same to the prosecuting witness. Fifth, in- of twenty-five dollars by the holder of this tent is the essence of the crime charged, and certificate. the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew he was disposing of a lottery ticket at the time he gave the slip of paper to the prosecuting witness. [1] The court cannot charge you as requested by these prayers, but does charge you that it is incumbent upon the state to prove every essential element of the crime charged, and will, before concluding, instruct you as to the presumption of innocence, and reasonable doubt, as requested by the third and sixth prayers. The card in evidence in this case reads: "American Diamond Clothing Company." (Omitting address.) "Philadelphia, Pa. Mr. J. C. Freeland, Address 220 French Street. List of $25.00 articles." Then follows list of the articles. Indorsed on the back of the card under "Date 2/12, 50¢ paid, and 2/19, 50¢” (initial of collector). Accompanying the card was this certificate: "Free Advertising Certificate. "For the purpose of advertising our special $25 articles, one will be given without extra charge to the holder of certificate bearing number corresponding to the last three figures of the Philadelphia bank clearings as published in the newspaper, Saturday afternoon, for the week ending date of Feb. 1917. American Diamond and Clothing Company." (Omitting the address.) What the Philadelphia bank clearings will be at the end of every week is the merest guess, and that any number on the certificate will correspond to the last three figures of such clearings is nothing less than chance. State v. Sedgwick, 2 Boyce, 453, 81 Atl. 472. [3] As was said in State v. Lipkin, 169 N. C. 265, 84 S. E. 340, L. R. A. 1915F, 1018: It does not "matter that the person who buys a chance for a trivial sum, in the expectation of winning something of much larger value, can go on with his contributions, and, after paying the full sum of $17.50" ($25 in this case) "get the piece of furniture he may want" (a watch and chain in this case). "This has been held not to devest it of its gambling quality. State V. Perry [154 N. C. 616, 70 S. E. 387] supra; De Florin v. State, 121 Ga. 593, 49 S. E. 699, 104 Am. St. Rep. 177; State v. Moren, 48 Minn. 555, 51 N. W. 618. In the case last citably operate as an additional incentive to pured, it is said that such a feature would probchase a chance in the lottery scheme, and does not take it out of the statute, as the vicious element still inheres in it. The sale of the ticket gave the purchaser a chance to obtain something more than he paid for, * and the other fact became an extra inducement for the purchase, making the general scheme more attractive and alluring. The difference between it and a single wager on the cast of a die is only one of degree. They are both intended to attract the player to the game, and have prac tically the effect of inducing others, by this easy and cheap method of acquiring property of value, to speculate on chances in the hope that And on the right margin of the certificate their winnings may far exceed their investment in value. This is what the law aims to pre- * The court is in full accord with the law as therein stated, and it is applicable to this case. The statute prohibits any person by himself, his servant or agent, or as the servant or agent of another, to sell or dispose of, or have in his possession with intent to sell or dispose [4] The question of criminal intent or of, "any lottery policy, certificate, or anything guilty knowledge of the accused, as suggestby which such person or any other personed by two of his prayers, is to be determined promises or guarantees that any particular number, character, ticket, or certificate, shall in the event, or on the happening of any contingency in the nature of a lottery, entitle the purchaser or holder to receive money, property, or evidence of debt," etc. The statute applies equally to an agent as to a principal. by you from the exhibits and evidence in this case, together with the court's instruction to you upon the law applicable to the facts of this case. Verdict, not guilty. (6 Boyce, 379) MORGAN et al. v. OWNBEY. (Superior Court of Delaware. New Castle. Nov. 27, 1916.) BAIL 4-FOREIGN ATTACHMENT-RIGHT [2] Lottery has been defined to be a scheme for the distribution of money or property by chance, and that the scheme is not limited to the sale of tickets nor to the terms or prom-1. ises printed or written upon them. The TO ANSWER-REQUIREMENT OF SPECIAL BAIL. Under the Delaware statutes relating to formeaning of a contingency in the nature of aeign attachment, where plaintiffs, in suit against lottery, within the contemplation of the statute, as applied to the facts of this case, is: "One" (article) "will be given without extra charge to the holder of certificate bearing num ber corresponding to the last three figures of the