JECTS.

Acts 1914, c. 492, as amended by Acts 1916, c. 340, providing for creation by popular vote of anti-saloon territory within Carroll county, held not in contravention of Const. art. 3. § 29, requiring each law to embrace but one subject.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 147-149.]

2. STATUTES 109-SUBJECT AND TITLE.

While the title of a statute must indicate its purpose, it need not contain an abstract of the contents of the act, nor need it mention means and methods by which the general purpose is to be accomplished.

Benjamin F. Crouse was convicted of violating the anti-saloon law, and appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, PATTISON, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ.

Francis Neal Parke and James A. C. Bond, both of Westminster, for appellant. William L. Seabrook, State's Atty., of Westminster, Albert C. Ritchie, Atty. Gen., and Edward O. Weant and Theo. F. Brown, both of Westminster, for the State.

BURKE, J. The appellant in this case was indicted, tried, and found guilty in the circuit court for Carroll county for the vio

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes,lation of the anti-saloon law of that county, Cent. Dig. §§ 136-139.]

3. STATUTES 205-CONSTRUCTION.

The meaning of a statute must be gathered from a consideration of all its provisions. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 282.]

4. STATUTES 183-CONSTRUCTION.

The real intent of the Legislature, when ascertained, will always prevail over the literal sense of the language used in the statute. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 261.]

JECTS.

5. STATUTES 114(6) PLURALITY OF SUBActs 1914, c. 492, as amended by Acts 1916, c. 340, providing for creation of anti-saloon territory in Carroll county by popular vote, is not invalid, under Const. art. 3, § 29, as containing more than one subject, because it provides for search warrants and seizure and destruction of intoxicating liquors; such provisions being merely means or methods provided for enforcement of the law, and no part of its subject.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 147-149.]

6. STATUTES 64(9)-PARTIAL INVALIDITY.

Acts 1914, c. 492, as amended by Acts 1916, c. 340, providing for creation of anti-saloon territory in Carroll county by popular vote, is not rendered invalid by reason of containing separate independent provisions for searches and seizures, even if such provisions should be held invalid.

being Acts 1914, chapter 492, as amended by Acts 1916, chapter 340, and was adjudged to pay a fine of $20 and costs, and stand committed to the custody of the sheriff of Carroll county until the fine and costs are paid or be discharged in due course of law. The appeal before us was taken from that judgment.

The appellant filed a demurrer to the indictment, and to each count thereof, which was overruled. The indictment contained three counts, but the state abandoned the second count. The appellant reserved an exception to the action of the court in permitting the state to prove the sale of intoxicating liquor, as charged in the indictment. The demurrer was interposed, and the exception reserved, for the purpose of raising the single question presented by this record, viz. the constitutionality of the law. It was contended with great earnestness by counsel for the appellant that the law is invalid, because it contravenes that provision of section 29, article 3, of the Constitution, which declares that:

"Every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, be described in its title." Cent. Dig. §§ 66, 195.]

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 42 WHO MAY
QUESTION VALIDITY OF STATUTE.
One convicted of violation of Acts 1914. c.
492, as amended by Acts 1916, c. 340, providing
for creation of anti-saloon territory in Carroll
county by popular vote, cannot urge invalidity
of portions of the act providing for searches
and seizures, where such provisions were not in-
voked against him.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitution-
al Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 39, 40.]
8. STATUTES

SUBJECT.

114(6)—VALIDITY-TITLE AND

Title of Acts 1914, c. 492, as amended by Acts 1916, c. 340, providing for creation of anti-saloon territory in Carroll county by popu lar vote, held to sufficiently describe the subject of the act, in compliance with Const. art. 3, § 29.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. 88 147-149.]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Carroll County; Wm. Henry Forsythe, Jr., Judge. "To be officially reported."

