ter and amount of property which shall be exempt from execution is "purely a question of legislative policy." Spence v. Smith, 121 Cal. 536, 66 Am. St. Rep. 62, 53 Pac. 653. And it is further to be observed that the legislature of California has acted under that assumption, and has in effect exempted life insurance policies from execution. Thus it is provided in the Civil Code of California as follows:

"Sec. 3470. Property exempt.-Property exempt from execution, and insurances upon the life of the assignor, do not pass to the assignee by a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, unless the instrument specially mentions them, and declares an intention that they should pass thereby. En. March 21, 1872."

table to do so. The wide departure from the legislation of many of the other states, shown by the unrestricted terms of the Washington statute, instead of manifesting the intention of the legislature of that state to narrow the exemption to conform to the statutes of other states, on the contrary, conclusively shows the intention of the Washington legislature to adopt a broader and more comprehensive exemption. And light upon the intention to give a broad and popular meaning to the term "life insurance" is shown by the amendment exempting the avails of accident policies, which ordinarily, in the event death does not result, is payable to the insured. And it may also be observed in this connection that the policies considered by the supreme court of Washington in Re Heilbron, 14 Wash. 536, 35 L. R. A. 602, 45 Pac. 153, were payable on the death of the insured to his executors, and no intimation was given in the opinion that policies of that character were not within the terms of the exempting statute.

The policies, then, being exempt by the state law, we are brought to consider the question whether they were exempt under the bankrupt act of 1898.

As we have said, § 6 of the act adopts, for the purposes of the bankruptcy proceedings, the exemptions allowed by the laws of the several states. The language so provid

Conceding the constitutionality of the statute, it is next insisted that it does not embrace an exemption of the avails of the policies in question. The arguments supporting this contention are somewhat involved, but are all embraced in the following propositions: First, life insurance, it is said, in its strictest and technical sense, relates only to a fund realizable by death, and therefore the words "all life insurance," in the Washington statute, must be given that restricted meaning; hence the statute is inapplicable to one of the policies which partakes of the nature of an endowment. Second, exemptions of life insurance policies, it is asserted, do not generally protecting is as follows: the avails of insurance from pursuit by creditors of the insured where the proceeds of the policies are payable to his estate, nor do they protect the avails of insurance from pursuit by the creditors of the wife of the insured, or other beneficiary. The application of these propositions is based upon the fact that in both of the policies the wifeone of the bankrupts—was named as a beneficiary in the event of surviving her husband, and in one of the policies the husband was entitled, if he survived the twentyyears' period, to surrender the policy, and receive its cash value.

To support the propositions the law of many states, limiting the exemption of the proceeds of life insurance policies to the cases specified, are referred to, and the argument is that, because in such states there are such statutes, a similar limitation should be read, by construction, into the Washington statute. But the error in the argument is manifest. It is not to be doubted that the broad terms of the statute, as ordinarily understood, embrace both of the policies, and it would not be construction, but legislation, to restrict the meaning of the statute in accord with narrower legislation in other states, because, in the judgment of a court, it might be deemed equi

"Sec. 6. Exemptions of Bankrupts.-a This act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the state laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the state wherein they have had their domicil for the six months or the greater portion thereof immediately preceding the filing of the petition."

It is beyond controversy that, if the section just quoted stood alone, the policies in question would be exempt under the bankrupt act. The contention that they are not arises from what is assumed to be a limitation imposed upon the terms of § 6 by a proviso found in § 70a of the act. We quote that section in full, italicizing the provision which it is deemed operates to take the proceeds or avails of policies of insurance out of the control of § 6:

"The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, upon his appointment and qualification, and his successor or successors, if he shall have one or more, upon his or their appointment and qualification, shall in turn be vested, by operation of law, with the title of the bankrupt, as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt, except in so far as it is to property which is exempt, to all (1) documents re'lating to his property; (2) interest in pat

be affixed to it without holding that the words "except in so far as it is to property which is exempt," do not control and limit the proviso. But to say this is to read out of the section the dominant limitation which it contains, and, therefore, to segregate the proviso from its context, and cause it to mean exactly the reverse of what, when read in connection with the context, it necessarily implies.

ents, patent rights, copyrights, and trade- | enumerations. The meaning now sought to marks; (3) powers which he might have be given to the proviso cannot in reason exercised for his own benefit, but not those which he might have exercised for some other person; (4) property transferred by him in fraud of his creditors; (5) property which, prior to the filing of the petition, he could by any means have transferred, or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him: provided, that when any bankrupt shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings; otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets; and (6) rights of action arising upon contracts or from the unlawful taking or detention of, or injury to, his property."

