Richardson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R the agreement was that appellee's agent should transmit to the initial carrier at Annapolis instructions to deliver the ticket to appellant. This they did with reasonable promptness, and appellee cannot be held responsible for delay of the other carrier in delivering the ticket after receipt of the instructions. * * *I did not say anything Appellant testified as follows: "When I arrived at St. Louis, preparatory to departing south for this place, I went through the gate, and tried to get on the chair car next to the sleeper, and the porter said 'Go to the forward car, next to the baggage car.' The porter saw my ticket. I obeyed orders, and went to the smoker, the one next to the baggage car, the one he directed me to, and rode in it to Texarkana. At that time I did not use tobacco. The effect of being in a place where it was used was sickening, made me sick at the stomach. It was in obedience to orders that I went there and rode to Texarkana in it. There was smoking in there all the way. to the conductor or brakeman about wanting to go into the other car, and made no complaint. I did not get off the train at any point." According to his own statement, he voluntarily submitted to the discomforts of the smoking car without objection or complaint, and cannot, therefore, claim damages therefor. He was not justified in accepting the direction given him by the train porter at the station to the car which he should enter as a command to remain therein throughout his journey. The train was in charge of the conductor, and when appellant found that the car to which he had been assigned by the porter was uncomfortable, and not such accommodation as he was entitled to on his ticket, he should have appealed to the conductor for more comfortable quarters. Failing to do so, he is deemed to have voluntarily accepted the place assigned him with its discomforts. He had reached the age of discretion, and cannot be allowed to claim damages on account of a situation caused by a mistake of the porter, which he accepted, and gave the railroad company, through its proper official in charge of the train, no opportunity to correct. The judgment is affirmed. RICHARDSON V. ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. R. (Supreme Court of South Carolina, April 18, 1905.) [51 S. E. Rep. 261.] Appeal-Harmless Error.-That a charge is not revelant to any issue in the case is not ground for reversal, where no prejudice is shown. Carriers Ejection of Passenger-Punitive Damages. Where a *As to the right to recover punitive or exemplary damages for injuries to passengers, see foot-notes appended to Pickett v. Southern Ry. Co. (S. Car.), 14 R. R. R. 269, 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 269; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Mattingly (Miss.), 14 R. R. R. 48, 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 48; foot-notes appended to Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v. Newman (Md.), 10 R. R. R. 525, 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 525. Richardson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R passenger buys a ticket to a station which the agent tells him is on the main line, and, on changing cars, is shown by a person in uniform a train for his destination, but after it starts is told by the conductor that it is a through train and will not stop, and is put off with only such force as was necessary, on refusal to pay the additional fare to the next stopping point, and is again received on payment of his fare, and carried to the station beyond, he is entitled to punitive damages. Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; Watts, Judge. Action by E. L. Richardson against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. George Johnstone and Frank G. Tompkins, for respondent. JONES, J. The plaintiff brought this action against defendant company for an alleged unlawful and willful ejection from its passenger train at Pee Dee, S. C., on the 26th day of September, 1903, which resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff for $875. The defendant appeals on two grounds-one complaining of the instruction to the jury, and the other of the refusal to grant a new trial. if Appellant complains of the following charge to the jury: "I charge you further, as a matter of law, if you go down to one of these railroad offices and buy a ticket and pay full fare for it, and there is no time limit, the time you are to use that ticket is not limited. You may buy a straight ticket-pay full fare—with no time limit to it. You have the right to put that ticket in your pocket, and use it whenever you see proper. But if you buy the ticket and board the train, you must make continuous passage. You cannot stop over on the ticket between two different points unless the ticket gives you that privilege. If you buy a straight ticket to a place, you need not use it immediately, but, if you do commence to use it, then you must go on through; otherwise, you drop off, you will have to pay again." It was alleged that this charge was erroneous: "(a) That, in so far as it refers to making a continuous trip when starting, it was not relevant to any issue in the case, nor premised any fact in the case, but it was misleading and calculated to prejudice the jury. (b) That, where there is necessary changing of cars and conductors, the same ticket being used, the law does