the result. Therefore what was said in the opinion in that case fully covers the present one, and the judgment appealed from will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed, with costs. (130 Md. 499) ALLERS et al. v. BACH. (No. 37.) (Court of Appeals of Maryland. April 13, 1917.) 1. EASEMENTS 16-UNITY OF OWNERSHIP. No right in a way which has been used during the unity of ownership of two parcels of land will pass upon the severance of the tene ments, unless proper terms are employed in the conveyance to show an intention to create the right de novo. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Easements, Cent. Dig. § 43.] 2. WATERS AND WATER COURSES 154(2) EASEMENT BY NECESSITY. Where plaintiff had an outlet to obtain drainage through his own property from the rear of his lot which he sought to divert onto the adjoining property of defendants, plaintiff had no continuous or apparent easement so to drain water across defendants' property necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of his own. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Cent. Dig. § 172.] Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; Walter I. Dawkins, Judge. "To be officially reported." tends northerly from the north side of West street, and binds upon the westernmost line of the plaintiff's lot for a distance of 18 feet and 8 inches, and lies to the north and south of the westernmost line of the plaintiff's property. The bill further avers that for over 20 years the property owned by the plaintiff has had an easement or right of drainage for the rain and surface waters from the rear of the plaintiff's property through the property of the defendants to a 3-foot alley, which extends southerly to West street, and that the easement or right of drainage is essential to the plaintiff's property, being its only means of outlet for the water. The bill then charges that the defendants have started and begun the construction of a large and heavy brick wall immediately along the westernmost line of the plaintiff's property, and extending to the north and south thereof, and have absolutely cut off and destroyed the easement or right of drainage, and have made no provisions whatever for it nor for the rain and surface water that flows through the right of way or easement, and that the plaintiff has been caused thereby irreparable loss and damage, as the right of drainage is an appurtenance and a necessity to the property, and the Suit by Henry Bach against Jacob F. Al- plaintiff is entitled to have the right of lers and Louisa W. Allers. From a decree directing injunction, defendants appeal. Decree reversed, and bill dismissed. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER, BLE, JJ. drainage restored, as it formerly existed. The relief asked by the bill is that an injunction may issue to prevent the building, erecting, and construction of the brick wall, as stated in the bill, and also for a manda STOCKBRIDGE, and CONSTA-tory injunction, directing the defendants to W. W. Parker, of Baltimore, for appellants. Edward L. Ward, of Baltimore, for appellee. BRISCOE, J. This is a proceeding in equity to enjoin and restrain the defendants by injunction from erecting and constructing a brick wall adjoining the westernmost line of the plaintiff's property, known as No. 1132 South Charles street, and to restore an alleged easement or right of drainage of any kind for rain or surface water from the rear of the plaintiff's property through the property of the defendants, known as No. 2 W. West street, to a three-foot alley, and thence into West street. The plaintiff's bill in substance avers that on the 4th day of January, in the year 1909, he became the purchaser of the property known as No. 1132 S. Charles street, Baltimore, located on the west side of Charles street at the distance of 41 feet and 4 inches northerly from the north side of West street, and then binds northerly on the west side of Charles street 18 feet and 8 inches, and has a depth westerly of even width 60 feet; that the defendants, Jacob F. and Louisa W. Allers, own the property known as No. 2 W. West street, Baltimore, which ex restore the easement or right of drainage from the plaintiff's property through the property of the defendants. The defendants, Jacob F. and Louisa W. Allers, answered the bill, and denied all of its material allegations. In answer to the third paragraph of the bill, they specifically deny that there has ever at any time in the past existed and that there does now exist any easement or right of drainage of any kind whatsoever for rain or surface water from the rear of any person's property or of the alleged property of the plaintiff through the property of these defendants, and that the plaintiff has not at any time in the past and has not now any right of drainage whatsoever or any easement through the property of these defendants, and that the property alleged to be owned by the plaintiff has full, complete, and ample means of drainage for both rain and surface water according to ways and means other than through or over the property of the defendants. In further answer to the third paragraph, it is averred that the plaintiff's property up to the period of within 7 years ago