T Another witness for the plaintiffs said that, just before the accident, he was at a store to the east of the railroad station, which is situated south of the tracks and directly east of Sixth street. He testified, "I had some letters to put on the train, * * first track, where her view to the west was at the near edge of the third track by the obstructed by the line of box cars; that she "bumper" of the locomotive, which extended looked and listened, as best she could at that out about 14 inches. This bystander also point, and when she "didn't hear any train observed that Mrs. Davison was walking coming, and didn't see any," she "started "reasonably fast," and carrying an "umacross the tracks." Plaintiff said further brella, to protect her from the sun." that she was carrying a parasol "to protect her from the sun," which, of course, at the time of the accident, was in the west, the direction from which the train which struck her came; that, since she stopped before entering upon the tracks, she thought she had taken all the precaution required of her; and I waited until the train whisand that, after starting across, she did not tled for Emlenton before I left the store;" "know anything" until struck by the locomo- that, after hearing the whistle, he walked tive of the passenger train. The witness 50 feet or more to reach the station platdid not say she was confused while crossing form; that, as he arrived at this point the tracks, and the whole tenor of the tes- the freight train was broken in two, and timony tends to rebut any such idea, yet she not only completely failed to observe the train which subsequently injured her, but she testified that she did not even know what had happened until some time after the accident. he saw Mrs. Davison immediately start across the tracks. Being asked the question, "Where was the passenger train then?" he replied, "The passenger train was very near the station; I don't know exactly how close." Although this witness expressed the opinion that the plaintiff could not see the latter train, yet his testimony plainly indicates that it must have been visible to her after she cleared the obstructed first track. It was conceded that the bell was rung and the whistle sounded as the passenger train neared Sixth street, and also that a brakeman, on the rear box car of the advance section of the divided freight train. Still another of the plaintiffs' witnesses, called to Mrs. Davison, just as she entered who saw the passenger train coming and the first track, to warn her against the ap- heard its whistle, stated that Mrs. Davison proaching train; but she said, "I didn't walked "at a good gait" across the tracks, think, when I had looked up and down the and never stopped until struck; and this track [referring to her observation before witness expressed the opinion that the instarting across the railroad] and saw noth-jured woman could have seen the approaching, and was looking in front and the tracking train, had she looked after clearing the was clear, I didn't understand that this hol- first track. lering had any reference to me" Immediately after this, in answer to the question, "As a matter of fact, you went right on and didn't pay any attention to it [referring to the verbal warning]?" she replied: "I presume I did. I didn't think I stopped there after I heard the hollering. I stopped before I entered upon the tracks, though. I thought I had taken all the precaution anybody possibly could take." A man who was standing with Mrs. Davison, and who started across the railroad directly behind her, heard the warning uttered by the railroad employé, and, despite the obstruction on the first track, looking to the west he plainly saw the smoke of the advancing passenger train, "shooting straight up" in the air. This witness said the locomotive was then 75 to 80 feet from the crossing; which shows that, since by that time Mrs. Davison must, at least, have cleared the first track, the advancing train was directly within her view. In addition, the witness said he likewise called to Mrs. Davison; but she continued on her way until hit It would serve no useful purpose to go further into the testimony, for we have already stated enough to show beyond any reasonable doubt that Mrs. Davison was clearly guilty of contributory negligence; crossing the railroad as she did, and, notwithstanding all the ordinary and extraordinary warnings given her as to the impending danger, walking into an advancing train which must have been clearly within her view had she made adequate observation, were plain carelessness, and particularly is this so when there was more than one place of safety in which she might have stood, in order to avoid the manifest danger which immediately confronted her. The first assignment, which complains of the refusal to give binding instructions for the defendant, and the third, which complains of the refusal to enter judgment n. o. v., are both sustained; this makes it unnecessary to consider the other specifications of error. The judgments are reversed, and here entered for the defendant. (91 Conn. 524) DOUTHWRIGHT v. CHAMPLIN et al. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. March 8, 1917.) 1. CONTRACTS 2 VALIDITY AND ESSEN TIALS-WHAT LAW GOVERNS. Courts of Connecticut can enforce only such foreign contracts as are enforceable in the jurisdiction of their origin. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 2, 41, 145.] 