not require a continuous journey unless it is so stipulated on the ticket." This exception cannot be sustained. If, as stated under specification "a," the charge was not relevant to any issue in the case, nor premised on any fact in the case, it does not constitute reversible error, unless appellant could show wherein it was prejudiced thereby, and no such showing has been made. With reference to specification "b," it is sufficient in addition to say that appellant made no request that the court modify its general statement of the law in the particular mentioned. With reference to the refusal of the motion for a new trial, Richardson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R it is excepted (1) that there was no evidence of actual damages beyond 50 cents; (2) that there was no evidence of a willful tort, such as to justify punitive damages for any sum. Punitive damages may be awarded for any intentional ejection of a person from a passenger train, no matter how slight the force used, if such ejection is unlawful. Such an act is not characterized by inadvertence or negligence, but is a willful invasion of a personal right. The evidence on behalf of plaintiff was to the effect that he was a lawyer residing at Greenwood, S. C., and had business to transact at Latta, S. C.; that, having reached Columbia, S. C., on his way, he there, on September 28, 1903, purchased a straight ticket from Columbia, S. C., to Latta, S. C., paying full fare therefor; that the ticket had no conditions or limitations on it; that when the ticket was purchased the ticket agent at Columbia, S. C., informed him that Latta was on the main line, and that he would reach Latta that afternoon or evening; that plaintiff boarded defendant's train and went to Sumter, and, after changing cars there under instructions, went to Florence. At Florence plaintiff took a train which he was informed by one wearing a uniform and carrying a lantern, whom he took to be a servant of the defendant company, was the train for Latta, but which was in fact a through limited train that did not stop at Latta, but defendant was not aware of this, and boarded the train, supposing it would stop at Latta. This train was the next and only train due to pass Latta that night. According to the company's regulation, this train did not stop to take on or let off passengers after leaving Florence until reaching Dillon, the next stop. Latta is an intermediate station, 7 miles from Dillon and 11 miles from Pee Dee, another intermediate point 13 miles from Florence, where the fast train slacks up for registering slips. When the conductor, after leaving Florence, came along for tickets or fare, the plaintiff presented his ticket for Latta, and was then informed that the train would not stop at Latta, but that plaintiff would be carried to Dillon upon payment of 19 cents in addition to his ticket to Latta; otherwise he would have to be ejected. Plaintiff refused to make further payment, and refused voluntarily to leave the train, and demanded to be put off at Latta. Thereupon he was ejected from the train at Pee Dee, with only such slight force as plaintiff's slight resistance rendered sufficient. After ejection from the train, plaintiff immediately tendered fare to Dillon, and was again received on board, and carried to Dillon. The next morning, plaintiff took a local train to Latta in time. to fill his business appointment. The actual damages by way of additional expenses did not exceed 50 cents. This afforded some evidence to be submitted to the jury on the question whether plaintiff's rights were willfully violated. The real issue in the case was whether plaintiff's ejection was unlawful, for, if unlawful, there was sufficient evidence of willfulness to warrant punitive damages. This issue depended upon the contested question of fact whether the defendant's agent at Columbia, S. C., Ft. Worth, etc., Ry. Co. v. State sold plaintiff a ticket from Columbia, S. C., under representation that plaintiff would be transported to Latta that night, and whether another agent of defendant at Florence informed plaintiff that the train he took was the train for Latta. This was submitted to the jury under instructions to which no exception has been taken. If plaintiff boarded defendant's train at Florence under these circumstances-and we must assume from the verdict that he did and it being undisputed that there was no other train to carry plaintiff to Latta that day, we are of the opinion that he was rightfully on board that train as a passenger for Latta, and his ejection before reaching his destination was unlawful, as the rule of the company not to stop that particular train at Latta, whether reasonable or not, must be held subordinate to the right of the passenger on board under a contract made under circumstances implying that it would stop there. It was therefore no error of law to refuse a new trial on the ground that there was no evidence that the ejection was willful or wanton, so as to justify punitive damages. The exceptions are overruled, and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. POPE, C. J., and GARY, A. J., concur. FT. WORTH & D. C. Ry. Co. et al. v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Texas, May 18, 1905.) [87 S. W. Rep. 336.] Anti Trust Law-Application-Contract between Railroad and Sleeping Car Company Furnishing Sleeping Cars.