[1] In the presentation of their objections to the act, counsel indulged in a wide range of discussion, but the legal question presented is a narrow and familiar one, and, we think, is not difficult of solution. The court must approach the consideration of the questions here presented in the light of well-established principles. The section of the Constitution quoted deals with two things: First, the subject of the enactment; and, secondly, its title. The first must be single, and the second must describe the subject. It was said in Fout v. Frederick County, 105 Md. 545, 66 Atl. 487, that:

"The general disposition of the courts has been to give a liberal construction to this provision of the Constitution, rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to render effective the purposes for which it was adopted. It is stated by Judge Cooley that the general purpose of this provision of the Constitution is accom

In People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep. 82, 14 Ann. Cas. 994, in which the constitutionality of the local option act of 1907 was sustained, the court said:

"The rule of law is that an investigation like this, concerning the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature, begins with the presumption All doubts or uncertainthat the act is valid.

plished when the law has but one general ob- | tutional and unconstitutional provisions may
ject, which is fairly indicated in its title, and even be contained in the same sections, and yet
that to require every end and means necessary be perfectly distinct and separable, so that the
or convenient for the accomplishment of this first may stand, though the last fall. The point
general object to be provided for, by a separate is, not whether they are contained in the same
act relating to that alone, would be not only section, for the distribution into sections is
unreasonable, but would render legislation im- purely artificial; but whether they are essen-
possible. This court has had occasion to pass tially and inseparably connected in substance.'"
so frequently upon this provision of the Con-
stitution that its purpose and meaning may be
assumed to be well understood and thoroughly
well settled. The difficulty in this, as in other
cases, is found to exist in the application of the
settled rule to the particular case. There must
be unity in the subject-matter of the act, but
'if the several sections of the law refer to and
are germane to the same subject-matter, which
is described in its title, it is considered as em-
bracing but a single subject, and as satisfying
the requirements of the Constitution in this re-
spect.' Mayor, etc., v. Reitz, 50 Md. 579. The
title is sufficient if it fairly indicates the sub-
ject-matter of the enactment. These rules of
construction have been stated and applied by
this court in every case in which it has been
called upon to consider this section of the Con-
stitution, from the case of Davis v. State, 7 Md.
151 [161 Am. Dec. 331] decided in 1854, in
which the question was before the court for the
first time, to the case of Mayor, etc., v. Flack et
al., 104 Md. 107 [64 Atl. 702], decided October
4, 1906, and in all of the cases it is held that the
title need not contain an abstract of the act;
nor mention the means or methods by which it
is to be carried into effect; nor will an act of
a general nature be declared obnoxious to this
clause of the Constitution, unless there be in-
grafted upon it some subject of a private or a
local character, or unless two or more dissimi-
lar and discordant subjects be legislated upon
in the same law. If foreign, irrelevant, or dis-
cordant subjects are introduced, they will be
rejected, if other sections of the law can stand
without them."

In State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 16 Atl. 445, Judge Alvey, speaking of the title of an act, said:

"The objects designed to be attained by the constitutional provision are twofold: The first is to prevent the combination in one act of several distinct and incongruous subjects; and the second is that the Legislature and the people of the state may be fairly advised of the real nature of pending legislation. All titles of acts, therefore, should be so framed as to accomplish these objects. But we regret to say that, in practice, a strict observance of the terms of the Constitution has not always marked our legislation in this respect. Many acts are passed, and often of great importance, the titles of which are exceedingly deficient in definite and clear description of the subject-matter of the act. But this court has ever been reluctant to defeat the will of the Legislature by declaring such legislation void, if by any construction it could possibly be maintained.'

