the plaintiff and another workman to do certain work on the porch, the placing of moulding, sheeting, etc. The porch work had proceeded to the extent that the roof was ready for slating, the floor joists laid and an opening made through the second floor joists three by nine (3x9') feet for a stairway. The roof of the second story porch was supported on the side and away from the building by four two by four (2x4") inch temporary uprights running from the second floor joists to the porch plate. The uprights at the bottom were toenailed into the joists and were not nailed at the top to the porch plate, and were also held in place by the weight of the roof structure resting on the uprights. At this point in the work it appears that no further use of the scaffolding was required, and that plaintiff and his fellow workman were directed by Miller, the foreman, to tear down the scaffold. In doing this work plaintiff began on the second story end of the porch and had done the work up to and including the third upright, and to avoid crossing over the stairway opening between the joists, he swung outside and around the upright, when it pulled out from the top, and plaintiff was thrown to the ground and severely injured. The omission to nail the uprights to the porch plate is the negligence upon which the plaintiff bases his right to recover damages against the defendant company for the injuries he has sustained. Considerable evidence was offered by both plaintiff and defendant whether to or not to fasten the uprights at the top was the usual or customary way of doing such porch construction work, and the jury has found against the defendant's contention that the uprights had been erected and constructed in the usual and customary way, and that it was due to this faulty construction that plaintiff was injured. [2] The defendant filed a point for binding instructions, and now asks for judgment non obstante veredicto on the ground that the defendant had performed its whole duty to plaintiff in furnishing proper materials for the porch and scaffold construction, and, so far as the evidence goes, competent and skillful workmen as coemployés with plaintiff on the work; that the negligence found by the jury in not fastening the uprights at the top was the negligence of a fellow servant; that the omission to nail the upright supports, either on the part of Miller or the other workman, was not incidental to any duties of superintendence that Miller as foreman was required to perform, but merely the performance of a manual act within the scope of the duties of any workman, citing the cases of Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. 42, 21 Atl. 157, 159, 23 Am. St. Rep. 160; Feeney v. Abelson, 49 Pa. Super. Ct. 163; McGrath v. Thompson, 231 Pa. 631, 80 Atl. 1109. The rulings in these cases do not control the case at bar. The plaintiff was not injured by any manual act of Miller, the foreman, or by any other workman in or about the erection or construction of the scaffolding, nor in the use of the scaffolding after being constructed. The scaffolding had filled its purpose, and the work had passed to another condition. One of the duties of a master, or any one representing the master, is to provide that workmen have a reasonably safe place to work. Miller, under the evidence in the case, had the supervision of the work and the control of the workmen. He represented the master in the performance of these duties. The negligence of this case is not an act of a fellow workman committed in the ordinary course or progress of the work. Miller, the foreman, was acting in a dual capacity, not only doing the work himself, but exercising supervision over the manner and method of doing the work. The defendant company had adopted an improper way of porch con struction in not securing the temporary upright supports at the top. Miller, as an experienced workman having charged of the work, did not follow the usual method of construction, but, as shown by the evidence, followed the method used by his principal. It was the omission to perform a usual and customary act which, if it had been performed, would have made the place reasonably safe in which the plaintiff was directed to do his work. The finding of the jury that such upright supports in all building construction should be nailed at the top in order to render them safe from giving way not only convicted Miller, who had charge of the work, of negligence, but also the defendant company in not requiring it to be done by the person who had charge of the work. [3] We are of the opinion that plaintiff's right to recover in this case does not depend entirely upon the provisions of the act of June 10, 1907 (P. L. 523), "extending and defining the liability of employers," for if the defendant's foreman was following an improper or faulty method of construction in the erection of the scaffolding or porch used or adopted by the defendant company which resulted in a condition that rendered the place unsafe for plaintiff to perform the work that he was directed to do, and in the performance of which he was injured, the defendant company should be held directly responsible for the results whether the defendant was supervising the work or any other person acting under its authority. Studebaker v. Shelby Steel Tube Co., 226 Pa. 239, 75 Atl. 358, 18 Ann. Cas. 611. Verdict for plaintiff for $3,245, and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed. Argued before BROWN, C. J., and POTTER, MOSCHZISKER, FRAZER, and WALLING, JJ. A. C. Christiansen and George C. Bradshaw, both of Pittsburgh, for appellant. T. M. Gealey and A. J. Eckles, both of Pittsburgh, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The judgment in this case is affirmed on the opinion of the learned court below overruling defendant's motions for a new trial, and for judgment non obstante veredicto. (255 Pa. 538) DONNER et al. v. WILSON. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 8, 1917.) 1. BROKERS 11-STOCK BROKERS-ACTION FOR DAMAGES. Where stock brokers sold shares of stock for a price less than that fixed by the owner, who refused to deliver to the purchaser, and were then compelled to repurchase at an advance for delivery to the purchaser, they could not recover damages for the owner's failure to deliver. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. § 58.] 2. BROKERS 8(1)-STOCK BROKERS-AUTHORITY TO SELL-PRICE-BURDEN OF PROOF. In such case, where the broker showed a general authority to sell and that one sale had been made and ratified by the owner, the burden of showing revocation of any limitation on the power to make an additional sale was on the owner, but if the owner after the first sale fixed a higher price, it was necessary for the broker For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes to show a renewal of authority to sell at the former price. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. 9.] made that the court did not lay down the correct rule as to the burden of proof. We are unable to discover the error of which complaint is made. Primarily the burden rested on plain tiff. Having shown general authority to sell Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Al- and that one sale had been made and ratified legheny County. Assumpsit by P. E. Donner and others, copartners under the firm name of Donner, Childs & Woods, against Mary O. Wilson to recover damages by reason of defendant's failure to deliver certain shares of stock. Verdict for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. From the record it appeared that in June, 1911, the defendant was the owner of 70 shares of the capital stock of the West End Savings & Trust Company. One Mackin, acting for the defendant, employed the plaintiffs to sell 60 shares of the stock. The plaintiffs sold 15 shares at $155 per share, and the sale was confirmed by the defendant. The defendant subsequently notified the plaintiffs not to sell stock at less than $160 per share. Subsequently Mackin gave the plaintiffs an order to sell 45 shares at $155 per share. The plaintiffs did not communicate Mackin's instructions to defendant, but executed the order and requested the defendant to deliver the shares to the purchaser, which she refused to do and the plaintiffs were compelled to repurchase the stock for $205 a share. Plaintiff's brought suit, alleging their employment, the agency of Mackin, defendant's breach of contract, and their loss. Further facts appear in the following opinion of the court below, Carpenter, J., refusing a new trial: Plaintiffs are stock brokers, and as such were authorized to sell stock owned by defendant in West End Savings Bank & Trust Company. [1, 2] The authority to sell was given in June, 1911, and the first sale was made early in October, 1912, at which time 15 shares were disposed of at $155 per share. Mrs. Wilson expressed some dissatisfaction with this sale, but ratified it. Under date October 4, 1912, she wrote defendants as follows: "Please do not sell any more West End Savings Bank stock for less than $160 per share." The postal card from which these words are quoted was introduced in evidence by plaintiff and is marked "Exhibit 7." Mr. Woods, when testifying in chief, was shown the postal card, and in answer to the question as to whether he had received it from Mrs. Wilson said, "Yes, sir; it evidently was received right after the first 15 shares was sold." Defendant testified that at a later date she was called by phone by some person in plaintiff's place of business, who asked her if she would sell 10 shares additional to the party who had bought the 15 shares, and that she replied that she would not sell any more at any price. On cross-examination Mr. Woods stated in reference to changes in price (meaning asking price), that his recollection was that most of the changes were verbal, with the exception of one letter from Mr. Mackin and one from Mrs. Wilson. The Mackin letter was written in June, 1913. He was asked if he had any communication with Mrs. Wilson other than the matter contained in the postal card, and replied "No sir; I didn't think it was necessary." Complaint is by defendant, the burden of showing revocation of any limitation on the power to make an additional sale was on the defendant, and specific instructions to that