tice of all princes and states, whose intentions were fair and honourable; so is it contrary to common prudence, as well as justice, I might add that it was impious too, by presuming to control events which are only in the hands of God. Ours, and the States complaint against France and Spain, are deduced in each of our declarations of war, and our pretensions specified in the eighth article of the grand alliance; but there is not in any of these the least mention of demanding Spain for the house of Austria, or of refusing any peace without that condition. Having already made an extract from both declarations of war, I shall here give a translation of the eighth article in the grand alliance, which will put this matter out of dispute.

THE EIGHTH ARTICLE OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE.

WHEN the war is once undertaken, none of the parties shall have the liberty to enter upon a treaty of peace with the enemy, but jointly and in concert with the other. Nor is peace to be made without having first obtained a just and reasonable satisfaction for his Cæsarean majesty, and for his royal majesty of GreatBritain, and a particular security to the lords of the States-general, of their dominions, provinces, titles, navigation, and commerce: and a sufficient provision that the kingdoms of France and Spain be never united, or come under the government of the same person, or that the same man may never be king of both kingdoms; and particularly, that the French

may

may never be in possession of the Spanish West Indies; and that they may not have the liberty of navigation, for conveniency of trade, under any pretence whatsoever, neither directly nor indirectly; except it is agreed that the subjects of Great Britain and Holland may have full power to use and enjoy all the same privileges, rights, immunities, and liberties of commerce, by land and sea, in Spain, in the Mediterranean, and in all the places and countries which the late king of Spain, at the time of his death, was in possession of, as well in Europe as elsewhere, as they did then use and enjoy; or which the subjects of both, or each nation could use and enjoy, by virtue of any right, obtained before the death of the said king of Spain, cither by treaties, conventions, custom, or any other way

whatsoever.

Here we see the demands intended to be insisted on by the allies upon any treaty of peace, are, a just and reasonable satisfaction for the emperor and king of Great Britain, a security to the States-general for their dominions, &c. and a sufficient provision that France and Spain be never united under the same man, as king of both kingdoms. The rest relates to the liberty of trade and commerce for us and the Dutch; but not a syllable of engaging to disposses the duke of Anjou.

But to know how this new language, of no peace without Spain, was first introduced, and at last prevailed among us, we must begin a great deal higher.

It was the partition treaty which begot the will in favour of the duke of Anjou; for this naturally led VOL. III. Cc

the

the Spaniards to receive a prince supported by a great power, whose interest, as well as affection, engaged them to preserve that monarchy entire, rather than to oppose him in favour of another family, who must expect assistance from a number of confederates, whose principal members had already disposed of what did not belong to them, and by a previous treaty parcelled out the monarchy of Spain.

Thus the duke of Anjou got into the full possession of all the kingdoms and states belonging to that monarchy, as well in the old world as the new. And whatever the house of Austria pretended from their memorials to us and the States, it was at that time but too apparent, that the inclinations of the Spaniards were on the duke's side.

However, a war was resolved on; and, in order to carry it on with great vigour, a grand alliance formed, wherein the ends proposed to be obtained are plainly and distinctly laid down, as I have already quoted them. It pleased God, in the course of this war, to bless the arms of the allies with remarkable successes; by which we were soon put into a condition of demanding and expecting such terms of a peace, as we proposed to ourselves when we began the war. But instead of this, our victories only served to lead us on to farther visionary prospects; advantage was taken of the sanguine temper which so many successes had wrought the nation up to; new romantick views were proposed, and the old, reasonable, sober design was forgot.

This was the artifice of those here, who were sure to grow richer, as the publick became poorer; and who, after the resolutions which the two houses were prevailed upon to make, might have carried on the

war

war with safety to themselves, till malt and land were mortgaged, till a general excise was established, and the dixième denier raised by collectors in red coats. And this was just the circumstance, which it suited their interests to be in.

The house of Austria approved this scheme with reason; since, whatever would be obtained by the blood and treasure of others, was to accrue to that family, while they only lent their name to the

cause.

The Dutch might perhaps have grown resty under their burden; but care was likewise taken of that, by a barrier-treaty made with the States, which deserves such epithets as I care not to bestow; but may perhaps consider it, at a proper occasion, in a discourse by itself *.

By this treaty, the condition of the war with respect to the Dutch was widely altered; they fought no longer for security, but for grandeur; and we, instead of labouring to make them safe, must beggar ourselves to make them formidable.

Will any one contend, that if, at the treaty of Gertruydenburg, we could have been satisfied with such terms of a peace, as we proposed to ourselves by the grand alliance, the French would not have allowed them? It is plain they offered many more, and much greater, than ever we thought to insist on when the war began; and they had reason to grant, as well as we to demand them, since conditions of peace do certainly turn upon events of war. But surely there is some measure to be observed in this; those who have defended the proceedings of our

* Which Discourse follows next in this volume.

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negotiators at the treaty of Gertruydenburg, dwell very much upon their zeal and patience in endeavouring to work the French up to their demands; but say nothing to justify those demands, or the probability that France would ever accept them. Some of the articles in that treaty were so extravagant, that in all human probability we could not have obtained them by a successful war of forty years. One of them was inconsistent with common reason; wherein the confederates reserved to themselves full liberty of demanding what farther conditions they should think fit; and in the mean time France was to deliver up several of their strongest towns in a month. These articles were very gravely signed by our plenipotentiaries, and those of Holland; but not by the French, although it ought to have been done interchangeably; nay, they were brought over by the secretary of the embassy; and the ministers here prevailed on the queen to execute a ratification of articles, which only one part had signed. This was an absurdity in form as well as in reason; because the usual form of a ratification is with a preamble, showing, that whereas our ministers, and those of the allies, and of the enemy, have signed, &c. we ratify, &c. The person who brought over the articles said in all companies (and perhaps believed) that it was a pity we had not demanded more; for the French were in a disposition to refuse us nothing we would ask. One of our plenipotentiaries affected to have the same concern; and particularly that we had not obtained some farther security for the empire on the Upper Rhine.

Horatio Walpole, secretary to that embassy.

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