original proceeding, but ancillary to court, it was ineffectual to pass the title to those which have already been had. In other the purchaser. In such case we are of opinwords, a Federal court, exercising a juris-ion that a supplemental bill may be filed in diction apparently belonging to it, may the original suit with a view to protecting thereafter, by ancillary suit, inquire whether that jurisdiction in fact existed. It may protect the title which it has decreed as against every one a party to the original suit, and prevent that party from relitigating the questions of right which have already been determined. French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250, 22 L. ed. 857; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 33 L. ed. 538, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 401, 37 L. ed. 1123, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136. In this case, on page 410, L. ed. p. 1125, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 138, it was said:
"It is well settled that a court of equity has jurisdiction to carry into effect its own orders, decrees, and judgments, which remain unreversed, when the subject-matter and the parties are the same in both proceedings. The general rule upon the subject is thus stated in Story's Equity Pleading, 9th ed. § 338: 'A supplemental bill may also be filed, as well after as before a decree; and the bill, if after a decree, may be either in aid of the decree, that it may be carried fully into execution,'
the prior jurisdiction of the Federal court, and to render effectual its decree. Central Trust Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. 59 Fed. 385; Fidelity Ins. T. & S. D. Co. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 88 Fed. 815; State Trust Co. v. Kansas City, P. & G. R. Co. 110 Fed. 10.
"In such cases where the Federal court acts in aid of its own jurisdiction, and to render its decree effectual, it may, notwithstanding Rev. Stat. § 720, restrain all proceedings in a state court which would have the effect of defeating or impairing its jurisdiction. Sharon v. Terry, 13 Sawy. 387, 1 L. R. A. 572, 36 Fed. 337, per Mr. Justice Field; French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250, 22 L. ed. 857; Deitzsch v. Huidekoper (Kern v. Huidekoper), 103 U. S. 494, 26 L. ed. 497." It must be borne in mind in this connection that the Huguley Manufacturing Company was made a party defendant, and appeared in the original foreclosure suit, and also that it had purchased the property, and owned it subject to the trust deed. So the The jurisdic-bill in the state court specifically avers, and the record of the proceedings in the foreclosure suit shows that it took an active part in the litigation. It admitted in that litigation that it was a citizen of Georgia. It now goes into a state court, and averring that it is a citizen of Alabama, the state of which the plaintiff was a citizen, contends that the United States court in Georgia had no jurisdiction; but having been in that United States court, litigating the case on its merits, and its rights there determined, that court has power to protect its decree as against any action which such litigant may take in any other court.
tion of courts of equity to interfere and effectuate their own decrees by injunctions or writs of assistance in order to avoid the relitigation of questions once settled between the same parties is well settled. Story, Eq. Jur. § 959; Kershaw v. Thompson, 4 Johns. Ch. 609, 612; Schenck v. Conover, 13 N. J. Eq. 220, 78 Am. Dec. 95; Buffum's Case, 13 N. H. 14; Shepherd v. Towgood, Turn. & R. 379; Davis v. Bluck, 6 Beav. 393. In Kershaw v. Thompson, the authorities are fully reviewed by Chancellor Kent, and need not be re-examined here."
It must also be remembered that the trust deed described the property conveyed as sit
See also Julian v. Central Trust Co. 193 U. S. 93, 48 L. ed. 629, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 399, which is very much in point. There, after a suit in a Federal court for foreclos-uated partly in Georgia and partly in Alaure of a mortgage, resulting in decree, sale, confirmation, and delivery of possession to the purchaser, a state court attempted to subject the property to a judgment rendered in that court against the mortgagor on a cause of action arising subsequently to the delivery of possession under the foreclosure proceedings. And it was held within the competency of the Federal court to restrain the action in the state court in order to protect the title it had conveyed by the
bama. The Federal court sitting in Georgia had jurisdiction to foreclose that trust deed. Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 24 L. ed. 207. Even if there were errors or irregularities in the proceedings they would not affect the matter of jurisdiction, and as those proceedings have been sustained on appeal we may assume that they were free from errors.
Where parties litigate in a Federal court, whose jurisdiction is invoked on the ground