It is, however, argued that unless the proviso be given the import attributed to it, and be treated as not subject to the limitation implied by the words creating the exception as to exempt property, that it becomes meaningless; and hence, under the rule of construction which commands that effect must be given, if possible, to all parts of a statute, the proviso must be construed as wholly disconnected from the clause as to exempt property. The premise upon which this proposition rests is a mistaken one. As 70a deals only with property which, not being exempt, passes to the trustee, the mission of the proviso was, in the interest of the perpetuation of policies. of life insurance, to provide a rule by which, where such policies passed to the trustee because they were not exempt, if they had a surrender value their future operation could

Conflicting views as to the operation upon § 6 of the proviso in § 70a referred to have been expounded by the circuit courts of appeal. Two of the leading cases are Steele v. Buel, 44 C. C. A. 287, 104 Fed. 968, holding that the proviso does not qualify the ex-be preserved by vesting the bankrupt with emptions accorded by § 6, and the other, a decision by the court of appeals of the ninth circuit, in Re Scheld, 52 L. R. A. 188, 44 C. C. A. 233, 104 Fed. 870, holding that the effect of the proviso was to limit, as to policies of insurance, the broad terms of § 6, adopting the state exemption laws.

Considering the matter originally, it is, we think, apparent that § 6 is couched in unlimited terms, and is accompanied with no qualification whatever. Even a superficial analysis of 70a demonstrates that that section deals not with exemptions, but solely with the nature and character of property, the title to which passes to the trustee in bankruptcy. The opening clause of the section declares that the trustee, after his appointment, shall be vested "by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt, except in so far as it is to property which is exempt," and this is followed by an enumeration, under six headings, of the various classes of property which pass to the trustee. Clearly, the words "except in so far as it is to property which is exempt," make manifest that it was the intention to exclude from the enumeration property exempt by the act. This qualification necessarily controls all the enumerations, and, therefore, excludes exempt property from all the provisions contained in the respective

the privilege of paying such surrender value, whereby the policy would be withdrawn out of the category of an asset of the estate. That is to say, the purpose of the proviso was to confer a benefit upon the insured bankrupt by limiting the character of the interest in a nonexempt life insurance policy which should pass to the trustee, and not to cause such a policy when exempt to become an asset of the estate. When the purpose of the proviso is thus ascertained it becomes apparent that to maintain the construction which the argument seeks to affix to the proviso would cause it to produce a result diametrically opposed to its spirit and to the purpose it was intended to subserve.

And the meaning which we deduce from the text and context of the proviso is greatly fortified by obvious considerations of public policy. It has always been the policy of Congress, both in general legislation and in bankrupt acts, to recognize and give effect to the state exemption laws. This was cogently pointed out by Circuit Judge Caldwell, in delivering the opinion in Steele v. Buel, where he said (44 C. C. A. 287, 104 Fed. 972):

"From the organization of the Federal courts under the judiciary act of 1789, the law has been that creditors suing in these

courts could not subject to execution property of their debtor exempt to him by the law of the state. Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. at L. 93, chap. 21); Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 32, 6 L. ed. 253, 260; Lamaster v. Keeler, 123 U. S. 376, 31 L. ed. 238, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 197; Dartmouth Sav. Bank v. Bates, 44 Fed. 546.

shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another.

2. No discrimination in state pilotage laws forbidden by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4237, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2903, is made by the Virginia compulsory pilotage charge on all vessels (except coasting vessels having a pilot's li cense), either inward bound from the sea through the Virginia capes to Smith's Point, Yorktown, Newport News, or Norfolk and intermediate points, or outward bound to the sea from those points through the capes, although compulsory pilotage does not prevail in all the inland waters of the state.

The same rule has obtained under the bankrupt acts, which have sometimes increased the exemptions, notably so under the act of 1867 (§ 5045, Rev. Stat.) but have never lessened or diminished them. An intention on the part of Congress to violate or abolish this wise and uniform rule, observed from the creation of our Federal system, should be made to appear by clear and unmistaka- Argued March 3, 1905. Decided May 15, ble language. It will not be presumed from a doubtful or ambiguous provision fairly susceptible of any other construction."

There has been some contrariety of opinion expressed by the lower Federal courts as to the exact meaning of the words "cash surrender value" as employed in the proviso, some courts holding that it means a surrender value expressly stipulated by the contract of insurance to be paid, and other courts holding that the words embrace policies even though a stipulation in respect to surrender value is not contained therein, where the policy possesses a cash value which would be recognized and paid by the insurer on the surrender of the policy. It is to be observed that this latter construction harmonizes with the practice under with the practice under the bankrupt act of 1867 (Re Newland, 6 Ben. 342, Fed. Cas. No. 10,170; Re McKinney, 15 Fed. 535), and tends to elucidate and carry out the purpose contemplated by the proviso as we have construed it. However, whatever influence that construction may have, as the question is not necessarily here involved, we do not expressly decide it.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the District Court affirmed; cause remanded to the lat

ter court.