had full, complete, ample, and efficient drainage for both rain and surface water through and upon and within the boundaries and confines of the property itself, so For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes fore granted in this cause is hereby made permanent, and said defendants are hereby directed by mandatory injunction as prayed in said bill to restore and provide the said plaintiff with said drainage for said rain and surface waters for plaintiff's said property, through the property of the defendants known as No. 2 W. West street to the 3-foot that both rain and surface water flowed | plaintiff's property to said 3-foot alley, leadfrom said property without encroaching uponing into West street, and having failed to the property of these defendants, but that make such provision, said injunction heretowithin this period the property was reconstructed and a new building erected thereupon by the owner thereof who himself interfered with and cut off the former natural outlet and drainage for all rain and surface water, and he attempted and he has persisted in such attempt to cause drainage from the property of both rain and surface water to pass upon the property of these defend-alley in question, and thence to West street. ants, thereby causing them great loss, dam- At the trial of the case the plaintiff producage, and inconvenience as a result thereof, ed six witnesses and the defendants producand that the owner of the property has had ed eight, who testified as to their recollecconstructed thereupon and there does now tion and knowledge of the location and surexist a method of drainage for both rain and roundings of the two properties and the consurface water so as not to interfere with ei- dition of the drainage from the rear of the ther the property of these defendants or plaintiff's lot. We have examined the testitheir rights therein, and that the action of mony with some care, but find it entirely too the owner of the property in causing rain | indefinite and uncertain to support the relief and surface water to drain over, through, asked by the plaintiff's bill, and that the and upon the property of these defendants is plaintiff has failed to make out a case to an invasion of their rights, is inequitable, justify the action of a court of equity by constitutes a trespass upon their property, injunction. and is without warrant of law. In answer to the fifth paragraph, it is admitted that they have torn down a partition fence between the two properties, and they are replacing the same with a brick wall, which constitutes a part of the improvements being erected upon their property, but they deny they have severed and destroyed the drainage so that the plaintiff's property will | be without any means or right of way whereby the water can be drained or carried off, or that his property will thereby become injured and damaged, and that the statements in the plaintiff's bill are without warrant in law, in equity, or in fact. The case was heard upon a motion to dissolve the injunction which had been previously issued, upon testimony in open court, and from a decree directing an injunction, this appeal has been taken. The decree appealed from is as follows: The court being of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to the right of drainage for the rain and surface waters from his property No. 1132 South Charles street through the property of the defendants, Louisa W. Allers and Jacob F. Allers, known as No. 2 W. West street, to a 3-foot alley leading into West street by an implied grant, said right of drainage or easement being continuous and apparent and necessary to the beneficial use and enjoyment of said property No. 1132 S. Charles street, it is thereupon this 21st day of December, 1916, by the circuit court of Baltimore city adjudged, ordered, and decreed that the plaintiff is entitled to said right of drainage for said property through the property of the defendants mentioned in this proceeding to the 3-foot alley leading into West street, and as the defendants have been given ample time since the filing of the opinion in this cause to provide and take care of the rain and surface waters from the The theory of the plaintiff's case, and the court below so held, is that the plaintiff is entitled to an easement or right of drainage from his property through the defendants' property by an implied grant, and this easement has existed for a period of more than 20 years. Turning now to the record it appears that the plaintiff purchased the lot on January 9, 1909, from certain named trustees for the sale of the property of Dietrich H. Allers, deceased, who held both properties as an entirety for a long time prior to 1879. The first severance of the West street lot now owned by the defendants was in the year 1882, when John H. Allers purchased the property, and on January 11, 1888, he conveyed it to his wife, Louisa W. Allers, one of the appellants in this case. The deeds are silent as to any reservation of the right to use the property of the defendants for surface drainage to the West street alley, and the proof shows that prior to the purchase of the property by the plaintiff the surface water from the rear of the property flowed