See INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS; LICENSEES.
See CARRIERS OF LIVE STOCK; EMPLOYERS' LIABIL-
ITY ACTS; LEASES AND RUNNING POWERS; MASTER
AND SERVANT; TICKETS AND FARES.
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.
See STREET RAILWAYS.
CONTRARY TO RULES.
See PERSONAL INJURIES.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
See CARRIERS OF LIVE STOCK; CARRIERS OF PAS-
SENGERS; COMMON CARRIERS; CROSSINGS; DEATH
BY WRONGFUL ACT; EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACTS;
EVIDENCE; LICENSEES; MASTER AND SERVANT;
STREET RAILWAYS; TRESPASSERS.
Burden of proving. Hot Springs St. Ry. Co. v. Hildreth (Ark.), 168.
Care required of one in face of danger. South Chicago City Ry. Co.
v. Kinnare (Ill.), 229.
Charge that decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence,
if he was injured and killed while using such means as then ap-
peared to him to be reasonably necessary to avoid danger was
erroneous. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Molloy's Adm'x (Ky.), 714.
Charge that, if decedent was killed while acting as a person of ordi-
nary prudence placed in such a position might reasonably act, it
was immaterial that he might have escaped injury if he had fol-
lowed some other course, should have been given, instead of the
one given. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Molloy's Adm'x (Ky.), 714.
Contributory negligence of driver of private team struck by street
car is not imputable to one riding as his guest or companion.
Hot Springs St. Ry. Co. v. Hildreth (Ark.), 168.
Degree of care required for self-protection. Normile v. Wheeling
Traction Co. (W. Va.), 235.
Does not prevent recovery where there was also negligence after
discovery of plaintiff's peril. Green . Los Angeles Terminal Ry.
Co. (Cal.), 192.
Effect of. Moulton v. Sanford & C. P. Ry. Co. (Me.), 154.
Exposing self to know danger, person guilty of does not assume
responsibility for other dangers which are unknown, and could
not by the exercise of ordinary care have been discovered.
Holmes v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (Neb.), 485.
Harmless error in instruction authorizing, but not requiring, jury
to consider decedent's contributory negligence in mitigation of
damages, where plaintiff remitted $3,000 from a verdict of $10,000.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Martin (Tenn.), 413.
In action for death of flagman by being struck by train while on
track, an instruction that jury "may," instead of "must," consider
deceased's contributory negligence in mitigation of damages, was
affirmative error. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Martin (Tenn.), 413.
Instruction was a fair one on the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence, in action for death of one killed while working in a dan-
gerous place. Ryan v. St. Louis Transit Co. (Mo.), 775.
Instruction was misleading, as leading the jury to believe that the
defense could only be raised by affirmative evidence offered by
defendant, thus withdrawing from the jury the evidence intro-
duced by plaintiff on presenting his case. Pittsburg, C., C. & St.
L. Ry. Co. v. Lightheiser (Ind.), 176.
In view of certain instructions, another instruction-that ordinary
care is that which an ordinarily prudent person, situated as de-
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-Continued.
ceased was before and at time of accident, would exercise for his
own safety-was not erroneous on the theory that it assumed
that deceased was not guilty of contributory negligence in being
in the position in which he found himself at time of the injury.
South Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Kinnare (Ill.), 229.
Not error to omit to instruct as to law of, at plaintiff's requests,
where defendant's instructions fully and fairly cover the point.
Normile v. Wheeling Traction Co. (W. Va.), 235.
Not presumed, but is a matter of defense to be proved by defend-
ant, unless it is shown by plaintiff's evidence. Choctaw O. & G.
Ry. Co. v. Doughty (Ark.), 665.
Question for jury whether deceased, while under influence of sudden
fear, so conducted himself as to incur imputation of contributory
negligence. South Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Kinnare (Ill.), 229.
Was question for jury. Holems v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.
(Neb.), 485.
When case may be withdrawn from jury.
politan St. Ry. Co. (C. C. A.), 250.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND FAILURE TO GIVE
SIGNALS.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND UNLAWFUL SPEED.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF FATHER.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PARENTS.
CONVERSION.
See CARRIERS OF GOODS.
CONVEYANCES.
See RIGHT OF WAY.
COPARTNERSHIPS.
See EXPRESS COMPANIES.