2. MASTER AND SERVANT 396-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-JURISDICTION OF COURts. The only actions to secure workmen's compensation under a foreign statute which the courts of Connecticut cannot enforce are those where right and remedy are so united that the right cannot be enforced except in the manner and before the tribunal designated by the act. 3. MASTER AND SERVANT 368-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-JURISDICTION OF COURTS. Pub. Acts 1913, c. 138, as to workmen's compensation, provides compensation for nonresidents as well as residents, and under all contracts of employment wherever and by whomsoever made. 4. MASTER AND SERVANT 368-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-JURISDICTION OF COURTS. Where master and servant lived in Massachusetts, where the master's principal place of business was, and there made a contract for employment, and the servant was injured while working for the master in Connecticut, both having accepted Pub. Acts 1913, c. 138,. pt. B, as to workmen's compensation, the courts of Connecticut could enforce compensation, since the Massachusetts act has no extraterritorial effect, and the Workmen's Compensation Act of Connecticut must be read into the contract. -SUFFICIENCY. REVIEW WHEELER, J. From the finding of the commissioner it appears that a contract of employment existed between the claimant, Douthwright, and the respondent Champlin on March 5, 1915, and for about two years prior thereto. Both the parties lived and Champlin's principal place of business was in Massachusetts, and the contract was made there. structed the father of the claimant to go Shortly before March 5, 1915, Champlin into Hartford, Conn., and sink a shaft for an elevator, and the claimant went with his father as his assistant in this work. On March 5, 1915, the claimant sustained an injury in Hartford which arose out of and in the course of this employment. Both the claimant and respondent has aċcepted part B of chapter 138, P. A. 1913, and Champlin had insured his full liability in insurance companies authorized to take such risks. The trial court found that the commissioner had no jurisdiction in the matter at issue, and therefore sustained the appeal and remanded the case to the commissioner, with directions to dismiss the proceedings for want of jurisdiction. We have held that our state might provide in a workmen's compensation act compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment under a contract made in Connecticut, but performed outside our state. We held that our act, not by direct expression, but by reasonable implica 5. MASTER AND SERVANT 418(4)-WORK- tion, when read in the light of its purpose, MEN'S COMPENSATION subject-matter and history, indicated an intent that contracts of employment made here might operate outside our jurisdiction. a necessary corollary we held that: RECORD In a proceeding for workmen's compensation, the findings of the commissioner must contain all facts essential to the case, and on appeal become a part of the record, so that it is not essential that his findings be specifically made a part of the record. 6. APPEAL AND ERROR 361(2) REVIEW-RECORD-SUFFICIENCY. Though Gen. St. 1902, § 798, provides a form of appeal with which every appeal shall be substantially in accordance, which contains a prayer for relief, an appeal otherwise sufficient is not fatally defective through omission of prayer for relief. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 1943.] As like character to those before us, though made We would "give similar effect to contracts of under a compensation act of another jurisdiction, provided they did not conflict with our vided for the ascertainment and collection of law or public policy, and the machinery prothe compensation could be used in our jurisdiction." Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 381, 94 Atl. 372, 378, L. R. A. 1916A, 436. [1] We can enforce only such contracts as are enforceable in the jurisdiction of their Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford origin. So we apply to this somewhat novel County; William S. Case, Judge. Proceedings by Alfred Douthwright for workmen's compensation, opposed by Frank A. Champlin, employer, and another. Compensation was awarded by the commissioner, and the employer appealed to the superior court. The appeal was sustained, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss, and the claimant appeals. Reversed and remanded. Thomas J. Spellacy, of Hartford, for appellant. William B. Ely, of New Haven, for appellee Champlin. contract the usual rules for the construction and enforcement of all contracts. The practical difficulties of enforcing the foreign contract, at least where the act is contractual, kept in mind that the right of compensation will not be as a rule insuperable if it is given by the act and the venue are totally and at the same time destroy, the right to different concepts. The act cannot create, sue upon a transitory action. [2] The only actions to secure compensation under a foreign statute which we cannot enforce are those "where right and remedy are so united that the right cannot be For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes enforced except in the manner and before the tribunal designated by the act." Tenn. Coal Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587, 58 L. Ed. 997, L. R. A. 1916D, 685. [3] Nor does our act provide compensation for residents alone. Its language is not that of restriction or limitation, but all-embracing. For example, it applies to "all contracts