Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

BOARDS.

See Insurance, 3, 4.

BONA FIDE PURCHASERS.

63 (Cal.App.) Where defendant agreed to
take a loan of $26,000 from any party, if ne-
gotiated, and to pay plaintiff loan broker a
commission of 72 per cent. on the amount, and
defendant either accepted and received the loan
and then refused to pay the commission, or re-

See Bills and Notes, 335-373; Vendor and fused to accept and receive the loan when pro-
Purchaser,

231-245.
BONDS.

cured by plaintiff broker, defendant broke its
contract.-Hughes v. Chung Sun Tung Co., 154
P. 299.
Me-65 (Kan.) An agent held not entitled to a
commission for procuring a contract for the ex-
change of certain properties where it appeared
that the contract had been fraudulently altered
by the agent.-Van Horn v. Wetterhold, 154 P.
274.

See Bail; Justices of the Peace, 159;
chanics' Liens, 227, 229; Municipal Cor-
porations, 917, 918; Principal and Sure-
ty; Replevin, 130-135; Sheriffs and Con-
stables, 157-168; States, 101; Ven-
dor and Purchaser, 54, 273, 285.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.
35 (Cal.) A bond given solely to comply
with a statute which is itself void, or which
does not require the bond as supposed, is with-
out binding force.-Roystone Co. v. Darling,
154 P. 15.

[blocks in formation]

IV. COMPENSATION AND LIEN.

43 (Or.) By direct provision of L. O. L., §
808, an agreement authorizing or employing an
agent or broker to sell or purchase real estate
for compensation or commission must be in
writing. Lueddemann v. Rudolf, 154 P. 116.

V. ACTIONS FOR COMPENSATION.

86 (Kan.) Evidence in an action for com
mission on sale of realty held to show that an
oral contract superseding the written one be-
tween the parties did not bind plaintiffs to sell
the property at $3,500 to be entitled to a com-
mission.-Rance v. Robinson Inv. Co., 154 P.
224.

88 (Wash.) Evidence held sufficient to jus
tify submission to the jury of the issue whether
a broker's contract to sell real estate for a com-
mission was subsequently altered to waive the
commission in case of sale for cash.-Payzant v.
Caudill, 154 P. 170.

BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIA-

TIONS.

26 (Okl.) Under Laws Colo. 1897, p. 125, §
6, a Colorado building and loan association may
loan its accumulations to members on plan of
repayment provided for in its by-laws, and may
contract for and recover a premium on plan as
may be provided for in the by-laws or note or
other evidence of debt, which notes shall be in
form nonnegotiable.-Legg v. Midland Savings
& Loan Co., 154 P. 682.

27 (Okl.) A contract between a Colorado
building and loan association and one of its
members made in Oklahoma territory, to be per-
formed in Colorado, is governed by the law of
Colorado, and, if valid there and not violative
of the public policy of such territory, is enforce-
able in Oklahoma.-Legg v. Midland Savings &
Loan Co., 154 P. 682.

28 (Okl.) A Colorado building and loan as-
sociation may without competitive bidding loan
its accumulations where its by-laws so provide.
-Legg v. Midland Savings & Loan Co., 154 P.
682.

BUILDING CONTRACTS.

50 (Cal.App.) An option to sell realty given
to brokers, providing that it should remain in
force for 90 days, and that, if the owner sold,
within 90 days after expiration, to one whom See Principal and Surety, 82.
the agents had recommended the property, the
owner would pay a 5 per cent. commission, lim-
ited to 90 days the time during which the
agents' authority to sell or negotiate a sale
should exist.-Elsea v. Fassler, 154 P. 1067.

An option to sell realty given brokers, pro-
viding it should remain in force for 90 days,
and that, if the owner sold within 90 days after
expiration to one to whom the land was recom-
mended by the brokers, the owner should pay
a commission, was an agreement to pay the
brokers a commission if the land was sold
within 90 days after expiration of the option to
one to whom it was recommended by the bro-
kers during the 90 days of the option's life.

-Id.

