CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OCTOBER TERM, 1883. (110 U. S. 296) WHITESIDE v. HASELTON and others. (January 28, 1884.) RES JUDICATA-PURCHASERS PENDENTE LITE - CORPORATION ORGANIZED IN ANOTHER STATE. - A decree settling the title to real estate is conclusive, in any subsequent litiga tion, upon all parties, privies, and purchasers pendente lite; and a corporation which purchases from its president lands which are in litigation in a suit to which he is a party, is not exonerated from the burden of this rule by the fact that it is organized under the laws of a different state. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Wm. H. De Witt, for appellant. George Norris, for appellees. MILLER, J. The suit in this case was brought originally in the chancery court of Marion county, Tennessee, by V. A. Gaskill and his wife, who is now the appellant, H. L. Whiteside. The defendants were J. C. Haselton, the Bartow Iron Company, of which he was president, James P. Boyce, and in his own right and as executor of Ker Boyce, deceased. The principal allegation of the bill with which we have to deal is that plaintiffs, in right of the wife, were the owners of one undivided half of certain mines, known as the Vulcan coal mines; that the half interest of plaintiffs was leased for five years to Badge and Eaton, against whom they had recovered judgments for rent unpaid, and that J. C. Haselton and the Bartow Iron Company had obtained possession of said mine, and were operating the same, and refused to recognize plaintiffs' title to the land or interest in the mine, and were confederating with Badge and Eaton to defraud plaintiffs of their lien on the tools, implements and machinery used in mining, and to keep them out of possession of the property. These mines are situated on section 3, township 2, range 6, and plaintiffs, conceding the title of Haselton, or of the Bartow Iron Company, under him, to the other undivided half of this land, pray for a partition, for an account of the rents, and for general relief, and for a temporary injunction, appointment of a receiver, etc. The case was removed, on the petition of Haselton and the Bartow Iron Company, into the circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of Tennessee, where, after a hearing on the merits, the bill of the plaintiffs was dismissed. A motion was made in this court to dismiss the appeal from that decree on the ground that the amount in controversy does not exceed $5,000. There being no distinct statement anywhere in the record of the value of the property in controversy, the parties were permitted to file affidavits here on that subject. Appellant has accordingly produced the affidavit of R. L. Watkins, who swears he knows the property well, and that the undivided half interest in it claimed by appellant is worth over $5,000, and was so when when the suit was brought, aside from the $2,500 for rents claimed by her. The examination of the record makes this very probable, and, as there is no denial on oath of this affidavit, we think the amount in controversy is sufficiently proved to be over $5,000. The Bartow Iron Company answers the bill,-the answer being sworn to by Haselton as its president,and asserts its ownership of the mine, and of the entire quarter section in which it is found, by purchase from Haselton; and it denies that plaintiffs have any interest whatever in the same. Haselton also answers and alleges that he was the owner of the property when he sold and conveyed the same to the Bartow Company, and that the plaintiffs have no interest in it. He gives a history of the title and previous litigation about it, which, in the view we take of the case, is unimportant. Upon this issue mainly the case was heard. Much evidence was introduced and is found in the record in the way of depositions, deeds, other suits, decrees, etc. The common source of title was Erasmus Alley, who, in 1859, conveyed the land in dispute, with many other tracts, to J. Holmes Agnew and James C. Haselton. It embraced a thousand acres and many distinct tracts. In the registration of the deed the south-east quarter of section 3 was omitted, as it is supposed, by accident. It is under this deed that appellant has for years claimed to own the undivided half of the land, and was in possession when the lease to Badge and Eaton was made. Other interests, however, intervened, and the question of innocent purchasers, without notice, embarrasses the case in some of its aspects. But on the trial there was introduced, by agreement of the parties, the record of a suit about this same land and the same title in the state chancery court of Hamilton county, or so much of that record as is necessary to this case. That suit was brought by Gaskill and wife, December 5, 1874, against Badge, Eaton, Haselton, and others, prior to the conveyance by Haselton to the Bartow Iron Company, and as there was a decree in favor of plaintiffs, it is relied on as conclusive of their rights in this suit against Haselton and the Bartow Company. We are unable to see why it should not be so. It was, like the present suit, a bill in chancery to enforce the lien of the