of employment," and this was intended to mean wherever and by whomsoever made. It gives compensation for "any injury," and this was intended to furnish to nonresident and resident alike the new remedy. It defines an employer and an employé as "any person." It excepts certain classes, and the designation of these exceptions marks the only limitation upon the definition. [4] When we turn from the substantive provisions determining the cause of action to those provisions affecting the venue we come upon terms and language of generality and not of restriction. Every contract of employment not excepted by the act and to be performed within our state will automatically have incorporated in it the provision for compensation for injury unless one or the other party to the contract shall indicate his refusal to accept the provisions of part B of the act. The act applies to every natural or artificial person who enters upon a contract of employment. When such a contract made in another state is entered upon here, the act does not attempt to make a new contract for the parties. It merely makes provision for the incorporation of an additional term, either by the voluntary acceptance of the parties, or by the laws assuming an acceptance in the absence of notice of refusal to accept. If the contract had been made in New Jersey, and the parties had accepted its terms, the contract; itself would have included the feature of compensation. We would then have enforced the contract unless the special terms of the act made its enforcement in this jurisdiction impracticable; for their act, like ours, is voluntary and contractual, and our declared public policy favors an enactment of this kind. If the contract had been inade in South Carolina, where there is no compensation act, and the parties had upon entering upon its performance here accepted ur act or failed to indicate a refusal to accept it in the manner called for by the act, it is not contended that the contract of hirIng would not have been enlarged by the addition of our provision of compensation for any injured in the employment. hire made in another state the observance of our act. If the state in which the contract is made contains a compensation act, but by its terms, or by the construction placed upon it by its own court, it is not operative outside the state of its origin, and the contract is performed in our state, the contract is in exactly the same situation it would have been in had there been no compensation act in the foreign state. In the one case we have no contract whatever which was made in reference to a compensation act; in the latter case we have a contract made in reference to the foreign act, but not in reference to an act which made its compensation feature applicable in our state. As to that feature each contract is silent. The Massachusetts act has been construed to possess no extraterritorial effect. Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 372. So that, if the parties had contracted with reference to the Massachusetts act, the contract of employment as performed in Connecticut would have had no reference to that act. It would merely have been a contract made in Massachusetts and performed here. So much of it as might be performed in Massachusetts would be subject to her compensation act, and so much as might be performed in Connecticut would be subject exclusively to our act. If Champlin had employed Douthwright in Connecticut to help in the work in Hartford and he had been injured in its course unquestionably, if neither party had refused to accept our act, he could recover compensation under our statute for an injury suffered in the course of the work. Equally liable would Champlin be if Douthwright had been employed in Massachusetts. The express acceptance of our act by these parties added its compensation features to their contract. In the absence of their refusal, the law would have added this to their contract; in either case it would have become a part of the contract. If the Massachusetts act had by her court been construed to have an extraterritorial effect, we should have endeavored, in an action for an injury suffered here by an employé who contracted in Massachusetts, to have given effect to the act as broadly as her own courts would have done. We should have treated the contract as subject to the law of the place where it was made just as we would if the claim had been for a breach of any of its provisions. But in this case the parties did not conIt is expressly conceded in the respond- tract with reference to the Massachusetts ent's brief, and properly so we think, that act, and it is not claimed that they contractparties to a contract of employment in Mas-ed to exclude the Connecticut act from their Bachusetts may there contract with refer- contract. They merely added one term to ence to our act, or when they come into Connecticut may make another contract of employment so as to come within our act. Our General Assembly might make as a condition their contract, and there is no jurisdictional reason why the contract of their making should not be enforced here. They had the right to modify or add to their contract ticut as to the kind and quality of the work, I scribed by the statute, including a statement the rate of wages, as to an insurance against that the appellant appeals for the revision risk, in short, as to any provision or condi- of certain errors which he claims to have oction of the contract, and for a like reason curred on the trial, and these