that her finger nails and lips would turn blue and she would turn blue around the nose, and was in spots all over her face at times, and this color became permanent in the year 1913. It would seem, therefore, to be clear and to admit of no doubt, that according to the undisputed evidence in the case, the discoloration of the plaintiff began at least in the year 1908, and, as stated by her husband, "she commenced to get worse in 1908, kept getting worse all along on up to 1913, when she was at the worst." The discoloration of her skin, of which she complained to her husband in 1908, was a sufficient indication of an injury, to have put her upon notice and inquiry, and it is clear from the evidence that if she had exercised ordinary care and diligence to have ascertained her rights, she could have discovered the cause of her alleged injury. The ground of the cause of action in this case was the discoloration of the plaintiff's skin by the use of the drug called argentum oxide, and the statute began to run from the time of the discovery of the alleged injury therefrom. As stated by the court below, when she began to be discolored that showed an injury, and that was the injury of which she had a right to complain. Then was her cause of action, and that was the time when the alleged injury was apparent, and that was more than four years before 1915. [4] We have examined this case with some care, and are unable to find any objections that would affect, or would take this case out of the statute of limitations. As said by Judge Miller, in Weaver v. Lieman, 52 Md. 708, mere doubt as to the right or difficulty in the way of its assertion will not do. Apart from the savings and disabilities expressed in the statute itself there must, in order to defeat its operation, be some insuperable barrier, or some certain and welldefined exception, clearly established by judicial authority. Green v. Johnson, 3 Gill & J. 394. Being of opinion, for the reasons stated that the court below committed no error in granting the defendant's fourth prayer, which instructed the jury that the plaintiff's suit was barred by the statute of limitations, and as this conclusion disposes of the case, the judgment will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed, with costs. (130 Md. 198) WASHINGTON, B. & A. ELECTRIC R. CO. v. MOSS. (No. 88.) (Court of Appeals of Maryland. Feb. 2, 1917.) 1. DAMAGES 208(9) - INTEREST REFERENCE TO JURY. Except in those cases where interest is allowable as of right, the question of interest should be referred to the jury to be allowed in its discretion. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Damages, Cent. Dig. §§ 144, 145, 533, 534.] 2. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 127(13)-COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION-AMENDED DECLARATION-NEW CAUSE OF ACTION. Where a declaration was for breach of contract, which was unenforceable because of indefiniteness, an amended declaration, claiming for services rendered and completed by plaintiff, in obtaining a lease for defendant and surrendering plaintiff's own lease to defendant, more than three years prior to the filing of an amended declaration, was barred, though the original and the amended declarations stated causes arising out of the same transaction. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. § 545; Pleading, Cent. Dig. § 688.] 3. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 46(2), 50(2) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-INITIATION OF PERIOD. In the computation of the statutory period of limitations in cases where there is an undertaking which requires a continuation of services, or the party's right depends upon the happening of an event in the future, the statute begins to run only from the time the services can be completed or the event happens. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 241, 274.] 4. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 199(1) - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT. In an action for services in obtaining a lease for a railroad the evidence being susceptible of more than one interpretation, and the facts being disputed or conflicting, the question of limitations was one of fact for the jury, subject to the instructions of the court as to what in law is sufficient to constitute a bar or to take the case out of the statute. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. § 727.] 5. JUDGMENT 250-CONFORMITY TO ISSUES -CLAIM FOR SERVICES-RECOVERY FOR Loss OF PROFITS. In suit against a railroad for services rendered in procuring a lease and in surrendering plaintiff's own lease, plaintiff could not recover any damages sustained by loss of profits of his grocery or boarding house business. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 436.] 6. JUDGMENT 250-EXTENT OF RECOVERY SCOPE OF CLAIM. In an action against a railroad for services rendered in securing a lease and for the surrender of plaintiff's own lease, plaintiff had the right to recover for only those two items of services alleged to have been rendered, and he could not recover compensation for alleged services in originating and suggesting the advisability, etc., of the location of the road and its interest on the particular premises. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 436.] In an action against a railroad for services in negotiating a lease, an instruction that plaintiff could not recover for such services more than an amount based on what the jury should find from the evidence was the usual commission of realty brokers in the city for negotiating leases was improper, as fixing the usual commission of brokers as the sole basis of the value of the services rendered, and ignoring other evidence bearing on the question. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 621, 622.] erty. 8. JUDGMENT 250-EXTENT OF RECOVERY- ported in 127 Md. 12, 96 Atl. 273. The SCOPE OF CLAIM. suit in that case was brought for the breach In an action against a railroad for services in negotiating a lease and in surrendering plain- of an alleged contract as set out in the tiff's own, plaintiff could not recover for services declaration filed in the case. We held on rendered by him in closing out his storehouse the former appeal that the alleged conand boarding house business and in the planning tract was unenforceable because of its inand construction of improvements on the prop- definiteness and vagueness in the essentials stated, in the opinion, and, being invalid, it would not support an action by the plaintiff for a recovery. It was also said in the course of the opinion that if the facts are as testified to by the appellee and his witnesses, the plaintiff was not without a remedy, because independently of the alleged contract, the plaintiff "has a right of recovery for the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 436.] 9. BROKERS 82(4) ISSUES AND PROOFCLAIM FOR SERVICES-EVIDENCE OF Loss of PROFITS. In an action against a railroad for services rendered in negotiating a lease and in surrendering plaintiff's own, evidence of alleged loss of profits from plaintiff's retail grocery business and his boarding house business, evidence as to services rendered for the benefit of the apthe planning and construction of improvements on the property after it was leased, evidence as to the closing out of plaintiff's business in the storehouse and the surrender of his business in the dwelling house, was inadmissible. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. § 103.] 10. BROKERS 82(4)-ISSUES AND PROOF. In such action, evidence as to the value and advantage of the property to the road was inadmissible; the reasonable value of services rendered by plaintiff in obtaining the property being the issue. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. § 103.] 11. EVIDENCE pellant, the Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Electric Railroad, in securing the lease from his aunt for it, as well as compensation for the surrender of his lease to the premises, if he had a lease that had a value." The judgment of the court below, on the former appeal, was reversed, and the cause was remanded in order to allow the appellee an opportunity to amend his declaration so as to conform to the views expressed, or to dismiss that action and institute a new suit for the recovery of such compensation "as shall be found to be due him for what he 487-OPINION-COMPETENCY did towards the securing of the lease and In an action against a railroad for services the surrender of his own lease and possesrendered in procuring a lease and surrendering sion, whichever he shall prefer." The case plaintiff's own, plaintiff, a nonexpert, could have was remanded to the circuit court for Howtestified as to the facts of the value of his services, their nature and extent, the time occupied ard county, and the mandate filed in that in their performance, and other attending cir- court on the 21st of January, 1916. On the cumstances, but could not give his estimate or 6th of March, 1916, an amended declaration judgment of their value in money; it being the was filed containing seven counts. The first province of the jury to weigh the testimony and fix the value of the services alleged to have been and third being the usual common counts in assumpsit, the second, "and for work done and services rendered by the plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant," the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh counts are special counts. OF NONEXPERT-VALUE OF SERVICES. rendered. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 2272.] 12. PLEADING COUNTS. 193(5)-DEMURRER-USELESS Where plaintiff could not recover under the sixth and seventh counts of his declaration, demurrer to them should have been sustained. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 433, 441, 442.] Appeal from Circuit Court, Howard County; Wm. Henry Forsythe, Jr., Judge. "To be officially reported." Action by William H. Moss against the Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Electric Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Judgment reversed, and new trial awarded. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, URNER, STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTABLE, JJ. George Weems Williams, of Baltimore (Edward M. Hammond, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant. Nicholas H. Green, of Annapolis, for appellee. BRISCOE, J. This case is presented upon a second appeal. The first appeal is re The fourth count alleges that the defendant, desiring to obtain the property at College avenue and Bladen street, on or about February 7, 1913, employed the plaintiff to negotiate for a purchase or lease of the same, and that in pursuance of said employment by the defendant, the plaintiff began negotiations with the owner of said property, which negotiations resulted in a lease to Robert Moss on the 25th day of February, 1913, for a term of ten years, with an option to renew same for another term of ten years, which lease was assigned to the defendant on the 27th day of March, 1913, for which services in negotiating the lease as aforesaid for the defendant the plaintiff has received no compensation. The fifth count avers that on February 25, 1913, the date of the lease to Robert