plaintiffs for rents under the lease of plaintiffs to Badge and Eaton. Haselton was made a defendant there, as he is here, on the ground that he had induced Badge and Eaton to recognize his claim, and was confederating with them to defraud plaintiffs out of their rents. Plaintiffs in that suit asserted title to an undivided half of the mine, and of the quarter section on which it is located. Haselton in his answer denied any interest in plaintiffs in the land. He gave an exhibit of the title, whereby he asserted it to be in himself, or nearly all of it, and admitted that he held Badge and Eaton accountable to himself for rents of the property. After full hearing, and on the exhibits as to title and other evidence, the court rendered a decree in favor of plaintiffs. This decree was rendered on the fifteenth day of December, 1876. It says: "This cause came on to be heard on the original, amended, and supplemental bills, exhibits thereto attached, and the answers and exhibits thereto attached, and the proofs and other exhibits in the cause, and from all which it appears to the court, and the court adjudges and decrees, that plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed in their bill: that the title to the lands embraced by the terms of the lease, (Exhibit A,) to complainants' original bill, and described in the deed from E. Alley to H. L. Whiteside, dated twenty-sixth April, 1870, (Exhibit A,) is and was at that date in complainant Whiteside, and superior to the title of the defendants, and that she was on that day * * * in actual possession of said land and premises. * * * And it further appearing to the court that the said lease of June 1, 1870, has expired during the proceedings of this litigation, and that the defendants, Badge and Eaton, decline and refuse to demand or accept a renewal lease, as provided for in said Exhibit A, and it further appearing, pending this litigation, the said defendants Badge and Eaton have combined and confederated with defendant J. C. Haselton to injure and defraud complainants, and to carry into effect such object, delivered over into custody and possession of J. C. Haselton the said leasehold premises, who now, in violation of the rights of complainants, is holding and claiming possession of the same, illegally and wrongfully: The chancellor, therefore, upon this branch of the case, and in view of the whole case, declares that the said complainants recover from the defendants the possession of all said leasehold premises, including said Vulcan mines, and the property thereon mentioned in said Exhibit A, to be returned to complainant H. L. Whiteside at the termination of said lease, to-wit, all the buildings, houses, tramways, tracks, entries, and approaches to said mines and upon said lands, the same having, with the mines and leasehold premises, been agreed and covenanted by defendants Badge and Eaton to be delivered up in good condition to complainant H. L. Whiteside at the expiration of said lease, and a writ of possession will issue, upon demand of complainants, by the clerk and master of this court, to put complainants in the peaceable, and quiet, undisturbed possession of the same, and as to all said property the injunction in this cause is made absolute." Here was an issue raised between Mrs. Whiteside and Haselton as to the title to this property,-the same issue and the same title now in question. It was necessary in that case that it should be decided, for if the plaintiff had no title to the land she had no right to recover, and the decree in her favor is that she had such title; that it was paramount or superior to that of defendants, including Haselton; and as by fraudulent confederacy of the lessees with Haselton the latter had possession, a decree for its restoration to plaintiffs was made. That such a decree is, if the court had jurisdiction to render it, which cannot be questioned, conclusive upon the parties before the court, is not doubted. Until reversed, set aside, or annulled by some appropriate judicial proceeding, it concludes Haselton and his privies. To this it is objected that the suit was between Badge and Eaton and Mrs. Whiteside, as landlord and tenant, and could not bind Haselton. The answer is, that Haselton had induced Badge and Eaton to acknowledge his title and deny plaintiff's, and when sued and brought into court he accepted the issue, denied plaintiff's title, and asserted his own, and his right to the allegiance of the tenants. On that issue of title the decree was clear and full against him, and he must abide by it. It is argued that he does not bind the Bartow Iron Company, who were innocent purchasers from Haselton. But they bought pendente lite, and, by the well-known rule on that subject, are bound by this decree. The suit was commenced December 5, 1874, Haselton's answer filed April 14, 1875, and the deed, though without date, from Haselton to the company, is acknowledged September 8, 1875. It is apparent, also, that during all the time Haselton was president of the Bartow Iron Company. The fact that the corporation was organized under the laws of another state does not, under these circumstances, relieve it from the rule which governs purchasers of property pending litigation about the title. We are of opinion that, as this case is presented to us, the decree of the chancery court of Hamilton county, Tennessee, is conclusive of the rights of all the parties to this suit. The decree of the circuit court is therefore reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. COOK v. SANDUSKY TOOL Co. (January 21, 1884.) PATENTS FOR INVENTION-ANTICIPATION. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio. Geo. H. Howard and H. E. Paine, for appellant. M. D. Leggett and L. L. Leggett, for appellee. WAITE, C. J. The decree in this case is affirmed. If the hoe made by the tool company infringes the patent of the appellant, it was an anticipation of the invention, and the patent is void, for the testimony leaves no doubt whatever in our minds that the company made and sold their hoes long before the date of the invention patented. If it is not an anticipation it is not an infringement. Affirmed. (110 U. S. 215) VINAL v. WEST VIRGINIA OIL & OIL LAND Co. (January 21, 1884.) PARTNERSHIP-ACTION BY PArtner. One partner cannot recover his share of a debt due to the partnership in an action at law, prosecuted in his own name alone, against the debtor. John A. Hutchinson, for plaintiff in error. N. Goff, Jr., for defendant in error. WAITE, C. J. This judgment is affirmed. One partner cannot recover his share of a debt due to the partnership in an action at law, prosecuted in his own name alone, against the debtor. That is the only question presented by the bill of exceptions in this case. The refusal of the court below to grant a new trial is not reviewable here. Affirmed. (110 U. S. 301) ILLINOIS CENT. R. Co. v. TURRILL, Adm'x, etc. MICHIGAN S. & N. I. R. Co. v. SAME. (January 28, 1884.) 1. PATENTS FOR Invention-INTEREST ON JUDGMENT-Error in AMOUNT OF DAMAGES. Where upon appeal from a decree awarding damages to a patentee for the infringement of his patent the case was sent back to a master to readjust the damages by making certain deductions, held, that the plaintiff was entitled to interest upon the corrected amounts from the time of the master's report. 2. SAME SURVIVAL OF ACTION-DEATH OF PATENTEE. A cause of action for the infringement of a patent survives, upon the death of the patentee, to his representatives. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. Geo. Payson, for railroad companies. Chauncey Smith and L. L. Bond, for administratrix. WAITE, C. J. The effect of the judgments in these cases, when here on the former appeals, as reported under the name of The Cawood Patent, 94 U. S. 695, was to affirm the decrees then appealed from, so far as they charged these appellants respectively with the profits made from the use of the infringing machines known as the "Illinois Central," the "Etheridge," and the "Whitcomb," and to reverse as to the profits made by the use of the "Bayonet Vise," the "Michigan Southern," and the "Beebee & Smith," which were adjudged to be non-infringing machines. The total amount of profits arising from the use of all the machines, infringing and non-infringing, was settled, and the judgment of the courts was that the profits had properly been estimated by comparing the cost of mending on the machines with the cost of mending on a common anvil. This was found to be about 36 cents per foot mended in favor of the machines. Page 709. Nothing was left open for further inquiry but the amounts of the former recoveries for the use of the non-infringing machines. It was quite right, therefore, for the circuit court, when the cases went back, to direct the master to ascertain from the old evidence, if possible, and, if not, from new, how much should be deducted from the old decrees on account of the erroneous recoveries. The true way of determining this clearly was to find out what part of the profits for which the original decrees were rendered had been made by the use of the non-infringing machines. This the master attempted to do, and in the case of the Illinois Central company there is no doubt in our minds that the conclusion he reached was entirely correct. In fact, we do not understand that this is disputed. It is argued that a sufficient allowance was not made in the accounting for cut rails, but that question was settled by the original decree, and could not be re-examined on this reference. The inquiry now is limited to the amount of mending done by the use of the non-infringing machines and its comparative cost. In the case of the Michigan Southern & Northern Indiana Company, the evidence is not as satisfactory as in that of the Illinois Central. The shop books in which the accounts for repairing rails were kept, if kept at all, were not produced, and had probably been destroyed as of no value before the accounting took place. In their absence it is difficult to determine with accuracy what the facts were, but upon full consideration we are satisfied the circuit court did not in its decree underestimate the amount of deduction to be made in favor of this company. In making up the decree interest was added from the date of the master's report on the balances found due after |