CORPORATE EXISTENCE.
See LEASES AND RUNNING POWERS.
CORPORATE LIMITS.
See RAILROADS.
CORPORATION COMMISSION.
See COMMON CARRIERS.
See EMINENT DOMAIN; EXPRESS COMPANIES; RAIL-
ROADS.
See COMMON CARRIERS; DAMAGES.
COST OF RAILROAD.
See TAXATION.
COUNTRY CROSSINGS.
See CROSSINGS.
See CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS.
CREDITS.
See TAXATION.
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
See PERSONAL INJURIES.
CROSSING INTERVENING TRACKS.
See CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS.
CROSSING SIGNALS.
See TRESPASSERS.
CROSSINGS.
See ACCIDENTS ON TRACK; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE; DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT; EVIDENCE;
LEASES AND RUNNING POWERS; NEGLIGENCE;
RAILROADS.
Attempting to drive across tracks in front of approaching street
car. Omaha St. Ry. Co. v. Mathiesen (Neb.), 509.
Charge that, if decedent was killed while acting as a person of
ordinary prudence placed in such a position might reasonably
act, it was immaterial that he might have escaped injury if he
had followed some other course, should have been given in
place of the one given. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Molloy's
Adm'x (Ky.), 714.
Decedent's precluded recovery.
Co. (Va.), 731.
Stokes' Adm'x v. Southern Ry.
Degree of care required of highway traveler. Thomas v. Central
of Georgia Ry. Co. (Ga.), 191.
Evidence was insufficient to warrant finding that deceased saw
the engine until in a moment of peril, and hence there was no
presumption that she trusted that the engineer was obeying
ordinance limiting speed of trains to six miles an hour. Green
v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo.), 793.
Exclusion of testimony to show that car might have been seen
at a greater distance was erroneous, as the question was whether
plaintiff was guilty of negligence in attempting to cross tracks
with the car at the distance it actually was when he saw it.
Omaha St. Ry. Co. v. Mathiesen (Neb.), 509.
In action for injuries at a crossing, question whether or not de-
fendant's right of way at or near the crossing had on it un-
dergrowth which prevented the traveler from seeing the ap-
proaching train was material. Stokes' Adm'x v. Southern Ry.
Co. (Va.), 731.
One who in broad daylight stops beside a street car track till the
car approaching at an unlawful speed is within ten feet of him,
when he attempts to cross in front of it, is guilty of contribu-
tory negligence, as matter of law, barring recovery for his
injury. Wolf v. City & Suburban Ry. Co. (Ore.), 210.
Person riding in buggy, who, when at a safe distance from track,
undertook to cross a railway crossing ahead of a train which
he knew was approaching, assumed the risk of any resulting
injury. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Molloy's Adm'x (Ky.), 174.
Where proximate cause of collision with train was contributory
negligence the question of the negligent management of the
train immaterial. Stokes' Adm'x v. Southern Ry. Co. (Va.), 731.
Contributory negligence in deliberately attempting to get across
tracks before train could reach point prevents recovery, although
train was running at negligent speed when it struck plaintiff, though
18 R R R-58
there had been failure to check speed in approaching the crossing,
near which the accident happened. Thomas v. Central of Georgia
Ry. Co. (Ga.), 191.
Contributory negligence, unlawful speed of train, and failure to
give statutory signals, railroad not liable for injury to pedestrian.
Green v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo.), 793.
Dedication of crossing in street to the public implied, though rail-
road division superintendent, under whose direction it was con-
structed, had no authority to make a valid dedication, and though
his unexpressed purpose in making the crossing was merely to
accommodate settlers coming in on trains. Larson v. Chicago M.
& St. P. Ry. Co. (S. Dak.), 465.
Duty of engineer after discovery of person's peril. Green v. Los
Angeles Terminal Ry. Co. (Cal.), 192.
Evidence relating to the crossing of a wagon in front of a freight
train more than 30 years before the accident, as to the time it
required a wagon and team different from that used by decedent
to go over the track at the crossing, and as to the speed of an-
other train, was inadmissible. Stokes' Adm'x v. Southern Ry.
Co. (Va.), 731.
Refusal to permit witness to state condition of right of way at
the crossing five hours after the accident was not prejudicial;
it being clear from the evidence that he had stated that he did
not know what the condition of the right of way was at the
time. Stokes' Adm'x v. Southern Ry. Co. (Va.), 731.