Philadelphia bank clearings as published," etc. The element of lottery in this scheme lies in the chance to get one of the list of articles named on the card without the full payment an individual, attached shares of stock of a domestic corporation, with direction to the sheriff, indorsed on the writ, that he summon the corporation as garnishee and demand bail in the sum of $200,000, the defendant, although plaintiffs filed a declaration in the suit, could not appear and contest the merits of plaintiffs' claim without entering the special bail demanded, notwithstanding such shares constituted defendant's entire property and had been deprived of all market value by suit in another jurisdic [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Attachment, Cent. Dig. §§ 735-752.] tion, rendering him financially unable to furnish | impossible for him to furnish security in the such amount of bail, for his entry of appear- large amount demanded. ance without such bail, if allowed, would destroy the lien and advantage of the attachment by changing the action from one in rem to one in personam and making any judgment recovered by plaintiffs a general judgment. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bail, Cent. Dig. 88 6-13.] 2. ATTACHMENT 73-CORPORATE STOCK. Under Rev. Code 1915, § 2009, providing that the shares of any person in any incorporated company, with all the rights thereunto belonging, may be attached for debt, and section 1986, providing that for all purposes of attachment the situs of the ownership of capital stock of all domestic corporations shall be regarded as in the state, in a foreign attachment suit attachment may be made of the stock of a domestic corporation by an officer of the company giving to the sheriff a certificate of the number of shares held by the debtor in such company, and in such case, the corporation itself not being summoned as garnishee, it is not necessary that it be doing business in the state under section 4120, as to attachment and garnishment. Argued before PENNEWILL, C. J., and BOYCE, J., and thereafter before PENNEWILL, C. J., and BOYCE, CONRAD, RICE, and HEISEL, JJ., as court in banc. Saulsbury, Morris & Rodney, of Wilmington, for plaintiffs. Ward, Gray & Neary, of Wilmington, for defendant. Action of foreign attachment in said Su perior Court by John Pierpont Morgan, William P. Hamilton, Herbert L. Satterlee and Lewis C. Ledyard, executors of John Pierpont Morgan, deceased, against James A. Ownbey. Entry of appearance by attorneys for defendant on the appearance docket, etc., as in ordinary actions, without given securiMotion to strike ty required by statute. off. Granted. Judgment for want of appear [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Attachment, ance at the second (March) term, amount to Cent. Dig. §§ 200, 201.] 3. BAIL 4-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 312DUE PROCESS-FOREIGN ATTACHMENT-STAT UTE. The Delaware foreign attachment statutes, in denying defendant any right to appear upon attachment thereunder without entering special bail, are not in conflict with Const. U. S. Amend. 14, as being arbitrary or unreasonable, nor a deprivation of property without due process of law, though plaintiff, by demanding special bail greater than defendant's financial ability to furnish, may prevent defendant from appearing in the suit at all before judgment is entered against him. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bail, Cent. Dig. 88 6-13; Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 928.] 4. BAIL 4-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. Nor are such statutes unconstitutional in making an arbitrary, unreasonable or illegal classification of the persons affected by them and denying them the equal protection of the laws, contrary to Const. U. S. Amend. 14, in that special bail before answering is required in foreign attachment suits, as a condition to appearing, only from individual defendants, and not from corporation defendants. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bail, Cent. Dig. 88 6-13; Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. 710.] - OPENING RULE TO 5. JUDGMENT 388 SHOW CAUSE. A rule to show cause why judgment should not be opened may properly be served upon plaintiffs' counsel, where plaintiffs' absence from the state precludes service on them. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 747-749.] 