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The declarations of war against France and Spain, made by us and Holland, are dated within a few days of each other. In that published by the States, they say very truly, that they are nearest and most exposed to the fire; that they are blocked up on all sides, and actually attacked by the kings of France and Spain; that their declaration is the effect of an urging and pressing necessity; with other expressions to the same purpose. They desire the assistance of all kings and princes, &c. The grounds of their quarrel with France, are such as only affect themselves, or at least more immediately than any other prince or state; such as, the French refusing to grant the Tariff promised by the treaty of Ryswick; the loading of the Dutch inhabitants settled in France, with excessive duties, contrary to the said treaty; the violation of the Partition Treaty by the French accepting the king of Spain's will, and threatening the States if they would not comply; the seizing of the Spanish Netherlands by the French troops, and turning out the Dutch, who, by permission of the late king of Spain, were in garrison there; by which means that republick was deprived of her barrier, contrary to the treaty of partition, where it was particularly stipulated, that the Spanish Netherlands should be left to the archduke. They alleged, that the French king governed Flanders as his own, although under the name of his grandson, and sent great numbers of troops thither to fright them; that he had seized the city and citadel of Liege; had possessed himself of several places in the archbishoprick of Cologne, and maintained troops in the country of Wolfenbuttle, in order to block up the

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Dutch on all sides; and caused his resident to give in a memorial, wherein he threatened the States to act against them, if they refused complying with the contents of that memorial.

The queen's declaration of war is grounded upon the grand alliance, as this was upon the unjust usurpations and encroachments of the French king; whereof the instances produced are, his keeping in possession a great part of the Spanish dominions, seizing Milan and the Spanish Low-countries, making himself master of Cadiz, &c. And instead of giving satisfaction in these points, his putting an indignity and affront on her majesty and kingdoms by declaring the pretended prince of Wales king of England, &c. Which last was the only personal quarrel we had in the war; and even this was positively denied by France, that king being willing to acknowledge her majesty.

I think it plainly appears by both declarations, that England ought no more to have been a principal in this war than Prussia, or any other power, who came afterward into that alliance. Holland was first in danger, the French troops being at that time just at the gates of Nimeguen. But the complaints, made in our declaration do all, except the last, as much, or more concern almost every prince in Europe.

For, among the several parties, who came first or last into this confederacy, there were few but who *,

*There were but few who,' &c. - This is a bad mode of phraseology, and should be changed to the following there were few who, in proportion, had not more to get or to lose,"

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in proportion, had more to get or to lose, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill success of this war, than we. The Dutch took up arms to defend themselves from immediate ruin; and by a successful war, theyproposed to have a large extent of country, and a better frontier against France. The emperor hoped to recover the monarchy of Spain, or some part of it, for his younger son, chiefly at the expence of us and Holland. The king of Portugal had received intelligence, that Philip defigned to renew the old pretensions of Spain upon that kingdom, which is surrounded by the other on all sides, except toward the sea; and could therefore only be defended by maritime powers. This, with the advantageo.s terms offered by king Charles, as well as by us, prevailed with that prince to enter into the alliance. The duke of Savoy's temptations and fears were yet - greater the main charge of the war on that side was to be supplied by England, and the profit to redound to him. In case Milan fhould be conquered, it was stipulated, that his highness should have the duchy of Montserrat belonging to the duke of Mantua, the provinces of Alexandria and Valencia and Lomellino, with other lands between the Po and the Tanaro, together with the Vigevenasco, or in lieu of it an equivalent out of the province of Novara, adjoining to his own state; beside whatever else could be taken from France on that side by the confederate forces. Then he was in terrible apprehensions of being surrounded by France, who had so many troops in the Milanese, and might have easily swallowed his whole duchy.

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The rest of the allies came in purely for subsidies, whereof they sunk considerable sums into their own

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coffers, and refused to send their contingent to the Emperor, alleging their troops were already hired by England and Holland.

Some time after the duke of Anjou's succeeding to the monarchy of Spain, in breach of the partition treaty, the question here in England was, whether the peace should be continued, or a new war begun. Those who were for the former, alleged the debts and difficulties we laboured under; that both we and the Dutch had already acknowleged Philip for king of Spain; that the inclinations of the Spaniards to the house of Austria, and their aversion for that of Bourbon, were not so surely to be reckoned upon as some would pretend that we thought it a piece of insolence, as well as injustice, in the French, to offer putting a king upon us, and the Spaniards would conceive we had as little reason to force one upon them that it was true, the nature and genius of those two people differed very much, and so would probably continue to do, as well under a king of French blood, as one of Austrian: but that if we would engage in a war for dethroning the duke of Anjou, we should certainly effect what by the progress and operations of it we endeavoured to prevent, I mean a union of interest and affections between the two nations; for the Spaniards must, of necessity, call in French troops to their assistance; this would introduce French counsellors into king Philip's court, and this, by degrees, would habituate

*To offer putting is ungrammatical; it should be to offer to put,' &c. or if in order to avoid the close conjunction of the two infinitives, and the repetition of the particle, to,' the participial mode be preferred, it should be to offer the putting of a king upon us.'

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and reconcile the two nations: that to assist king Charles by English and Dutch forces, would render him odious to his new subjects, who have nothing in so great abomination as those whom they hold for hereticks; that the French would by this means become masters of the treasures in the Spanish West Indies; that in the last war, when Spain, Cologne, and Bavaria, were in our alliance, and by a modest computation brought sixty thousand men into the field against the common enemy; when Flanders, the seat of war, was on our side, and his majesty, a prince of great valour and conduct, at the head of the whole confederate army; yet we had no reason to boast of our success: how then should we be able to oppose France with those powers against us, which would carry sixty thousand men from us to the enemy; and so make us upon the balance weaker by one hundred and twenty thousand men at the beginning of this war, than of that in 1688 ?

On the other side, those, whose opinion, or some private motives inclined them to give their advice for entering into a new war, alleged, how dangerous it would be for England that Philip should be king of Spain; that we could have no security for our trade while that kingdom was subject to a prince of the Bourbon family, nor any hopes of preserving the balance of Europe, because the grandfather would in effect be king, while his grandson had but the title, and thereby have a better opportunity than ever of pursuing his design for universal monarchy. These, and the like arguments prevailed; and so, without taking time to consider the consequences, or to reflect on our own condition, we hastily engaged in a war, which has cost us sixty millions; and after repeated,

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