54 (Kan.) An agent held not entitled to a
commission for procuring a contract for the ex-
change of certain properties, where it appeared
that the contract had been fraudulently altered
by the agent, and that the person procured was
not able, ready, and willing to perform.-Van
Horn v. Wetterhold, 154 P. 274.

BUILDINGS.

See Adjoining Landowners, 4; Contracts,
198; Master and Servant, 316, 318,
320, 330.

BURGLARY.

See Criminal Law, 414; Insurance, 84.
II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT.
41 (Nev.) Evidence held to justify convic-
tion.-State v. Whitaker, 154 P. 927.

was broken into in the nighttime between sun-
Evidence held to justify finding that the mill
set and sunrise, as defined by Rev. Laws, §
6634.-Id.

CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
See Exchange of Property, 5; Quieting Ti-
tle; Reformation of Instruments; Venue,
40.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

[blocks in formation]

ally to be apprehended.-McGilchrist v. Port-
land, E. & E. Ry. Co., 154 P. 419.

303 (Wash.) A street car conductor's an-
nouncement of a stopping place is not of itself
an invitation to a passenger to alight before the
car comes to a full stop, and does not show that
the conductor intended or had any reason to be-
lieve that the passenger would alight before the
car stopped.-Sumner v. Grays Harbor Ry. &
Light Co., 154 P. 126.

Where a passenger, on announcement of her
stopping place went to the platform, stood in
the doorway, and stepped from the car while it
was slowly coming to a stop, the conductor's
failure to warn her that the car was in motion
was not negligence.-Id.

12 (Kan.) Before a special privilege to stop
cattle in transit to test the market can be grant- 316 (Mont.) Derailment of a car, injuring a
ed, it is necessary that the tariffs pertaining passenger, raises a presumption of negligence.
thereto be filed with the Public Utilities Com--Freeman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 154
mission, and be open to all shippers on equal P. 912.
terms. Mollohan v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 154 P. 248.

318 (Kan.) Evidence in an action for the
death of an alleged passenger from slipping on
13 (Kan.) Where cattle were shipped from B. ice and falling beneath the train, held not to
to P. at the regularly published and filed rates, show that defendant failed to perform any duty
held that a special contract, giving privilege owed deceased, or that his death was the proxi-
of stoppage in transit to test the market, was mate result of defendant's negligence.-Rodgers
preferential and discriminatory, and violative v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 P. 1027.
of Gen. St. 1909, §§ 7174, 7178, 7181, 7214,318 (Mont.) Evidence in a passenger's ac-
7223, and Public Utilities Act.-Mollohan v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 154 P. 248.

II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS.
(A) Delivery to Carrier.

40 (Kan.) The words "actual cost of the
same" in a tariff provision relating to repair
of cars by the shipper, include the cost of the
necessary material and labor, but not the cost
of inspecting or cleaning cars or attaching grain
doors.-Rock Milling & Elevator Co. v. Atchi-
son, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 154 P. 254.

(J) Charges and Liens.
1962 (Kan.) In a shipper's action against
a railroad for furnishing grain doors, plaintiff
could not recover by showing merely the total
cost of all doors furnished by him including an
unascertained number of items for which no
charge could be made under the rulings of the
Interstate Commerce Commission because they
accrued in interstate shipments.-Stockton Ele-
vator & Shipping Ass'n v. Missouri Pac. Ry.
Co., 154 P. 1126.

III. CARRIAGE OF LIVE STOCK.
207 (Kan.) Where the tariffs filed with the
Public Utilities Commission specified the points
at which live stock might be stopped in transit
to test the market, any special contract enlarg-
ing on that privilege, which is not specified in
the tariffs, is void.-Mollohan v. Atchison, T.
S. F. Ry. Co., 154 P. 248.

tion for personal injury when his train was de-
railed held to show a causal connection between
the derailment and his wrist-drop and minor in-
juries and to establish liability for the damages.
-Freeman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 154
P. 912.

318 (Wash.) Evidence in a passenger's ac-
tion for personal injury while alighting from
defendant's street car, apart from any negli-
gence of the conductor in failing to warn her
that the car was still in motion, held not to
show any negligence on the part of the defend-
ant. Sumner v. Grays Harbor Ry. & Light
Co., 154 P. 126.

