was ample proof to support the finding that at the time of his death she was "living apart" from the deceased "for justifiable cause." Massachusetts seems to be the only state in which a similar provision is contained in the Compensation Law. Our attention is called to the following cases in which this provision has been construed by the Supreme Court of that state: Newman's Case, 222 Mass. 563, 111 N. E. 359, L. R. A. 1916C, 1145; Fierro's Case, 223 Mass. 378, 111 N. E. 957; Veber's Case, 224 Mass. 456, 116 N. E. 811. As these cases were decided prior to the adoption of the 1919 amendment, counsel for defendants call our attention to the rule stated in Drennan v. People, 10 Mich. 169, 177: "As a general rule, it is a fair inference that the Legislature, in adopting a statute from another state, which has there been judicially construed, intended to give it the same interpretation it had there received by judicial construction." Conceding the application of this rule, we are content to follow the holding in the Newman Case and the reasoning on which it is founded. It is there said: "A careful examination of the evidence plainly shows that several years before the death of the husband, he and his wife separated by mutual consent and agreement, and continued to live apart up to the time of his death. * * * The correct determination of this question depends upon what is meant by the phrase 'living apart for justifiable cause.' These words have been interpreted by this court in numerous decisions. They have been construed in divorce proceedings brought by a wife against her husband for desertion, in petitions brought by her for separate support and maintenance, as well as in actions brought against the husband to recover for necessaries furnished to his wife. These words have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law. We are therefore bound to construe them in accordance with such meaning. *** Where a woman lives apart from her husband and it is contended that such separation is for justifiable cause, ordinarily it must appear that such living apart is due to some failure of duty or misconduct on the part of the husband, but this classification does not exclude cases of living apart because of physical or mental infirmities of either or both husband and wife. If the wife lives apart from her husband by mutual consent, she is not living apart from him for justifiable cause, and she is not entitled to a divorce upon the ground of desertion." While the facts in the other cases were somewhat different and it may be said that the court inferred a consent on the part of the wife by reason of their long separation, the holding in each case is bottomed on the opinion in the Newman Case. It does not appear in any of these cases that the wife was hopeful and expectant that her husband would return to her or provide a home for her elsewhere and invite her to occupy it with him as appears from the proofs presented by this record. [7] 3. The power of the Legislature to impose the duty on the board to make such a finding is challenged by the defendants. It is said to be a delegation of judicial power to a board contrary to section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution of Michigan, which provides that the judicial power of the state shall be vested in the courts. This question was raised as to several provisions of this act before this amendment. The powers and duties of the board and its exercise of such incidental quasi judicial powers as are necessary to carry its purposes into effect were considered and discussed at length by Mr. Justice Steere in Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., 187 Mich. 8, 153 N. W. 49, and the act upheld as a proper exercise of legislative power. The board found that the plaintiff was living apart from her husband and the reasons therefor. The duty to determine whether she was so "living apart" from her husband "for justifiable cause" is no more ju dicial than the determination whether the disability for which claim is made is due to an "accidental injury" arising out of and in the course of employment. It may be noted that this question does not appear to have been presented in any of the cases considered by the Massachusetts court. The award is affirmed. KOTTARI ET AL. V. EMPIRE IRON CASUALTY CO. ET AL. (No. 18.) (Supreme Court of Michigan. Feb. 8, 1922.) 186 Northwestern Reporter, 400. MASTER AND SERVANT-COMPENSATION CLAIM BY UNAUTHORIZED ATTORNEY HELD SUFFICIENT. Where, shortly after an employee was killed, an attorney made claim on behalf of his dependents living in a foreign country. and the employer answered the claim without attacking its sufficiency, a finding by the Industrial Accident Board that the claim was sufficient to stop the running of limitations will be sustained, though the authority of the attorney who made the claim was afterwards repudiated by the attorney in fact of the dependents. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 398.) Certiorari to the Industrial Accident Board. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Hilma Kot-. tari and others, as dependents, to recover compensation for the death of Nicoli Kottari, employee, opposed by the Empire Iron Casualty Company and the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York. The Industrial Accident Board awarded compensation to the claimant, and the opposers bring certiorari. Affirmed. Argued before Fellows, C. J., and Wiest, Stone, Clark, Bird, Sharpe, Moore and Steere, JJ. Cummins & Nichols, of Lansing, for appellants. MOORE, J. This is certiorari to the Industrial Accident Board to review their action in making an award to claimants, growing out of the death of Nicoli Kottari, which occurred September 19, 1916. The acciIdent was reported to the Industrial Accident Board October 14, 1916, by the superintendent of the mine, in which report appear the following questions and answers: Single. married, widowed, or divorced: Was supposed to be single Number of children under sixteen years: Man who claims to be his brother-in-law says there is one. Soon after the accident one A. W. Jurma, an attorney at Ishpeming, Mich., took up with the Fidelity & Casualty Company the matter of compensation for the death of Kottari, making the claim that there were a wife and child dependent upon him, living in Finland. The record does not disclose that a more formal claim was made until March 31, 1917. The deposition of Mr. Jurma was taken. In it appear the following questions and answers: "Q. Can you state at whose request this letter was written? A. I cannot. I don't remember who the party was who came in, but no doubt somebody did ask me to write it. * * * "Q. State fully your best recollection of the circumstances in connection with the writing of that letter, as to who requested you to write it and why you did prepare it. A. I can answer this only in a general way. When a person comes to my office in these matters, and if he is not closely and vitally interested in the deceased I advise him to file a claim as a precautionary matter, and I am quite satisfied that such was the case here. I never make or prepare a claim in any case without the request of somebody. "Q. Do you remember who authorized you to write this letter? A. I do not, except as stated before. * *. * "Q. At the time the first letter was written, did you know whether or not Mr. Kottari had dependents or not? A. I had no personal knowledge. What knowledge I might have had was hearsay, given to me as attorney." At the trial it was stipulated certain correspondence might be received. We quote part of the stipulation: "It is further hereby stipulated and agreed that the three letters hereto attached, addressed to Claude C. Ritze, Judge of Probate, Iron River, Michigan,' signed ‘R. R. Freeman,' one of which is dated October 11, 1917, one September 14, 1917, one July 17, 1918, and the letter hereto attached addressed to Mr. Claude C. Ritze, judge of probate, Iron River, Michigan, signed 'W. C. Phillips, Examiner,' and dated July 15, 1918, may also be considered in evidence on the hearing of said claim by and before said Industrial Accident Board, with the same force and effect as if said letters were formally introduced in evidence upon said hearing, the genuineness of the signatures to said letters being hereby conceded, and that, at the time said letters were written, said R. R. Freeman was attorney for said insurer, and the said N. C. Phillips, at the time the letter signed by his name was written, was in the employment of said insurer, and authorized to write said letter." We quote such of the correspondence as we think material: "Jos. D. Griffin, Examiner, "Milwaukee, Wis., October 14, 1916 "Industrial Accident Board, Received Oct. 16, 1916, Lansing, Michigan.” "Industrial Accident Board Lansing Michigan-Gentlemen: In re Empire Iron Company Nicolai Kodderi, No. 1131. Herewith inclosed please find report of accident which was fatal to the above-named injured employee, and I wish to call your attention to the fact that this case will be handled through this office. I wish also to advise you that Attorney Jurma, of Ishpeming, Michigan, has now appeared in this case, and claims that the deceased had a wife and one child living in Finland. "Yours very truly." December 11, 1916, Mr. Griffin wrote: In re "Industrial Accident Board, Lansing, Michigan-Gentlemen: Empire Iron Company, Nicolai Kodderi, No. 1131. Mr. Kodderi was killed on September 19, 1916, while in the employ of the Empire Iron Ore Company, of Palmer, Michigan. Attorney A. W. Jurma, of Ishpeming, Michigan, presents claim to dependency for wife and child in Finland. The assured has no definite knowledge as to whether there were depend ents or not. John W Elliott, undertaker at Negaunee, Michigan, has presented to our assured a bill for $99.50, and there are a few other outstanding bills incurred on account of the funeral We are ready and willing to pay the funeral expenses" -and inquired if an allowance would be made if dependents appeared. Later one Rantaaho wrote to the Industrial Accident Board a letter in which appears the following: "I want it to be made known that the widow has given me an order and power to make settlement in this case; also, I am sure that Attorney A. W. Jurma, of Ishpeming, has never been asked by dependents to look after their rights in this case. An amended answer was then filed, it being contended, if Jurma had no authority to act, that defendants were not liable because no claim was made within six months. The contention of counsel is (we quote from the brief): "In the last analysis, the situation resolves itself into this: A claim was made, informally, which the insurance company recognized as a claim without having any notice that the person making the claim had no authority to do it. When it received such notice, it then denied liability upon the ground that no claim had been made in behalf of the dependents. We think this raises squarely the question of whether or not a claim made by a pure volunteer is a good claim, and will sustain a finding when the authority of the man making it was afterwards repudiated by the attorney in fact of the dependents.' ten: After the amended answer was filed, the following letter was writ "January 22, 1918. "Hon. Claude C. Ritze, Judge of Probate, Iron River, MichiganDear sir: Re Kottari v. Empire Iron Company. I have your letter of December 27th in the above matter. It has not been answered before, due to the fact that I have been in Washington on work connected with the War Department since some