Ordronaux v. Rey. preferred to others, even to mortgage creditors. (Articles 2094, 2095.) The ranks between privileged creditors are then declared. Those in the same rank are to be paid rateably. The privileges are then enumerated. Those over movables, are, in general, 1, law expenses; 2, funeral expenses; 3, expenses of last sickness; 4, salaries of servants; 5, supplies for family subsistence. (All these are also privileges over immovables.) The Code then prescribes privileged credits over certain enumerated movables. Amongst the privileges over immovables, are, 1, for the purchase money; 2, loan for the purchase; 3, for labor and materials laid out on buildings, &c. (Articles 2096 to 2105.) Without proceeding farther with these interesting and wellconsidered provisions, it suffices to say, that no privilege is accorded to a wife by the Code, for her claims under a contract of marriage. Mortgage is by the Code restricted to immovables, and it is either legal, judicial, or conventional; and takes place only in the cases, and according to the forms authorized by law. (Articles 2114 to 2119.) Legal mortgage results from the law, and among the rights and credits to which it is applicable are those of married women upon the property of their husbands; (articles 2121, 2122;) and the right is to be exercised under certain modifications. It is this legal mortgage which is mentioned in the eighth article of Mrs. Ordronaux's marriage contract. The contract could not, however, enlarge the provisions of the Code as to mortgage. Judicial mortgage, is analogous to our liens by judgment and decree. Conventional mortgage, depends on covenants and acts of the parties, and can only be made by an Act passed in authentic form before a notary. Therefore neither judicial or conventional mortgage have any application to this case. Mortgage by the Code, takes precedence from the day of enrolment, with but two exceptions. One of these is for the bene Ordronaux v. Rey. fit of women by reason of their matrimonial covenants, for whom it exists independent of enrolment. Husbands are nevertheless enjoined to cause enrolments to be made of the incumbrance of wives on their immovables, and on default, enrolment must be demanded by the commissioner in the civil court at the domicil of the husband, or at the place where the property is situated. Besides these provisions for publicity of the wife's mortgage, it will be borne in mind that the marriage covenants which result in this species of lien, can only be made by an Act before a notary, which remains a record in the public archives of the place where it is made, and they cannot be altered after the marriage is celebrated. To the end that mortgage in favor of the wife may not render immovables virtually inalienable during coverture, the Code contains provisions for discharging the enrolment where it exists, and for exonerating the property from the mortgage, where there is no enrolment, in favor of purchasers. (Articles 2181, 2193, &c.) The result is that in France, the wife has no preference over other creditors in respect of the movables of her husband. She has no lien by way of privilege over his immovables. She has a mortgage upon his immovables, which is notified to the public by her marriage articles, recorded at the domicil of the parties when they were married; and if the husband or commissioner of the civil court has discharged the duty imposed upon them, registered in the office of mortgages within the jurisdiction in which the property is situated. It is abundantly manifest from these provisions of the Code Civil, that whether the premises in question be deemed the property of John Ordronaux, or of the community, the complainant has no lien or priority over other creditors. The Code refuses to contracts made in a foreign country the force of a mortgage in France; (article 2128;) and it would be a great stretch of international comity, to extend the local provisions of the Code which give a lien upon lands in France for the covenants of marriage, to real estate in this country, Independent of the entire inapplicability of the French mode of notifying purchasers and in Ordronaux v. Rey. cumbrancers; in this state, and I believe in every country, immovables are controlled by the lex loci rei sita. We have our own modes of authenticating incumbrances, and our own laws regulating equitable liens. Creditors of persons domiciled and having property here, have a right to look to those laws and those only for the administration of their debtors estates. Justice to our own citizens - forbids that we should yield a priority, such as is here claimed, upon the faith of a secret agreement made and registered in a foreign country twenty years before the parties had an interest in the property in question. It will be sufficiently oppressive on creditors dealing upon the faith of visible property, if we accord to the complainant the participation as a creditor, which the French laws appear to concede to her. The cases to which I was referred, Decouche v. Savetier, 3 J. C. R. 190; and Le Breton v. Miles, 8 Paige, 261, arose between the parties to marriage settlements, or their representatives. There was no conflict in either case with the rights of creditors. Mr. Justice Story says that as to immovable property, a contract of marriage made between parties in a foreign country, will at most, confer only a right of action, to be enforced according to the jurisprudence rei sitą. Story's Conflict of Laws, 160, § 184. He cites to the