116 (Cal.App.) Plaintiff in divorce may tes-
tify as to specific acts of cruelty, though there
can be no corroboration thereof.-Perkins v.
Perkins, 154 P. 483.
125 (Cal.) Granting divorce on defendant's
admission of plaintiff's residence alone without
independent proof thereof, as required by Civ.
Code, 130, held error requiring reversal.-
Flynn v. Flynn, 154 P. 837.
127 (Cal.App.) The physicians of plaintiff
in divorce for extreme cruelty may, as corrob-
oration, testify generally to the subject to which
she ascribed her condition when she consulted
them.-Perkins v. Perkins, 154 P. 483.
Under Civ. Code, § 130, requiring corrobora-
tion of the parties for divorce, all the facts tes-
tified to need not be corroborated.-Id.
(E) Dismissal, Trial or Hearing, and New
150 (Cal.App.) Finding in a divorce suit,
that the evidence does not prove extreme cruel-
ty and is insufficient to warrant a divorce, is
insufficient as a finding of facts.-Perkins v.
Perkins, 154 P. 483.
Findings of facts in a divorce suit held requir-
ed under Civ. Code, § 131, though there is a de-
fault, and divorce is denied.-Id.
(F) Judgment or Decree.
168 (Cal.) Express findings on the essential
fact of residence or on other essential facts are
not necessary to validity of decree of divorce as
against collateral attack.-Flynn v. Flynn, 154
P. 837.
184 (Cal.App.) In a husband's action for
divorce, where both had been persistently at-
tempting to secure divorce, a ruling sustaining
defendant's objection to plaintiff's question to
her as to whether she was willing to go back
and live with plaintiff was harmless, if er
roneous.-Benson v. Benson, 154 P. 285.
V. ALIMONY, ALLOWANCES, AND
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY.
240 (Cal.App.) In a wife's suit for divorce,
the decree, awarding her $75 a month alimony,
made in accordance with the terms of a contract
settling the property rights of the parties,
whereby the husband agreed to make the pay-
ment, and pursuant to the prayer of the com-
plaint, held not improper as a double award, in
that plaintiff had a remedy both under the de-
cree and the agreement.-Newell v. Newell, 151
P. 32.
243 (Or.) Under L. O. L. § 53, reference in
summons in suit for divorce to the relief sought
held to give the court jurisdiction to enter a
money judgment for permanent alimony for
plaintiff.-Jacobs v. Jacobs, 154 P. 749.
245 (Utah) Under Comp. Laws 1907, § 1212,
amended by Laws 1909, c. 109, a wife, who was
granted no alimony when a decree of divorce
was rendered in her favor, cannot thereafter be
granted alimony on subsequent petition to the
court.-Cody v. Cody, 154 P. 952.
255 (Cal.App.) Defendant, in a suit for di-
vorce in which plaintiff demanded that he be re-
quired to pay her $75 a month, as alimony, pur-
suant to their contract settling their property
rights, could not attack the decree awarding $75
that it was without the issues tendered.-New-
a month for plaintiff's support, on the ground
ell v. Newell, 154 P. 32.
280 (Utah) An appeal will lie from an order
of the trial court denying the petition of a wife
who secured a divorce for an award of alimony
filed long after the rendition of the decree.-
Cody v. Cody, 154 P. 952.
286 (Cal.) Only a clear abuse of discretion
of the trial court given by Civ. Code, § 137, in
granting or refusing temporary alimony will be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.-Newlands v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 154 P.
170 (Cal.App.) Under Civ. Code, §§ 131,
132, final decree of divorce was properly vacated
when entered within a week after the actual en-
try of an interlocutory decree entered nunc pro
tune as of the day when the case was submitted308 (Cal.App.) Where the husband, against
for decision a year before.-Nolte v. Nolte, 154
171 (Cal.App.) Where a wife sued for di-
vorce, charging cruelty and desertion, and judg-
ment was for the husband, who thereafter com-
mitted acts of cruelty and desertion, the judg-
ment was not conclusive upon the wife's right
to maintain a cross-bill, based on such acts, in
a subsequent action for divorce by the husband.