6. ATTACHMENT 217-JUDGMENT-OPENING IN FOREIGN ATTACHMENT SUIT. Notwithstanding the court's inherent power to open a judgment, if convinced that it would be in the furtherance of justice to do so, judgment in a foreign attachment suit against an individual will not be opened merely because defendant has been prevented from appearing and contesting on the merits by his financial inability to furnish the amount of special bail demanded, where he had knowledge of the attachment from the time it was made, and the only excuse he could give for failing to appear was that it was be ascertained by inquisition at bar. Motion. to open judgment and permit defendant to appear and disprove claim of plaintiffs, withDenied. Final judgout giving security. ment obtained by inquisition at bar, at the subsequent (May) term. Motion to open final judgment, and permit defendant to appear without security and disprove or avoid the debt or claim of plaintiffs. Denied. These several motions, in turn, were, without prejudice to plaintiffs, first heard by the court in banc. The writ of foreign attachment was issued upon affidavit required by the statute, with direction to the sheriff, indorsed on the writ, that he summon as garnishee the Wooten Land & Fuel Company, and demand bail in the sum of $200,000. The sheriff made due return of the writ that he attached all the shares of the capital stock of James A. Ownbey in the Wooten Land & Fuel Company, a corporation of the state of Delaware, with all the rights thereunto belonging, and left a Copy of the process with certain directors of the company and received from the same a certificate, made part of the return, showing the number of shares held or owned by the defendant to be 33,324%. On the first rule day plaintiffs filed a dec laration on the common counts, without bill of particulars, with copy, and ruled pleas by first general rule day thereafter. Ward, Gray & Neary, attorneys for defendant, for the purpose of entering an appearance for defendant, wrote their names on the appearance docket as in ordinary cages, and on the same day filed pleas with the prothonotary, who marked the same "Filed," and made the following entry in the appear. ance docket: "March 2, 1916. Defendant pleads, with copy, nonassumpsit, statute of limitations, payment. Rule reps. and issues by second rule day in March." On March 13, 1916, the attorneys for the plaintiffs presented a written motion to the court, asking that the appearance and the entry so made be stricken off, and that the pleas be stricken from the files of the court, for the reason that security required by the statute had not been given. "b. That the entry of appearance by the defendant in the said writ may be made without disturbing the seizure of property thereunder or its security for any judgment finally entered in this suit. "c. That the purpose of the writ of foreign attachment is two-fold, to wit: To compel the appearance of the defendant in the cause and to devote or apply the value of the property attached to the judgment, if any, obtained in the suit begun by such process. On March 14, 1916, at the request of the attorneys for defendant, the time for the argument of the motion was enlarged; and entered by the defendant, and pleas filed, no "d. Where, in any case, appearance has been on March 21st they filed with the prothono-judgment can be entered until the trial of the tary another paper in the nature of an an- issue so raised in said cause. swer to the motion, which after reciting the docket entries is as follows: "3. That said Wooten Land & Fuel Company, while a corporation of the state of Delaware, is engaged in coal mining and all other of its activities and business in the states of Colorado and New Mexico, where it has much and valuable property, and is not and never has been engaged in business in the state of Delaware. "4. That James A. Ownbey is a resident of the state of Colorado and that the stock in the said the Wooten Land & Fuel Company, which has been attached in this case, constitutes substantially all of his property, assets and estate. "5. That a suit was instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado in the month of February, 1915, by the plaintiffs in this cause and Francis H. McKnight, a person under the control of the said executors of John Pierpont Morgan, deceased, against the said the Wooten Land & Fuel Company, this defendant and other persons, praying for an accounting by this defendant, who had been the general manager of said Wooten Land & Fuel Company, and the appointment of a receiver for said company. And in said cause a receiver for said company was duly appointed and certain matters therein referred to a master to take testimony. That the master is still engaged in taking testimony in said cause and the receiver so appointed is now in possession and control of the property of the said the Wooten Land & Fuel Company. That by reason of the premises the market value of the shares of said company owned by this defendant and attached as aforesaid has been temporarily destroyed, although in fact of great value, so that the defendant has found said shares unavailable to assist him in securing the required bail or security to procure the discharge of said shares from said attachment. "6. That by reason of the premises, the defendant has found it impossible and avers it is impossible to secure bail or