effect were given. If the jury believed Mrs. Wilson's version of the transaction was correct, then it was necessary for plaintiffs to show a renewal of authority to sell at $155 per share. Inasmuch as Mr. Woods produced the postal card written by Mrs. Wilson limiting the selling price to $160 per share, the burden of showing authority to sell for less rested upon plaintiffs, and so far as the evidence shows, Mrs. Wilson was not consulted by the brokers as to price. Had she authorized Mackin to fix the price at $160, it might be inferred that he had the right to reduce the price, but having received positive orders in writing, from the principal, not to sell below a price specified, the burden of showing a modification by the principal rested on plaintiffs. Even if it be conceded that there was no direct revocation of authority to sell, there is no escape from the conclusion that plaintiffs had written instructions direct from defendant not to sell for less than $160, and there is no evidence that they consulted her or received any instructions from her to sell for less. Although the postal card was offered in evidence, it seems to have escaped the attention of the court during the charge. It was evidently not overlooked by the jury. Verdict for defendant and judgment thereon. Plaintiffs appealed. Argued before BROWN, C. J., and MESTREZAT, MOSCHZISKER, FRAZER, and WALLING, JJ. James G. Marks, of Pittsburgh, for appellants. John D. Brown and John E. Winner, both of Pittsburgh, for appellee. PER CURIAM. It clearly appears from the opinion of the court below, refusing plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, why the verdict of the jury should not be disturbed, and, on that opinion, the judgment is affirmed. (255 Pa. 612) In re HELSEL'S ESTATE. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 8, 1917.) 1. CONVERSION 11-SALE BY INTESTATE SURCHARGING ACCOUNT OF ADMINISTRATRIX. Where an option to purchase land was exercised in the vendor's lifetime, and he died before the conveyance or the payment of the purchase money, there was a conversion of the estate, and the vendor's administratrix was properly surcharged with the amount of the purchase money, although the deeds were executed by the widow and heirs of the vendor, and the consideration was paid to them. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Conversion, Cent. Dig. §§ 19-24.] 2. APPEAL AND ERROR OF EVIDENCE-EXCEPTION. 260(1)—ADMISSION An appellant will not be heard to complain of the inadmissibility of evidence where no exception was taken to its admission in the lower court. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1503, 1506-1509, 15111515.] Appeal from Orphans' Court, Cambria | tiff for $1,860.51, judgment for defendant County. n. o. v., and plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and judgment entered for plaintiff on the verdict. Exceptions by L. E. Helsel and others to the report of the auditor in the estate of Jonathan Helsel, deceased. From a decree dismissing their exceptions, exceptants appeal. Appeal dismissed, and decree affirmed. Argued before BROWN, C. J., and MESTREZAT, POTTER, STEWART, MOSCHZISKER, FRAZER, and WALLING, JJ. Philip N. Shettig, of Ebensburg, R. Edgar Leahey, of Johnstown, and M. D. Kittell, of Ebensburg, for appellants. Charles C. Greer, of Johnstown, for appellee. PER CURIAM. [1] On exceptions to the account of Christina Helsel, administratrix of the estate of Jonathan Helsel, deceased, she was surcharged $21,000, the amount of the purchase money for coal lands which the auditor found the decedent had sold under an optional agreement executed by him and accepted by the assignee of the optionee in the lifetime of the optionor. The complaint of these four appellants, children of the decedent, is of the finding of the auditor, confirmed by the court, that there had been a conversion of the lands into personalty, to be accounted for by the administratrix. It appeared from record evidence that Jonathan Helsel had executed an option for the sale of the lands, which was in force and effect when a notice of the acceptance of it was served on him, on December 10, 1909, by the then optionee. After Helsel's death the purchaser accepted deeds from his widow and heirs for the lands in question, and paid for them the consideration fixed by him. [2] The record evidence upon which the auditor properly found that there had been a conversion upon the acceptance of the option on December 10, 1909, was not excepted to, and appellants will not now be heard in complaint of its inadmissibility. Argued before BROWN, C. J., and MESTREZAT, POTTER, STEWART, MOSCHZISKER, FRAZER, and WALLING, JJ. Ernest O. Kooser and Francis J. Kooser, both of Somerset, for appellant. Charles F. Uhl, Jr., and Charles H. Ealy, both of Somerset, for appellee. em STEWART, J. This was an action in trespass. In the plaintiff's statement of claim it was averred that the defendant, in operating a coal mine on a tract of land adjoining a tract belonging to the plaintiff, had, by his superintendents, agents, miners, and ployés, entered upon the plaintiff's adjoining land and mined and removed therefrom a large quantity of the plaintiff's coal and converted the same to his own use. The defendant pleaded the general issue. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,860.51, which the court on motion subsequently set aside and entered judgment for the defendant non obstante. From the judgment so entered we have this appeal. The considerations which influenced the learned court to take the action it did are thus stated in the opinion filed in the case: "The_trespass complained of was committed by H. E. Gray, lessee and independent contracThere was no evidence in the case to show that tor, and not the agent of the defendant, Wills. when the trespass was committed Gray was the agent of the defendant, though the burden rested on the plaintiff to show it. The mining was done by Gray, without any direction or control of the defendant. Gray was the defendant's lessee, and the defendant, without knowledge or consent, is not liable for Gray's trespass." What the relation between the defendant and Gray really was is of no present concern. The jury found that it was that of principal and agent or employer and employé; the court found that Gray was an independent Appeals dismissed, and decree affirmed, at lessee. The question in the case then is not the costs of appellants. (255 Pa. 613) PHILSON v. WILLS. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 8, 1917.) MASTER AND SERVANT 332(1)-LIABILITY FOR TORTS-AGENCY-QUESTIONS FOR JURY. In an action for damages for the mining and removal of coal from plaintiff's land, whether the superintendent of defendant's mine acted as defendant's agent in unlawfully mining plaintiff's coal held on the evidence a question for the jury, and, the jury having found for plaintiff, it was error to enter judgment for defend ant n. o. V. which of these two conflicting findings has the stronger support in the evidence, but, having regard to the evidence produced by the plaintiff, and that alone, the question is: Would that evidence warrant a reasonable inference that Gray was acting under the defendant as his agent or employé? In other words, was the evidence produced by the plaintiff, on this branch of the case, sufficient to make out for him a prima facie case? If so, the case was for the jury, and if the jury went so far astray that the court in good conscience could not give its approval to the verdict, it should have sustained the motion [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and for a new trial. The entry of judgment for Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1274.] the defendant under such circumstances Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Som- would be nothing more or less than substituterset County. Trespass by Samuel B. Philson against John Wills to recover damages for removing coal from plaintiff's land. Verdict for plain ing the findings of the court for those of the jury. Assuming, as we must, that the evidence on the part of the plaintiff was credible, what does it show? It shows that the For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes defendant was the owner of the coal underly- [ veredicto; the motion for a new trial being ing the surface of the tract adjoining that of withdrawn by counsel at hearing thereof. This the plaintiff, subject to a royalty on each alleged to be sustained by plaintiff in the act of case is an action of trespass to recover damages ton of coal mined therein; that in min- rescuing his little child on the tracks of the deing this coal whoever was conducting the op- fendant company from an approaching train. eration had trespassed upon the plaintiff's The defendant, at the time of the accident, was running its regular passenger car between property and had there mined and removed Branchton and Hilliard, in this county, and in a large quantity of coal belonging to the place of the usual locomotive a motorcar was plaintiff; that the coal so mined had been April, 1914, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, utilized. The plaintiff, on the 27th day of carried to the surface through the coal mine whilst engaged in playing or watching a game of the defendant and delivered at the mouth of ball near the tracks of defendant company, of the mine to the defendant in his own saw his little girl, three years of age, proceedcars; that the defendant had paid the roy: company at a point about 50 yards distant from ing or walking between the tracks of defendant alty on the coal so mined on plaintiff's prop- where he was standing, and at the same time erty to the party from whom he acquired ti- plaintiff saw the approaching train of defendtle to his own mine; further, that the de-track and succeeded in throwing or pushing the company. He thereupon ran towards the fendant, when plaintiff demanded of him compensation for the coal taken, made no disclaimer of responsibility and accountability on any other ground than he had paid royalty on the coal so taken to the owner of the adjoining tract; and further still, there was direct testimony from several witnesses that during the period covering the trespass Gray was superintendent of the defendant's mines. Certainly upon this evidence the plaintiff could have rested his case, and, except as defendant offered evidence to contradict or explain it in a way to make it not inconsistent with the defense set up, plaintiff would have been entitled to a verdict. The actual merits of the case, as between plaintiff and defendant, is a matter entirely aside from the present inquiry; but the fact that a careful study of the entire evidence has left us unconvinced that the verdict of the jury does injustice renders it much easier to make that disposition of the case which the court has directed. The judgment is reversed, and now judgment is entered for the plaintiff on the verdict. (255 Pa. 588) ALEMENTO v. BESSEMER & L. E. R. CO. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 8, 1917.) RAILROADS 398(1) INJURY ON TRACK EVIDENCE. In an action against a railroad for damages for personal injuries when struck by defendant's train a judgment for plaintiff was sustained by divided court. girl from the track, but in doing so he himself was struck by the motorcar and injured. The little girl, three years of age, was a trespasser on the tracks of the defendant company. The testimony on part of the plaintiff was that at the time he first saw the girl on the track the approaching car was at a point known as the Allegheny junction or switch, a distance of 300 cation of the girl to such switch was slightly yards from the girl, that the track from the locurved, but one could plainly see from such switch any object on the track at the point and that there was no obstruction of vision on where the girl stood or walked upon the track, said track the entire distance of 900 feet between said points. The plaintiff was corroborated by defendant company testified that the girl first several witnesses. It is true the motorman of proceeded on the track at a point about 200 feet from the car. For the purpose of this motion, however, the evidence on part of plaintiff must his child in a place of imminent peril and using be accepted. The plaintiff in this case, observing ordinary care under the circumstances, had a right to go upon the tracks of the defendant company to the rescue of the child, and the case therefore involves the relation of the defendant company to the child upon its tracks which occasioned the accident to plaintiff. to submit the case to the jury on the question We were of the opinion that it was our duty of fact as to the want of ordinary care on part of the motorman under all the facts and circumstances, being then of the opinion that the case as presented came within the law as declar ed in Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Co. v. Spearen, 47 Pa. 300, S6 Am. Dec. 544, and followed in Piepke v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 242 Pa. 321, 89 Atl. 124, and in a number of other cases. After a careful review of the whole case, we are not satisfied that we were in error in the submission of the case to the jury or that the case establishes such evidence as brings it within the rule that there is no duty upon the defend[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Railroads, ant company, or its employés, to be on the lookCent. Dig. §§ 1356, 1363.] out for trespassers, as contended for by defendant. Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Butler County. Trespass for damages for personal injury by Giacomo Alemento against the Bessemer & Lake Erie Railroad Company. Verdict for plaintiff for $1,770.83 and judgment thereon, motion for judgment n. o. v. denied, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. Reiber, P. J., filed the following opinion in the court of common pleas sur defendant's motion for judgment n. o. v.: Verdict for plaintiff for $1,770.83, and judgment thereon. Defendant appealed. Argued before MESTREZAT, POTTER, STEWART, MOSCHZISKER, FRAZER, and WALLING, JJ. John H. Wilson, of Butler, and Templeton & Whiteman, of Greenville, for appellant. W. H. Martin and Samuel Walker, both of Butler, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The judgment is affirmed This matter came on to be heard on motion on part of defendant for judgment non obstante by an equally divided court. (40 R. I. 249) (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 1917. On Motion for Reargument, from the other direction; and "that on account of the road being narrow as aforesaid, and on account of there being no railing as aforesaid at said place, the said automobile went down April 13, said steep place or bank, outside of the said central part of said highway, constructed and accepted as aforesaid by the state;" that it was the duty of the town to keep in repair and amend that part of said highway "outside the central part thereof constructed and accepted by the state" so that the same should be safe and convenient for travelers. 1. HIGHWAYS 190 STATUTORY DUTY TO REPAIR--QUALIFICATION. The duty of municipalities to keep highways in good repair, being imposed by statute, cannot be qualified by anything of less authority, but may be qualified expressly or impliedly by statute. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. 88 325, 479, 480.] 