northerly, then easterly, through the alley leading into Charles street, and not over the land of the defendants to the West street alley. [1] In Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 307, it is said a party cannot have an easement in his own land, as all the uses of an easement are fully comprehended and embraced in his general right of ownership. The general principle is that no right in a way which has been used during the unity of ownership will pass upon the severance of the tenements, unless proper terms are employed in the conveyance to show an intention to create the right de novo. Stewart v. May, 119 Md. 19, 85 Atl. 957; Duvall v. Ridout, 124 Md. 196, 92 Atl. 209, L. R. A. 1915C, 345. [2] It would be impossible to hold, under the facts of this case, that the easement or Md.) MAROWITZ v. LAND right of drainage claimed by the appellee 783 and store fixtures by a corporation which received title through a composition with creditors from a bankrupt that the transfer was not only made on a good consideration, but that it was also bona fide, for if it were not made in good faith it was void, though the grantee paid full consideration. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 10-14.] 3. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 309(12) The defendants' CLAIM BY THIRD PERSON-INSTRUCTION. witnesses testified that the natural drainage of the plaintiff's lot was north, then east through the alley into Charles street, and all the water from the rear flowed northerly across the yard, thence easterly out the alley into Charles street, except the hydrant water, and this was removed before the purchase of the property by the plaintiff. It is apparent, we think, from the record that the plaintiff has no ground for relief on account of the obstruction complained of, and, as was said in Duvall v. Ridout, supra, to sustain his contention "would amount to an appropriation to that extent of the appellants' land for the benefit of the adjacent property of the appellee." We have not deemed it necessary to re view and to discuss the authorities relied For the reasons stated, the decree of the court below will be reversed, and the bill of complaint dismissed. In such action, the prayer that verdict should be for the claimant, though the jury should believe the bankrupt told the witnesses that the store and the goods and fixtures were his, etc., unless the jury should further find that claimant heard the statements or knew the bankrupt was making the same, and did not contradict or refute them, and there was no evidence in the case from which the jury could so find, was properly refused. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. § 957.] Appeal from Circuit Court, Frederick County; Glenn H. Worthington and Edward C. Peter, Judges. Action by Charles S. Hahn and L. Edgar Betson, partners trading as Hahn & Betson, against Charles D. Land, wherein Samuel R. Marowitz claimed the property attached. From the judgment against him, the claimant appeals. Affirmed. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, Daniel S. Sullivan, of Baltimore, for ap- PATTISON, J. The appellees Charles S. Hahn and L. Edgar Betson, partners trading as Hahn & Betson, sued out of the circuit court for Frederick county an attachment against the appellee Charles D. Land and caused to be attached as his property a stock of merchandise and store fixtures in storeroom No. 45 South Market street, Frederick, Md. Samuel R. Marowitz, the appellant, filed his petition in said court, claiming Decree reversed, and bill dismissed, with the property attached, and alleging therein costs to the appellants. (130 Md. 514) MAROWITZ v. LAND et al. (No. 6.) (Court of Appeals of Maryland. April 4, 1917.) 1. EVIDENCE 230(5)—ADMISSIONS FRAUD. On petition, claiming attached property of a bankrupt, alleging a sale to the claimant, testimony, of third persons who dealt with the bankrupt after the alleged sale of the property to claimant, as to the bankrupt's statements, direct and implied, that the business was his, was properly admitted, since, where fraud is set up, a wide latitude is allowed in the admission of testimony involving the fraudulent intent of the parties. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. § 848.] 2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 9 FIDES. BONA that Charles D. Land, trading as Charles D. Land & Co., was in the spring of 1915 a merchant in Frederick city and the owner of a stock of goods and fixtures in said storehouse; that in the month of May of that year he became financially embarrassed and was declared a bankrupt, and receivers or trustees were appointed by the United States District Court to take possession of the assets of said bankrupt; that he thereafter effected a composition with his creditors, which was confirmed by said court, and his assets were turned over to one Rothchilds, who had procured for him the money by which he was enabled to effect such composition with his creditors; that Rothchilds turned over said assets to the Consolidated Skirt & Cloak Company, a body corporate of which Charles D. It was essential to the validity of the trans- Land was president, and that the petitioner, fer to a third person of a stock of