Testimony that crossing was dangerous was incompetent.
ville & N. R. Co. v. Molloy's Adm'x (Ky.), 714.
Care required of pedestrian as affected by fact that gates are open.
Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Schmitz (Ill.), 214.
Opening gates as an invitation to cross. Chicago & E. I. R. Co.
v. Schmitz (Ill.), 214.
Last clear chance, insufficiency of evidence to show that doctrine
was applicable. Brammer's Adm'r v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.
(Va.), 497.
Negligence, act of fireman in "hooking" his fire as engine emerged
from cut was not, although it temporarily prevented him from
viewing crossing. Brammer's Adm'r v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.
(Va.), 497.
Negligence in operating train was question for jury. Chicago &
E. I. R. Co. v. Schmitz (Ill.), 214.
One approaching railroad track is not in a position of danger, so
as to charge engineer of approaching train with notice thereof.
and with the duty of using every exertion to avoid injuring him,
until he steps upon the track. Green v. Los Angeles Terminal
Ry. Co. (Cal.), 192.
Proximate cause when train should have been seen in time by de-
ceased and there was failure to give signals. Brammer's Adm'r
v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (Va.), 497.
Right of engineer to assume that person approaching crossing will
keep out of danger. Green v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry. Co.
(Cal.), 192.
Certain statute of Missouri makes proof of accident and of failure
to ring bell as required sufficient for a prima facie case, and to
throw on railroad the burden of proving that the accident was
not the result of failure to signal; but where plaintiff, in prov-
ing the accident, also shows that it was not caused by failure
to signal, or the person injured was negligent, there is nothing
for the railroad to prove in order to prevail. Green v. Missouri
Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo.), 793.
Failure to ring bell as evidence of negligence under New Hamp-
shire statute. Tucker v. Boston & M. R. R. (N. H.), 294.
Failure to ring bell, sufficiency of evidence of. Tucker v. Boston
& M. R. R. (N. H.), 294.
Ky. St. 1903, § 786, applicable to crossing outside settled portion
of town, and which is in effect a country crossing. Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Molloy's Adm'x (Ky.), 714.
Proximate cause, finding that it was failure to give signals was
warranted by evidence. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Crominarity
(Miss.), 513.
Where speed of a train is great, care commensurate with the dan-
ger in giving warning of the approach of train must be observed.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Molloy's Adm'x (Ky.), 714.
Speed of trains, rule requiring it to be moderated at crossings
not applicable to crossings not within settled part of town and
which are practically country crossings; and at such crossings
no rate of speed is negligent; but where the speed of a train
is great, care commensurate with the danger in giving warning
of the approach of train must be observed. Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. Molloy's Adm'x (Ky.), 714.
Care required of person about to cross railroad tracks. Bram-
mer's Adm'r v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. (Va.), 497.
Contributory negligence in not taking precautions just before
stepping on track at point where view of train, which should
have been previously seen when a long way off, was obstructed.
Thomas v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (Ga.), 191.
Duty of highway traveler to look and listen. Stokes' Adm'x v.
Southern Ry. Co. (Va.), 731.
Excessive speed of trains, care required of traveler as affected
by. Green v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry. Co. (Cal.), 192.
Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, as matter
of law, for failing to stop vehicle; it appearing that no train
was scheduled to pass; that his view of track was obstructed
except for the width of the street; and that he slowed up and
listened for a train. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Crominarity
(Miss.), 513.
CROSSINGS IN SUBURBS.
See CROSSINGS.
See CARRIERS OF LIVE STOCK; CARRIERS OF PAS-
SENGERS.
CUSTOM NOT CHARGE FOR CHILDREN.
See CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS.
CUSTOM OF DECEASED.
See DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.
CUSTOM OF OTHER CARRIERS AS A DEFENSE.
See CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS.
See ACTIONS; BAGGAGE; CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS;
COMMON CARRIERS; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE;
EMINENT DOMAIN; NUISANCES; PERSONAL IN-
JURIES; RIGHT OF WAY.
Injuries sustained in plaintiff's person and in his property in a
single collision with a railroad train gives rise to but one cause of
action, and damages for both classes of injuries must be recov-
ered in a single suit. Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Matthews (Tenn.),
747.
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