SUPPORT.
See Divorce, 308, 323.
SURETYSHIP.
102 (Cal.) In view of Civ. Code, § 1714, no recovery can be had on the last clear chance See Principal and Surety. doctrine because of the wanton negligence of the servants of a street car company where de- ceased's own contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.-Tucker v. United Railroads of San Francisco, 154 P. 835.
SURFACE WATERS.
See Waters and Water Courses, 119–126.
103 (Cal.) The last clear chance doctrine as to injuries on street car tracks applies in California.-Tucker v. United Railroads of San See Physicians and Surgeons. Francisco, 154 P. 835.
114 (Wash.) Evidence held to warrant find-
ing that the motorman in charge of a street See Abatement and Revival, ~53, 57. car could have avoided collision with the auto- mobile truck which plaintiff was driving had he used ordinary care when plaintiff was com- pelled to stop his truck to avoid collision with another vehicle.-Anderson V. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 154 P. 135. STREETS.
See Highways; Municipal Corporations, 706.
SUBCONTRACTORS.
See Mechanics' Liens, 229.
SUBROGATION.
See Bankruptcy, 207; Insurance,
See Appeal and Error, 154, 171; Consti- tutional Law, 229, 284; Intoxicating Liquors, 49; Municipal Corporations, 422-582, 958; Schools and School Districts, 100; Statutes, 64, 95; Towns, 54; Waters and Water Courses, 231.
I. NATURE AND EXTENT OF POWER IN GENERAL.
4 (Okl.) Under Const. art. 10, § 13, the 25 (Okl.) Where the local agent of both M. Legislature may select the subjects of taxation. and A., loan companies and mortgage creditors-In re Gross Production Tax of Wolverine Oil of the same debtor, received a payment made by Co., 154 P. 362. the debtor for M. and paid same on A.'s mort-5 (Or.) Where a homestead entry has been gage which was canceled. A. having knowledge made, final proof submitted, and final certifi- of the facts, held, that M., its mortgage having cate issued, the land immediately becomes li- been canceled by judicial decision, was entitled able to taxation.-Cannon v. Hood River Irr. to be subrogated in A.'s mortgage in the amount Dist., 154 P. 397. due it and to have such mortgage restored for that amount.-Midland Savings & Loan Co. v. Sutton, 154 P. 1133.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIRE- MENTS AND RESTRICTIONS.
38 (Okl.) Act March 11, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 107, art. 2, subd. A) § 1. imposing a gross production tax, held not repugnant of Const. art. 10, § 19, requiring that every tax shall specify distinctly the purpose for which tue tax was levied.-In re Gross Production Tax of Wolverine Oil Co., 154 P. 362.
40 (Okl.) Act March 11, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 107, art. 2, subd. A) § 1, imposing a gross production tax on ores bearing lead, zinc, etc., and on the production of petroleum or other mineral oil or natural gas, held not violative of Const. art. 10, § 5, requiring uniformity of taxation, though it omits to impose such tax-
ation on coal.-In re Gross Production Tax off all apportionments have been made and taxes Wolverine Oil Co., 154 P. 362. levied. Id.
42 (Okl.) Under Const. art. 10, § 22, the legislative power to classify objects of taxation wide range of discretion, and, while classification must be reasonable, and not ar- bitrary, there can be no precise application of the rule of reasonableness. In re Gross Pro- duction Tax of Wolverine Oil Co., 154 P. 362. The courts will not interfere with the legis- lative classification of objects of taxation un- less the classification adopted clearly makes an invidious and unreasonable distinction.-Id.
Act March 11, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 107, art. 2, subd. A) § 1, held not violative of Const. art. 10, § 5, requiring that taxation be uniform on the same class of subjects, though it pro- vides that property of those engaged in mining through a federal agency shall be taxed on an ad valorem basis, and not subject to the gross production basis provided for by the act.--Id.
49 (Okl.) Act March 11, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 107, art. 2, subd. A) § 1, does not impose an ad valorem tax, and therefore is not repug- nant to Const. art. 10, § 8, requiring that prop- erty taxable ad valorem shall be assessed at its fair cash value.-In re Gross Production Tax of Wolverine Oil Co., 154 P. 362.
200 (Okl.) That portion of Act March 11, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 107, art. 2, subd. A) § 1, imposing a tax on the business of producing petroleum, etc., which provides that the tax shall be "in lieu of any other taxes" etc., held not an "exemption" from taxation in violation of Const. art. 5, §§ 46, 46u, 50, but a substi- tution of one form of taxation for another.- In re Gross Production Tax of Wolverine Oil Co., 154 P. 362.
210 (Okl.) Where an exemption from taxa- tion is based on the use to which lands are put, the exemption ceases on termination of the use. -Rogers v. Herndon, 154 P. 1185.