merchandise the appellant, on or about July 22, 1915, For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes bought of said corporation all of said stock and payable to said company, the first for of goods and fixtures in said storehouse in $525 and the other for $110.06. The check Frederick, Md., at and for the sum of $2,325, for $1,000, he states in his testimony, was of which sum $1,000 was paid in cash, and the cash payment under the agreement, the the balance in or about 10 days thereafter; other two checks amounting to $635.06 were that ever since then he has been the owner of further payments upon the purchase money, said property so purchased of the Consolidat- and the balance of the purchase money was ed Skirt & Cloak Company, except so much paid by him as he testified in "customers' thereof as has been sold in the ordinary checks and cash"; the last payment being on course of trade, and he asked in his petition September 16, 1915, at which time he took that the property be delivered to him by said from the Consolidated Skirt & Cloak Comsheriff. The answer to the petition is not pany its receipt, signed by Land as president, set out in the record. The docket entries, acknowledging the payment of the balance however, show that issues were joined, and of said purchase money, although it seems that a jury impaneled to try such issues ren- that the bill of sale provided for in the aforedered a verdict for the defendants upon said agreement to be given to Marowitz upon which a judgment was thereafter entered. It his payment of said balance was never exis from that judgment that this appeal is ecuted or delivered. The testimony of the taken. claimant was to the effect that he bought In the trial of the case the claimant pro- this stock of goods and fixtures without ever duced an agreement, purporting to have been having seen them, that upon taking possesexecuted by himself and the said Charles sion of the storehouse and premises he did D. Land, as president of the Consolidated not have the lease of the premises assigned, Skirt & Cloak Company. This agreement was or the license transferred, to him, that the dated the 22d day of July, 1915, and by it the rent thereafter so long as he held the store Consolidated Skirt & Cloak Company agreed was paid by him through Charles Land, the to sell to the said Samuel R. Marowitz, lessee under the aforesaid lease; and, when claimant, the said stock of goods, merchan- asked why he had Land pay the rent, he andise, and fixtures in the storehouse at Fred-swered, saying: erick, "together with the good will of said "I give him the money. I didn't want to take store and the lease of the premises," at and for the sum of $2,325, $1,000 of which was to be paid in cash and the balance within 10 days thereafter. The agreement provided to go up to see the landlord." that, upon the payment of said sum of $1,000, Marowitz was to take possession of said property and proceed to sell the stock of goods in the usual course of business, upon the condition, however, that all sums received therefor should belong to the Consolidated Skirt & Cloak Company, and such proceeds were to be turned over to it, and Marowitz was "to get no title whatever thereto." It was further provided in the agreement that the possession of said store and goods "was made upon the condition that the title of the property that was agreed to be sold to Marowitz should remain in said Consolidated Skirt & Cloak Company and, should Marowitz fail to pay the balance of the purchase money, to wit, the sum of $1,325, within 10 days from the date of the agreement, the said company was authorized to "re-enter said store and take possession thereof," and all sums received in part payment of the purchase price for said property were to be retained as liquidated damages. It was further provided that upon the payment of the said sum of $1,325 the Consolidated Skirt & Cloak Company was to execute a bill of sale for the property mentioned in the agreement. Marowitz also produced his check, dated July 22, 1915, upon the Old Town National Bank of Baltimore, for the sum of $1,000, payable to the order of the Consolidated Skirt & Cloak Company, and his two subsequent checks of August 6th and August 27th over the obligation of the lease. I bought the lease, but did not want it to be taken in my name, to be responsible for two years rent. I bought the lease but did not want * * Marowitz after the alleged purchase did not remove to Frederick, but continued to live in Baltimore and placed the management of the business with one Galley, who was in the employ of Land at the time of his adjudication as a bankrupt. Galley managed the business two or three weeks, when he was succeeded by Nathan Land, a younger brother of said Charles Land, and those who had served as clerks under Charles Land were continued as employés. Upon these visits he Marowitz visited Frederick only a few times between the 22d of July and the date of the attachment in January following. Charles Land continued going to Frederick about once in every week, or once in every two weeks, as he had formerly done before his adjudication as a bankrupt. His visits were usually on Friday or Saturday, remaining over until Monday, and while there was in the store waiting upon customers as he had previously done. was usually accompanied by his wife, and she, too, while at Frederick, was employed in the store, and for her services Marowitz said he paid her $5 a week; but it seems he did not pay the husband anything and could not account for his going there unless it was to see his brother, although on one or two occasions he accompanied Marowitz to Frederick, and was seen by Marowitz at such times, at work in the store assisting in the The seventh, eighth, and ninth exceptions were to the evidence of G. O. Paxson, an electrical contractor of Frederick, who was allowed to testify without objection that he, after the 22d day of July, 1915, "put on a new switch" and furnished Charles D. Land with lamps that were used in the storehouse at No. 45 South Market street. He was then asked under objection in the seventh exception, "Had you any conversation with him as to who was to pay for the lamps?" and he Mr. the proceeds of sales at the store was first | him, he was told by Charles D. Land that he deposited in the name of Mrs. Land, and this (Charles D. Land) would pay him and that continued until some time in September or he was running the business. October, when Marowitz, as he says, had it placed to his own credit. Marowitz, as he testified, continued the business at Frederick, in the manner stated, until the 8th of November, when he disposed of the stock of goods, fixtures, and business to Nathan Land, and an agreement was produced containing the terms and conditions of such sale. Nathan Land thereafter, as stated by Marowitz and himself, managed and continued the business in his own name until January 15, 1916, and, as testified to by Marowitz and Nathan was permitted to answer, "Yes, sir." Land, the former again became "the absolute T owner of the store and fixtures located at 45 South Market street, Frederick, Md." Marowitz in his petition states very fully how the property passed from Charles D. Land & Co., bankrupt, to himself, naming those through whom it passed, and alleges that after taking possession of the store goods and fixtures under the alleged contract of July 22, 1915, he has since that time been the owner of said property, making no mention whatever of the sale and transfer of said property by him to Nathan Land, and it was upon his cross-examination that this alleged fact was first disclosed. It will be observed that title to this property is alleged to have passed from Nathan Land to Marowitz on January 15th, only 11 days before the service of the attachment in this case. The pleadings present the sole question: Was the property attached the property of the claimant? It is sufficiently clear from the record that Marowitz's claim to the property was resisted upon the ground of fraud. In the progress of the trial there were ten exceptions taken to the rulings of the court upon the evidence and one to its rulings upon the prayers. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendants. There was no error in the court's ruling on the first exception, for, should the evidence admitted thereunder be regarded as immaterial, it was not harmful to the plaintiff; and we discover no error in the court's ruling in the second exception. Land said he would pay for them "as soon [1, 2] The evidence admitted under these exceptions we think was properly admitted. It is essential to the validity of the transfer of the property to Marowitz that it was not only made on a good consideration, but that it was also bona fide. If it were not made in good faith, it is void, although the grantee The law will not permit one man to assist in may have paid a full consideration therefor. cheating another. Cooke v. Cooke, 43 Md. 531, and the other cases there cited. Where fraud is set up, as in this case, a The third exception was to a question ask-wide latitude is allowed in the admission of ed the witness, which, so far as the record testimony involving the fraudulent intent of discloses, was never answered. The fourth, the parties. As was said in Cooke v. Cooke, supra: "Fraud assumes so many shapes and disguises that it can only be detected in many cases by a consideration of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, some of which when separately considered may seem trivial, remote, and even disconnected. It is not easy, therefore, to draw a precise line separating facts such as are fairly admissible, from test after all being whether they tend to throw others which ought to be excluded; the true light upon and explain the true nature of the transaction." fifth, and sixth exceptions were to the admission of the evidence of Edgar L. Betson of the firm of Hahn & Betson, the attaching creditors. He was permitted to state that he was asked by Charles D. Land, who was at the time engaged in the sale of goods in said storehouse and was acting in relation thereto as he had done prior to his adjudication in bankruptcy, to shelve the northern side of the storehouse, and that at such time, as well as at other times after the 22d day of July, 1915, when witness called upon It may be that some of the facts admitted him for the payment of the amount owing to in evidence under the foregoing exceptions, 100 A.-50 |