security in the said sum of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000), or in any adequate sum for the release of his shares in said Wooten Land & Fuel Company, attached in this case. "7. That the defendant in the above stated case has a good defense to the whole of any cause of action stated in said suit, the nature of which defense is that there exists no indebtedness upon any account or for any sum or sums of money whatsoever, due to said plaintiffs or their decedent, the said John Pierpont Morgan, from said defendant either at this time or at the time said suit was instituted. "8. That the said writ of foreign attachment, issued as original process in said cause, is a process existing under and defined and limited by the statutes of the State of Delaware, in that behalf. That said statutes, upon due' interpretation or construction thereof, provide: "a. That entry of the bail or security for the discharge of the property seized under such writ of foreign attachment is not a necessary prerequisite for the entry of appearance by the "9. If the statutes of the state of Delaware, relating to foreign attachment, cannot duly be construed so as to permit appearance and defense, in case of a cause begun by foreign attachment, without the entry of bail or security for the discharge of the property seized under such writ, such statutes are unconstitutional under the first section of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that: "a. Such statutes are laws abridging the privilege and immunities of citizens of the United States. "b. Such statutes deprive parties defendant in cases brought thereunder of property without due process of law. "c. Such statutes deny such defendants the equal protection of the laws. "10. To require the defendant in this cause to give bond in the sum of two hundred thousand dollars or in any sum adequate to secure the payment of the amount of monies claimed by plaintiff therein, or to procure the dissolution of said attachment and the release therefrom of the shares of stock so attached, as a condition precedent to the allowance of an appearance and entry of pleas in bar, in said cause, by said defendant, is oppressive, unreasonable and in violation of fundamental principles for the administration of justice." The prothonotary marked the same "Filed," and made the following entry in the appearance docket: to strike appearance and defence filed." "March 21, 1916. Reply to plaintiff's motion On March 27, 1916, attorneys for plaintiffs filed a further written motion to the effect that the entry so made in the appearance docket be stricken off; that the paper writing containing reply to plaintiffs' first motion be stricken from the files, for the reason that security required by the statute had not been given; and on the same day, they also filed another written motion, viz.: * * It appearing that * * the defendant has not entered special bail, the * plaintiffs, by * * their attorneys, move, at this the second term after issuing the writ, for judgment, collectible from the property attached, pursuant to sections 20 and 28, chapter 126, being sections 4137 and 4145 of the Revised Code. "And further, that the amount of said judgment be ascertained by inquisition at bar." The Superior Court, considering that the questions of law raised by the motions ought to be heard by the court in banc, did, upon the joint application of the parties, without prejudice to the plaintiffs, direct the same to be so heard. Accordingly the motions came on to be Argument for Plaintiffs. In foreign attachments under the Delaware statute a common appearance cannot be entered and the defendant cannot appear and defend without entering special bail. Section 4137, Revised Code of 1915; section 4123, Id.; Reybold v. Parker, 6 Houst. 544. The act passed in 1770 (Rev. Laws 1829, p. 46) is with very few changes the act of today. Parts of sections 3, 10 and 16 thereof cited; also "A supplement to an act entitled 'An act directing the manner of suing out attachments within this government.' Section 3, p. 52, Code (1829); also "An additional supplement (1823) to the act, etc., Code (1829) p. 52; Woolley on Del. Prac. §§ 1291, 1292, and 1258. So far as is known, no attempt has ever before been made under the act of 1770, and the amendments thereto, to enter appearance otherwise than by special bail. The language of the court in Penna. Steel Co. v. N. J. S. R. R. Co., 4 Houst. 572, 578, is applicable. Wells v. Shreve's Adm'r, 2 Houst. 329, 369; Frankel v. Satterfield, 9 Houst. 201, 209, 19 Atl. 898; National Bank of W. & B. v. Furtick, 2 Marv. 35, 51, 42 Atl. 479, 44 L. R. A. 115, 69 Am. St. Rep. 99. "A foreign attachment is only a process to compel an appearance, and is dissolved by the defendant's entering such appearance, by putting in special bail to the suit." Serg. on For. Attch. 