318 (Wash.) Evidence, in action for person-
al injury from negligence of defendant when its
outbound car, approaching at full speed, with-
out warning, or any attempt to stop, struck
plaintiff, as he was boarding an inbound car,
held to sustain verdict for plaintiff.-Bemiss v.
Puget Sound Traction Light & Power Co., 154
P. 171.

320 (Mont.) Where the evidence produced
by a carrier tends to rebut the presumption of
negligence arising from a derailment, its utmost
effect, in view of Rev. Codes, § 8028, subd. 2, is
to raise a question for the jury.-Freeman v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 154 P. 912.
(E) Contributory Negligence

Injured.

of Person

333 (Kan.) An attempt by a street car pas-
senger to alight a short distance from the usual
stopping place held not contributory negligence
if she believed the car had come to a stop in
response to her signal.-Christian v. Union
Traction Co., 154 P. 271.

227 (Okl.) In an action for damages to a
shipment of cattle, held, that the admission of
evidence on the issue of a waiver of terms of
the shipment contract was error, where such
issue was not raised by the pleadings.-Atchi-347 (Kan.) A passenger who alighted while
son, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Lynn & Hudson, 154
P. 657.

[blocks in formation]

the car was in motion and before it reached the
place for discharge of passengers, and passed
around the rear end of the car, and was struck
by a car moving on a parallel track in a direc-
tion opposite to that of the car from which he
alighted, held guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law.-Galloway v. Hutchinson
Interurban Ry. Co., 154 P. 238.

271 (Okl.) An intending passenger should
inform himself whether the train on which he
takes passage will, under the carrier's regula-347 (Or.) It cannot be said as matter of
tions, stop at his destination.-Chicago, R. I. &
P. Ry. Co. v. Sheets, 154 P. 550.

(D) Personal Injuries.

law that it is negligent to alight from a moving
car, but the circumstances and the speed of the
car make it a question for the jury.-McGil-
christ v. Portland, E. & E. Ry. Co., 154 P. 419.

280 (Or.) A common carrier owes to its 347 (Wash.) In passenger's action for in-
passengers the highest degree of care, prudence, jury when struck by defendant's outbound car
and foresight consistent with the practical op- as he was about to board its inbound car, held
eration of its road or the utmost skill and care that his contributory negligence was a question
consistent with its business, in view of the in- for the jury.-Bemiss v. Puget Sound Traction
strumentalities employed and the danger natur-Light & Power Co., 154 P. 171.

CHARACTER.

348 (Or.) In action for personal injury
when thrown from car by its sudden jerk as
plaintiff was alighting, instruction that, if it See Witnesses, 342.
was so dark as to make it obviously dangerous
to alight there while the car was moving, plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence, held
not objectionable in view of the evidence.-Me-
Gilchrist v. Portland, E. & E. Ry. Co., 154 P.

419.

(F) Ejection of Passengers and Intruders.

CHARGE.

By carrier, see Carriers, 12, 1962.
By telephone companies, see Telegraphs and
Telephones, 33.
To jury, see Trial, 194–295.

CHARITIES.

LIDITY.

383 (Okl.) Under the evidence in a passen-
ger's action for being forcibly ejected from a I. CREATION, EXISTENCE, AND VA-
train, held, that whether plaintiff was misin-
formed or misled by the carrier's servants as to
the regular stopping place of the train and
whether he was thereby induced to believe that
the train would stop at his destination, were
questions for the jury.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.
Co. v. Sheets, 154 P. 550.

[blocks in formation]

See Appeal and Error, 660; Eminent Do-
main, 264; Physicians and Surgeons,
11; Taxation, 299.

I. NATURE AND GROUNDS.

5 (Wash.) Where attorneys for original re-
ceiver had obtained a judgment, and after sub-
stitution of new receiver and attorney the first
attorneys filed a lien on the judgment to which
the new receiver filed motion to strike, certiorari
was proper procedure to review ruling of court
in overruling motion as made at improper time,
but without passing on validity of lien.-State
v. Superior Court for King County, 154 P. 603.