*-Laws 1903, p. 119, c. 94 (Anti-Trust Law March 31, 1903, 28th Leg.) § 1, forbids combinations of capital, skill, or acts by two or more corporations *For the authorities in this series on the subject of the legality of combinations between carriers, see Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Searles (Miss.), 14 R. R. R. 465, 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 465 (car service association); Northern Securities Company v. United States (U. S.), 11 R. R. R. 56, 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 56; Dady v. Georgia & A. Ry. (Ga.), 1 R. R. R. 594, 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 594 (right of railroads to consolidate as affected by fact that they both cross shallow rivers upon which are freight and passenger steamboats); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. in Miss. (Miss.), 12 R. R. R. 234, 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 234 (Miss. Acts 1902, p. 141, c. 89, authorizing a competing company to purchase a portion of the Southern Ry. Co's line, is unconstitutional); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association (U. S.). 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 388; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Kentucky (U. S.), 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 525; East St. Louis Connecting Ry. Co. v. Jarvis (C. C. A.), 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 459 (consolidation of parallel and competing lines); Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co. (U. S.), 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 503 (consolidation of competing lines); State v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (Ga.), 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas.. N. S., 845; note, 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 796 (validity of contracts between railroads to prevent competition). Ft. Worth, etc., Ry. Co. v. State for the following, among other, purposes: First, to fix or maintain any standard or figure whereby the cost of transportation shall be in any manner affected or established; second, to make any contract to keep the cost of transportation at a fixed or graded figure, or by which they shall in any manner affect or maintain the cost of transportation, or by which they shall agree to pool, combine, or unite any interest they may have in connection with any charge for transportation. Held, that a contract whereby a sleeping car company was to furnish sleeping cars for a railroad company, and in which the only reference to any charges to be made was the stipulation that the sleeping car company might charge passengers on its cars on the line of the railroad company such fares as were customary on competing lines of railroads, where equal sleeping accommodations were furnished, did not violate the statute through interference with transportation of passengers. Same Same Same-Same.-Nor did the contract in any way affect or tend to affect transportation or charges therefor in that its provisions that the railroad company should pay for the sleeping cars used a mileage of 2 cents per mile for every mile run on its road, unless the average revenue from the sales of seats and berths was between $5,000 and $6,000, when one cent per mile should be paid, but, if it equaled or exceeded $6,000, no mileage was to be paid, had a tendency to increase the rates charged on the sleeping cars, in order to reach the maximum revenue of each car; for, while the railroad company would be benefited by the increased revenue of the other company through a reduction or release from mileage, it had no power over the sleeping car charges. Same Same Same Same. The further provision of the statute prohibiting such combinations from creating or carrying out restrictions in the free pursuit of any business authorized or permitted by the laws of the state was not violated by the stipulation in the contract granting the sleeping car company the exclusive right for 15 years of furnishing sleeping cars for use on all lines of road owned or controlled by the railroad, or thereafter acquired or operated by it, since neither the former company nor any other corporation or person had a right irrespective of contract to attach sleeping cars to the railroad's passenger trains, and therefore no business right existed to be restricted. Same Same Same-Same.-Section 2 of the statute (Laws 1903, p. 119, c. 94) defines a monopoly as "a combination or consolidation of two or more corporations, when effected in either of the two following methods: (1) When the direction of the affairs of two or more corporations is in any manner brought under the same control for the purpose of producing * * * a trust, as defined in the first section of this act. (2) Where any corporation acquires the franchises or other rights or the physical properties * of any other corporation * * for the purpose of preventing or lessening competition," etc. Held, that the contract did not constitute a monopoly within the terms of said section 2, as the agreement by the railroad to haul the cars of the sleeping car company did not transfer to the latter any of the former's franchise authorizing it to operate trains over its road. Certified Questions from Court of Civil Appeals of Third Supreme Judicial District. Action by the state of Texas against the Ft. Worth & Denver City Railway Company and another. Certified questions from the Court of Civil Appeals of the Third Supreme Judicial Dis trict. 18 RR R-23 |