6. "This judgment against the defendant can only be a judgment by default, for want of appearance by him, that is by entering special bail." Id. 20. "When appearance is effected by special bail being put in, the suit proceeds as in ordinary cases. Id. 130, 135. In Fowler v. Dickson and Tweeddale, 1 Boyce, 113, 119, 74 Atl. 601, 603, in speaking of the proceeding of foreign attachment, our court said: "It had its origin in the custom of London." See also 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 894 (1st Ed.); Drake on Attach. § 5. The defendant, as under the custom of London, is not allowed to plead to the action until he has given the required security. Id. § 312; 4 Cyc. 816. To the like effect is Andrews v. Clarke, Carthew, 25, 1690; Bacon's Abridgment, 51, under "Customs of London, H. 1"; also Com. Dig. under "Attachment, E."; also McClenachan v. McCarty, 1 Dall. 375, 1 L. Ed. 183; also Callender & Co. v. Duncan, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 454, in which the defendant, without objection of plaintiff, appeared and pleaded to the action without putting in special bail. In Vann v. Frederick, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 303, it was held that the wife of the absent defendant in attachment cannot appear and plead to the declaration. chapter 7. See also Watson v. Noblett, 65 N. J. Law, 506, 47 Atl. 438; Garrett v. Tinnen, 8 Miss. (7 How.) 465; Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. & McH. (Md.) 535. The defendant is in the same situation he would have been in if taken on a capias ad respondendum. Cunningham's Dict. under "Appearance," printed in 1771. 3 ting in and justifying bail to the action; which "Appearance in such case is effected by putis commonly called putting in bail above." Blacks. Com. 290, 291; also Highmore on Bail, 37, published about 1783; 1 Sellon's Practice, 137; Dashwood v. Folks, 3 Levinz, *343. "Appearance is necessary in all cases, because the defendant must be in court before his attorney can plead, or take any steps on his behalf, or plaintiff can proceed against him, except by declaring de bene esse.' 1 Sel. Proc. 91; also Highmore on Bail, 41, and 1 Tidd's Prac. 465; Ven v. Calvert, 4 Tr. Rep. 578; Saunders v. Owen, 2 Dowling & Ryland, 252; Mayor and 160, 16 Fed. Cas. 1268, No. 9358; Voss v. Commonalty v. Čooke et al., 1 Cranch, C. C. Tuel, 1 Cranch, C. C. 72, 28 Fed. Cas. 1305, No. 17015; Wager v. Lear, 2 Cranch, C. C. 92, 28 Fed. Cas. 1324, No. 17,034. From the authorities, it follows that the defendant has neither appeared nor pleaded. It is contended that the courts in this state have three several times permitted the defendant, after judgment in foreign attachment cases, to open the judgment and be heard in disproving the debt without giving bail. Taylor v. Rossiter, 6 Houst. 485; In re Levy, 3 Pennewill, 5, 50 Atl. 540; In re Warthman, 4 Pennewill, 319, 55 Atl. 6. In this connection, it is important to consider section 4089, Revised Code, which is as follows: "If the defendant in a writ of summons, shall not appear at the return day thereof, and it shall appear by the return that he was duly summoned, it shall be lawful for the plaintiff, having filed his declaration, to take judgment thereon for default of appearance, according to the rules and practice of the court. "But if the defendant shall, at or before the next term after such judgment, by affidavit deny notice, or knowledge, of such suit before the judgment was rendered, and shall allege that there is a just, or legal, defense to the action, or some part thereof, such judgment shall be taken off and he shall be permitted to appear; any execution which may have been issued thereon to remain cautionary." It will be observed that the petitions in two of the cases last cited conform strictly to the requirements of this section of the Code, which, it is respectfully submitted, can have no application to the law of attachments, for the reason that it applies to summons cases, yet the court did in Taylor v. Rossiter, followed in In re Warthman, probably by analogy, apply the practice to the defendants therein. In re Levy, 3 Pennewill, 5, 50 Atl. 540, shows the uncertainty and lack of sound basis for the practice. Remedy by attachment must be pursued In Alexander v. Taylor, 62 N. C. 36, it was in conformity with the terms of the law held the debtor in an attachment suit conferring it. Drake on Attach. § 4a; Reynin equity has no status in court until he olds v. Howell, 1 Marv. 52, 59, 60, 31 Atl has appeared and replevied in accordance 875; Penna. Steel Co. v. N. J. S. R. R. Co., If the defendant be permitted to appear | tutionality of our attachment statute depends and defend in the manner attempted, with- wholly upon whether the requirement that out giving special bail, the plaintiffs would special bail must be given as a prerequisite probably be prevented from obtaining judg- to appearance and defense violates the "due ment