INDEX.

ACCRETION.

See RIPARIAN OWNER.

ALASKA.

See BEHRING SEA;

JURISDICTION, D, 1, 3, 4.

ALIEN IMMIGRANT.

The act of February 26, 1885, "to prohibit the importation and migration
of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor
in the United States, its Territories, and the District of Columbia,” 23
Stat. 332, c. 164, does not apply to a contract between an alien, resid-
ing out of the United States, and a religious society incorporated under
the laws of a State, whereby he engages to remove to the United States
and to enter into the service of the society as its rector or minister.
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 457.

APPEAL.

See BEHRING SEA.

APPURTENANCE.

An appurtenance is that which belongs to or is connected with something
else to which it is subordinate or less worthy, and with which it passes
as an incident; and in strict legal sense land can never be appurtenant
to land. New Orleans Pacific Railway Co. v. Parker, 42.

See RAILROAD, 1, 3.

AVULSION.

See RIPARIAN OWNER.

BEHRING SEA.

At a time when a diplomatic correspondence was going on between the
United States and Great Britain respecting the extent of the jurisdic-
tion of the former in the waters of Behring Sea, a libel in admiralty
was filed in the District Court of Alaska, alleging a seizure by the

711

United States authorities of a vessel "within the limits of Alaska Ter-
ritory, and in the waters thereof and within the civil and judicial Dis-
trict of Alaska, to wit: within the waters of that portion of Behring
Sea belonging to the United States and said district, on waters navi-
gable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden," and charg
ing that "the said vessel and her captain, officers and crew were then
and there found engaged in killing fur seals within the limits of Alaska
Territory and in the said waters thereof, in violation," etc. The find-
ings of fact followed this description, and described the act complained
of as done "within the waters of Alaska." No request was made to
have the findings made more specific as to the place where the offence
was committed. The vessel being condemned, the claimants appealed
to this court. The appeal was duly entered and docketed, and was
then dismissed on application of the appellant, who applied for leave
to file an application for a writ of prohibition to restrain the court
below from enforcing the sentence or the decree of condemnation.
Leave being granted, the petition was filed, and it is now Held,
(1) That the legal inference from the findings of fact is, that the act took
place within the jurisdiction of the United States;

(2) That an appeal lay to this court from the decree of the District Court;
(3) That, the District Court having found the facts, this court would be

limited, on appeal, to the consideration of the questions of law pre-
sented by the record;

(4) That the District Court on the pleadings and facts found had jurisdic-
tion of the case, and the petitioner might have prosecuted an appeal;
and that the appeal taken was insufficient for petitioner's purposes,
because of his neglect to have included in the findings the exact
locality of the seizure;

(5) That for this reason the writ of prohibition should not issue: the
court resting its denial of it on this ground, although it might have
placed it upon the well settled principle that an application to a court
to review the action of the political department of the government,
upon a question pending between it and a foreign power, and to deter-
mine whether the government was right or wrong, made while diplo-
matic negotiations are still going on, should be denied. In re Cooper,
472.

BILL OF REVIEW.

See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 1.

BOUNDARY.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 13;

EQUITY, 3;

JURISDICTION, B, 7.

CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY.

See REBELLION, 3.

CASES AFFIRMED.

1. As the bill of exceptions does not purport to contain all the evidence,
and as no request was made for a finding of fact as to the actual fact
of the killing of the seals and the seizure of the vessel, the rulings in
Ex parte Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, are decisive of this case, and it is
followed. The Sylvia Handy, 513.

2. The case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, reviewed and adhered to, and
its application in cases decided in the state courts considered. Budd
v. New York, 517.

3. Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. 224, cited and followed. Hoyt v.
Latham, 553.

See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 2;

MAILS, TRANSPORTATION OF;
STATUTE, B, 1.

CASES DISTINGUISHED OR EXPLAINED.

1. Ex parte Dubuque & Pacific Railroad, 1 Wall. 69, distinguished from
this case. Smale v. Mitchell, 99.

2. The decision in Chicago &c. Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418
explained. Budd v. New York, 517.

3. United States v. Langston, 118 U. S. 389, distinguished from this case.
Dunwoody v. United States, 578.

CHARGE TO THE JURY.

When the trial court has, in its general charge, given the substance of in-
structions requested, there is no error in refusing to give them in the
language requested. Erie Railroad Co. v. Winter, 60.

CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.

See JURISDICTION, B, 3.

CITIZEN.

See NATURALIZATION.

COMMON CARRIER.

1. Passengers on railroad trains are not presumed or required to know the
rules and regulations of the company, made for the guidance of its
conductors and employés, as to its own internal affairs. Erie Railroad
Co. v. Winter, 60.