Moss, the plaintiff was, and for a number of years prior thereto had been, in possession of the premises as a tenant, and at the request of the defendant and with full expectation and promise of pay therefor surrendered his ten ancy and gave up his possession, and the de-ings, in overruling the defendant's special exfendant has not paid him therefor. The sixth count states that on February 25, 1913, the plaintiff was, and had been for a number of years prior thereto, employed in conducting a grocery store on a portion of the premises in question, and at the request of the defendant, and with full expectation of compensation therefor, closed out his business and gave up his business, but has not been paid any compensation by the defendant. ception to the plaintiff's prayer and the refusal to grant the defendant's 29 prayers and the granting of the plaintiff's prayer form the basis of the seventy-first bill of exceptions. It is apparent from the record, and an examination of the declaration and the various items and claims set out in the bill of particulars, that the plaintiff sought in this action to recover for matters and undertakings embraced in the contract declared upon in the original declaration, and which we held on the former appeal to be invalid, and not alone upon a quantum meruit for alleged services rendered in securing the lease from The seventh count alleges that the plaintiff on February 25, 1913, was and for a number of years prior thereto had been conducting a boarding house on part of the premises, his aunt and the surrender of his own lease. and at the request of the defendant and with W., B. & A. R. R. Co. v. Moss, 127 Md. 22, full expectation of payment therefor ceased 96 Atl. 273. to conduct said boarding house, and the defendant has not compensated him therefor. The defendant demurred to each and every count of the declaration but the demurrer was overruled. The plaintiff, upon demand, filed the following, as the bill of particulars of his claim against the defendant for services rendered by him from January 1, 1913, to May 21, 1913, as follows: For services rendered in originating and suggesting the advisability, advantages, (1) In surrender of tenancy.... (3) In surrender of business conducted in (4) In planning and construction of the remodeling of improvements on said property There was error in granting the plaintiff's first prayer, because apart from allowing the plaintiff to recover under the evidence for services rendered in securing the lease and for the surrender of his own lease, it instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover for separate and distinct services, in the surrender of his boarding house business, closing out of his retail grocery business and conducted on the premises, either by previous employment or the acceptance of the plaintiff's agency and the adoption of his acts. This prayer was not only clearly erroneous under our former decision in 127 Md. 22, 96 Atl. 273, but is also open to the objection that it directed the jury to allow interest "from such time as the jury may find from the evi5,000 00 dence such services were completed to the date of their verdict." $ 5,000 00 [1] It is the settled practice in this state, 4,000 00 except in those cases where interest is allowable as of right, to refer the question of 4,000 00 interest to the jury to be allowed in its discretion. Newson v. Douglass, 7 Har. & J. 417, 1,000 00 16 Am. Dec. 317; Baltimore City v. Sewell, 37 Md. 443; Curtis v. Gibney, 59 Md. 131. The defendant's exception to the rejection of its first, second, and third prayers are waived and need not be considered. 1,000 00 $20,000 00 [2] The defendant's fourth prayer present To the declaration the defendant filed four pleas: First and second, that the cause of ac-ed the question of limitations, and the court tion did not accrue within three years from was asked to instruct the jury that under the the suit, or within three years prior to the pleadings the plaintiff could not recover for 6th of March, 1916, the date of the amended any services alleged to have been rendered by declaration. The third and fourth pleas the defendant, and which were completed were the usual general issue pleas of never more than three years before the filing of the promised and not indebted as alleged. The amended declaration, the amended declaraplaintiff's demurrer to the second plea was tion being filed on March 6, 1916. The same sustained, and the case was tried upon a trav-question was raised by the ruling of the court erse to the first plea and issue joined on the other pleas. in sustaining the plaintiff's demurrer to the defendant's second plea. The question as There were 71 exceptions reserved to the here presented upon the evidence set out in rulings of the court in the course of the trial. the record is not free from difficulty. The Seventy of these relate to the admissibility of suit is in assumpsit upon a quantum meruit testimony and the other to the ruling of the for services rendered in obtaining the lease, court upon the prayers. The plaintiff offered and surrendering the plaintiff's own lease. one prayer, and this was granted. The court Under all the authorities, the statute of limigranted the defendant's 18th prayer, but re- tatious would run against any services ren than three years prior to the filing of the amended declaration. In Spencer v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 126 Md. 200, 94 Atl. 660, this court said: price of $7,500; that he then approached her on the subject of a long-term lease, and she said she would let him know about it in a few days, and she finally did let him know "The