4. The Executor and Relations of the deceased.

5. The Judges.

6. Members of the Bar.

7. The Officers of the High Court of Chancery.

8. The Governor and Council. 9. Other Officers of Government. 10. The Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council of the City of Richmond. 11. Citizens.'

"Need it be said, that the crowd which assembled in the capitol was uncommonly numerous, and respectable? After the delivery of a funeral oration by Mr. Munford, a member of the executive council, the procession set out towards the church, -It is no disparangement to the virtues of the living, to assert, that there is not perhaps another man in Virginia, whom the same solemn procession would have attended to his grave."

BETWEEN

WILLIAM FARRAR, plaintiff,

AND

FRANCIS JACKSON, defendant.

1. Slaves-Bill to Recover-Statute of Limitations.—

Statute of limitations pleaded to a bill by heir in tail to recover a slave, her increase and their profits. Defendant at time of purchase had no notice of plaintiff's title. Plaintiff replied that

defendant's vendor had removed said slaves to a

distance for the purpose of concealing them; that he could not by diligent search find out where, in whose possession said slaves were, till three months before he commenced suit. HELD, by two chancellors, that "upon the whole circumstances," the statute should not bar.

2 Remarks thereon by Wythe, Ch. who dissented. THOMAS FARRAR, tenant in taille of lands, to which slaves were annexed, sold, for his life, two of them, a woman and a boy her child, to James Waddill, who sold them to John Pruett, from whom the defendent, supposing them to be the property of John Pruett, purchased them for 75 pounds.

The plaintiff, eldest son and heir in taille of Thomas Farrar, was not able to discover in whose possession the two slaves, with several others born by the woman after the sale of her, were, until more than five years had elapsed from the time, when his right of action accrued by the death of his father; but soon after he discovered them to be in possession of the defendant, against him this suit was commenced, in Amelia county court in chancery, to recover the two negroes, with the after-born children of the woman, and their profits.

2

The bill stated, that the defendent knew or suspected the slaves which he bought to be under incumbrance, and John *Pruett not to have power to convey a legal title to them, and therefore took from him a warranty in the bill of sale.

The defendant, by answer, alledged himself to have been a purchaser for a valuable consideration honestly paid, and denied notice of the plaintiffs title before the purchase, but confessed that he had notice, sometime after he had purchased the slaves, and paid for them, that they were entailed; and pleaded the statute for limitation of actions in bar of the plaintiffs demand.

The plaintiff replied, that he ought not to be precluded, because the slaves were removed, by John Pruett, to such a distance from the plaintiffs residence, for the purpose of concealment, that, though the five years had elapsed from his coming of age, before suit commenced, he could not, in all

that time, by the most diligent search, find out where, or in whose possession, the slaves were, and never made this discovery until three months before the commencement of this suit.

Many witnesses were examined, but no material fact, more than the facts stated before, and admitted by the answer, were proved, unless it be this; that the defendent, after having notice of the plaintiffs title, which notice probably was in the life time of Thomas Farrar, proposed to sell the slaves to one who might carry them to some remote parts, perhaps with design to prevent a recovery of them by the plain

tiff.

The county court dismissed the bill. the high court of chancery, to which the plaintiff appealed, on the 20 day of may, 1788, reversed the decree, two of the three judges, whereof the court at that time consisted, declaring their opinion, in opposition to the other, to be, that the plaintiffs title to the slaves claimed by him is well established, and that, upon the whole CIRCUMSTANCES of the case, the defendent ought not to be admitted to avale himself of the act of limitations in bar of such title, and decreed the defendent to deliver up the slaves, and pay their profits, an account whereof was directed to be stated by auditors, to the plaintiff.

Upon this opinion, he who dissented from his colleagues submits to censure these

REMARKS:

The circumstances, upon which the plea was disallowed must be one or some or all of the following: the warranty contained in the bill of sale from John Pruett to the defendent; the removal of the slaves by John Pruett to a great distance, for the purpose of concealment; the defendents failure to disclose his possession of the slaves to the plaintiff, after his title to them, and 3

searches to discover the possessor of them, were *known to the defendent; the defendents treaty, with a dealer in slaves, to transport them to remote places, and thereby to hinder the plaintiff from reclaiming them.

The first of these circumstances, is at most, a slight presumptive evidence of a suspicion that John Pruetts title might not be a good title. but how this can prevent the operation of the statute is not discerned; and therefore this circumstance is believed not to be one of those to which the two judges alluded.

The second circumstance is thought to be not more pertinent, and therefore perhaps was also not intended. for any thing done by John Pruett, in which the defendent did not act a part, ought not to be detrimental