-Benson v. Benson, 154 P. 285.
172 (Cal.App.) The judgment in a wife's
prior action for divorce was not conclusive up-
on her right to maintain a cross-bill, charging
cruelty and desertion, in the husband's later
action, where such former judgment was not
pleaded by the husband, and no proof thereof
was offered under the wife's plea of estoppel-
Benson v. Benson, 154 P. 285.
182 (Cal.) Denial of alimony under Civ.
Code, § 137, pending wife's appeal from a decree
for her husband held proper, it appearing_that
he was entitled to divorce.-Newlands v. Supe-
rior Court of Los Angeles County, 154 P. 829.
Pending an appeal from a decree of divorce
in favor of her husband, held, that the court
might properly deny fees to her attorneys, the
husband having consented that they might be
fixed upon determination of the appeal.-Id.
VI. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF
CHILDREN.
whom a divorce was awarded, was a carpenter
and building contractor, making good wages and
usually employed, an allowance to the wife,
solely for the support and maintenance of the
three minor children, of $15 per month each,
was proper.-Benson v. Benson, 154 P. 285.
308 (Or.) Under L. O. L. § 53, reference in
summons in suit for divorce to the relief sought
held to give the court jurisdiction to enter a
money judgment for the maintenance and educa-
tion of the minor children.-Jacobs v. Jacobs,
154 P. 749.
VII. OPERATION AND EFFECT OF
DIVORCE, AND RIGHTS OF
DIVORCED PERSONS.
323 (Kan.) The responsibility of the father
for maintenance and education of minor children
is not canceled by a divorce decree not pro-
viding for the children, though divorce be grant-
ed for fault of the mother.-Rowell v. Rowell,
154 P. 243.
Where the father, after securing a divorce
decree making no provision for maintenance of
minor children, leaves that burden to the mother,
she may recover from him a reasonable amount
for expenditures made by her for their support.
Id.
Where, after divorce, the father neglects to
provide for support of minor children, and such
support is provided by the mother, the proper
remedy available to her is to open the decree,
that an allowance may be made in the divorce
suit for past as well as future support of the
children.-Id.
See Dedication; Evidence, 461.
I. CREATION, EXISTENCE, AND TER-
MINATION.
2 (Cal.App.) The time of prescription to es-
tablish a right of way cannot commence to run
while title to the land is in the United States
or the state.-Lapique v. Morrison, 154 P. 881.
7 (Cal.App.) If a way to which a right is
370, claimed by prescription is plowed by the owner
of the land and obstructed by him for his farm
purposes during the time of prescription, the
claim cannot be supported.-Lapique v. Morri-
son, 154 P. 881.
I. ESTABLISHMENT AND MAIN-
2 (Cal.) Act creating reclamation district
(St. 1913, p. 130) held not objectionable for
specifying location of levee instead of leaving lo-
cation to board of trustees as provided by Pol.
Code, 3454.-Reclamation Dist. No. 1500 v.
Superior Court in and for Sutter County, 154 P.
845.
2 (N.M.) Laws 1912, c. 84 (Code 1915, §§
1877-1958), providing for organization of drain-
age districts through the courts, held valid.-
In re Dexter-Greenfield Drainage Dist., 154 P.
382.
Laws 1912, c. 84 (Code 1915, §§ 1877-1958),
providing for organization of drainage districts
through the courts, held not violative of Const.
art. 11, § 6, requiring that domestic corpora-
tions be organized by and through the state
corporation commission; drainage districts be-
ing public corporations not comprehended by
this section.-Id.