rule is well settled in this state, and in that she would give a lease for ten years, other jurisdictions, that where an amended dec-renewable for ten years more; that as the laration introduces a new or different cause of ac tion and makes a different claim and demand, it is equivalent to a new suit, upon a new cause of action, and opens the case to the bar of the statute of limitations, and the plea is proper and available, and this rule applies although the two causes of action arise out of the same transaction." Hamilton v. Thirston, 94 Md. 253, 51 Atl. 42; Di Giorgio Co. v. Stock, 116 Md. 201, 81 Atl. 385; Johnston v. District, 1 Mackey, D. C. 428; Union Pacific Ry. v. Wyler, 158 U. S. 285, 15 Sup. Ct. 877, 39 L. Ed. 983. final outcome of these services, Mrs. Baldwin, on February 25, 1913, and in company with the witness went to the office of Robert Moss and executed a lease for ten years, renewable for another ten years, to Robert Moss, with the understanding that the lease was to be turned over to the defendant, which was done on March 27th following. He also testified upon cross-examination as follows: "Q. How long was it from the first visit that you made to Mrs. Baldwin until the lease was procured? A. The first visit was made on February 7th, and the lease was signed on February 25th, Q. And you are charging $1,500 for 18 days' work? A. Yes, sir. Q. Of course you were not working all that time? A. Yes, sir. Q. On this? A. No, sir; not on getting the lease. Q. You were actively engaged in working all the 18 days in getting the lease? A. No, sir." In Young v. Mackall, 3 Md. Ch. 399, it is said, as soon as the cause of action accrues, whether it be a trust or not, if it be a fit subject for a suit at law as well as in equity, the statute of limitations begins to run. Green v. Johnson, 3 Gill & J. 390. Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 Atl. 83. [3] The general rule seems also settled that in the computation of the statutory period, Mr. Robert Moss, a witness for the plainin cases, where there is an undertaking tiff, testified that what little representing which requires a continuation of services, or he did in the transaction he represented the the party's right depends upon the happening railway company; that he was employed at of an event in the future, the statute begins the time as local counsel for the defendant to run only from the time the services can company, and had represented them for many be completed or from the time the event hap-years; that he did not receive anything for pens. Angell on Limitations, § 120; Wood the services rendered in connection with the on Limitations, 325-330. In 25 Cyc. 1065 and leasing of the property; that possibly the 1066, it is said: defendant made him an allowance on his gas ""The accrual of the cause of action' means bill of a few dollars or so, but not very much; the right to institute and maintain a suit; and that he was sure it was not over $18; that whenever one person may sue another, a cause he sent his brother to attend to the lease for of action has accrued, and the statute begins to run. So whether at law or in equity the cause the company, because he knew that he was of action arises when and only when the ag- the best one and the only one could attend grieved party 'has the right to apply to the to it quickly and efficiently for them; and proper tribunal for relief.' The statute does not that his brother was the only person who attach to a claim for which there is no right of action, and does not run against a right for which there is no corresponding remedy, or for which judgment cannot be obtained. The true test, therefore, to determine whether a cause of action has accrued is to ascertain the time when plaintiff could first have maintained his action to a successful result. The fact that he might previously have brought a premature or groundless action is immaterial." In the case at bar, there is a manifest conflict in the evidence as to when the services of the defendant were completed for which the suit was brought in this case. The amended declaration, it appears, was filed on the 6th of March, 1916. In the fourth count of the declaration, it is averred that the plaintiff, on or about the 7th of February, 1913, was employed by the defendant to negotiate for the purchase or lease of certain property in the city of Annapolis and the negotiations resulted in a lease of the property to Robert Moss on the 25th of February, 1913, for a term of ten years, with a renewal of another term of ten years, and this lease was assigned to the defendant on the 27th of March, 1913. The plaintiff testified that after his aunt Mrs. could get a lease on the property for them. He further testified upon cross-examination that he had no idea as to how many visits his brother paid Mrs. Baldwin in procuring the lease for the company, but that the matter was started on February 7th, and was concluded on February 25, 1913. It further appears that while the lease is dated the 25th of February, 1913, the term did not begin until the 1st day of April, 1913, and the lease was not assigned by Robert Moss to the company until March 27, 1913; that the plaintiff did not close out his business until the latter part of March, and under instructions from the company he kept the place open from April 1 to April 21, 1913. [4] Upon this state of facts, we think, the question of limitations in this case is a mixed one of law and fact. It is well settled, that when the evidence is susceptible of more than one interpretation and the facts are disputed or conflicting, the question of limitations is one of fact for the jury, subject to the instructions