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Opinion of the Court.

States could treat all property within the Confederate lines as enemy's property, and in the exercise of their belligerent rights seize and appropriate to their own use any of it which could be of service to them in the prosecution of the war; and that the property which was most beneficial to the Confederacy in furnishing funds was cotton, and it was for that reason particularly sought by the national forces for capture. The Court of Claims recognized the doctrine, also, that the right of capture extended to the products of the soil, whether owned by citizens of the Confederacy or strangers to both belligerents, and that the capture of movable property within the Confederacy transferred the title when reduced to firm possession; and it therefore held that when the cotton for the proceeds of which this action is brought was captured by the national forces and sold and the proceeds paid into the treasury of the United States, the title to the property and proceeds passed absolutely to the general government.

This decision of the Court of Claims would have been correct, and been sustained, had the government of the United States confined its action simply to the enforcement of its rightful powers as a belligerent, and had not surrendered its rights as a belligerent to appropriate property of a particular kind taken in the enemy's country, belonging to a loyal citizen. In Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch, 110, 122, 123, the court said that it was conceded that war gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found, and observed that the mitigations of this rigid rule, which the humane and wise policy of modern times had introduced into practice, might more or less affect the exercise of this right, but could not impair the right itself.

Substantially the same thing was said in Young v. United States, 97 U. S. 39, 60: "All property," was the language of the court in that case," within enemy territory is in law enemy property, just as all persons in the same territory are enemies. A neutral, owning property within the enemy's lines, holds it as enemy property, subject to the laws of war; and, if it is hostile property, subject to capture."

Opinion of the Court.

But in another case, that of Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 404, 419, this court said that "this rule, as to property on land, has received very important qualifications from usage, from the reasonings of enlightened publicists, and from judicial decisions. It may now be regarded as substantially restricted to special cases dictated by the necessary operation of the war,' and as excluding, in general, the seizure of the private property of pacific persons for the sake of gain.""

The circumstances in which the late war originated, and the fact that within the Confederate lines there were multitudes of people who were sincerely attached to the government of the Union and desired its success, gave ample reason to the Federal government for a modification of the harsh rules of war in regard to the capture of property on land, so as not to bring within the same calamity friend and foe. It was a desire to ameliorate as much as possible the exercise of the necessary belligerent right of capture of property within the rebel lines, in its application to the property of persons thus friendly to the Union, so far as cotton was concerned, which led to the passage of the Captured and Abandoned Property Act of March, 1863, and the subsequent amendments thereto.

Cotton was considered the great means of procuring supplies for the Confederate government. It is well known to have been its chief reliance for the purchase of arms and other munitions of war abroad; indeed, without this resource, the Confederacy would have been deprived of its greatest means of obtaining the necessary supplies to continue the struggle. As said by this court in the case of Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 420, cited above, no principle of equity or just policy required, when the national occupation was itself precarious, that it should be spared from capture and allowed to remain, in case of the withdrawal of the Union troops, an element of strength to the rebellion.

The act of Congress of March 12, 1863, providing for the collection of abandoned and captured property in the insurrectionary territory, (12 Stat. 820, c. 120,) declared that all such property might be appropriated to the public use or sold. But it also said, in substance, that the property of friend and foe

Opinion of the Court.

cannot at the time be separated; and all the property of that kind found within the Confederate lines will be taken, sold, and when sold its proceeds will be deposited in the Treasury; but if afterwards within two years after the suppression of the rebellion the owner can establish to the satisfaction of the Court of Claims his title to the property thus taken, and his loyalty to the Union cause, then the portion of the proceeds belonging to him shall be restored, after deducting the expenses attendant upon its capture, removal and custody. United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 67.

