Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Τόμος 1
M. Newman, 1822 - 587 σελίδες
"This book is Volume 1 of a four volume set of transcribed lectures on the philosophy of the human mind by Thomas Brown, M.D., professor of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. The lectures of this volume cover the relationship of philosophy of mind to other disciplines such as: the sciences and arts, morality, physical inquiry, power and causality, hypothesis and theory, the study of mind, consciousness, materialism and related (as well as opposing) philosophies, identity, affections, the body, and, finally, all manner of sensation." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).
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Σελίδα 232 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.
Σελίδα 400 - To ask, at what TIME a man has first any ideas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive; — HAVING IDEAS, and PERCEPTION, being the same thing.
Σελίδα 188 - Behold the child, by Nature's kindly law, Pleas'd with a rattle, tickled with a straw : Some livelier plaything gives his youth delight, A little louder, but as empty quite : Scarfs, garters, gold, amuse his riper stage, And beads and prayer-books are the toys of age : Pleas'd with this bauble still, as that before, Till tir'd he sleeps, and life's poor play is o'er.
Σελίδα 465 - A ray of heavenly light, gilding all forms Terrestrial in the vast and the minute ; The unambiguous footsteps of the God, Who gives its lustre to an insect's wing, And wheels His throne upon the rolling worlds.
Σελίδα 436 - Bright effluence of bright essence increate. Or hear'st thou rather pure ethereal stream, Whose fountain who shall tell ? before the sun, Before the heavens thou wert, and at the voice Of GOD, as with a mantle, didst invest...
Σελίδα 36 - When we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success; and when we have well surveyed the powers of our own minds, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing anything; nor on the other side, question everything, and disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood.
Σελίδα 42 - Teach me to feel another's woe, To hide the fault I see : That mercy I to others show, That mercy show to me.
Σελίδα 86 - ... several sorts of bodies that fall under the examination of our senses perhaps we may have : but adequate ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And though the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse, yet whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of scientifical knowledge ; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable truths concerning them. Certainty and demonstration are things we must not, in these matters, pretend to.