of the court as to what in law is sufficient to constitute a bar or to Shilling, 66 Md. 558, 8 Atl. 355; Quynn v. charges or commission of real estate brokers Carroll, 10 Md. 197; Guy v. Tams, 6 Gill, 82; in Annapolis for negotiating leases. This Dempsey v. McNabb, 73 Md. 433, 21 Atl. 378; | prayer was properly rejected because it lim25 Cyc. 1434, 1435, 1436. ited the recovery and fixed the usual charge, There was no error then in the ruling of or commission, of real estate brokers in Anthe court, in sustaining the plaintiff's demur-napolis, as the sole basis of the value of the rer to the defendant's second plea, or in the services rendered in negotiating the lease, rejection of the defendant's fourth prayer, in and ignored the other evidence bearing on the form it was offered. this question. There was no error in the rejection of the twenty-second prayer, and it is conceded in the defendant's brief to have been properly refused. [5] The defendant's fifth, sixth, and seventh prayers should have been granted. These prayers instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not recover any damages sustained by loss of alleged profits, in either [8] The twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, twentythe grocery store business or the boarding seventh, twenty-eighth, twenty-ninth, and house business. The suit was not for loss thirtieth prayers instructed the jury that the of profits, but for services rendered in secur- plaintiff could not recover for certain services ing the lease and in surrendering the plain-alleged to have been rendered by the plaintiff tiff's own lease. in closing out the storehouse and the board [6] The defendant's tenth, eleventh, ing house business and in the planning and twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth prayers construction of certain improvements on the relate to compensation for alleged services property. These prayers should have been rendered in originating and suggesting the granted, and there was error in their readvisability, advantages, and necessity of jection for the reason stated in a former part the location of the defendant and its inter- of this opinion. est on the corner of Bladen street and College This brings us to the rulings on the admisavenue, in the city of Annapolis, as a sepa-sibility of evidence. The first, second, fourth, rate and independent undertaking, in addi- fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, elevouth, tion to the services rendered, in securing the twelfth, thirty-fourth, thirty-eighth, and sevlease. While the tenth prayer was too gen- entieth bills of exceptions are abandoned by eral to have been granted in the form it was the defendant. offered, it is too clear for discussion that the It would extend this opinion to an unreaappellee had a right to recover for only two sonable length to discuss each exception sepitems of services alleged to have been ren-arately, and, as it appears from what we dered, assuming the truth of the plaintiff's have said, in discussing the prayers, that evidence, and they were as stated on the there was error in many of the rulings upon former appeal, compensation for securing a evidence, we shall, as far as necessary, dislease from his aunt for it, and for the sur- pose of the remaining exceptions, set out in render of his own lease, if it had a value. the record. The difficulty and error on these rulings [9] The evidence of alleged loss and profits arose from the plaintiff's declaration and the from the retail grocery business and the bill of particulars, wherein he sought to re-boarding house business; the planning and cover for six distinct and separate undertak- construction of improvements on the properings and services: First, for suggesting the ty after it was leased, the closing out of idea; secondly, for securing the lease; third- business in the storehouse, and surrender of ly, for surrendering the tenancy; fourthly, business in the dwelling house, contained for closing out the grocery store business, in the third, tenth, thirteenth, twenty-second, fifthly, for closing out the boarding house and twenty-third exceptions, and in other business; and, sixthly, for planning and re-exceptions embracing similar evidence, was modeling of improvements on the property. clearly inadmissible, and should have been The court's ruling was correct on the elev-excluded, for reasons stated by us in passing enth and twelfth prayers for the reasons upon the prayers. stated in support of the fourth prayer. [10] There was also error in the ruling of The thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, twen- the court in the fourteenth, fifteenth, sixtieth, twenty-first, and twenty-fourth prayers teenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, were demurrers to the evidence, and were twentieth, thirty-second, thirty-third, thirtyproperly rejected in the form they were of-sixth, and thirty-seventh exceptions and the fered. The sixteenth and seventeenth prayers again raised the question of limitations, and for the reason stated, in the ruling on the fourth prayer, they were properly rejected. [7] The nineteenth prayer instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not recover for the services rendered in negotiating the lease, more than an amount based on what the other exceptions containing similar testimony. The issue in the case was not the value and advantage of the property to the defendant, but the reasonable value of the services rendered by the plaintiff in obtaining the property. The twenty-eighth exception presents the ruling of the court in allowing the plaintiff to give an opinion estimate of his services |