24 (Cal.) Under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1068,
1074, relating to writs of review, and Public
Utilities Acts, $$ 60, 67, held, that petition for
writ of review on Railroad Commission's ruling
on demurrer, before final determination of ques-
tion involved. was premature, and would be
dismissed.-Holabird v. Railroad Commission
of State of California, 154 P. 831.

CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE.

7 (Okl.) Under Rev. Laws 1910, § 2260,
held, that a deed executed by a grantor not in
possession or enjoyment of the premises within
the year was void as between the grantee and
a person in adverse possession.-Sutton v. Den-
ton, 154 P. 1193.

[blocks in formation]

20 (Or.) Under will devising realty to es-
tablish home for wayward girls, with reversion
to Churches of Christ Scientist, it was not in-
tended that there should be any legal connection
between the churches and the Mother Church,
and not necessary that such relation appear in
their articles of incorporation, if otherwise
shown.-Carson v. Schulderman, 154 P. 903.

CHARTER.

See Municipal Corporations, 47, 958.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

See Evidence, 441.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.
(A) Nature and Essentials of Transfers of
Chattels as Security.

5 (Kan.) An assignment of the proceeds of
a contract due and to become due for furnish-
ing materials and labor to a building contractor
ion to be valid against a garnisheeing creditor.
held not a chattel mortgage requiring registra-
-Hall v. Kansas City Terra Cotta Co., 154 P.
210.

6 (Idaho) Whether the instrument sued on
was a conditional sale note or a chattel mort-
gage, and whether plaintiff mistook his remedy
in seeking to have it decreed to be a chattel
mortgage and foreclosed, depended on the agree
ment of the contracting parties and their in-
tent as shown by the facts and circumstances.
-Keane v. Kibble, 154 P. 972.

38 (Idaho) Under Rev. Codes, § 3392, held,
that the fact that a transfer was made subject
to a defeasance on condition could be proven in
order to show the transfer to be a mortgage,
though the fact did not appear from the instru-
ment.-Keane v. Kibble, 154 P. 972.

III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA-

TION.

(D) Lien and Priority.

136 (Wash.) The lien of mortgage on crop
was not lost when mortgagee sought judgment
on its debt and obtained a foreclosure, result-
ing in a deficiency judgment, and the mortgagee
might proceed against one who had converted
part of crop.-German-American State Bank v.
Seattle Grain Co., 154 P. 443.

The judgment for the debt did not operate as
a waiver or a release of the security.-Id.

138 (Wash.) The rights of the holder of a
chattel mortgage on a crop were superior to any
equities in one who had received a part of the
crop in payment of an indebtedness for sacks
furnished the mortgagor the previous year.-
German-American State Bank v. Seattle Grain
Co., 154 P. 443.

138 (Wash.) Under Rem. & Bal. Code, §§
1188, 1190, 1190a, 1181, giving farm laborer
lien on crops produced, plaintiff, having an ad-
judicated lien, held entitled to damages against
defendant, the mortgagee of the crop, who had
received the crop, commingled it in nine ware-
houses, and sold it by negotiable warehouse re-
ceipts.-Hubbard v. Johnson, 154 P. 457.

138 (Wash.) A purchaser of leased land up-
on which there were growing crops held to have
acquired title to the growing crops, which he
harvested, and neither he nor the lessor to be
liable to the lessee's mortgagee for any deficien-
cy; the other personalty included in the mort-
gage not being enough to discharge it.-Woody v.
Wagner, 154 P. 819.

IX. FORECLOSURE.
275 (Wash.) In an action to foreclose chat-
tel mortgage on wheat crop, grain company, to
whom mortgagor had delivered part of crop
in payment of a previous indebtedness, and
whose possession was known to the mortgagee
prior to the commencement of the action, while
a proper, was not a necessary, party thereto.-
German-American State Bank v. Seattle Grain
Co., 154 P. 443.

141 (Okl.) A mortgagee's consent to the
furnishing of feed and pasturage for mortgaged
cattle may be implied from facts and circum-278 (Okl.) Where a receiver sold mortgaged
stances so as to give a lien therefor preference chattels pursuant to the court's order, it was er
over his prior recorded mortgage.-Cather v.
ror, on trial of the foreclosure suit, to exclude
Spencer, 154 P. 1130.
erty at the receiver's sale.-J. I. Case Threshing
evidence of mortgagor's purchase of the prop-
Mach. Co. v. Barney, 154 P. 674.