2. HIGHWAYS 198 BARRIERS ON STATE ROAD-LIABILITY FOR INJURY. Gen. Laws 1909, c. 84, as amended, establishing a state highway system, puts state roads under control of the state board, with the only exception of the removal of snow and ice, expressly required of the municipality by section 6, since by section 6 the municipality is directed to report any needed repairs to the state board, and section 7 empowers state board to remove obstructions on the highway, while section 3 indicates that the interest of the entire state governs in improving state highways, and section 4 provides that by agreement of the municipality with the board the width of such highways may be increased; hence a town was not liable for injuries resulting from failure to maintain proper barriers along such highway. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Cent. Dig. §§ 504-507.] 3. HIGHWAYS 198—REPAIRING STATE ROAD -LIABILITY FOR INJURY-STATUTE. Highways, The fact that Gen. Laws 1909, c. 84, § 7, provides compensation for damages due to construction of state roads, but makes no provision for injuries caused by lack of repair, does not make municipality liable for latter, and the failure to provide a remedy in such cases is for legislative consideration. [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. §§ 504-507.] Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Chester W. Barrows, Judge. Action by Stephen A. Pooler against William Burton, Town Treasurer. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff excepts. Exceptions overruled, and case remitted. A. B. Crafts, of Providence, for plaintiff. Tillinghast & Lynch, of Providence, for defendant. STEARNS, J. This is an action of trespass on the case against the town of Johnston for neglect to keep in repair a certain public highway in said town, by reason of which the plaintiff suffered damage to his person and property. The defendant, by a special plea, avers that: tiff's declaration was a public road and a part "That certain highway mentioned in plainof the same was constructed by the state board of public roads of said state of Rhode Island, prior to the time when said plaintiff was injured upon the highway mentioned in said plaintiff's declaration. And also avers that said highway was improved by said board of public roads priin said declaration, and that said highway menor to the accident to said plaintiff mentioned tioned in said plaintiff's declaration was, prior to the accident mentioned in said plaintiff's declaration, and ever since, under the care, control, and supervision of said state board of public roads." [1] The plaintiff demurs on the ground that the defect in said highway was entirely outside of the part of said highway constructed and improved by the state, and under the control of the state board of public roads, and that the town is still liable to keep that part of the highway which was defective in repair and safe for travel and to provide a rail at the side of said road. See section 1, c. 83, and section 15, c. 46, Gen. Laws R. I. 1909. This demurrer was overruled by the superior court, to which ruling the plaintiff took an exception, and this exception is now by bill of exceptions before this court. plaintiff concedes that the state, through the state board of public roads, bas exclusive control over so much of this highway as it has constructed or repaired, but claims that the town is obliged to keep in repair and safe condition the remainder of the highway. The There are no decisions in this state cover ing this precise point. The cases of McCom miskey v. Greene, 32 R. I. 402, 79 Atl. 819, and Johnson v. Lee, 38 R. I. 316, 95 Atl. 601, are cases in which the duties of the state and the towns and cities were defined in regard to bridges lying in public highways. [2] In deciding this case the court must seek to ascertain the intent of the Legislature as manifested in the statutes. The duty of the towns and cities to keep their highways in good repair being imposed by statute, cannot be qualified by anything of less authority. But by statute it can be qualified, and qualified, too, either expressly or by impli cation. The declaration charges: "That within the limits of said highway, outside of and adjacent to the central part of said highway constructed and accepted by the state, there was a steep place or decline, and there was not, and had not been for a long time prior thereto, any sufficient railing or any railing Williams v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 447, at whatsoever to protect travelers from going off p. 454. Chapter 84, Gen. Laws R. I. 1909, or falling off the traveled part of said highway "Of the Construction, Improvement, and down said steep place or decline;" that the Maintenance of State Roads" which was plaintiff, who was unacquainted with said high-enacted in 1902, made a distinct departure way, while driving his automobile at night was obliged to turn to the right side of the highway in the policy of this state in regard to the in order to pass an automobile approaching main highways of the state. Prior to that For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 100 A.-30 |