and nieces and five grandnieces, representing three deceased nephews or nieces. Joseph McMurray, a nephew, applied for letters of administration on his estate. This was opposed by Edward M. Reis, another nephew, who asked that letters be issued to him. After hearing each of them and their witnesses, the register granted letters to McMurray. On appeal to the orphans' court, the decree of the register was reversed, and it was ordered that letters be issued to Reis. Subsequently, on the application of McMur ray, the matter was reargued before the court, but it declined to disturb its decree. [1-3] To the register of wills is committed, in the first instance, the duty of granting letters of administration, and he acts judicially in the performance of that duty. From a decree granting or refusing letters an appeal lies to the orphans' court, under section 31 of the act of March 15, 1832 (P. L. 135, 144). While such an appeal, in a certain sense, brings the matter complained of before the orphans' court de novo, that court does not, strictly speaking, act originally, but is confined to a review of the discretion exercised by an inferior judicial officer, in whom it is vested by section 22 of the act of March 15, 1832; and if the legal discretion of that officer has not been abused in his appointment of an administrator, his selection cannot be disturbed. Wilkey's App., 108 Pa. 567; Levan's App., 112 Pa. 294, 3 Atl. 804. In Brubaker's App., 98 Pa. 21, Jacob Sheaffer died intestate, leaving as his only heirs at law two married daughters, Elizabeth Brubaker and Lavina Wolf. Letters of administration on his estate were granted by the register to Mrs. Brubaker, the elder daughter. Subsequently the petition of the younger was presented, praying that she be joined with her sister in the administration of their father's estate. This was refused by the register, and thereupon Mrs. Wolf appealed from his decision to the orphans' court, which sustained her appeal and ordered letters of administration to be issued to her on her father's estate. In reversing this action by the court and affirming what the register did, we said: of kin, others, even in the same degree of kindred, have, during the life of the administrator, tors, 64. In the case before us the two daughno title to a similar grant.' Hood on Executers of the intestate were equally competent to administer, and the register might have granted letters to both jointly if they had so desired; but he was not bound to do so. In the exercise of his discretion he selected Mrs. Brubaker, who requested that letters should be issued to herself alone. Having done 'so, it was not in his power to revoke the letters thus granted, or to join the younger sister in the administration against the will of the other." of the register to grant letters of administration to a nephew of the intestate, if qual [4] In the case before us it was the duty ified to administer the estate. Did he make an improper selection from the class from must be determined from what was developed which he was required to appoint? This at the hearing before him, for the lower ment of counsel that the appeal was to be court acted upon it alone, under an agreeheard on the petition for it and answer thereto, if any should be filed, and upon the testimony which had been taken before the register; and no testimony, facts, or pleadings which were not part of the record when the case was originally before the court were taken into consideration by it on the reargu ment. Three nephews and one niece testified before the register that they wished letters to be issued to Joseph McMurray, the appellant. Two nephews and one niece testified that they preferred Edward M. Reis, the appellee. Three nephews, one niece, and three grandnieces requested, in writing, that letters be issued to McMurray, but the court below refused to consider these requests, for the reason that they had not been offered in evidence, but it nevertheless took into account similar requests in favor of Reis, made by two nieces and two grandnieces, though they had not been offered in evidence, so far as appears from the record. In view of this the learned president judge of the court below inadvertently erred in saying that a majority in interest in the estate of the deceased, who had signified a preference as to whom the register should appoint, requested him to appoint Edward M. Reis. "When the class primarily entitled to adminSeven witnesses testified before the regisistration consists of several persons, it is the duty of the register to grant letters to such ter as to the good business habits of Joseph one or more of them as he shall judge will best McMurray, and to his fitness to administer administer the estate. He may thus grant let-the estate of his deceased uncle, and no one ters to them all jointly, if they so desire; or, in his discretion, he may select one of them and commit the administration to him alone, to the exclusion of the others; and, when properly exercised, his discretion is not the subject of review either in the orphans' court or here. Ho is not bound to select the oldest in preference to the youngest of the class entitled to administration. Primogeniture gives no right of preference, so as to weigh against the wish of the majority of interest; yet, if things are precisely equal-if the scale is exactly poised-being the elder brother would incline the