same point, Henry on Foreign Law, 48, 49, 95. With this authority and the plain good sense of the matter concurring, I must hold that the complainant has neither a lien upon, or a priority over, the real estate in dispute. As the bill proceeds solely upon the ground of preference and equitable lien in favor of the complainant personally, it cannot be sustained. This conclusion leaves untouched the rights of the complainant as a creditor, and also the defendants claim to set off their debt against the rents. The bill must be dismissed with costs, Shotwell, Executor, &c. v. Mott and others. SHOTWELL, Executor, &c. v. MOTT and others. Where a testator directed his executors to sell his lands and to distribute the proceeds amongst various persons together with sundry charitable institutions; it was held that there was a conversion of the real estate and the gifts were to be treated as legacies. It was also held, that if they were to be deemed land, they were nevertheless valid, because the revised statutes relative to Uses and Trusts, do not apply to Charitable Uses. A bequest for the use of the poor of a town, and one to an unincorporated religious association for the use of its poor ministers, are not within the provisions of the statutes against perpetuities. Charitable uses were bestowed in England, and were recognized by law, before the Norman conquest; and they were always fostered and protected by the common law. They were subject to the jurisdiction of the court of chancery long before the statute of Charitable Uses, 43d Elizabeth; and this, whether the trustees were a corporation or individuals, and whether the gift were to trustees by name, or for a definite and specific object without naming trustees. The revised statutes against perpetuites and regulating uses and trusts, were aimed at private trusts and accumulations for remote posterity. Public trusts and charitable uses were not within the intention of the legislature, or the spirit and object of the enactment. The English statute of Uses, 27 Henry VIII., did not apply to public uses or charities. A bequest for the benefit of poor ministers of a specified religious denomination, is valid, though it does not appoint the trustees of the fund. And it is competent for the testator to empower the executors and trustees of his will to designate the first trustees of such fund. If it were otherwise, the trust would remain and the court of chancery would appoint the trustees. A bequest for the ministers of the New York Yearly Meeting of Friends called Orthodox, who are in limited and straitened circumstances, is not too vague or uncertain, or too indefinite in its objects. So of a bequest for the relief of such indigent residents of the town of Flushing, as the trustee or trustees of the town for the time being should select. Both gifts were held to be valid. April 2; August 6, 1844. THE bill in this cause was filed by the sole acting executor of Nathaniel Smith, late of Flushing, deceased, for a construction of his last will and testament, and for directions as to the disposal of the residue of his estate. The will bore date the 22d of May, 1833, and the testator died in 1835. Shotwell, Executor, &c. v. Mott and others. It made numerous bequests for charitable purposes, which were not questioned. He directed his executors, as soon as conveniently might be after the death of his wife, to sell his house and lot in Broadway, in New York, and to distribute the net proceeds among sundry legatees and benevolent institutions; among which dispositions were the two following, which were controverted. "The sum of four thousand dollars to my said friends, Benjamin Clark, Joseph S. Shotwell, Samuel Parsons, and William F. Mott," (who were his executors,) "or to the survivors or survivor of them, or to the executors or administrators of such survivor, to be invested or placed at interest in the names of suitable trustees, and under such regulations that the interest or income thereof may be distributed and divided annually forever under the direction of the New York Yearly Meeting of Friends called Orthodox, unto and among such Orthodox ministers of such society in limited and straitened circumstances, especially those who travel in the ministry, as the said meeting, or its committee, shall, for that purpose, name and designate; such interest or income to be distributed during the sittings of said yearly meetings annually forever; and as I hold the privilege of attending our yearly meetings to be very important to many pious and worthy ministers, and believe that small pecuniary aid to such as are in limited and straitened circumstances would enable them to enjoy that great privilege, and hope that others may think well of the example, and may thereby be induced to make similar bequests, it is my wish that this legacy or appropriation of four thousand dollars to be invested or placed at interest, shall be so invested as to perpetuate in the society the knowledge of my great desire for its growth and prosperity, and to which end I wish that the existence of the fund, together with the name of its founder, and also its object, shall be publicly made known annually forever by the yearly meeting." The other was a bequest of four thousand dollars to the executors by name, "or to the survivors or survivor of them, or to the executors or administrators of such survivor, to be invested permanently in such way and manner that the interest or income thereof may be appropriated annually forever as follows: that is |