*

If

ties, arising either from the language of the
Constitution or the act, must be resolved in
favor of the validity of the act, and the court
will only assume to declare it void in case of
The
a clear conflict with the Constitution.
duty of the court is to so construe acts of the
Legislature as to uphold their constitutionality
and validity, if it can reasonably be done, and
if their construction is doubtful, the doubt will
be resolved in favor of the law.
the subject is not expressed in the title or if
the act embraces more than one subject the act
will be void, and in this act the creation and
abolition of anti-saloon territory is expressed in
the title and covered by the body. In deciding
the question whether the act embraces more than
one subject we are to be governed by certain
well-established rules. The only purpose of the
provision of the Constitution is to prevent the
joining in one act of incongruous and unrelated
matters, and the word 'subject' is not synony-
mous with 'provision.' Any number of provi-
sions may be contained in an act, however di-
verse they may be, so long as they are not in-
consistent with or foreign to the general sub-
ject and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject. The requirement that an act shall
embrace but one subject is not intended to
hamper the Legislature or embarrass honest
legislation, but it is intended to prevent incor-
porating in an act matters not related to the
subject of legislation and of which the title
gives no hint. An act may contain many pro-
visions and details for the accomplishment of
the legislative purpose, and if they legitimately
tend to effectuate that object the act is not con-
trary to the constitutional provision. Man-
chester v. People, 178 Ill. 285, 52 N. E. 964:
Meul v. People, 198 Ill. 258, 64 N. E. 1106.
The constitutional prohibition against more
than one subject not being directed against the
title but against the act itself, the question now
being considered is to be determined by the
body of the act, and there is in the act but one
general subject. That subject is the determina-
tion by the legal voters of a certain district
whether the sale of intoxicating liquors shall be
prohibited therein."

The title to that act, which appears to We said in Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. have been the model of proposed local op466, 87 Atl. 413: tion, or anti-saloon state-wide legislation, in this state, was:

*

"Every presumption favors the validity of the statute; it cannot be stricken down as void unless it plainly contravenes some provision of the Constitution; a reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality is sufficient to sustain it, and the party assailing the Act must point out the special provision of the Constitution to which it is obnoxious. 'A statute may be good in part, while other parts are invalid. If a portion be unconstitutional, the Court is not authorized, for that reason, to declare the whole void.' Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 [61 Am. Dec. 331]. In Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 5 Gray [Mass.] 482, where the same rule of construction was adopted, the court said: "The consti

"An act to provide for the creation by popular vote of anti-saloon territory within which the sale of intoxicating liquor and the licensing of such sale shall be prohibited, and for the abolition by like means of territory so created." Laws Ill. 1907, p. 297.

The court held, as we have seen, that the act, which was passed in conformity to its title, embraced but one subject. Many of the provisions of the Illinois act are incorporated in the law under consideration; but the title is somewhat different, and this dif

ference in title gives rise to the only real commissioners of Carroll county, and certain question in the case, for, as we understand | paragraphs of section 23, which impose the the law, the decision in the McBride Case supra, upon sound reason and in harmony with the cases in our own court, establishes the unity of the subject of the act.

[3, 4] But the construction must be upon the whole act. The meaning must be gath-in support of this construction is based largeered from a consideration of all the provisions of the act. "The cardinal rule in the construction of a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature as it is expressed in the words of the statute, and for this purpose the whole act must be considered together." Mitchell v. State, 115 Md. 360, 80 Atl. 1020; Healy v. State, 115 Md. 377, 80 Atl. 1074; Purnell v. State Board of Education, 125 Md. 266, 93 Atl. 518. And "the real intent, when ascertained, will always prevail over the literal sense of the language." Cutty v. Carson, 125 Md. 25, 93 Atl. 302; Brenner v. Brenner, 127 Md. 189, 96 Atl. 287.

Constitution authorized a referendum vote, POISEL v. CASH, Clerk of Circuit Court. with certain well-defined exceptions, upon

Appeal from Circuit Court, Carroll Coun- in the American courts, it cannot be questy; Wm. Henry Forsythe, Jr., Judge.

with his wife which had the effect of condoning those offenses, which is a question we do not find it necessary to decide, yet she is shown to have been guilty of flagrant marital infidelity subsequent to the latest period to which the acts of condonation can be referred. It is an established principle in the law of divorce that condonation is not an absolute but a conditional forgiveness of marital misconduct. It is an excuse of past offenses upon the implied condition that the marriage vows shall thereafter be duly regarded. It is not a license for their continued violation. If there is a breach of the condition inherent in the condonation the original grievance, as a cause of divorce, is at once revived. These principles are clearly stated in the opinion delivered by Judge Boyd in the case of Fisher v. Fisher, 93 Md. 298, 48 Atl. 833, when previous decisions on the subject are cited and discussed.