he assigns in they had the right to add to their contract due form. The appeal thus conforms subthe compensation feature of our act. The stantially to the prescribed form. authority in this country where the precise question we are considering has arisen is confined, so far as we are aware, to the New Jersey court. In American Radiator Company v. Rogge, 86 N. J. Law, 436, 92 Atl. 85, 94 Atl. 85, the contract of employment was made in New York, where there was no workmen's compensation act. The decedent was employed in New York to work in New York and New Jersey, and was injured in New Jersey while so working. The relation of the parties in New Jersey is contractual, and may be implied by law, and the parties may prevent the operation of the statute by giving the prescribed notice, as in our act. The court held: "The liability of the employer to make compensation is an obligation superimposed upon the original contract as a condition of its performance in New Jersey, and it is contractual in character because either party may escape the obligation by giving notice that he will not be bound thereby, and because it does not arise out of any wrongdoing. But the addition of this contractual obligation by statute does not affect the contract of hiring; that is still enforced as far as it goes by its terms." See, also, American Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. Law, 436, 92 Atl. 85, 94 Atl. 85; Bradbury, Workman's Comp. (2d Ed.) 57. The judgment finding that the commissioner had no jurisdiction and remanding the case to the commissioner with direction to dismiss the proceedings for want of ju risdiction was erroneous. [5] The appellee pleads in abatement of the appeal because the record on appeal contains no finding by the superior court making the finding of the commissioner a part of the record. The finding of the commissioner must contain all facts essential to the case, and upon appeal it becomes a part of the record, and there is ordinarily no occasion that the court should make this finding a part of its record. To this extent we modify the rule of practice announced in Thompson v. Twiss, 90 Conn. 444, 446, 97 Atl. 328, L. R. A. 1916E, 506. The demurrer to the plea in abatement is well taken. There is error, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to be proceeded with according to law. The other Judges concurred. (91 Conn. 510) ANDERSON v. DEWEY. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. March 8, 1917.) 1. EXECUTION 451-IMPRISONMENT-POOR DEBTOR'S OATH-JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES. A justice of the peace has general jurisdiction to administer the poor debtor's oath, but only in proceedings in strict conformity with the requirements of Gen. St. 1902, § 2946, and while the administration of the oath is a ministerial act, the determination whether sufficient reason is shown why it should not be administered is a judicial act. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 1306-1361.] 2. EXECUTION 451-IMPRISONMENT-POOR DEBTOR'S OATH-CERTIFICATE. Though Gen. St. 1902, § 2946, does not expressly provide for the recording of the oath of a poor debtor by the justice of the peace or for the manner in which notice should be given the jailer, the issuance of a written certificate to the jailer reciting compliance with the statutory conditions for the administration of the oath and stating that it has been administered is the proper practice. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 1306-1361.] 3. EXECUTION 451 - IMPRISONMENT - RELEASE LIABILITY OF JAILER-CERTIFICATE— "PROCESS." Though such a certificate is not a "process," which is synonymous with writs, but rather a statement of the finding and action of a judicial officer, it is the duty of the jailer to act upon it immediately by releasing the prisoner if it is regular on its face, and he is not liable for making such release, where the certificate recited that notice had been given to the plaintiff, though in fact such notice was never served. Cent. Dig. §8 1306-1361. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Execution For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Process.] 4. EXECUTION 451-IMPRISONMENT-POOL DEBTOR'S OATH-CERTIFICATE-RECITALS. The certificate of a justice of the peace that the poor debtor's oath had been administered to an imprisoned debtor, to be regular on its face, should contain a recital of all facts essential to give the justice jurisdiction to administer the oath. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. §§ 1306–1361.] [6] The further ground for abating the ap、 peal is that it contains no prayer for relief. The statute (section 798) expressly provides that the appeal "shall be substantially in accordance with" the form given. The form or appeal prescribed by this statute contains such prayer for relief, and the better practice will follow the prescribed form. But when an appeal is attacked as defective; Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, substantial, and not literal, compliance with Hartford County; Edward L. Smith, Judge this form of appeal should be the test. Those Action by Bessie Anderson against Edward matters only which are essential to the ap- W. Dewey. Judgment for the defendant aftpeal will be held to be fatally defective. This er demurrer to the reply was sustained, and appeal contains all of the essentials pre- plaintiff appeals. No error. John J. Dwyer, of Hartford, for appellant. | tration, but we think this is implied in the