63 (Cal.App.) Where defendant agreed to take a loan of $26,000 from any party, if ne- gotiated, and to pay plaintiff loan broker a commission of 72 per cent. on the amount, and defendant either accepted and received the loan and then refused to pay the commission, or re-
See Bills and Notes, 335-373; Vendor and fused to accept and receive the loan when pro- Purchaser,
cured by plaintiff broker, defendant broke its contract.-Hughes v. Chung Sun Tung Co., 154 P. 299. Me-65 (Kan.) An agent held not entitled to a commission for procuring a contract for the ex- change of certain properties where it appeared that the contract had been fraudulently altered by the agent.-Van Horn v. Wetterhold, 154 P. 274.
See Bail; Justices of the Peace, 159; chanics' Liens, 227, 229; Municipal Cor- porations, 917, 918; Principal and Sure- ty; Replevin, 130-135; Sheriffs and Con- stables, 157-168; States, 101; Ven- dor and Purchaser, 54, 273, 285.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. 35 (Cal.) A bond given solely to comply with a statute which is itself void, or which does not require the bond as supposed, is with- out binding force.-Roystone Co. v. Darling, 154 P. 15.
IV. COMPENSATION AND LIEN.
43 (Or.) By direct provision of L. O. L., § 808, an agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to sell or purchase real estate for compensation or commission must be in writing. Lueddemann v. Rudolf, 154 P. 116.
V. ACTIONS FOR COMPENSATION.
86 (Kan.) Evidence in an action for com mission on sale of realty held to show that an oral contract superseding the written one be- tween the parties did not bind plaintiffs to sell the property at $3,500 to be entitled to a com- mission.-Rance v. Robinson Inv. Co., 154 P. 224.
88 (Wash.) Evidence held sufficient to jus tify submission to the jury of the issue whether a broker's contract to sell real estate for a com- mission was subsequently altered to waive the commission in case of sale for cash.-Payzant v. Caudill, 154 P. 170.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIA-
26 (Okl.) Under Laws Colo. 1897, p. 125, § 6, a Colorado building and loan association may loan its accumulations to members on plan of repayment provided for in its by-laws, and may contract for and recover a premium on plan as may be provided for in the by-laws or note or other evidence of debt, which notes shall be in form nonnegotiable.-Legg v. Midland Savings & Loan Co., 154 P. 682.
27 (Okl.) A contract between a Colorado building and loan association and one of its members made in Oklahoma territory, to be per- formed in Colorado, is governed by the law of Colorado, and, if valid there and not violative of the public policy of such territory, is enforce- able in Oklahoma.-Legg v. Midland Savings & Loan Co., 154 P. 682.
28 (Okl.) A Colorado building and loan as- sociation may without competitive bidding loan its accumulations where its by-laws so provide. -Legg v. Midland Savings & Loan Co., 154 P. 682.
BUILDING CONTRACTS.
50 (Cal.App.) An option to sell realty given to brokers, providing that it should remain in force for 90 days, and that, if the owner sold, within 90 days after expiration, to one whom See Principal and Surety, 82. the agents had recommended the property, the owner would pay a 5 per cent. commission, lim- ited to 90 days the time during which the agents' authority to sell or negotiate a sale should exist.-Elsea v. Fassler, 154 P. 1067.
An option to sell realty given brokers, pro- viding it should remain in force for 90 days, and that, if the owner sold within 90 days after expiration to one to whom the land was recom- mended by the brokers, the owner should pay a commission, was an agreement to pay the brokers a commission if the land was sold within 90 days after expiration of the option to one to whom it was recommended by the bro- kers during the 90 days of the option's life.
54 (Kan.) An agent held not entitled to a commission for procuring a contract for the ex- change of certain properties, where it appeared that the contract had been fraudulently altered by the agent, and that the person procured was not able, ready, and willing to perform.-Van Horn v. Wetterhold, 154 P. 274.
See Adjoining Landowners, 4; Contracts, 198; Master and Servant, 316, 318, 320, 330.
See Criminal Law, 414; Insurance, 84. II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT. 41 (Nev.) Evidence held to justify convic- tion.-State v. Whitaker, 154 P. 927.
was broken into in the nighttime between sun- Evidence held to justify finding that the mill set and sunrise, as defined by Rev. Laws, § 6634.-Id.
CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS. See Exchange of Property, 5; Quieting Ti- tle; Reformation of Instruments; Venue, 40.
For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
ally to be apprehended.-McGilchrist v. Port- land, E. & E. Ry. Co., 154 P. 419.
303 (Wash.) A street car conductor's an- nouncement of a stopping place is not of itself an invitation to a passenger to alight before the car comes to a full stop, and does not show that the conductor intended or had any reason to be- lieve that the passenger would alight before the car stopped.-Sumner v. Grays Harbor Ry. & Light Co., 154 P. 126.
Where a passenger, on announcement of her stopping place went to the platform, stood in the doorway, and stepped from the car while it was slowly coming to a stop, the conductor's failure to warn her that the car was in motion was not negligence.-Id.
12 (Kan.) Before a special privilege to stop cattle in transit to test the market can be grant- 316 (Mont.) Derailment of a car, injuring a ed, it is necessary that the tariffs pertaining passenger, raises a presumption of negligence. thereto be filed with the Public Utilities Com--Freeman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 154 mission, and be open to all shippers on equal P. 912. terms. Mollohan v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 154 P. 248.
318 (Kan.) Evidence in an action for the death of an alleged passenger from slipping on 13 (Kan.) Where cattle were shipped from B. ice and falling beneath the train, held not to to P. at the regularly published and filed rates, show that defendant failed to perform any duty held that a special contract, giving privilege owed deceased, or that his death was the proxi- of stoppage in transit to test the market, was mate result of defendant's negligence.-Rodgers preferential and discriminatory, and violative v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 P. 1027. of Gen. St. 1909, §§ 7174, 7178, 7181, 7214,318 (Mont.) Evidence in a passenger's ac- 7223, and Public Utilities Act.-Mollohan v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 154 P. 248.
II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS. (A) Delivery to Carrier.
40 (Kan.) The words "actual cost of the same" in a tariff provision relating to repair of cars by the shipper, include the cost of the necessary material and labor, but not the cost of inspecting or cleaning cars or attaching grain doors.-Rock Milling & Elevator Co. v. Atchi- son, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 154 P. 254.
(J) Charges and Liens. 1962 (Kan.) In a shipper's action against a railroad for furnishing grain doors, plaintiff could not recover by showing merely the total cost of all doors furnished by him including an unascertained number of items for which no charge could be made under the rulings of the Interstate Commerce Commission because they accrued in interstate shipments.-Stockton Ele- vator & Shipping Ass'n v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 154 P. 1126.
III. CARRIAGE OF LIVE STOCK. 207 (Kan.) Where the tariffs filed with the Public Utilities Commission specified the points at which live stock might be stopped in transit to test the market, any special contract enlarg- ing on that privilege, which is not specified in the tariffs, is void.-Mollohan v. Atchison, T. S. F. Ry. Co., 154 P. 248.
tion for personal injury when his train was de- railed held to show a causal connection between the derailment and his wrist-drop and minor in- juries and to establish liability for the damages. -Freeman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 154 P. 912.
318 (Wash.) Evidence in a passenger's ac- tion for personal injury while alighting from defendant's street car, apart from any negli- gence of the conductor in failing to warn her that the car was still in motion, held not to show any negligence on the part of the defend- ant. Sumner v. Grays Harbor Ry. & Light Co., 154 P. 126.
318 (Wash.) Evidence, in action for person- al injury from negligence of defendant when its outbound car, approaching at full speed, with- out warning, or any attempt to stop, struck plaintiff, as he was boarding an inbound car, held to sustain verdict for plaintiff.-Bemiss v. Puget Sound Traction Light & Power Co., 154 P. 171.
320 (Mont.) Where the evidence produced by a carrier tends to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from a derailment, its utmost effect, in view of Rev. Codes, § 8028, subd. 2, is to raise a question for the jury.-Freeman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 154 P. 912. (E) Contributory Negligence
333 (Kan.) An attempt by a street car pas- senger to alight a short distance from the usual stopping place held not contributory negligence if she believed the car had come to a stop in response to her signal.-Christian v. Union Traction Co., 154 P. 271.
227 (Okl.) In an action for damages to a shipment of cattle, held, that the admission of evidence on the issue of a waiver of terms of the shipment contract was error, where such issue was not raised by the pleadings.-Atchi-347 (Kan.) A passenger who alighted while son, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Lynn & Hudson, 154 P. 657.
the car was in motion and before it reached the place for discharge of passengers, and passed around the rear end of the car, and was struck by a car moving on a parallel track in a direc- tion opposite to that of the car from which he alighted, held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.-Galloway v. Hutchinson Interurban Ry. Co., 154 P. 238.
271 (Okl.) An intending passenger should inform himself whether the train on which he takes passage will, under the carrier's regula-347 (Or.) It cannot be said as matter of tions, stop at his destination.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Sheets, 154 P. 550.
law that it is negligent to alight from a moving car, but the circumstances and the speed of the car make it a question for the jury.-McGil- christ v. Portland, E. & E. Ry. Co., 154 P. 419.
280 (Or.) A common carrier owes to its 347 (Wash.) In passenger's action for in- passengers the highest degree of care, prudence, jury when struck by defendant's outbound car and foresight consistent with the practical op- as he was about to board its inbound car, held eration of its road or the utmost skill and care that his contributory negligence was a question consistent with its business, in view of the in- for the jury.-Bemiss v. Puget Sound Traction strumentalities employed and the danger natur-Light & Power Co., 154 P. 171.
348 (Or.) In action for personal injury when thrown from car by its sudden jerk as plaintiff was alighting, instruction that, if it See Witnesses, 342. was so dark as to make it obviously dangerous to alight there while the car was moving, plain- tiff was guilty of contributory negligence, held not objectionable in view of the evidence.-Me- Gilchrist v. Portland, E. & E. Ry. Co., 154 P.
(F) Ejection of Passengers and Intruders.
By carrier, see Carriers, 12, 1962. By telephone companies, see Telegraphs and Telephones, 33. To jury, see Trial, 194–295.
383 (Okl.) Under the evidence in a passen- ger's action for being forcibly ejected from a I. CREATION, EXISTENCE, AND VA- train, held, that whether plaintiff was misin- formed or misled by the carrier's servants as to the regular stopping place of the train and whether he was thereby induced to believe that the train would stop at his destination, were questions for the jury.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Sheets, 154 P. 550.
See Appeal and Error, 660; Eminent Do- main, 264; Physicians and Surgeons, 11; Taxation, 299.
I. NATURE AND GROUNDS.
5 (Wash.) Where attorneys for original re- ceiver had obtained a judgment, and after sub- stitution of new receiver and attorney the first attorneys filed a lien on the judgment to which the new receiver filed motion to strike, certiorari was proper procedure to review ruling of court in overruling motion as made at improper time, but without passing on validity of lien.-State v. Superior Court for King County, 154 P. 603.
24 (Cal.) Under Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1068, 1074, relating to writs of review, and Public Utilities Acts, $$ 60, 67, held, that petition for writ of review on Railroad Commission's ruling on demurrer, before final determination of ques- tion involved. was premature, and would be dismissed.-Holabird v. Railroad Commission of State of California, 154 P. 831.
CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE.
7 (Okl.) Under Rev. Laws 1910, § 2260, held, that a deed executed by a grantor not in possession or enjoyment of the premises within the year was void as between the grantee and a person in adverse possession.-Sutton v. Den- ton, 154 P. 1193.
20 (Or.) Under will devising realty to es- tablish home for wayward girls, with reversion to Churches of Christ Scientist, it was not in- tended that there should be any legal connection between the churches and the Mother Church, and not necessary that such relation appear in their articles of incorporation, if otherwise shown.-Carson v. Schulderman, 154 P. 903.
See Municipal Corporations, 47, 958.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES.
See Evidence, 441.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (A) Nature and Essentials of Transfers of Chattels as Security.
5 (Kan.) An assignment of the proceeds of a contract due and to become due for furnish- ing materials and labor to a building contractor ion to be valid against a garnisheeing creditor. held not a chattel mortgage requiring registra- -Hall v. Kansas City Terra Cotta Co., 154 P. 210.
6 (Idaho) Whether the instrument sued on was a conditional sale note or a chattel mort- gage, and whether plaintiff mistook his remedy in seeking to have it decreed to be a chattel mortgage and foreclosed, depended on the agree ment of the contracting parties and their in- tent as shown by the facts and circumstances. -Keane v. Kibble, 154 P. 972.
38 (Idaho) Under Rev. Codes, § 3392, held, that the fact that a transfer was made subject to a defeasance on condition could be proven in order to show the transfer to be a mortgage, though the fact did not appear from the instru- ment.-Keane v. Kibble, 154 P. 972.
III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA-
(D) Lien and Priority.
136 (Wash.) The lien of mortgage on crop was not lost when mortgagee sought judgment on its debt and obtained a foreclosure, result- ing in a deficiency judgment, and the mortgagee might proceed against one who had converted part of crop.-German-American State Bank v. Seattle Grain Co., 154 P. 443.
The judgment for the debt did not operate as a waiver or a release of the security.-Id.
138 (Wash.) The rights of the holder of a chattel mortgage on a crop were superior to any equities in one who had received a part of the crop in payment of an indebtedness for sacks furnished the mortgagor the previous year.- German-American State Bank v. Seattle Grain Co., 154 P. 443.
138 (Wash.) Under Rem. & Bal. Code, §§ 1188, 1190, 1190a, 1181, giving farm laborer lien on crops produced, plaintiff, having an ad- judicated lien, held entitled to damages against defendant, the mortgagee of the crop, who had received the crop, commingled it in nine ware- houses, and sold it by negotiable warehouse re- ceipts.-Hubbard v. Johnson, 154 P. 457.
138 (Wash.) A purchaser of leased land up- on which there were growing crops held to have acquired title to the growing crops, which he harvested, and neither he nor the lessor to be liable to the lessee's mortgagee for any deficien- cy; the other personalty included in the mort- gage not being enough to discharge it.-Woody v. Wagner, 154 P. 819.
IX. FORECLOSURE. 275 (Wash.) In an action to foreclose chat- tel mortgage on wheat crop, grain company, to whom mortgagor had delivered part of crop in payment of a previous indebtedness, and whose possession was known to the mortgagee prior to the commencement of the action, while a proper, was not a necessary, party thereto.- German-American State Bank v. Seattle Grain Co., 154 P. 443.
141 (Okl.) A mortgagee's consent to the furnishing of feed and pasturage for mortgaged cattle may be implied from facts and circum-278 (Okl.) Where a receiver sold mortgaged stances so as to give a lien therefor preference chattels pursuant to the court's order, it was er over his prior recorded mortgage.-Cather v. ror, on trial of the foreclosure suit, to exclude Spencer, 154 P. 1130. erty at the receiver's sale.-J. I. Case Threshing evidence of mortgagor's purchase of the prop- Mach. Co. v. Barney, 154 P. 674.
A lien for feed and pasturage furnished cattle with consent of the mortgagee will take prece- dence over a prior recorded chattel mortgage.
157 (Wyo.) In an action by a chattel mort- gagee against defendant, whom he claimed had taken possession of mortgaged cattle, defendant has the burden of proving that the lien he serted is superior.-Reynolds v. Morton, 154 P. 325.
IV. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTIES.
281 (Idaho) The right to have a receiver ap- pointed in proceedings to foreclose a chattel mortgage is purely statutory, depending on Rev. Codes, § 4329, as amended by Sess. Laws 1909, p. 26.-Keane v. Kibble, 154 P. 972. as-281 (Okl.) Where a receiver sold mortgaged chattels pursuant to the court's order, it was er- ror, on trial of the foreclosure suit, to peremp- torily discharge the receiver and set aside his acts.-J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Bar- ney, 154 P. 674.
162 (Okl.) On default in making payments, held that the mortgagee under an express provi- sion of the mortgage could take a peaceable pos- session of the mortgaged personalty, though he could not use force.-J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Barney, 154 P. 674.
168 (Okl.) Refusal of the mortgagor to con- sent to the mortgagee's taking possession of the mortgaged chattels, pursuant to the mortgage on default in making payments, held not a con- version.-J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Bar- ney, 154 P. 674.
169 (Okl.) That plaintiff waited several months after taking the property before proceed- ing to foreclose its mortgage held not a conver- sion, where it appeared that after the property was taken over there were negotiations toward effecting a settlement.-J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Barney, 154 P. 674
282 (Okl.) In an action to foreclose a chat- tel mortgage on a threshing outfit, held that it was error to instruct that the defendant mort- gagors were entitled to recover the value of the property, when plaintiff took possession under its mortgage, authorizing it to do so on the mortgagors' default, where the taking did not constitute a conversion.-J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Barney, 154 P. 674.
See False Pretenses; Fraud.
See Banks and Banking, 134; Garnish- ment, 51, 123, 232.
170 (Wash.) Where chattel mortgage upon a wheat crop gave the mortgagee a lien of which defendant had notice through the public records, defendant's taking of part of the crop and commingling it with its own wheat was an act See of conversion.-German-American State Bank v. Seattle Grain Co., 154 P. 443.
308, 323; Infants; Negligence, 39, 85; Parent and Child.
CHIROPRACTORS.
Physicians and Surgeons, 6. CHOSE IN ACTION.
177 (Wyo.) A chattel mortgagee entitled to See Assignments. possession may maintain an action against one who deprives him of the property by which the debt is secured.-Reynolds v. Morton, 154 P. 325.
See Religious Societies.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
See Negligence, 134.
VII. REMOVAL OR TRANSFER OF PROPERTY BY MORTGAGOR. (A) Rights and Liabilities of Parties. 229 (Wyo.) Where mortgaged chattels are taken by purchaser, the mortgagee, though not entitled to possession, the debt not being due, See Municipal Corporations. may at once maintain an action for damages to his reversionary interest.-Reynolds v. Morton, 154 P. 325.
CITY ENGINEER.
See Municipal Corporations, 147.
CIVIL SERVICE.
Where a copy of the mortgage attached to the complaint of the mortgagee showed that he was entitled to immediate possession of the cattle, the value of which he sought to recover from a See Evidence, 47. purchaser from the mortgagor, the complaint held sufficient, in the absence of demurrer, to state a cause of action, though not averring the mortgagee's right to possession.-Id.
Where a chattel mortgage provided that the mortgagee should become entitled to possession on sale or removal, or attempt to sell or re- See Garnishment, 219, 225; States, 181. move any of the property, the mortgagee's right to possession is immediate upon sale or removal, in which case he can at once maintain an ac- tion against the purchaser.-Id.
See Constitutional Law, 208.
42 (Wash.) In action for collision, where plaintiffs' and defendants' steam vessels met evi- dence held sufficient to support finding of de- See Brokers, 43-88; Principal and Agent, fendants' vessel's negligence.-Angeles Brewing & Malting Co. v. Carter, 154 P. 601.
124 (Wash.) In action for collision, ship- pers' invoices held admissible to show damages to freight in absence of showing that shippers' See claims were fraudulent or invoice prices were in excess of actual value of freight.-Angeles Brewing & Malting Co. v. Carter, 154 P. 601.
130 (Wash.) In action for collision, inter- est on sums paid out on repairs and freight claims held improperly computed from date ves- sel resumed run.-Angeles Brewing & Malting Co. v. Carter, 154 P. 601.
COMBINATIONS.
See Conspiracy, 41.
COMMERCE.
See Carriers; Courts, 489.
I. POWER TO REGULATE IN GEN-
14 (Ariz.) As the Webb-Kenyon Act divested intoxicating liquors of their interstate character, Const. art. 23, § 1, prohibiting disposal or in- troduction into the state of intoxicating liquors,
is not an interference with interstate commerce. -Sturgeon v. State, 154 P. 1050.
II. SUBJECTS OF REGULATION. 27 (Mont.) Proof that decedent was employ- ed and the railroad company engaged in inter- state commerce at the time of the accident held indispensable to the right to recover under the federal Employers' Liability Act.-Alexander v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 154 P. 914.
Where a railroad conductor was killed from
derailment of car on a branch line wholly with- in the state, while he was taking cars loaded with ties to a siding from which they would later be taken to a point within the state to be treated, after which they would be used with- in or without the state, he was not employed in interstate commerce, and hence the action was not sustainable under the federal Employ- ers' Liability Act.-Id.
COMMON SCHOOLS.
Schools and School Districts, 63-100.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY.
See Husband and Wife, 257-270.
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.
See Negligence, 97, 98.
COMPENSATION.
See Attorney and. Client, 130-167; Bro- kers, 43-88; Contracts, 229; Eminent Domain, 71-264; Insurance, 84; Mas- ter and Servant, ~871⁄2 2504; Municipal Corporations, 220; Officers, 95; Prin- cipal and Agent, 82-89; Sheriffs and Con- stables, 71.
COMPLAINT.
See Pleading, 52, 72.
COMPOSITIONS WITH CREDITORS. See Compromise and Settlement.
2 (Okl.) To constitute a valid composition, there must be a mutuality of contract between the debtor and creditor; a mere unilateral agreement purporting to bind the debtor not be- ing enforceable against the creditor until ac- cepted by him.-C. D. Osborne & Co. v. White, 154 P. 653.
COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT. See Accord and Satisfaction; Attorney and Client, 101; Compositions with Creditors; Payment; Release.
5 (Ariz.) Plaintiff, who entered upon land under an invalid oral agreement for a lease, held not to have completed an agreement to ac- cept a division of crops in payment and hence that he might recover the value of his services. -Crane v. Franklin, 154 P. 1036. COMPUTATION.
27 (Wash.) One inspecting the main track of a railroad engaged in intra and inter state commerce is engaged in "interstate commerce," and an action for his death or injury falls with- See Limitation of Actions, 51, 58; Time.
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