binding upon the goods attached under process of law" clause of the Fourteenth the statute at the second term. Any judg- Amendment. ment subsequently rendered is not authorized by the statute, unless it be a judgment in personam in case the attachment has been dissolved. See Reynolds v. Howell, 1 Marv. 60, 31 Atl. 875. Under section 4145, Rev. Code 1915, the plaintiff after judgment may proceed by order of sale, fieri facias, capias ad satisfaciendum, or otherwise, as on other judgments. If judgment be obtained under section 4137, Rev. Code 1915, then the procedure is by order of sale only. The writ of fi. fa., of course is applicable where the defendant appears by putting in special bail and the judgment thereon is a personal judgment. If the defendant be permitted to appear and defend without giving special bail further proceedings by the plaintiffs would be wholly nugatory. Woolley on Del. Prac. § 1297. It was contended that section 4120, Rev. Code 1915, which provides in part: "All corporations doing business in this state, | except banks, saving institutions and loan associations, are subject to the operation of the attachment laws of the state of Delaware, as provided in the case of individuals * * -should be construed with, and is operative upon sections 2009 and 2013 inclusive, and that this would prevent the attachment of shares of stock of any company not doing business in this state. This contention is faulty in that it overlooks section 1986 which is: "For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all courts held in this state, but not for the purpose of taxation, the situs of the ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this state, whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as in this state." -and also overlooks the decision in Fowler v. Dickson & Tweeddale, 1 Boyce, 113, 74 Atl. 601, where a similar contention was disposed of. "Due process of law" under the federal Constitution, since it is not defined in the Constitution, means "the law of the land" as used in the Magna Charta, and to ascertain what is "the law of the land" we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 15 L. Ed. 372. The "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment applies only to the nation, while the "due process" clause in the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states. Tracy v. Ginzberg, 205 U. S. 170-178, 27 Sup. Ct. 461, 51 L. Ed. 755. The case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 722, 24 L. Ed. 565, has been said to be a landmark in the law of attachments. The court held that a proceeding by attachment was substantially a proceeding in rem. See also Central Loan & Trust Co. v. Campbell, 173 U. S. 84, 97, 19 Sup. Ct. 346, 43 L. Ed. 623; Light v. Canadian County Bank, 2 Okl. 543, 37 Pac. 1075. Distress for rent is an ancient commonlaw procedure, which is still in force in this state. The constitutionality of proceedings by distress for rent is considered in Anderson v. Henry, 45 W. Va. 319, 31 S. E. 998. The requirement of special bail is not unknown to the laws of the United States. Section 942 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 1568), passed about 1799. Section 29, Judicial Code of the United States (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1095 [U. S. Comp. St. 1913, § 1011]), pertaining to the removal of causes, provides for the defendant "entering special bail in such suit if special bail was originally requisite therein," from which it must be assumed that failure to give special bail as therein required would be accompanied by all the commonlaw disabilities for so doing. See Cooley's Const. Lim. 440, note 2 (4th Ed.) for "what is meant by 'the law of the land.' ” It was also contended that section 4143, Rev. Code 1915, which provides for a proceeding in attachments against foreign corporations different from the proceedings against individuals, renders the proceedings against individuals void in that there is no reasonable basis for a separate classification. A complete answer to this is contained in Vogle v. New Granada Canal Co., 1 Houst. 295, where the court held that a corporation was not subject to foreign attachment, which resulted in the passage of the statute embod-States. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. ied in section 4143, Rev. Code 1915. A statute requiring that appearance be entered by putting in special hail does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The requirement of security for the payment of the judgment of the court is not in violation of the Constitution of the United S. 1, 43-46, 19 Sup. Ct. 580, 43 L. Ed. 873. The right to appear and defend and the right to a trial by jury, both being rights under the Constitution of the United States, if the giving of security may be made a preThe validity of the challenge of the consti- requisite to the enjoyment of one, there is no |