8 (Cal.App.) A claim to a right of way by
prescription cannot be supported where the way
has been allowed as a matter of accommodation,
and claimant's use of it has not been such as to
give the landowner notice of an adverse user.-
Lapique v. Morrison, 154 P. 881.
18 (Cal.App.) A claim to a particular right
of way over another's land because it is necessa-
ry to the reasonable use of the claimant's prop-
erty cannot be supported, where the claimant
has another, though less convenient, way of ac-
cess.-Lapique v. Morrison, 154 P. 881.
36 (Cal.App.) The claimant of a right of
way by prescription must prove a five years' con-
tinuous and uninterrupted use and enjoyment of
the way.-Lapique v. Morrison, 154 P. 881.
II. EXTENT OF RIGHT, USE, AND
OBSTRUCTION.
61 (Or.) Upon proper application a court
of equity will enjoin interference with an own-
er's easement, when the injury complained of
is irreparable, the intermeddling continuous, or
the remedy at law for damages inadequate.-
Nicholas v. Title & Trust Co., 154 P. 391.
EJECTION.
6 (Cal.) Building of levee by reclamation
district officers as directed by creative act (St.
1913, p. 130), must be deemed for public benefit.
-Reclamation Dist. No. 1500 v. Superior Court See Costs, 47; Vendor and Purchaser,
in and for Sutter County, 154 P. 845.
17 (Cal.) Imposition on reclamation district
No. 1500 of duty of building levee by its creative
act (St. 1913, p. 130) is an imposition of such
duty on its directing officers.-Reclamation Dist.
No. 1500 v. Superior Court in and for Sutter
County, 154 P. 845.
36 (N.M.) Laws 1912, c. 84, § 35 (Code
1915, § 1911), relative to drainage districts, held
to give right of appeal to the Supreme Court
from findings of the district court as to the
required signatures of the petition for organiza-
tion of the district within thirty days after
same are filed, and to cut off the right thereafter
to question such findings. In re Dexter-Green-
field Drainage Dist., 154 P. 382.
DRAMSHOPS.
See Intoxicating Liquors.
DRUGGISTS.
See Intoxicating Liquors, 49, 97.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
See Constitutional Law, 276-313.
DUPLICITY.
See Indictment and Information, 125.
DYING DECLARATIONS.
See Homicide, 203.
III. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE.
64 (Or.) A description of realty in the pe-
tition in an ejectment suit as "real property sit-
uate in the county of M., state of O., to wit,
lot eight (8), block seven (7), in Central Albina,
an addition to the city of P., M. county, O.," fa-
miliarly known as a certain number and street,
is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the coun-
ty court of that county.-Wettersten v. Fisher,
154 P. 534.
See Criminal Law, 678; Pleading, ~369;
Wills,781, 782.
ELECTION OF REMEDIES.
(Wash.) The doctrine of election of reme-
dies applies only to cases where plaintiff has a
choice of remedies arising out of the same state
of facts.-O'Donnell v. McCool, 154 P. 1090.
7 (Wash.) Appearance by plaintiff in de-
fendant contractor's surety's federal court suit
to restrain numerous state court actions by
claimants under the bond and proof of such
claim in such suit held election of remedies by
plaintiff whereunder statute of limitations ran
so as to defeat right to maintain subsequent
state court action on claim after its dismissal by
federal court.-Marshall-Wells Hardware Co. v.
Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 154 P. 801.
7 (Wash.) Where, pending entry of decree
of affirmance, one surety on a supersedeas bond
died, and the judgment creditor presented a con-
tingent claim to the representatives of his es-
tate, and on its rejection brought action thereon | power, cannot compel specific performance of
in the superior court, such action was not an the contract as against the public right.-State
election of remedy, and did not bar his right to v. Spokane & I. E. R. Co., 154 P. 1110.
summary judgment in the Supreme Court.-Ol- Under the Public Service Commission Law,
son v. Seldovia Salmon Co., 154 P. 1107.
the commission cannot compel a traction com-
pany to disclose its contracts for the sale of its
surplus power to private buyers.-Id.