Noble E. Pierce, of Hartford, for appellee. nature of the office and the character of the function. The notification to the jailer should be in writing and should specify the conditions upon which the oath was administered. This conforms to the practice. And it is the only way by which the jailer may be ap prised of what the justice has done and whether he has complied with the legal requirements; and it is the only way in which the jailer may have a certain record upon which he may rely for the proof of his justification in the course he may decide to take. The certificate lodged with the defendant jailer was in the form required by our law, and approved of by our practice. [3] The action of the jailer in releasing WHEELER, J. The complaint alleges that the defendant, as keeper of the jail in the county of Hartford, wrongfully suffered one Rostek to escape from his custody as such keeper. In his answer the defendant admits that he released Rostek by authority of a certificate issued by a justice of the peace and served upon him, which recited that Rostek while in the jail limits made application to the justice to be permitted to take the oath provided for poor debtors in accordance with G. S. § 2946, and that, the statutory notice having been duly served upon the judgment creditor, plaintiff herein, and she having failed to appear, and no reason appearing | Rostek is supported upon the theory that the to the contrary, and no notice having been given by the plaintiff creditor that she intended to apply for a review, the justice admitted the debtor to take said oath and administered the same to him. The plaintiff replied that the application had not been served upon her, nor upon her attorney, and that she had had no notice whatever of the application. The defendant demurred to the re-justice. He cannot wait; he must act. ply because upon its face the certificate was sufficient, and the matters set forth in the reply are immaterial and irrelevant. Upon the admissions of the demurrer the statutory notice was not given the plaintiff, and the justice was without authority to administer the oath. The single question involved is whether the certificate affords protection to the defendant keeper for his release of Rostek. [1] The justice of the peace had general jurisdiction conferred by statute to administer the poor debtor's oath, but only in proceedings taken in strict conformity with the statutory requirements. The certificate under which the justice acted recited all of the statutory requisites, viz. the application made, the notice to the judgment creditor in due form and duly given, the failure of the judgment creditor to appear or show cause, and no reason appearing to the contrary why the oath should not be administered, and no notice having been given by the plaintiff creditor of her intention to apply for a review. These conditions appearing, the statute provides that the jailer "shall thereupon discharge such prisoner from jail." The statute does not specify in what manner notice of the administration of the oath shall be given the jailer. [2] The mere administration of the oath is a ministerial act, but the inquiry into the matter and the determination that "no sufficient reason is shown" why the oath should not be administered are exercises of the judicial function. The justice of the peace is a judicial officer. The statute does not expressly provide for the recording of the oaths administered together with a finding of the certificate of the justice is a process regular on its face affording to the jailer acting in reliance upon its complete protection. "Process" is synonymous with writs. This certificate is not a process, but rather a statement of the finding and action of a judicial officer, and the statute imposes upon the jailer immediate compliance with the action of the He cannot investigate or take time to seek advice; he must make his choice. If he should seek advice, his adviser may give him false, though sincere, advice, and he may find himself in consequence liable either for false imprisonment or escape. His duty is as clear as that of an officer with process in his hands. It is for him to see that the process is good upon its face. He need not look beyond his warrant if it be in due form and issued by competent authority having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties. Prompt service of process is all-important, and to secure it the officer is protected in the performance of his duty through reasons arising out of the highest considerations of public policy, provided the process be regular upon its face and issued by competent authority. Watson v. Watson, 9 Conn. 140, 146, 23 Am. Dec. 324; Osgood v. Carver, 43 Conn. 24; Neth v. Crofut, 30 Conn. 580. The authority of the justice to administer the poor debtor's oath is derived from the statute, and is to be exercised only after all statutory requirements are complied with; otherwise he has no jurisdiction to act. The jailer justifying under the action taken by the justice must show that all the jurisdictional requirements of the statute have been taken. This he can do by proof of the order or certificate of the justice reciting that he administered the oath. In New York it has been held that justification may be established by proof of the jurisdictional facts aliunde the order or certificate if they are not recited therein. The preferable and safer practice, in our opinion, sanctions proof of justification in only one way, by the order or certificate of the jus |