Under this act immense amounts of property belonging to citizens of the United States, who sincerely mourned the origin of the Confederacy, and longed for the re-establishment of the national government, and who kept faith in their hearts through the whole of the long struggle, were accounted for and the proceeds restored to the rightful owners; and certainly it must be regarded as a most beneficent act on the part of the general government. The records of the Court of Claims show a multitude of cases where this law has been administered, and many loyal people have had the proceeds of their property returned to them, which had been captured because of the fact that it was situated within hostile territory.

In the present case, the petitioner was allowed the same right to present his claim for the proceeds of the property belonging to his testator which would have been allowed if the testator himself had presented his claim within two years after the capture. The question was as to the loyalty of the testator of the claimant, and also as to his ownership of the cotton. His loyalty was found by the court, and also the bona fides of the sale of the property. After these facts had been established the only question that could have been properly considered was the amount of the proceeds which the petitioner should receive. That was not considered by the Court of Claims.

In passing the act, Congress considered that a question might arise whether the transaction between Morehead and Briggs constituted a sale, or an assignment by way of mortgage, although it purports to be a sale and transfer. The act pro

Statement of the Case.

vides that if the transaction was intended only as security for indebtedness and against contingent liabilities, only such portion of the proceeds should be awarded to the petitioner as would satisfy the debts and claims of the testator, to secure which the assignment, as it is termed in the act, was made. The case, therefore, will be

Reversed, and sent back to the Court of Claims, with instructions to pass upon the question whether the transaction was an absolute sale or merely a mortgage or pledge; and according to the view adopted the amount of the proceeds due and payable to the petitioner should be ascertained, and it is so ordered.

NEBRASKA v. IOWA.

ORIGINAL.

No. 4. Original. Argued January 29, 1892. - Decided February 29, 1892.

When grants of land border on running water, and the banks are changed by the gradual process known as accretion, the riparian owner's boundary line still remains the stream; but when the boundary stream suddenly abandons its old bed and seeks a new course by the process known as avulsion, the boundary remains as it was, in the centre of the old channel: and this rule applies to a State when a river forms one of its boundary lines.

The law of accretion controls on the Missouri River, as elsewhere; but the change in the course of that river in 1877 between Omaha and Council Bluffs does not come within the law of accretion, but within that of avulsion.

THE Court stated the case as follows:

This is an original suit brought in this court by the State of Nebraska against the State of Iowa, the object of which is to have the boundary line between the two States determined. Iowa was admitted into the Union in 1846, and its western boundary as defined by the act of admission was the middle. of the main channel of the Missouri River. Nebraska was ad

Opinion of the Court.

mitted in 1867, and its eastern boundary was likewise the middle of the channel of the Missouri River. Between 1851 and 1877, in the vicinity of Omaha, there were marked changes in the course of this channel, so that in the latter year it occupied a very different bed from that through which it flowed in the former year. Out of these changes has come this litigation, the respective States claiming jurisdiction over the same tract of land. To the bill filed by the State of Nebraska the State of Iowa answered, alleging that this disputed ground was part of its territory, and also filed a crossbill, praying affirmative relief, establishing its jurisdiction thereof, to which cross-bill the State of Nebraska answered. Replications were duly filed and proofs taken.

Mr. J. M. Woolworth for the State of Nebraska. Mr. C. J. Greene and the Attorney General of that State were with him on the brief, in which were cited Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U. S. 178; 8 Opinions Attorneys General, 177; Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479.

Mr. Smith McPherson for the State of Iowa. The Attorney General of that State and Mr. J. J. Stewart were with him on the brief, in which were cited St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U. S. 226; Mulry v. Norton, 100 N. Y. 424.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.

It is settled law, that when grants of land border on running water, and the banks are changed by that gradual process known as accretion, the riparian owner's boundary line still remains the stream, although, during the years, by this accretion, the actual area of his possessions may vary. In New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 717, this court said: "The question is well settled at common law, that the person whose land is bounded by a stream of water which changes its course gradually by alluvial formations, shall still hold by the same boundary, including the accumulated soil. No other rule can be applied on just principles. Every pro

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