ELEVATORS.
(Colo.) Where plaintiff, deeming that his
license to maintain an irrigation ditch over de-
fendant's land was revocable, instituted condem-
nation proceedings, but dismissed them on dis-
covering his mistake, there was no election of
remedies, precluding the assertion of the irre- See Master and Servant, 871⁄2.
vocable character of the license.-Graybill v.
Corlett, 154 P. 730.
14 (Cal.App.) Where defendant procured
plaintiff's land by fraud for which she obtained
judgment in action for damages, plaintiff was
estopped from proceeding in equity to have dec-
laration of homestead by defendant, on land pur-
chased with proceeds of land procured from
plaintiff, annulled.-Hilborn v. Bonney, 154 P.
26.
4 (Cal.App.) "Embezzlement" consists in the
fraudulent appropriation of property possession
of which was lawfully acquired.-People v. Dye,
154 P. 875.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
See Appeal and Error, 200; Injunction.
7; Statutes, 123.
See Municipal Corporations, 918; Witness-I. NATURE, EXTENT, AND DELEGA-
es, 300.
186 (Cal.) As under Pol. Code, § 1211,
subd. 1, a cross is not essential in the case of a
name written on a ballot, the fact that a voter,
after writing in a name, placed a cross oppo-
site it, will not warrant the rejection of the
ballot. Turner v. Wilson, 154 P. 2.
Because a voter wrote in the words "Yes"
or "No" in the voting squares opposite a bond
proposition, instead of stamping such squares
with the appropriate cross, will not warrant the
rejection of the entire ballot.-Id.
194 (Cal.) Under Pol. Code, § 1211, subd.
4, which was added in 1903, held, that ballots
would not be rejected because the voter, after
making pencil crosses, used the stamp contain-
ing the cross, nor because he placed crosses in
improper voting squares.-Turner v. Wilson, 154
P. 2.
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The sale of electrical power for traction pur-
poses, light, manufacturing, etc., is not a public
use, and the sale by a public service traction
company of the difference between its ordinary
requirements and its peak load is only an in-
cident to the public employment, of which the
law will take no notice.-Id.
Public Service Commission Law has not ex-
tended the jurisdiction of the Commission over
a traction company, selling its surplus of power
between ordinary requirements and peak load to
various private buyers, so far as such branch
of the business is concerned.-Id.
If the state, at any time, acting through its
accredited agency, puts a burden upon a public
service corporation which requires the use of its
surplus power, it must devote such power to the
public use and abandon any private contracts it
may hold for the sale thereof.-Id.
1 (Wash.) Where the state requires a pub-
lic service corporation to devote its surplus
power to the public use, a private contractor
with the corporation, who has been buying such
2 (N.M.) Laws 1912, c. 84 (Code 1915, §§
1877-1958), providing for organization of drain-
age districts through the courts, held not viola-
tive of Const. art. 2, § 20, prohibiting the
taking of private property for public use with-
out compensation.-In re Dexter-Greenfield
Drainage Dist., 154 P. 382.
31 (Cal.) Act creating reclamation district
(St. 1913, p. 130), held not violative of Const.
art. 1, § 14, prohibiting taking of private prop-
erty without compensation, in that levee provid-
ed for by act will destroy or damage county
roads, bridges, and buildings.-Reclamation Dist.
No. 1500 v. Superior Court in and for Sutter
County, 154 P. 845.
II. COMPENSATION.
(A) Necessity and Sufficiency in General.
71 (Cal.) Under Const. art. 1, § 14, and ar-
ticle 12, §§ 22, 23, and section 23a (adopted No-
vember 3, 1914), Public Utilities Act, § 47, as
amended (St. 1913, p. 684), authorizing Rail-
road Commission to fix compensation in emi-
nent domain proceeding by municipal water dis-
trict, etc., held valid.-Marin Water & Power
Co. v. Railroad Commission of State of Califor-
nia, 154 P. 864.