time before Thanksgiving. I was just as much surprised as yourself to learn that an amendmended answer had been filed. During my absence, Mr Griffin, who is the adjuster for the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, called at the office and directed my assistant, Mr. Bendinger, to file such answer. You and I discussed this case thoroughly, and the only question evidently which any one thought was involved was that of the dependency. * * It seems to me we are estopped to raise a defense of such a character at the present time, and in view of the fact that within the statutory time an attempt was made to negotiate the claim by paying expenses, certainly we had knowledge of the making of a claim, and the fact that we answered and affirmatively alleged the payment of funeral expenses shows conclusively that we recognized the making of the claim on behalf of the applicant. * * * In any event, I do not possibly see how the defense set up in the amendment can be in any way helpful to us at the present time; but I want you to know that I knew nothing of the filing of this amendment until my return home. "Yours very truly, * R. R. Freeman.” We now quote from the findings of the Industrial Accident Board: "As to the question of whether or not claim for compensation was made within six months, when the cause was heard on arbitration, two letters were admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits by the deputy. One letter, admitted as evidence and marked as Exhibit 2 over the initials of the deputy, is a letter bearing the date of January 22, 1916, from Robert R. Freeman, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and addressed to Hon. Claude C. Ritze, Judge of Probate, Iron River, Michigan. Judge Ritze was at that time serving as attorney for claimants, or as attorney for Matt Rantaaho, who held power of attorney from Mrs. Kottari. Mr. Freeman was attorney for the respondents, and it is conceded by a stipulation in the file of the case that letters written as early as October 11, 1917, were written while he was attorney for the insurers; and in fact it appears from the files that he was at that time the attorney in charge of the case in behalf of respondents. * * * "In the letter Mr. Freeman expressly says: 'Certainly we had knowledge of the making of the claim.' This admission on the part of Mr. Freeman, the attorney for respondents, in charge of the case from an early date, is prima facie evidence that claim was made. No proof has been introduced on the part of respondents to explain this statement, or to show that it was made under misunderstanding of the facts or conditions. There is no affirmative proof on the part of respondents that I claim was not made. There being evidence that claim was properly made, and no testimony to rebut it, we have no alternative but to rely on the evidence before us." We have, then, a case where a man was killed under such circumstances that, if he had dependents, they would be entitled as of course to compensation under the Employers' Liability Law, Comp. Laws 1915, §§ 5423-5495. The superintendent of the mine knew of this death, and within a month reported it to the Industrial Accident Board, with the information that the brother-in-law of the deceased advised him there was one child under the age of 16 years. October 14, 1916, only a little over a month after the death, Mr. Griffin, the claim examiner, advised the Industrial Accident Board the case would be handled through his office, and that he had been advised by Attorney Jurma that the dead man had a wife and one child living in Finland. An original answer to the claim was filed, and while we are unable to find it in the return, the inference is fair from the language of Mr. Freeman, the attorney for defendants, in his letter which we have quoted, that it did not aver that the claim was not made in time, and it is not until long after the six months has expired that an amended answer is filed, in which for the first time the question is raised. The purpose and requisites of a claim for compensation have been considered by this court in Purdy v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, 188 Mich. 573, 155 N. W. 597, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 881, Matwiczuk v. American Car & Foundry Co., 189 Mich. 449, 155 N. W. 412, and Shafer v. Parke Davis & Co., 192 Mich. at page 580, 159 N. W. 304. While none of these cases is on all fours with the instant case, what was said therein requires this case upon its facts to be affirmed. J. It is affirmed, with costs to the claimant. Steere, Sharpe, Wiest, Stone, and Bird, JJ., concurred with Moore, A CLARK, J. (dissenting). Kottari was killed September 19, 1916. formal claim for compensation was filed by Mr. Jurma April 2, 1917, more than six months after the death. But letters had passed between Mr. Jurma and defendants within the period of six months. Assuming that in such letters there was language sufficient to make an unequivocal claim of compensation, it still appears that Mr. Jurma had no authority to act for the dependents. His testimony discloses no authority, and the statement of Rantaaho, dependents' attorney in fact, that no such authority was given, is not disputed. The defendants recognized Mr. Jurma as representing the dependents until shortly after May 21, 1917, when Rantaaho filed his power of attorney. Mr. Freeman's opinions, expressed in his letter of January 22, 1918, quoted by Justice Moore, as to estoppel, and as to the effect of recognizing Mr. Jurma as representing the dependents, are binding upon no one They do not constitute an admission by defendants that a claim for compensation was made by dependents within the statutory time. The recognition by defendants of Mr. Jurma and of the claim for compensation |