It appears from the opinion filed by the court below that the conclusion it reached was influenced by the case of Schwab v. Schwab, 96 Md. 592, 54 Atl. 653, 94 Am. St. Rep. 598, where it was held that a plaintiff, who had filed a bill for divorce charging the defendant with having committed adultery with a designated person, was not entitled to file a supplemental bill in the same suit alleging similar offenses with other persons, after the suit was brought, as a cause of divorce in that proceeding. The court recognized, however, certain important exceptions to the general rule upon which its decision was based. The exceptions were thus stated:

first instance, and the offense charged in the bill was duly proved. When the case was ready for a decree, the defendant represented to the judge before whom it was pending that her husband had cohabited with her since the institution of the suit. In view of this information, the court declined to decree the divorce; but the bill was not dismissed. | The plaintiff subsequently filed a petition in which he denied his wife's statement as to the resumption of their marital relations, and alleged that she continued to commit adultery after making the representations which induced the court to refuse the divorce. The petition prayed that the case be remanded for further proof, and an order was passed for that purpose. Both parties then offered testimony upon the issue as to whether there had been cohabitation since the acts of adul- | tery charged in the bill of complaint, the commission of the offense not being disputed. It had already been proven that the plaintiff left his wife in July, 1915, on account of her marital infidelity, but the defendant testified that he afterwards frequently visited her in the home, in which she had remained, and that marital intercourse repeatedly occurred on such occasions until April, 1916, when the visits were finally discontinued. It was admitted by the plaintiff that he often returned to the home after separating from his wife, but he stated that he went there solely for the purpose of seeing their only child, a boy five years of age, who had been left with his mother under an agreement that the plaintiff would make weekly payments for his support, and it was denied by the plaintiff that he at any time cohabited with his wife after the commission of the offenses which caused their separation. The defendant's mother and uncle testified that on the occasion of the plaintiff's visits to his former home he was sometimes alone with his wife in her room, although the child was usually present. In April, 1916, as the evidence shows, the defendant was ill, and at her request the child was taken by the father and has since remained in his custody. The testimony is direct and uncontradicted that in July, 1916, the defendant was continuing her The facts of the case now before us clearadulterous relations with the same person who ly bring it within one of the exceptions to was implicated in the marital offenses origi- the rule, and not within the terms of the nally proven. Upon a resubmission of the rule itself, upon which the decision below case for final decree, the divorce was denied, appears to have been largely predicated and and the bill dismissed, on the ground that upon which it is sought to be sustained on the adultery of the wife charged in the bill appeal. The proposal here is, not that a had been condoned, and that the repetition divorce should be decreed on the ground of of the act with the same person after the the adultery committed by the defendant aftsuit, while provable for corroborative pur-er the institution of the suit, but that this poses, could not be made the basis of a decree dissolving the marriage. From that decision the plaintiff has appealed.

"When the defendant has been guilty of subsequent acts of adultery with the same person the subsequent acts may be shown, as tending who is named as particeps criminis in the bill, to explain or corroborate evidence already taken in reference to the acts originally charged, as was the case in Thayer v. Thayer, supra (101 Mass. 111 [100 Am. Dec. 110]). Or where a condonation of the adultery alleged in the bill had been set up in defense of the action, when acts of adultery committed by the defendant pendente lite were permitted to be set up by supplemental bill because they operated to revive the original cause of action, as was the case in Lutz v. Lutz, supra [52 N. J. Eq. 241, 28 Atl. 315]."

subsequent misconduct, as alleged by supplemental petition and duly proved, should be held to nullify the effect of the condonation In our view of the case a divorce should relied upon as a defense. According to the have been granted. Even if we were to con- defendant's own testimony, she had no opclude from the evidence that, after the adul-portunities for marital relations with her teries charged in the bill of complaint were husband after April, 1916, and she makes no