A lien for feed and pasturage furnished cattle
with consent of the mortgagee will take prece-
dence over a prior recorded chattel mortgage.

-Id.

157 (Wyo.) In an action by a chattel mort-
gagee against defendant, whom he claimed had
taken possession of mortgaged cattle, defendant
has the burden of proving that the lien he
serted is superior.-Reynolds v. Morton, 154 P.
325.

IV. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
PARTIES.

281 (Idaho) The right to have a receiver ap-
pointed in proceedings to foreclose a chattel
mortgage is purely statutory, depending on Rev.
Codes, § 4329, as amended by Sess. Laws 1909,
p. 26.-Keane v. Kibble, 154 P. 972.
as-281 (Okl.) Where a receiver sold mortgaged
chattels pursuant to the court's order, it was er-
ror, on trial of the foreclosure suit, to peremp-
torily discharge the receiver and set aside his
acts.-J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Bar-
ney, 154 P. 674.

162 (Okl.) On default in making payments,
held that the mortgagee under an express provi-
sion of the mortgage could take a peaceable pos-
session of the mortgaged personalty, though he
could not use force.-J. I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co. v. Barney, 154 P. 674.

168 (Okl.) Refusal of the mortgagor to con-
sent to the mortgagee's taking possession of the
mortgaged chattels, pursuant to the mortgage
on default in making payments, held not a con-
version.-J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Bar-
ney, 154 P. 674.

169 (Okl.) That plaintiff waited several
months after taking the property before proceed-
ing to foreclose its mortgage held not a conver-
sion, where it appeared that after the property
was taken over there were negotiations toward
effecting a settlement.-J. I. Case Threshing
Mach. Co. v. Barney, 154 P. 674

282 (Okl.) In an action to foreclose a chat-
tel mortgage on a threshing outfit, held that it
was error to instruct that the defendant mort-
gagors were entitled to recover the value of the
property, when plaintiff took possession under
its mortgage, authorizing it to do so on the
mortgagors' default, where the taking did not
constitute a conversion.-J. I. Case Threshing
Mach. Co. v. Barney, 154 P. 674.

CHEAT.

See False Pretenses; Fraud.

CHECKS.

See Banks and Banking, 134; Garnish-
ment, 51, 123, 232.

See Divorce,

170 (Wash.) Where chattel mortgage upon
a wheat crop gave the mortgagee a lien of which
defendant had notice through the public records,
defendant's taking of part of the crop and
commingling it with its own wheat was an act See
of conversion.-German-American State Bank v.
Seattle Grain Co., 154 P. 443.

CHILDREN.

308, 323; Infants; Negligence,
39, 85; Parent and Child.

CHIROPRACTORS.

Physicians and Surgeons, 6.
CHOSE IN ACTION.

177 (Wyo.) A chattel mortgagee entitled to See Assignments.
possession may maintain an action against one
who deprives him of the property by which the
debt is secured.-Reynolds v. Morton, 154 P.
325.

CHURCHES.

See Religious Societies.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

See Negligence, 134.

CITIES..

VII. REMOVAL OR TRANSFER OF
PROPERTY BY MORTGAGOR.
(A) Rights and Liabilities of Parties.
229 (Wyo.) Where mortgaged chattels are
taken by purchaser, the mortgagee, though not
entitled to possession, the debt not being due, See Municipal Corporations.
may at once maintain an action for damages to
his reversionary interest.-Reynolds v. Morton,
154 P. 325.

CITY ENGINEER.

See Municipal Corporations, 147.

CIVIL SERVICE.

Where a copy of the mortgage attached to the
complaint of the mortgagee showed that he was
entitled to immediate possession of the cattle,
the value of which he sought to recover from a See Evidence, 47.
purchaser from the mortgagor, the complaint
held sufficient, in the absence of demurrer, to
state a cause of action, though not averring
the mortgagee's right to possession.-Id.

CLAIM AND DELIVERY.