[No. 159.]

1905.

N ERROR to the Supreme Court of Ap

peals of the State of Virginia to review the denial of a writ of error to the Court of Law and Chancery of the City of Norfolk, in that state, which had entered judg ment on a verdict in favor of plaintiff in an action to recover a compulsory pilotage charge imposed by the laws of that state. Judgment of lower court affirmed.

See same case below on first writ of error, 101 Va. 635, 44 S. E. 755.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Robert M. Hughes for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. D. Tucker Brooke, John W. Daniel, R. C. Marshall, and Fred Harper for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

The law of the state of Virginia imposes compulsory pilotage on all vessels inward bound from sea through the Virginia capes, other than coasting vessels having a pilot's license, no matter to what port or point the vessel may be bound, and likewise imposes compulsory pilotage on all vessels outwardbound through the capes. The compulsory pilotage inward bound from the sea extends

Mr. Justice McKenna took no part in no further than to Newport News, Smith's the decision of this cause.

(198 U. S. 310)

ABRAM P. THOMPSON, Plff. in Err.,

v.

JOSEPH J. DARDEN.

Point, Yorktown, or Norfolk, and the compulsory pilotage outward bound through the capes commences at said points respectively. In the inland waters of Virginia, above the points named, compulsory pilotage does not prevail, but pilotage is regulated and rates therefor are provided, the duty being imposed, except where the statutes otherwise provide, of using only a licensed Virginia pilot if the services of a pilot are taken. Virginia Code of 1887, §§ 1963, 1965, 1966, 1. The adoption of compulsory pilotage regu- 1978, and 1900. Reference is made in the lations by a state, under the authority of U. brief of counsel for the defendant in error S. Rev. Stat. § 4235, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2903, does not violate U. S. Const. art. 1, to Virginia colonial legislation (1775) im§ 9, cl. 6, which provides that no preference posing compulsory pilotage on vessels in

Compulsory pilotage-validity-discrimina

tion.

ward bound from sea through the capes ac- | states to adopt pilotage regulations, despite companied with the statement, which is un- the recognition of that authority by Conchallenged, that from that time to the pres- gress as early as 1789 (Rev. Stat. 4235, U. ent date there has been no period when S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2903), and the recompulsory pilotage regulations of a like peated adjudications of this court recogniznature have not prevailed in Virginia. The ing and upholding the practice on the subcontentions of the plaintiff in error arising ject which has obtained from the beginning. on this record assail the validity of the Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 332, 25 Sup. Ct. pilotage laws now in force. The controversy Rep. 52, 49 L. ed. 224, and authorities there thus arose. cited.

2d. "The Virginia pilot law is in conflict with § 4237 of the United States Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2903). The section in question was quoted and commented on in Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 332, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 52, 49 L. ed. 224, and avoids the provisions of all state regulations making "any discrimination in the rate of pilotage or half pilotage between vessels sailing between the ports of one state and vessels sailing between the ports of different states, or any discrimination against vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam, or against national vessels of the United States." It cannot be said that the pilotage charge for vessels bound in and out through the capes is, in and of itself, discriminatory, since it imposes a like compulsory pilotage charge upon all vessels bound in and bound out. Speaking of the requirements of the statute, the supreme court of appeals of Virginia said in its opinion in this case:

In August, 1902, the schooner, William Neely, engaged in the coastwise trade between New England and Virginia, Abram P. Thompson, master, when bound in from sea to Norfolk, was offered by Joseph J. Darden, a licensed Virginia pilot, his services, which were declined. Thereupon Darden, the pilot, sued Thompson, the master, in the court of law and chancery of Norfolk, for his pilotage charge. Thompson demurred on the ground that the Virginia statutes as to pilotage were void because repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, for various reasons, which were specified in the demurrer. The trial court sustained the demurrer. Darden, taking the record to the court of appeals of Virginia, applied for a writ of error, which was not a matter of right. The court allowed the writ, heard the cause, and, for reasons expressed in a full and careful opinion, reversed the judgment, and remanded the cause for a new trial. 101 Va. 635, 44 S. E. 755. At the new trial "By the provisions of the sections of the Thompson reiterated, by way of offers of code quoted all vessels (except coastwise evidence and other proceedings, the objec- vessels with a pilot license) inward bound tions which had been expressed in the de- from the sea to Smith's Point, Yorktown, murrer, and preserved his rights by excep- Newport News, or Norfolk, or any intertions taken to the action of the trial court, mediate point, and all such vessels outward which adjudged against him. He then car-bound to the sea from Smith's Point, Yorkried the record to the court of appeals and town, Newport News, or Norfolk, or any inapplied for a writ of error, which was re-termediate point, are subject to the comfused, and thereupon this writ was sued out. pulsory regulations and rates therein proIn the argument at bar seven grounds of vided. All vessels are subject to the same error are stated, and in referring to them regulations, and under the same circumgenerally many minute suggestions are stances and conditions are required to pay made concerning the pilotage statutes, by the same fees." way of indicating that discrimination arises from them. They mainly relate to the statutes regulating pilotage in the internal waters. Whilst we have given these suggestions our attention, we content ourselves with saying that we deem them to be devoid of merit. The more so because, in the written argument, the discussion is expressly limited to the first, second, and fifth grounds of alleged error. These we proceed to consider.