2. Plaintiff bought a ticket in Boston entitling him to a passage over de-
fendant's road. At the time he informed the ticket agent of his wish

to stop off at the Olean station, and was then told by the agent that
he would have to speak to the conductor about that. Between Bing-
hamton and Olean the plaintiff informed the conductor that he wished
to stop over at Olean and the conductor, instead of giving him a stop-
over ticket, punched his ticket and told him that was sufficient to give
him the right to stop over at Olean, and afterwards to use the punched
ticket between Olean and Salamanca. He made the stop, and taking
another train to Salamanca, presented the punched ticket, informing
the conductor of what had taken place. The conductor refused to
take it and demanded full fare. The payment of this being refused
the conductor stopped the train at the next station and ejected him
from it, using such force as was necessary. Held, (1) That he was
rightfully on the train at the time of his expulsion; (2) That the con-
ductor had no right to put him off for not paying his fare; (3) That
the company was liable for the act of the conductor; (4) That the
passenger had a right to refuse to be ejected from the train, and to
make a sufficient resistance to being put off to denote that he was be-
ing removed against his will by compulsion; (5) That the fact that
under such circumstances he was put off the train was, of itself, a good
cause of action against the company, irrespective of any physical in-
jury he might have then received, or which was caused thereby. Erie
Railroad Co. v. Winter, 60.

See EVIDENCE, 3.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

A. OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. Section 3894 of Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of September
19, 1890, 26 Stat. 465, c. 908, which provides that "no letter, postal
card or circular concerning any lottery
drawings at any lottery

and no list of the
and no lottery ticket or part thereof
. . shall be carried in the mail, or delivered at or through any
post-office, or branch thereof, or by any letter-carrier "; and that no
newspaper "containing any advertisement of any lottery" "shall be
carried in the mail, or delivered by any postmaster or letter-carrier ”;
and that "any person who shall knowingly deposit or cause to be
deposited . . . anything to be conveyed or delivered by mail in
violation of this section
shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and on conviction shall be punished by a fine of not more
than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
year," is a constitutional exercise of the power conferred upon Congress
by Article I, sec. 8 of the Constitution, to establish post-offices and
post-roads, and does not abridge "the freedom of speech or of the

press," within the meaning of Amendment I to the Constitution. In
re Rapier, 110.

2. An ordinance of a city, imposing, pursuant to a Statute of the State, a
license tax, for the business of running any horse or steam railroad for
the transportation of passengers, does not impair the obligation of a
contract, made before the passage of the statute, by which the city sold
to a railroad company for a large price the right of way and franchise
for twenty-five years to run a railroad over certain streets and accord-
ing to certain regulations, and the company agreed to pay to the city
annually a real estate tax, and the city bound itself not to grant, dur-
ing the same period, a right of way to any other railroad company over
the same streets. New Orleans City & Lake Railroad Co. v. New
Orleans, 192.

3. Sec. 3894, Rev. Stat. as amended by the act of September 19, 1890, 26
Stat. 465, c. 908, is constitutional, under the decision in Ex parte
Rapier, 143 U. S. 110. Horner v. United States, No. 1, 207.

4. The statute of New York of May 26, 1881, (Laws of 1881, c. 361,)
imposing a tax upon the corporate franchise or business of every cor-
poration, joint-stock company or association incorporated or organized
under any law of the State or of any other State or country, to be com-
puted by a percentage upon its whole capital stock, and to be ascer-
tained in the manner provided by the act, when applied to a manufactur-
ing corporation organized under the laws of Utah, and doing the greater
part of its business out of the State of New York, and paying taxes in
Illinois and Utah, but doing a small part of its business in the State of
New York, does not tax persons or property not within the State; nor
regulate interstate commerce; nor take private property without just
compensation; nor deny to the corporation the equal protection of
the laws; nor impose a tax beyond the constitutional power of the
State: and the remedy of the corporation against hardship and injus-
tice, if any has been suffered, must be sought in the legislature of the
State. Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 305.

5. The cases respecting state taxation of foreign corporations reviewed. Ib.
6. The act of the legislature of Michigan of June 28, 1889, (Public Laws of
1889, pp. 282,283,) fixing the amount per mile to be charged by rail-
ways for the transportation of a passenger, violates no provision in the
Constitution of the United States, so far as disclosed by the record in
this case.
Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Wellman, 339.
7. A legislature has power to fix rates for the transportation of passengers
by railways, and the extent of judicial interference is protection against
unreasonable rates. Ib.

8. Courts should be careful not to declare legislative acts unconstitutional
upon agreed and general statements, and without the fullest disclosure
of all material facts. Ib.

9. Whenever, in the pursuance of an honest antagonistic assertion of rights
there is presented a question involving the validity of any act of any