III. PROCEEDINGS TO TAKE PROP-
ERTY AND ASSESS COM-
PENSATION.
203 (Or.) Evidence in a suit to restrain
ejectment for land taken by plaintiff in the in-
junction suit as a right of way for a water
power ditch under a parol license, and to assess
damages, held to sustain a finding of damages in
the sum of $300.-Molalla Electric Co. v. Wheel-
er, 154 P. 686.
231 (Cal.) In proceeding before Railroad
Commission by municipal water district to fix
compensation for land, etc., of water company
taken by eminent domain, brought before Rail-
road Commission under Public Utilities Act, §
47, as amended (St. 1913, p. 684), held, that com-
mission was judicial tribunal, with power to
call and examine witnesses against will of ei-
ther party.-Marin Water & Power Co. v. Rail-
road Commission of State of California, 154 P.
864.
In proceeding by municipal water district to
have compensation for land and rights of water
company taken by eminent domain fixed by Rail-
road Commission under Public Utilities Act,
§ 47, as amended (St. 1913, p. 684), commission
held not to have exceeded its authority in con-
sidering testimony of witness on questions of
use and value.--Id.
In proceeding by municipal water district to
fix compensation for property taken by emi-
See Highways, 96; Mandamus, ~10; Mu-
nicipal Corporations, 147.
ENROLLMENT RECORDS.
nent domain, brought under Public Utilities
Act, § 47, as amended (St. 1913, p. 684), fail-
ure of witness to state items of value separate-
ly and of Railroad Commission to award such
value separately held not to deprive commis-
sion of jurisdiction, or to make its award inval-
id.-Id.
In proceeding before Railroad Commission by See Indians, 13.
municipal water district to fix compensation to
be paid for rights of a water and power compa-
ny, held, that commission was not limited to tes-
timony of witnesses offered by parties, but
might take testimony evidence at the hearing by
witness called by it.-Id.
See Judgment, 273; Public Lands, ☺—35.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
See Constitutional Law, 229, 240.
EQUITABLE DEFENSES.
Under Public Utility Act, § 47, as amended
(St. 1913, p. 684), and section 70, failure of
Railroad Commission in fixing value of proper-
ty of water company taken by municipal water
district to find separately the value of each sep-
arate parcel held not to cause a loss of juris- See Judgment, ~621.
diction or to make the proceeding void.—Id.
234 (Cal.) In proceeding by municipal wa-
ter district before Railroad Commission to fix See Estoppel, 55–117.
compensation for land, rights, etc., taken by it
by eminent domain, contention that commission
erred allowing nothing for possibility of increas-
ing the amount of water stored by dams held
not sustained, where commission allowed there-
for by another method.-Marin Water & Power
Co. v. Railroad Commission of State of Cali-
fornia, 154 P. 864.
262 (Cal.) Under Public Utilities Act, § 47,
as amended (St. 1913, p. 684), and section 70,
confirmed by Const. art. 12, § 23a (adopted
November 3, 1914), held that on facts appear-
ing on review instituted under section 47 as
amended the Supreme Court would consider the
case on theory that Railroad Commission had
lawful authority to entertain proceeding to fix
compensation for land taken by water district.
-Marin Water & Power Co. v. Railroad Com-
mission of State of California, 154 P. 864.
262 (Colo.) An order in a condemnation
proceeding for the jury's view of the premises,
without requiring respondent to advance the ex-
pense, to which the petitioner saved an ex-
ception, but did not state any ground of ob-
jection, was not reviewable.-East Denver Mu-
nicipal Irr. Dist. v. Altura Farms Co., 154 P.
264 (Cal.) Under Const. art. 6. § 4, and
Code Civ. Proc. § 1068, Public Utilities Act, §
47, as amended (St. 1913, p. 684), and section 67,
Supreme Court held to have jurisdiction in cer-
tiorari to review conclusions of Railroad Com-
mission in condemnation proceedings, based on
uncontradicted evidence.-Marin Water & Pow-
er Co. v. Railroad Commission of State of Cali-
fornia, 154 P. 864.
V. TITLE OR RIGHTS ACQUIRED.
318 (Wash.) Where land is taken for a rail-
road right of way, the railroad company is en-
titled to make all the use of the land which the
necessities and convenience of the public may
require; the original compensation being pre-
sumed to cover such added use.-Tacoma Mill
Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 154 P. 173.
EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYÉS.
See Master and Servant.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACTS.
See Commerce, 27.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE.
See Insurance, 212.
ENCROACHMENT.
See Constitutional Law, 55, 70-80.
See Account; Appeal and Error, 974, 1009,
1175; Assignments, 48, 100; Costs,
13; Estoppel, 56, 62; Fraudulent Convey-
ances; Injunction; Jury, 13; Nuisance,
83; Quieting Title; Reformation of In-
struments; Set-Off and Counterclaim, ~8;
Specific Performance; Trusts.
I. JURISDICTION, PRINCIPLES, AND
(A) Nature, Grounds, Subjects, and Extent
of Jurisdiction in General.
42 (Or.) Where defendant fails to demur
for lack of equitable jurisdiction of the subject-
matter to a complaint to protect an easement,
and also joins in an application for equitable
relief, any objection on that ground is waived.-
Nicholas v. Title & Trust Co., 154 P. 391.
VIII. HEARING, SUBMISSION OF IS-
SUES TO JURY, AND REHEARING.
377 (Mont.) The judge in the trial of a
cause in equity may call a jury to decide issues
of fact, and, if he does so, he may submit such
issues as he chooses.-Yellowstone Nat. Bank
v. McCullough, 154 P. 919.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.
See Execution, 38.
2 (Cal.App.) Bank Act, § 15, as amended
in 1913 (St. 1913, p. 145, § 16), as to payment
into state treasury of unclaimed bank deposits,
held valid.-State v. Security Sav. Bank, 154
P. 1070.
3 (Cal.App.) State held entitled to assume
control of property unclaimed for such a period
as to indicate abandonment and danger of loss,
or to make it the proper subject of escheat, in-
cluding unclaimed savings bank deposits.-State
v. Security Sav. Bank, 154 P. 1070.
Possible detriment to owner of unclaimed bank
deposit through loss of interest, held not defense
available to proceeding to require bank to pay
unclaimed deposit into state treasury.-Id.
See Deeds, 124, 128; Descent and Distribu-
tion; Executors and Administrators; Life Es-
tates; Remainders; Tenancy in Common;
Wills.
interest in the mother.-Leslie v. Harrison Nat.
Bank, 154 P. 209.
See Appeal and Error, 154, 882; Dedica-93 (Wash.) Where a landowner had ac-
tion, 39; Insurance, 141, 400, 664, quiesced in the construction of a system of wa-
755; Landlord and Tenant, 61: Limita- terworks necessitating the taking of water from
tion of Actions, 13.
a stream which flowed through her land, held,
that she and her lessee were estopped from en-
joining the city from a further diversion of the
(B) Estates and Rights Subsequently Ac- water.-Domrese v. City of Roslyn, 154 P. 140.
37 (Or.) Where a land claimant under pro-
visional constitution orally agreed to convey
land before passage of Donation Act Cong. Sept.
27, 1850, § 4, evidenced by void quitclaim deed
made after passage of act, such agreement
though enforceable, did not vest title in the pro-
posed grantee upon issuance of donation cer-
tificate or patent thereunder to grantor.-Stans-
bery v. First Methodist Episcopal Church, 154
P. 887.
III. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
(A) Nature and Essentials in General.
55 (Okl.) It is only where the conduct of
one who has kept silent when he should have
spoken has misled or prejudicially affected an-
other's conduct that the latter may successfully
plead estoppel in pais against the former.-Ma-
dill State Bank v. Weaver, 154 P. 478.
94 (Mont.) A grantee who sued to foreclose
a lien by the fact that he permitted his grantor,
a deed as a mortgage was not estopped to claim
after the conveyance to him, to convey by war-
ranty deed to the defendant, where his deed
was on record prior to the transaction with de-
fendant; that being the only notice which he
was required in law to give.-Yellowstone Nat.
Bank v. McCullough, 154 P. 919.
(E) Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Re-
view.
117 (Mont.) Where the grantee sued to fore-
close his deed as a mortgage, and the defense
was that he permitted a subsequent grantee of
the same grantor to purchase, although he knew
of the transaction, it was not error to exclude,
as immaterial, evidence that the grantor was re-
sponsible financially at the time of the transac-
tion with the defendant, and that he later be-
came irresponsible; the rights of the parties
tion by the fact that the plaintiff's deed had
been recorded.-Yellowstone Nat. Bank v. Mc-
Cullough, 154 P. 919.
56 (Ariz.) In an action to recover for sell-being concluded on the date of the transac-
ing defendant's property under an employment
by defendant's special agent, the plaintiff could
not recover on the ground of estoppel, where
he had not changed his situation to his detri-
ment in reliance upon the principal's conduct.
-Brutinel v. Nygren, 154 P. 1042.
62 (Wash.) A city which accepted land and
constructed a street thereon, held estopped to
deny its power to make the refund of special as-
sessments which it agreed to make as considera-
tion for the land.-Washington Water Power
Co. v. City of Spokane, 154 P. 329.
Although a city cannot be estopped to deny its
power to perform an act absolutely void because
ultra vires, it may be estopped where the act
was authorized, though the method of doing it
was not specifically authorized.-Id.
(B) Grounds of Estoppel.
70 (Or.) Where the grantee accepted a deed
with knowledge that it did not contain a cove-
nant in his favor which he claimed was omitted
through fraud, and held possession for several
years, he cannot seek to reform the deed on that
ground.-Jakel v. Seeck, 154 P. 424.
75 (Okl.) Where the owner of a chattel has
given the seller express power to sell and he
sells clothed with the indicia of ownership, the
buyer takes title.-A. L. Jepson Mfg. Co. v.
Shank, 154 P. 516.
78 (Kan.) Heirs by entering into a family
agreement held estopped from claiming estate by
inheritance, where their conduct induced dece-
dent's widow not to probate the will for more
than three years.-Freeman v. Peter, 154 P.
Where the grantee sued to foreclose his deed
as a mortgage, evidence that the defendant had
made inquiry of the county clerk to ascertain
whether his immediate grantor could give title
and that the clerk informed him that his title
was good was inadmissible.-Id.
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I. JUDICIAL NOTICE.
20 (N.M.) The proper method of operating
a locomotive, not being a matter of common or
general knowledge, cannot be judicially known.
-Thayer v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 154 P. 691.
32 (Cal.) Generally a court of record does
not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances,
and such ordinances must, where a necessary
part of the case, be proven; but judicial notice
presupposes an absence of evidence, and the
rule does not apply where a prima facie case
is made.-Tilton v. Decker, 154 P. 860.
47 (Or.) Where rules of the civil service
commission of a city were not pleaded below or
brought before the Supreme Court by bill of
exceptions, such court cannot consider them,
as, like ordinances of cities, they are not sub-
jects of judicial notice.-Kay v. City of Port-
land, 154 P. 750.
II. PRESUMPTIONS.
82 (Cal.App.) In the absence of showing of
abuse of authority by the court in appointing a
receiver, the presumption, on appeal in another
suit where the point is material, is that the ap-
pointment was proper in all respects.-Borges
v. Hillman, 154 P. 1075.
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