balance. Hood on Executors, 64; 1 Williams on Executors, 427. And the same principle applies to the elder of two sisters. * was called to contradict them. His competency to administer the estate is admitted by the learned court below in its opinion refusing to sustain the register. That officer, who had original jurisdiction in the matter, selected from the members of the proper class one admittedly competent to administer the estate; and against whom no objection was made by a majority of those interested in it. But, notwithstanding all this, the learned court below reversed the register and direct"When admin-ed that letters be issued to Reis, because sufistration has been committed to any of the next ficient weight had not been given to the tes timony that the decedent had consulted him negligence, it was too late to do so in a motion in business transactions and had expressed for a new trial. exercising the discretion given to him the register was not required to give controlling weight to this alleged declaration of the intestate. If his real desire had been that the appellee should administer his estate, he could have expressed such desire in a single written line, and that nephew would have become his personal representative after his death. This expressed desire may have been taken into consideration by the register in connection with all the other testimony before him, but, be this as it may, he granted letters to one from a class from which the statute required him to select; his appointee was admittedly a fit person to administer the estate, and, with no superior legal right in the appellee, or any one else, to administer, the letters granted to the appellant ought not to have been vacated. The assignments of error are sustained, the decree of the orphans' court is reversed and set aside, and the decision of the register is affirmed, all costs below and on this appeal to be paid by the appellee. (256 Pa. 239) SCHWARTZ v. CAPLAN. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 8, 1917.) 1. MASTER AND SERVANT 286(22)-ACTION FOR INJURY-QUESTION FOR JURY-PRACTICABLE GUARDING OF MACHINERY. In a bakery employé's action for personal injury when his hand was drawn into rolls into which he was pushing dough, held, on the evidence, that whether the unguarded rolls could have been guarded without destroying their efficiency was for the jury. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1028.] 2. MASTER AND SERVANT 105(2)-ACTION FOR INJURY-UNGUARDED MACHINERY-DE FENSE. It was no defense that like machinery in other bakeries was not guarded. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 186, 187.] 3. MASTER AND SERVANT 229-INJURY TO SERVANT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence merely because he chanced to slip while at his work so that his hands were caught in the rolls. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 674, 683.] 4. APPEAL AND ERROR 216(1)—FAILURE TO INSTRUCT-REQUESTS. Where the court's instructions are sound and cover every feature of the case advanced by counsel, an appellate court will not ordinarily reverse for an omission to instruct on some question to which the court's attention was not directed. [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see New Trial, Cent. §§ 24-29.] Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County. Action by Robert Schwartz for damages for personal injury against Gutman Caplan. Verdict for plaintiff for $5,225 and judgment thereon, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. Argued before BROWN, C. J., and POTTER, MOSCHZISKER, FRAZER, and WALLING, JJ. Stephen Stone, of Pittsburgh, for appellant. Meredith R. Marshall, Rody P. Marshall, and Charles H. Sachs, all of Pittsburgh, for appellee. WALLING, J. [1] Plaintiff's hand was caught and crushed between iron rolls, while he was employed in defendant's bakery. The rolls were set in a table one above the other; the top of the lower roll being practically flush with the table. In the process of breadmaking the dough was passed back and forth between the rolls by workmen standing at each end of the table. Plaintiff seems to have slipped as he was pushing the dough back into the rolls so that the hand he was using for that purpose got caught. The rolls were operated by the employé at the other end of the table by means of a lever. There was some evidence that it was safer to use a paddle in pushing in the dough, and that defendant's foreman had promised to supply plaintiff with one, but this was denied; also some evidence to the effect that the dough should be pushed against the rolls with the closed hand and not with the fingers. However, the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint was that the rolls were unguarded in violation of Act May 2, 1905 (P. L. 352) § 11. As a matter of fact, there were no guards over the face of the rolls; defendant's contention being that to place guards over them would destroy their efficiency. This was denied by conflicting, and it was properly submitted to plaintiff, and as to that the evidence was the jury, who found for the plaintiff. The question of contributory negligence was not urged at the trial, and no reference was made thereto in the charge, the court's attention not having been called to that branch of the case by a formal request or otherwise; and only a general exception was taken to the charge. Whether it was practicable to guard the rolls in question without destroying their efficiency was for the jury under the evidence. Booth et al. v. Stokes, 241 Pa. 349, 88 Atl. 490; Shannon v. Carnegie Steel Co., 244 Pa. 346, 91 Atl. 357; Smith v. Philadel5. NEW TRIAL 18-ACTION FOR INJURY-phia Rubber Works, 248 Pa. 494, 94 Atl. 232. In a servant's action for injury, where de- [2] That in other bakeries like machinery fendant at the trial did not allege contributory was not guarded was no defense. Jones v. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 627.] SETTING UP DEFENSES-TIME. American Caramel Co., 225 Pa. 644, 74 Atl. prises Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. 613. On the rule for a new trial the court below gave careful attention to the question of contributory negligence, and found that there was no sufficient evidence thereof to submit to the jury; and we agree with that conclusion. [3] Contributory negligence is never presumed, and plaintiff was not guilty thereof merely because he chanced to slip while at his work so that his hand was caught in the rolls. Fegley v. Lycoming Rubber Co., 231 = Pa. 446, 80 Atl. 870; Gross v. Eagle Wheel Mfg. Co., 252 Pa. 361, 97 Atl. 457. I [4, 5] And in any event, in a civil suit, where the court's instructions are sound and cover every feature of the case advanced by counsel, an appellate court will not ordinarily reverse for an omission to instruct the jury on some question to which the lower court's attention was not in any manner directed at the trial. Here the defendant took his chances of a favorable verdict on other grounds, and for the first time mentions contributory negligence in the motion for a new trial. This would seem to be too late even if otherwise meritorious. This case is no exception to the general rule that the refusal to grant a new trial is not reversible error. The judgment is affirmed. (256 Pa. 215) JACKMAN v. HARRY DAVIS ENTER- (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 8, 1917.) TATION. Even if the landlord represented a building to be safe, yet in the absence of any representation of peculiar knowledge other than what might be gained by examining the building, it did not amount to fraud, even if incorrect. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 82, 83.] 2. LANDLORD AND TENANT 176-EVICTION -ACT OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES. The act of a city in notifying parties to the lease of a theater to empty the tank on the roof and that the wall was unsafe and must be taken down, was not an eviction of the lessee; and proceedings by an adjoining owner to erect a party wall, whereby the wall of the theater building was actually taken down, was not an eviction. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. § 711.] 3. LANDLORD AND TENANT 160(3) USE Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County. Actions of assumpsit for rent and for breach of covenant in a lease by Edward F. Jackman against the Harry Davis Enter Assumpsit for rent and breach of a covenant in a lease requiring defendant to restore the premises in the same condition in which they were received. Shafer, P. J., in the court of common pleas, filed the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: These three cases were tried together, the two of July term having been tried for two days before a jury, when it was agreed by counsel that all three of the cases should be tried without a jury, and the evidence taken before the jury used in all three of them as if taken in each. They are actions of assumpsit, each for a month's rent, the third case being also for breach of a covenant in the lease requiring the defendant to restore the premises in the same condition in which they were received, together with the personal property thereon. Findings of Fact. (1) In 1890 the plaintiff was the owner of a building on Penn avenue, city of Pittsburgh, used for a stable, which had been erected some five or six years before, the front of it having been built with the intention of at some time changing it to a theater. In that year plaintiff had plans drawn for a theater. According to these plans the front was left standing and about 15 feet of the sidewall at each end next to the street. All the rest of the building was reThere were used moved, foundations and all. in the reconstruction some of the bricks of the walls torn down, and the iron girders which had supported the upper stories and roof of the stable. (2) On the east side of the building stood a three-story house, the wall of which was on the line between the lots, this wall having been erected before 1885, when the stable was built. The east wall of the theater, except the 15 feet at the front which was not taken down, was built against the wall of the adjoining house upon a foundation 30-odd inches in thickness on a cement footing. The new wall was joined to the old 15 feet from the street by steel anchors, there being a chimney in the old wall at this place. In joining these two walls no attempt was made to dovetail the bricks or make the wall so that in case the other house should be torn down the seam between the two walls would be covered up in any way. In building the new part of the east wall it was necessary in certain places to vary the thickness of the wall, by reason of the wall of the adjoining house somewhat overhanging the line, and no attempt was made by the bricklayers to make the wall even where it came against the old wall. In one place, apparently by reason of a window sill or other projection on the other wall, the outside bricks against the old wall were set on their edge instead of on their side, and in general no attention was paid to what would be the appearance of the outside of this wall in case the other wall were taken down. This wall was supported at the front of the stage by a transverse wall or proscenium arch, the wall being some three feet thick, and iron trusses were laid from the east to the west wall and on these the roof was supported. (3) The plans of this building were drawn by competent architects, and the work on it let out to various contractors, and the work examined occasionally by an architect employed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff himself was almost every day on the ground while the work was going on. He had no special knowledge of building operations, and knew nothing of any defects For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes in the building of the east wall, if there were any. (4) After the completion of the theater it was used for that purpose by a lessee; and in 1902, or about that time, a water tank, to contain 10,000 gallons, was put up at the rear corner of the building, on the east side, a part of it supported by the rear wall, and part by the east wall, this tank being used to feed a sprinkler system installed in the theater. (5) At the end of the theatrical season of 1909, the plaintiff's lessees were in default in payment of rent, and he gave them notice to leave for such nonpayment. Anticipating their doing so, he had plans prepared for the renovation of the theater, which included changing of the balconies, or at least of the stairs to the balconies, and of the seats and the arrangement of the lobby, the principal object of the changes being to increase the safety of the building as a place of public amusement; public attention having been called to that matter recently by a disastrous fire in Chicago. (6) His lessees having given up possession about the middle of July, the plaintiff on the next or following day let contracts to various persons for the making of the changes designed, and work was begun on them at once. (7) It having become known that the former lessees had given up the theater, which was known as the Duquesne Theater, one William M. Cooper, a real estate agent, but not in the employ of either of the parties, spoke to the plaintiff about renting the theater, and suggested a lease to Mr. Harry Davis. The plaintiff said he would not lease to Mr. Davis, but when called on again and informed that the proposed lessee was the Harry Davis Enterprises Company, a corporation, he agreed to take up the matter of leasing to that company. Thereupon Cooper and Davis came to the theater on several occasions, it being then in the hands of a large number of workmen, and saw what could be seen in that way, and negotiations were so carried on that an oral agreement for the lease of the theater to the present defendant was made some time in July, 1909. (8) It is alleged by the defendant and denied by the plaintiff during these negotiations that certain representations were made to the defendant by the plaintiff in regard to the theater. These representations are set out in the affidavit of defense by stating that in answer to inquiries of the plaintiff "as to the condition of the building and its suitability for theater purposes," the plaintiff stated "that said theater had been made suitable in all respects for theatrical purposes and had been put in a thorough state of repair, and that said defendant could procure a license to operate the same,' and that, relying upon such representations, the lease was signed. In a supplemental affidavit of defense filed in the first two cases, it is alleged that plaintiff told defendant that the theater was and would be in all respects and conditions in proper shape for use as a theater, and that the defendant could procure the necessary license to operate it, and that he was making extensive alterations and improvements to it, and that it would be in proper state of equipment and repair in every respect, and that thereupon, without making any examination of the structure, the defendant signed the lease. The statement of plaintiff, as testified to by Mr. Davis, is: "I am putting this building in perfect condition, safe in every way, and will remodel it after the Maxine Elliott Theater on Thirty-Ninth street in New York; it will be one of the finest theaters in Pittsburgh, both in safety and contour and in every other way." As testified to by Mr. Cooper, called by the defendant, who claimed to be present at the making of the statement, it was, "He was completely overhauling the building, remodeling it and refurnishing it, doing everything that was necessary to make it strictly safe and first-class as a place for amusement," adding that he would not allow any prospective agent or tenant to interfere with the improvements he was making. The plaintiff denies ever having had any such conversation, or in fact any conversation on the subject, with Mr. Davis at any time. The testimony of these witnesses is of conversations supposed to have taken place over six years ago. In view of the defendant's omission from the affidavit of defense of any allegation as to statements made to it by the plaintiff in regard to the safety of the building, we are unable to find by the weight of the evidence that any such statement was in fact made, and therefore find that the plaintiff did not, before the making of the lease, represent to the defendant that the building was safe. Besides this, if the word "safe" was used by the parties, it was understood by them to refer to what is ordinarily meant by the safety of a theater; that is, the facility providing for getting the audience out in case of an alarm. The matter of the strength of the walls of the building or the strength of any part of the building was not discussed between the parties at all. (9) In the latter part of August a written lease, a copy of which is annexed to the plaintiff's affidavit of claim, was drawn up, and on August 31, 1909, the lease was signed, together with several other papers which form a part of the contract. The lease was signed by the plaintiff in the presence of his attorney in a room in the Anderson Hotel, and by the officers of the defendant company at their own office; the lease having been sent from the Anderson Hotel to that office and brought back signed and there signed by the plaintiff. This lease provided for the defendant taking possession on the 1st of September. The improvements contracted for by the plaintiff were not yet finished, and an additional agreement was drawn up that these improvements should be completed by the 20th of September, and that no rent should be paid for the intervening time; and in another paper the plaintiff gave to the defendant a list of the contracts which he had with various persons for work on the theater. This lease was for five years, at a rental of $40,000 per annum, payable monthly in advance, being $3,333.33 per month. (10) The defendant thereupon went into possession on September 20th, and occupied and used the theater for theatrical purposes from that time until the close of the ordinary theatrical season in 1914, the lease expiring September 1, 1914. (11) In the spring of 1914 Rosenbaum & Co. began the erection of a large steel frame building on the lot adjoining the theater on the east side and other adjacent property, and in May, 1914, took down the wall of the adjoining house, but had not then excavated the ground adjoining the theater for some distance away from it. (12) On May 21, 1914, S. A. Dies, superintendent of the bureau of public construction of the city of Pittsburgh, sent notice to the defendant and the plaintiff that the tank on the roof should be emptied, stating that the sidewall was not in condition to carry the tank, and that the entire wall was not of good construction and that it ought to be removed. The tank was thereupon emptied. (13) The condition of the wall at this time was a subject upon which a great deal of testimony was taken at the trial. We find the fact to be that the wall had not settled or moved, so far as appeared, since it was built; that the removal of the wall of the adjoining building made no difference in its strength, as the theater wall inclined somewhat away from the adjoining wall and was not supported by it to any appreciable extent, and that so long as the earth was not excavated in the adjoining lot too near the wall, the east wall of the theater was safe. (14) On May 25, 1914, proceedings were instituted by the Rosenbaum Company for William Stanton, the owner of the property adjoining the theater, for the erection of a party wall, and on May 29, 1914, it was determined that a party wall should be erected one-half on each side of the line. This proceeding required the removal of the east wall of the theater, as not being proper to form a part of the new building, and the wall was accordingly soon thereafter removed. tion of the lease. The evidence that this lack of repair existed before the plaintiff's watchman took charge of the building, or that it was not brought about by workmen engaged in taking down the wall, is not sufficient to charge the defendant on this claim. (24) In addition to these amounts, the parties have agreed that there shall be allowed to (15) On or about June 1, 1914, the defendant the plaintiff the sum of $226.97 for items other company applied to the city for a theater license than those above mentioned, which is admitted for the month of June, which was refused. It by defendant. was impracticable and unsafe to occupy the building as a theater during the removal of the wall. (16) The holding of performances in the theater ceased shortly before the 1st of June, and the defendant remained in possession of the building, keeping its watchman there, as required by the contract, until the 18th of June, 1914, when it notified the plaintiff that they would remove the watchman and would not consider themselves responsible for the rent after the last of May. (17) The lease required the defendant to keep up by new material, replacements and repairs, all carpets, scenery, and fixtures, chandeliers, electric lights, etc., and to make all necessary repairs to the building and premises, and to return the premises in as good and sufficient repair as when received. (18) The lease also required the defendant to keep a watchman on the premises, which was done during the whole time of the lease except between June 18, 1914, and August 31, 1914, during which time the plaintiff kept a watchman there at a cost to him of $291, which was the reasonable value of the services. (19) It is claimed by the plaintiff that there were about 1,400 sockets for electric lamps in the theater, and that all of these were furnished with lamps at the time of the lease, and that nearly all of these lamps had been taken away and were not replaced at the end of the term. These lamps were worth 10 cents apiece. The defendant's evidence tended to show that most of the sockets were filled when they left the theater. That a considerable number of lamps were missing there is no doubt. As we are called on in this matter to perform the functions of a jury, we deem it proper to arrive at a result in such circumstances in the same manner as a jury would be compelled to do, and in that way we find that there were missing lamps to the value of $70. (20) When the theater came into possession of defendant under the lease it contained a new velvet carpet on the floor of the value of $777.67, which was worn out and not replaced. Conclusions of Law. First. The only question in the first and second cases under consideration is whether or not the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the rent for the months of June and July, respectively. In the third case the same question arises as to the rent for the month of August and the additional question as to the amount of liability of defendant for not restoring the premises in the same condition as when received. [1] Second. The reason alleged by defendant for not paying the rent for these three months is that it was induced to enter into the contract of lease by the fraud of the plaintiff. This fraud consisted, as contended by the defendant, in a statement made by the plaintiff to the defendant some time before the lease was agreed upon or executed, that the theater building was safe, and that the plaintiff either knew, or should have known, that it was not safe, and that, relying upon this representation, the lease was made. We have found that he did not represent the building to be safe. Even if he had done so, in the absence of any representation of peculiar knowledge on the subject or knowledge different from that which any one might gain by examining the building, we are of opinion that that does not amount to fraud even if the representation turned out to be incorrect. It is not claimed the defendant did not have all opportunity to inspect the building which it desired. The plaintiff's statement that he would not allow any lessee to interfere with his improvements did not refer, in any way, to the inspection of the building, but meant he would not alter those improvements at the suggestion of a proposed lessee. a [2] Third. The act of the city in notifying the parties to empty the tank on the roof, and that the wall was unsafe and must be taken down, was not an eviction of the defendant, nor were the proceedings by the adjoining owner for the erection of a party wall, under which the wall of the theater was in fact taken down, such an eviction. In the third case, being that (21) When the defendant took possession of at October term, 1914, the plaintiff is admittedthe theater under the lease it contained a cer- ly entitled to recover some amount. It is adtain number of pieces of scenery and stage equip-mitted, as we understand it, that if the plaintiff ment which were used up or removed and not re- is entitled to recover for the rent from June placed by the defendant. The plaintiff now 18th to the end of the term, he is also entitled claims that this equipment and scenery was to recover for the services of a watchman, of a worth $960. The defendant admits that it was value of $291; and if not entitled to recover worth $188. No inventory of it appears to have this rent, that he is not entitled to recover this been taken either at the beginning or end of amount for watchman. the lease, so that the amount and character of it is difficult to ascertain. Practically all of it was of no value except as material to be used in making up other scenery. The witnesses varied very materially as to the character and value of the scenery, as well as to the amount of it. Upon an examination of the evidence we are of opinion that the value of this scenery and equipment not replaced was $400. (22) Plaintiff claims there were chairs to the value of $120 in this theater at the time it was leased, which were not there at the end of the term. The defendant claims that these chairs were not in the theater when it was leased. As to these chairs we find the plaintiff did not make out a case by the weight of the evidence. (23) Plaintiff also claims $50 for expense of plumbing, in putting in repair a water-closet Fourth. Without regard to the liability of defendant for the rent, the liability to plaintiff in this third case is: The value of lamps that were not restored, $70; the value of carpet, $777.67; for scenery, $400; and for other small items contained in the stipulation filed by the parties, $226.97. Fifth. Being of opinion that the defendant has shown no sufficient defense for the payment of the rent, it is ordered in the case at No. 2142, July term, 1914, that judgment be entered for the plaintiff and against the defendant for $3,333.33 with interest from June 1, 1914, amounting to $3,710. Sixth. In the case No. 2515, July term, 1914, it is ordered that judgment be entered for the plaintiff and against the defendant for $3,333.33, with interest from July 1, 1914, amounting |