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legislature, State or Federal, and the decision necessarily rests on the
competency of the legislature to so enact, the court must determine
whether the act be constitutional or not; but it never was the thought
that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could
transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the leg.
islative act. 16.
10. An act of the legislature of New York (Laws of 1888, chap. 581) pro-
vided that the maximum charge for elevating, receiving, weighing and
discharging grain should not exceed five-eighths of one cent a bushel;
and that, in the process of handling grain by means of floating and
stationary elevators, the lake vessels or propellers, the ocean vessels or
steamships, and canal boats, should only be required to pay the actual
cost of trimming or shovelling to the leg of the elevator when unload-
ing, and trimming cargo when loading; Held, that the act was a legit-
imate exercise of the police power of the State over a business affected
with a public interest, and did not violate the Constitution of the
United States, and was valid. Budd v. New York, 517.
11. Although the act of New York did not apply to places having less than
130,000 population, it did not deprive persons owning elevators in
places of 130,000 population or more, of the equal protection of the
12. Although it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without his consent, that principle has no
application to a suit by one government against another government.
United States v. Texas, 621.
13. The exercise by this court of original jurisdiction in a suit brought by
one State against another to determine the boundary line between
them, or in a suit brought by the United States against a State to
determine the boundary between a Territory of the United States and
that State, so far from infringing, in either case, upon the sovereignty,
is with the consent of the State sued. 16.
14. The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by
the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an
official attestation by the two Houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress; and when the bill thus attested receives the approval of the
President, and is deposited in the Department of State according to
law, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress is complete
and unimpeachable. Field v. Clark, 649.
15. It is not competent to show from the journals of either House of
Congress, that an act so authenticated, approved and deposited, did
not pass in the precise form in which it was signed by the presiding
officers of the two uses and approved by the sident. 16.
16. Congress cannot, under the Constitution, delegate its legislative power
to the President. 16.
17. The authority conferred upon the President by section 3 of the act of
October 1, 1890, to reduce the revenue and equalize duties on imports,
and for other purposes, 26 Stat. c. 1244, pp. 567, 612, to suspend by
proclamation the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and
hides, when he is satisfied that any country producing such articles
nposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other prod-
ucts of the United States, which he may deem to be reciprocally
unequal or unreasonable, is not open to the objection that it unconsti-
tutionally transfers legislative power to the President, (FULLER, C. J.,
and Lamar, J., dissenting ;) but even if it were it does not follow that
other parts of the act imposing duties upon imported articles, are
18. The court does not decide whether the provision in that act respecting
bounties upon sugar (schedule E, Sugar, 26 Stat. 583) is or is not con-
stitutional, because it is plain from the act that these bounties do not
constitute a part of the system of customs duties imposed by the act,
and it is clear that the parts of the act imposing such duties would
remain in force even if these bounties were held to be unconstitution-
ally imposed. 16.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, 7;
JURISDICTION, B, 6;
TAX AND TAXATION, 2.
In the interpretation of any particular clause of a contract, the court is not
only at liberty, but required, to examine the entire contract, and may
also consider the relations of the parties, their connection with the
subject matter of the contract, and the circumstances under which it
was made. Chicago, Rock Island &c. Railway v. Denver $ Rio Grande
See NATIONAL BOARD OF HEALTH; Rebellion, 1, 2;
TAX AND TAXATION, 2, 3.
See Local Law.
See JURISDICTION, C, 1.
COURT AND JURY.
See CHARGE TO THE JURY;
MINERAL LAND, 1 (3).
1. Under $ 3894 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of Sep-
mailed at the city of New York, and addressed there to a person in
Illinois, to be delivered to such person in Illinois, by mail, and an
indictment for so doing is triable in Illinois. Horner v. United States,
No. 1, 207.
2. At common law it was deemed essential in capital cases that inquiry be
made of the defendant before judgment was passed whether he had
anything to say why sentence of death should not be pronounced upon
him; thus giving him an opportunity to allege any ground of arrest,
or to plead a pardon if he had obtained one, or to urge any legal
objection to further proceedings against him. And if the record did
not show that such privilege was accorded to him the judgment would
be reversed. Schwab v. Berggren, 442.
3. This rule, however, does not apply to an appellate court, which, upon
review of the proceedings in the trial court, merely affirms a final
judgment, without rendering a new one. Due process of law does not
require his presence in the latter court at the time the judgment sen-
tencing him to death is affirmed. 16.
4. Neither the statutes of Illinois nor due process of law, require that the
accused, upon the affirmance of the judgment sentencing him to death,
shall be sentenced anew by the trial court. The judgment is not
vacated by the writ of error; only its execution is stayed pending pro-
ceedings in the appellate court. 16.
5. The time and place of executing the sentence of death is not strictly
part of the judgment unless made so by statute. 16.
6. The governor of Illinois has power under the constitution of that State,
to commute the punishment of death to imprisonment for life in the
7. F. was convicted of murder, in the Criminal Court of Cook County,
Illinois, and sentenced by that court to suffer the penalty of death.
Upon writ of error to the Supreme Court of Ilinois, that judgment
was affirmed and the day fixed in the original judgment for carrying
the sentence into execution having passed, that court fixed another
day. After the expiration of the term the accused applied for a cor-
rection of the record of the Supreme Court, so as to show that he was
not present in that court when the original judgment was affirmed,
and another day fixed for the execution. The application was denied
upon the ground, in part, that amendments of the record of the court
in derogation of the final judgment could not be allowed at a subse-
quent term. Held, (1) That the law of Illinois, as declared by its
highest court, in respect to amendments of the record, was applicable
to all persons within the jurisdiction of that State, and its enforce-
ment against the plaintiff in error was not a denial to him by the State
of the eqnal protection of the laws; (2) That due process of law did
not require the presence of the accused in the appellate court when
the original judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and a new day
fixed for his execution. Fielden v. Illinois, 452.
See ConstitUTIONAL LAW, A, 17, 18; STATUTE, B, 4.
See EQUITY, 1.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
1. Section 354 of Rev. Stat. Dist. Columb., providing that“no person shall
be appointed to office, or hold office in the police force [of the District
of Columbia] who cannot read and write the English language, or who
is not a citizen of the United States, or who shall ever have been in-
dicted and convicted of crime; and no person shall be appointed as
policeman or watchman who has not served in the army or navy of
the United States and received an honorable discharge” was repealed
by the act of June 11, 1878, “providing a permanent form of govern-
ment for the District of Columbia.” 20 Stat. 102, c. 180. District of
Columbia v. Hutton, 18.
2. Eckloff v. District of Columbia, 135 U. S. 240, affirmed as to the point
that the act of June 11, 1878, 20 Stat. 102, c. 180, supplied to the Dis-
trict of Columbia for the first time a permanent form of governinent
in the nature of a constitution. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, C, 2.
1. A decree in a suit in equity found that T., an individual defendant, and
one of a plain defect of equity jurisdiction, under & 723 of the Revised
Statutes; (2) The decree was not outside of the case made by the bill,
but gave relief agreeable to it, under the prayer for general relief; (3)
The evidence sustained the decree, and the report of a master, finding
in favor of the plaintiff the facts on which the decree was based, was
not excepted to by T. Tyler v. Savage, 79.
2. A court of equity will not aid a party whose application is destitute of
conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence, but will discourage
stale demands, for the peace of society, by refusing to interfere
where there has been gross laches in prosecuting rights, or where long
acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights has occurred; and in
these respects each case must be governed by its own circumstances.
Hammond v. Hopkins, 224.
8. A suit in equity being appropriate for determining the boundary between