1st. "This statute violates article 1, § 9, clause 6, of the Federal Constitution, which provides that no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another." In effect, this proposition denies the power of Congress to permit the several'

The arguments made to support the assertion that the pilot laws conflict with the act of Congress are twofold. First. As the state of Virginia has no appreciable commerce from her own ports inward bound through the capes, therefore there is discrimination. Second. As Virginia has chosen by her legislation not to subject commerce on her internal waters to a compulsory charge for pilotage, therefore there is a discrimination in favor of commerce on the internal waters of Virginia, and against commerce bound in and out through the capes from and to the sea. In other words, the proposition is that the state of Virginia was without power to make an undiscriminating regulation as to pilotage for ships bound in and out through the capes, unless a like regula

tion was made applicable to all the internal waters within the state. This is attempted to be sustained by contending that the navigation of the internal waters of Virginia is more tortuous than is the navigation in and out of the capes, and other suggestions of a kindred nature.

customed places in common with the citizens of the territory" of Washington, and of "erecting temporary buildings for curing them," secured to the Yakima Indians by the treaty of 1859, survives the private acquisition of lands bordering on the Columbia river by grants from the United States or state of Washington.

But the unsoundness of the proposition is 2. Patents issued by the Land Department to

3.

lands bordering on the Columbia river, though absolute in form, can grant no exemption from the fishing rights secured to the Yakima Indians by the treaty of 1859.

Fishing rights in the Columbia river, secured to the Yakima Indians by the treaty of 1859, which provided for the extinguishment of the Indian title to the lands occupied and claimed by them, preparatory to opening the lands for settlement, are not subordinate to the powers acquired by the state of Washington in and over the shore lands on its admission into the Union.

made manifest from its mere statement. In effect, it but denies the power of Virginia to regulate pilotage, and presupposes that courts are vested with authority to avoid the pilotage regulations adopted by the states, which do not discriminate as to commerce to which they apply, simply because it is deemed they are unwise or unjust. As pointed out in Olsen v. Smith, an objection based on the assumed injustice of a pilotage regulation does not involve the power to make the regulation. Objections of this character, therefore, if they be meritorious, but concern the power of Congress to exercise the ultimate authority vested in it on Argued April 3, 4, 1905. Decided May 15, the subject of pilotage.

3d. "The pilot law violates § 4236 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2903), which provides: "The master of any vessel coming into or going out of any port situate upon waters which are the boundary between two states, may employ any pilot duly licensed or authorized by the law of either of the states bounded on such waters to pilot the vessel to or from such port."" It is said that whilst it may be difficult to say that the waters of the Chesapeake bay between the capes constitute a boundary, still it is possible to so conclude. We observe concerning this contention that it does not appear to have been raised in the courts below. It is accompanied with no suggestion that the state of Maryland has ever attempted to regulate pilotage between the capes of Virginia, to which the Virginia statute relates, or that any Maryland pilot offered his services. The proposition, therefore, rests upon a series of mere conjectures, which we cannot be called upon to investigate or decide.

Judgment affirmed.

(198 U. S. 371)

[No. 180.]

1905.

A United States for the District of Wash

PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the

to enjoin any obstruction of the fishing rights in the Columbia river, secured to the Yakima Indians by the treaty of 1859. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

ington to review a decree dismissing a bill

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Solicitor General Hoyt for appellants. Messrs. Charles H. Carey, F. P. Mays,. and Huntington & Wilson for appellees.

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit was brought to enjoin the respondents from obstructing certain Indians. of the Yakima Nation, in the state of Washington, from exercising fishing rights and privileges on the Columbia river, in that state, claimed under the provisions of the treaty between the United States and the Indians, made in 1859.

There is no substantial dispute of facts,. or none that is important to our inquiry. The treaty is as follows:

"Article 1. The aforesaid confederated

UNITED STATES, Thomas Simpson, and tribes and bands of Indians hereby cede, re

White Swan, Appts.,

linquish, and convey to the United States all their right, title, and interest in and to the lands and country occupied and claimed by them.