[blocks in formation]

Where a chattel mortgage provided that the
mortgagee should become entitled to possession
on sale or removal, or attempt to sell or re- See Garnishment, 219, 225; States, 181.
move any of the property, the mortgagee's right
to possession is immediate upon sale or removal,
in which case he can at once maintain an ac-
tion against the purchaser.-Id.

CLASS LEGISLATION.

See Constitutional Law, 208.

[blocks in formation]

COMMISSIONS.

42 (Wash.) In action for collision, where
plaintiffs' and defendants' steam vessels met evi-
dence held sufficient to support finding of de- See Brokers, 43-88; Principal and Agent,
fendants' vessel's negligence.-Angeles Brewing
& Malting Co. v. Carter, 154 P. 601.

XII. SUITS FOR DAMAGES.

(C) Evidence.

82-89.

COMMON CARRIERS.

See Carriers.

124 (Wash.) In action for collision, ship-
pers' invoices held admissible to show damages
to freight in absence of showing that shippers' See
claims were fraudulent or invoice prices were
in excess of actual value of freight.-Angeles
Brewing & Malting Co. v. Carter, 154 P. 601.

(D) Damages.

130 (Wash.) In action for collision, inter-
est on sums paid out on repairs and freight
claims held improperly computed from date ves-
sel resumed run.-Angeles Brewing & Malting
Co. v. Carter, 154 P. 601.

COLOR OF TITLE.

See Adverse Possession.

COMBINATIONS.

See Conspiracy, 41.

COMMERCE.

See Carriers; Courts, 489.

I. POWER TO REGULATE IN GEN-

ERAL.

14 (Ariz.) As the Webb-Kenyon Act divested
intoxicating liquors of their interstate character,
Const. art. 23, § 1, prohibiting disposal or in-
troduction into the state of intoxicating liquors,

is not an interference with interstate commerce.
-Sturgeon v. State, 154 P. 1050.

II. SUBJECTS OF REGULATION.
27 (Mont.) Proof that decedent was employ-
ed and the railroad company engaged in inter-
state commerce at the time of the accident held
indispensable to the right to recover under the
federal Employers' Liability Act.-Alexander v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 154 P. 914.

Where a railroad conductor was killed from

derailment of car on a branch line wholly with-
in the state, while he was taking cars loaded
with ties to a siding from which they would
later be taken to a point within the state to be
treated, after which they would be used with-
in or without the state, he was not employed
in interstate commerce, and hence the action
was not sustainable under the federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act.-Id.

COMMON SCHOOLS.

Schools and School Districts, 63-100.

COMMUNITY PROPERTY.

See Husband and Wife, 257-270.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.

See Negligence, 97, 98.

COMPENSATION.

See Attorney and. Client, 130-167; Bro-
kers, 43-88; Contracts, 229; Eminent
Domain, 71-264; Insurance, 84; Mas-
ter and Servant, ~871⁄2 2504; Municipal
Corporations, 220; Officers, 95; Prin-
cipal and Agent, 82-89; Sheriffs and Con-
stables, 71.

COMPETENCY.

See Jury, 110.

COMPLAINT.

See Pleading, 52, 72.

COMPOSITIONS WITH CREDITORS.
See Compromise and Settlement.

2 (Okl.) To constitute a valid composition,
there must be a mutuality of contract between
the debtor and creditor; a mere unilateral
agreement purporting to bind the debtor not be-
ing enforceable against the creditor until ac-
cepted by him.-C. D. Osborne & Co. v. White,
154 P. 653.

COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT.
See Accord and Satisfaction; Attorney and
Client, 101; Compositions with Creditors;
Payment; Release.

5 (Ariz.) Plaintiff, who entered upon land
under an invalid oral agreement for a lease,
held not to have completed an agreement to ac-
cept a division of crops in payment and hence
that he might recover the value of his services.
-Crane v. Franklin, 154 P. 1036.
COMPUTATION.

27 (Wash.) One inspecting the main track
of a railroad engaged in intra and inter state
commerce is engaged in "interstate commerce,"
and an action for his death or injury falls with- See Limitation of Actions, 51, 58; Time.

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »