ed, and that the ruling of the court denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial should be reversed, and that said case should be remitted to the superior court, with direction to enter judgment for the plaintiff upon the question of liability and for a new trial for the assessment of damages only. Wherefore the plaintiff prays that this bill of exceptions may be allowed, and said transcript be allowed, and that said case be remitted to the superior court, with direction to enter judgment for the plaintiff upon the question of liability and for a new trial for the assessment of damages only." The bill of exceptions, with the exclusion of one exception, and the transcript of testimony as presented was allowed by the trial court against the objection of the defendant. The case is now before us upon the motion of the defendant to dismiss the bill of exceptions on the ground that the transcript of testimony is not, and does not purport to be, a full transcript of all the evidence in the case which the jury had before them, and upon which they reached a verdict for the defendant, and therefore this court is not in a position to determine whether the finding of the jury was justified, or whether the ruling of the trial court in denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial was er roneous. The defendant has filed a number of affidavits, in support of its motion to dismiss, which are designed and intended to prove to this court that the omissions from the transcript of evidence embrace matters which are so important and necessary to the proper consideration of the exceptions that we cannot, in their absence, properly determine the questions involved. However this may be, we think that the defendant's motion to dismiss must be denied. [1] The statute (section 17, chapter 298 of the General Laws of 1909) does not provide for a complete transcript of all the testimony in every case. It only exacts such portion or portions thereof as may be required for the proper consideration and determination of the questions raised by the exceptions. If the excepting party fails to include enough of the testimony to answer this requirement, he must take the consequences of his own default. [2] In the case at bar the plaintiff has presented to the trial court his bill of exceptions and a transcript containing a portion of the testimony produced at the trial. The partial transcript has been allowed by the trial court, and we cannot say, in advance of a hearing upon the exceptions, that it does not contain all of the testimony that is required. We think that the allowance by the trial judge would establish its sufficiency prima facie. pose of showing the insufficiency of the transcript should the defendant see fit to use them for that purpose. The petition to establish the correctness of the transcript is essentially a motion to dismiss, and does not seem to us to require individual consideration. The defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's bill of exceptions is denied. WILBOUR, Insurance Com'r, v. COUR LAFONTAINE NO. 1, FORESTIERS FRANCO-AMERICAINS. (No. 392.) (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. June 4, 1917.) 1. APPEAL AND ERROR 320-CERTIFICATION OF CAUSE. Where an unsigned supplemental bill of complaint contained no prayer for relief, as required by the superior court equity rule 7, and the which were undetermined, the record is incomanswer raised material disputed issues of fact plete and the cause not ready for hearing on final decree, and should not be certified to the Supreme Court under Gen. Laws 1909, c. 289, $ 35. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1790-1794, 2299.] 2. APPEAL AND ERROR 320-CERTIFICATION OF CAUSE-ISSUES COMPLETE. A suit to compel a fraternal benefit society to comply with Laws 1912, c. 803, § 10, limiting expenditures for a home office building to 20 per cent. of its death fund, should contain exact facts regarding the society's various funds and their apportionment before being certified to the Supreme Court under Gen. Laws 1909, c. 289, § 35. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1790-1794, 2299.] 3. INSURANCE 691 MUTUAL BENEFIT WHO MAY BRING ACTION. Under Laws 1912, c. 803, § 25, providing that an injunction shall not be granted against domestic fraternal benefit societies except on the Attorney General's application, and section 24, directing the insurance commissioner to report instances of ultra vires acts to the Attorney General, who may in his discretion proceed by quo warranto, etc., a suit to enjoin expenditure for home office building to amount prescribed by Laws 1912, c. 803, § 10, must be instituted by the Attorney General, and not the insurance commissioner. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1829-1831.] Case Certified from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties. Bill by Philip H. Wilbour, Insurance Commissioner of Rhode Island, against Cour Lafontaine No. 1, Forestiers Franco-Americains. Cause certified to Supreme Court under Gen. Laws 1909, c. 289, § 35. Remanded for further proceedings. Herbert A. Rice, Atty. Gen. (James A. Tillinghast, of Providence, of counsel), for the State. Eugene L. Jalbert and Elphege J. Daignault, both of Woonsocket, for respondent. [3] We see no reason why the sufficiency of the transcript cannot be considered when the case comes to be heard upon the exceptions, and we see no reason why the affida- PER CURIAM. This is a bill in equity vits now on file may not be used for the pur- to determine the right of the respondent, a this application for an injunction by the insurance commissioner. He discharges his duty in this respect when he presents the facts to the Attorney General. The Attor fraternal benefit society, to invest its funds in a building for the use an occupation by the society, as provided for by section 10, c. 803, Public Laws 1912, and the cause was certified to this court under the provisions of sec-ney General is then to decide what if any tion 35, c. 289, Gen. Laws R. I. 1909. [1] The complainant, Philip H. Wilbour, insurance commissioner of Rhode Island, filed his original bill of complaint, which was not signed by counsel, February 23, 1917, and on April 4, 1917, filed a supplemental bill of complaint. Within the proper time thereafter the respondent filed its answer to the "complainant's supplemental bill of complaint." This supplemental bill of complaint, which is a new bill, and not an amendment to the original bill, is not signed by counsel or complainant, and contains no prayer for relief, either general or special, as required by rule 7 of the equity rules of the superior court. Paragraphs 9, 10, 12, and 13 of the answer raise certain disputed issues of fact some of which are material, and which should be decided before the cause can be considered by this court. The record in this cause is incomplete, the cause is not ready for hearing for final decree, and consequently the certification to this court was erroneous. [2, 3] In paragraph 11 in the supplemental bill (which is admitted by the answer) it appears that: "Said respondent has never filed in the office of the insurance commissioner of said state any return which would enable complainant to know definitely and accurately the condition of the death fund of said respondent at the present time, if said respondent has and maintains such a death fund." If hereafter another cause raising the same question is certified to this court for its opinion, the exact facts in regard to the various funds, the amounts and apportionments thereof, should be presented to this court. The application for an injunction in this case should have been made by the Attorney General, and not by the insurance commissioner. Section 25 of chapter 803, Public Laws 1912, an act for the regulation and control of fraternal benefit societies, provides that: "No application for injunction against or proceedings for the dissolution of or the appointment of a receiver for any such domestic society or branch thereof shall be entertained by any court in this state unless the same is made by the Attorney General." Section 24 of said chapter 803 provides that, whenever after examination the insurance commissioner is satisfied that any domestic society is exceeding its power, etc., the insurance commissioner may present the facts to the Attorney General, who shall, if he deem the circumstances warrant, commence an action in quo warranto, etc. It is clear from the sections of the statute above cited that the court cannot entertain action is to be taken against such fraternal benefit association. The responsibility for taking action then rests upon the Attorney General, and the proceedings must be taken by him in his capacity as Attorney General. The cause is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. Under Pub. Acts 1915, No. 90, § 2, requiring an answer to contain either denials of the complainant's allegations or a statement of facts relied upon in defense, the revocation of a broker's contract for commissions is an affirmative defense which should be specially set up in defendant principal's answer. Dig. § 102.] [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. 2. APPEAL AND ERROR 882(6)—Review— ESTOPPEL. Where evidence regarding the revocation of amination of plaintiff's witness, but nothing ina contract sued upon was elicited on cross-exdicated such testimony would be relied upon to establish matter outside the issues, plaintiff is not precluded from asserting that the pleadings did not raise the issue of revocation. 3. BROKERS 84(1)—ACTION FOR COMPENSATION-BURDEN OF PRoof. In a broker's action for commissions, de fendant has the burden of proving that the contract sued upon was revoked. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. § 104.] 4. BROKERS 44 CONTRACT FOR COMMISSION -REVOCATION. The principal's good faith is essential to his valid revocation of a contract for broker's commissions. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. § 45.] 5. BROKERS 88(1)—ACTION FOR COMPENSATION--JURY QUESTION. In a broker's action for commissions, the principal's good faith in revoking the contract sued upon held a jury question. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. §§ 128, 129.] Exceptions from Bennington County Court; F. M. Butler, Presiding Judge. Action by G. W. Bradley against Amos N. Blandin and the Somerset Land Company. Directed verdict for defendants, and plaintiff excepts. Reversed and remanded. Argued before MUNSON, C. J., and WATSON, HASELTON, POWERS, and TAYLOR, JJ. Batchelder & Bates, of Bennington, and F. C. Archibald, of Manchester Center, for plaintiff. C. C. Fitts and H. E. Eddy, both of Brattleboro, for defendants. POWERS, J.1 This plaintiff seeks to recover a commission on the sale of the softwood timber on a 12,000-acre tract of land in Bennington county called the Manchester Slope. A verdict was ordered for the defendants, and the case comes here on plaintiff's exceptions thereto. So far as here need be stated, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, fairly and reasonably tended to show the following facts: Early in the year 1910, the plaintiff and Blandin, who represented the Somerset Land Company, the owner of the land in question, met at Manchester and entered into an agreement that the defendants would pay the plaintiff a commission to the plaintiff if he sold the slope. The amount of this commission was not then agreed upon; but by the terms of the arrangement then entered into it was to become payable if the plaintiff effected | a sale of the land or timber, or any part thereof to George N. Ostrander, or to Finch, Pruyn & Co., whom he represented, or if a sale thereof was made through the efforts, in whole or in part of Ostrander or his company. In the latter part of May of the same year, Bradley and Blandin had another meeting at which it was agreed the commission was to be 22 per cent. of the purchase price. The plaintiff negotiated with Ostrander and expended time and money in the effort to sell the property to him or the company, but without success. In November and December, 1911, Blandin wrote the plaintiff several letters therein stating that "our property" and "the property" was not for sale; and there was evidence tending to show that these expressions had reference to all the lands of the Somerset Land Company, including the Manchester Slope. In the late fall of that year-the exact time did not appear-Blandin entered into an arrangement with Ostrander whereby the latter was to undertake to sell the property to outside parties on a commission basis. He first negotiated with the International Paper Company, but no sale resulted. He then took it up with the Rich Lumber Company, and ultimately, through Ostrander's efforts-in part, at least-a sale of the soft-wood lumber on the tract was made to that concern at $5.50 per 1,000 feet. It is agreed that the total amount of this sale was $62,500,000. The action of the court below in granting the defendant's motion for a verdict was predicated upon the view that the letters from Blandin to the plaintiff above referred to amounted to a valid revocation of the plaintiff's authority, and, inasmuch as he had not then earned his commission by completing a sale, he could recover nothing. 1 This case was originally assigned to Munson, C. J. [1, 2] But the question of revocation was not properly in the case. The defense stood upon the general issue alone. The doctrine of revocation implies that a valid contract of agency has been entered into, but has, prior to its performance by the agent, been terminated by the lawful act of the principal. It does not deny the contract relied upon, it avoids it. It is therefore an affirmative defense, and should have been specially set up in the answer. No. 90, Acts 1915, § 2. The verdict ordered, therefore, was upon an is sue not within the scope of the pleadings, and, although the evidence referred to was before the jury, it was to be applied only as it bore on the issues joined by the parties. Poole v. Mass. Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 75 Vt. 85, 53 Atl. 331; Griffin v. Martel, 77 Vt. 19, 58 Atl. 788; Probate Court v. Enright, 79 Vt. 416, 65 Atl. 530; Wells v. B. & M. Railroad, 82 Vt. 108, 71 Atl. 1103, 137 Am. St. Rep. 997. It is proper to say in this connection that the course of the trial below might have been such as to require us to hold that the plaintiff had waived his right to object to this line of evidence as outside the pleadings, and that the defense of revocation was available on this account. But the letters from Blandin came into the case during the cross-examination of the plaintiff, and there was nothing fairly indicating that they were to be relied upon as evidence of any affirmative defense not covered by the pleadings. In these circumstances, the plaintiff is not precluded from raising the question. [3-5] Moreover, even if the plaintiff had waived this point, it would not save the case. The burden of proof on the question of revocation was on the defendant. Bourke v. Van Keuren, 20 Colo. 95, 36 Pac. 882; Clements v. Stapleton, 136 Iowa, 137, 113 N. W. 546; Hartford v. McGillicuddy, 103 Me. 224, 68 Atl. 860, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 431, 12 Ann. Cas. 1083. And one of the essential elements of a valid revocation is the good faith of the principal. 4 R. C. L. 254; Branch v. Moore, 84 Ark. 462, 105 S. W. 1178, 120 Am. St. Rep. 78; Handley v. Shaffer, 177 Ala. 636, 59 South. 286. And see other cases collected in note to Alexander v. Sherwood Co. (W. Va.) 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) at page 987. This was a question of fact, and should have been submitted to the jury. Coolidge v. Ayers, 76 Vt. 405, 57 Atl. 970; Woodward v. Blanchard, 16 Ill. 430. It is not claimed that the agency of the plaintiff was terminated in any other way than by the letters, so we seek no further for a revocation. No objection was made below to the form of the defendants' motion, and, in view of this fact and the result reached, we have deemed it best to treat it as sufficient. Reversed and remanded. (91 Vt. 410) ed in accordance with a provision in the con VAN CLEVE v. EASTERN FRUIT & NUT tract itself, which was not acted under, and ORCHARD CO. 3. MASTER AND SERVANT 41(2) — ACTION tions of tort. so is immaterial here to be stated. [1] June 4, 1914, the general manager of the defendant gave the plaintiff a written notice to the effect that his services were no longer required, and that he was required to vacate the premises. No question is made as to the authority of the general manager in all that he did, and by this notice the defendant terminated the contract. Emack v. Hughes, 74 Vt. 382, 52 Atl. 1061; White v. Lumiere, etc., Co., 79 Vt. 206, 64 Atl. 1121, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 807. [2] The right of the plaintiff to the possession of the house occupied by him was an incident to the contract, and by the termination of the contract his right to the possession terminated and it was his duty to vacate the house in a reasonable time, and it is to be taken that such reasonable time was given him, since the plaintiff introduced no evidence that the time was unreasonable. The plaintiff testified that on June 16, 1914, the defendant's manager came with men and took some of the goods of the plaintiff and removed them from the house and took them along the highway for some distance, that it was raining at the time, and that by these doings the goods became wet and otherwise damaged. The plaintiff testified that there after on June 20, 1914, at about 4 o'clock in the morning, while he and his wife were in bed, the manager came with men and had the dining room and kitchen doors locked, and that about 7 o'clock of the same morning men in the employ of the defendant came back and removed from the kitchen some of the plaintiff's stuff, including the kitchen stove, and carried these things where the others already spoken of had been carried, and that these last suffered damage by the manner of their removal. [3] In charging the jury, the court, after enumerating various elements of damage in this action, added that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for whatever damage his furniture and other property may have suffered by reason of their removal from the house and premises in the way shown by the evidence. To the charge in respect of such damage as an element of recovery in this case the defendant specifically excepted, on the ground that if any such damage could be recovered at all, the recovery must be in an action of tort, and could not be had in this action of contract. This exception was well and clearly taken. The Practice Act, while it liberalizes proceedings in many respects, carefully preserves the distinction between actions of contract and actions of tort. By a contract dated January 31, 1914, the defendant, a corporation, employed the plaintiff as superintendent of an orchard and farm of the defendant. The plaintiff was to have a certain salary and the use of a house, part of a barn and a garden plot. Performance Whether the removal of the goods as they under the contract was to begin, and did were removed brought the proceedings within begin, April 1, 1914. The contract was to the purview of our statutes against forcible run for two years unless previously terminat-entry into lands and tenements counsel do not discuss, nor do we. Some minor ques- iff of Washington County. Petition distions have been somewhat argued, but any missed. such likely to arise on a new trial, were Argued before WATSON, C. J., and not so distinctly raised as to require their POWERS, TAYLOR, and discussion here. Judgment reversed, and case remanded. 2. STATUTES 181(2) CONSTRUCTION RULE. In construing statutes, a construction that leads to an absurd consequence must always be avoided, and to that end, when the true meaning can be ascertained from the context, words may be modified, altered, or supplied, to avoid absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 259, 263.] 3. STATUTES 206-CONSTRUCTION-RULE. In construing a statute, every part thereof must be considered, and effect given, if possible, to all of its provisions. HASELTON, MILES, JJ. Hale K. Darling, of Chelsea, for petitioner. Julius A. Willcox, of Ludlow, for petitionee. TAYLOR, J. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus, directed to the petitionee, as sheriff of Washington county, commanding him to draw the petit jurors for attendance upon the September term, 1917, of Washington county court, in the manner directed by P. S. 1469, as amended by No. 82, Acts of 1910, and from the names therein indicated. The controversy arises over an act of the General Assembly of 1917 relating to the drawing of jurors and establishing a jury commission (No. 76 of the Acts of 1917). The act, if valid, amends certain sections of the Public Statutes, and repeals others, relating to choosing, drawing, and summoning grand and petit jurors. Among other things the petition alleges, in substance, the passage by the Senate and House of Representatives of a certain bill, called House Bill 375, entitled "An act to amend certain sections of the Public Statutes relating to drawing grand and petit jurors and to establish a board of jury commissioners;" that as finally adopted by the General Assembly the bill contained the proviso, “But [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, nothing in this act shall affect the nominaCent. Dig. § 283.] tion, appointment, election, drawing, service 4. STATUTES 16(1)-CONSTRUCTION-CLER- or compensation of grand and petit jurors ICAL ERROR-"OR." Acts 1917, No. 76, establishing a board of jury commissioners and amending sections of the Public Statutes relating to drawing grand and petit jurors, when finally adopted by the General Assembly, contained a proviso that "nothing in this act shall affect the nomination, appointment, election, drawing, service or compensation of grand and netit jurors chosen, drawn 'and' summoned prior to the day on which this act takes effect." When signed by the presiding officers of the two houses, and subsequently approved by the Governor, in the proviso the word "or" had been substituted for the word "and," so that the proviso concluded "chosen, drawn 'or' summoned," etc. It is contended that by reason of this change the bill never became a law. Held that, as in the disjunctive sense the act would read "chosen or drawn or summoned," and as all the jurors affected by the act were "chosen" at the March meeting, prior to May 1st, the words "drawn or summoned" would have no force, but that, taken in the conjunctive sense, then only jurors who had been "chosen and drawn and summoned" are not affected by the act, thus removing the inconsistency, the substituted word "or" will be read "and," leaving no variance between the bill as passed by the General Assembly and that finally approved by the Governor, and the act is valid. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 14. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Or.] Petition for writ of mandamus by Melvin G. Morse against Frank H. Tracy, as Sher chosen, drawn and summoned prior to the day on which this act takes effect;" that through clerical error in preparing the bill to be presented to the Governor for his approval, the word "or" was substituted for the word "and," so that the bill as signed by the presiding officers of the two houses and subsequently approved by the Governor contained the proviso, "But nothing in this act shall affect the nomination, appointment, election, drawing, service or compensation of grand or petit jurors chosen, drawn or summoned prior to the day on which this act takes effect;" that the bill signed by the Governor was thereafter deposited in the office of the secretary of state, where it remains, having been published by him as No. 76 of the Acts of 1917; that the bill enacted by the General Assembly was never presented to the Governor, and never in fact approved by him. It is further alleged that, acting on the assumption that the bill as it had been presented to and signed by the Governor had become the law of the state, the assistant judg es and clerk of Washington county court, in which the petitioner has a cause pending and for trial by jury at the September Term, 1917, of said court, assuming to act as a board of jury commissioners under the provisions of said bill, on the 10th day of May, |