241 (Wyo.) Under Comp. St. 1910, § 2322, exempting from taxation property of lodges not used for private profit, property of lodge rented only occasionally for the evening for social gatherings held exempt.-Hardin V. Rock Springs Lodge No. 12, A. F. & A. M., 154 P. 323.
V. LEVY AND ASSESSMENT. (A) Levy and Apportionment.
299 (Utah) Under Comp. Laws 1907, 88 2561, 2588, as amended by Laws 1909, c. 63, and section 2562, and section 2593, as amended by Laws 1915, c. 111, state board of equalization held authorized to correct apportionment before second Monday in August.-Rich County v. Bailey, 154 P. 773.
State board of equalization, in apportioning railroad property to S. county for taxation claimed to be located in R. county, held not to have exceeded jurisdiction or power so as to make its acts subject to writ of certiorari.-Id. The state board of equalization's determina- tion, in apportioning railroad property, as to the location of the boundary between adjoining counties, is not conclusive with regard to any succeeding fiscal or taxing year.-Id.
State board of equalization's determination, in apportioning railroad property, as to location of boundary line, held to become conclusive when
Writ of certiorari to review state board of equalization's apportionment of railroad prop- erty held to be denied when applied for after apportionments by county commissioners to lesser taxing units.-Id.
VIII. COLLECTION AND ENFORCE-
MENT AGAINST PERSONS OR PERSONAL PROPERTY.
(C) Remedies for Wrongful Enforcement. 608 (Okl.) The sole remedy of a taxpayer aggrieved at the action of the state board of equalization in changing the aggregate valuation from that certified to the county board, is by appeal under Rev. Laws 1910, §§ 7368-7370, ex- cept where he has no taxable property within the tax district, and hence injunction against collection of the tax will not lie.-McClellan v. Ficklen, 154 P. 660.
610 (Or.) Equity will not relieve from the payment of an invalid tax or the collection of an excessive levy, until the complainant first pays or tenders for payment the amount legal- ly levied.-Cannon v. Hood River Irr. Dist., 154 P. 397.
X. REDEMPTION FROM TAX SALE.
708 (Wash.) Under Rem. & Bal. Code, §§ 9245, 9257, the inclusion in the summons and foreclosure of a delinquency certificate on ac- count of taxes for 1908 only of the name of the owner shown by the assessment rolls for 1908 and not of the owner shown for 1909, was suffi- cient where the certificate, covering taxes both 1908 and merely had the additional amount for 1909 added, which was paid by the holder.- Rockwood v. Turner, 154 P. 465.
for 1908 and 1909, was originally issued for
Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 237, subd. 3, pro- viding by whose affidavit proof of service of summons by publication shall be made, proof in a tax delinquency certificate foreclosure suit by the cashier of the newspaper was insufficient. -Id.
In suit to quiet title against foreclosure of a tax delinquency certificate, where the record in the foreclosure proceedings affirmatively showed that service of summons upon the owner was not proved as required by statute, there was no ice was duly made to appear to the court.—Id. presumption that the jurisdictional fact of serv-
XI. TAX TITLES.
(C) Actions to Confirm or Try Title.
796 (Wash.) In an action to quiet title against a tax foreclosure, where defendant, aft- er objecting to plaintiff's offer of the deed rec- ord on the ground that it included other prop- erty than that involved, reserved the right to cross-examine plaintiff with plaintiff's abstract, which examination defendant thereafter waived, he also waived strict documentary evidence of plaintiff's title as shown by the deed record. Rockwood v. Turner, 154 P. 465. (D) Rights and Remedies of Purchaser of
831 (Cal.App.) A tax purchaser is a mere volunteer as to the amount paid on competitive bidding in addition to the taxes due, and, the tax title being invalid, he cannot recover such amount from the owner.-O'Reilly v. All Per- sons, 154 P. 474.
XIV. DISPOSITION OF TAXES COL- LECTED, AND FAILURE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO COLLECT.
90634 (Idaho) Sess. Laws 1915, c. 27, §§ 12, 14, 15, providing for diverting from the state treasury tax money due to the state from counties and for paying it out by the counties to persons engaged in emergency employment, held
908 (Okl.) Sess. Laws 1895, c. 43, art. 3, § 2, amending St. 1893, § 5643, and Sess. Laws 1897, c. 32, art. 9, § 3, providing that interest, penalties, and forfeitures on delinquent taxes shall be paid into the county sinking fund, were not repealed by Act March 12, 1897, amending Sess. Laws 1895, c. 43, art. 3, § 2.-Board of Com'rs of Custer County v. City of Clinton, 154 P. 513,
Rev. Laws 1910, §§ 6771-6775, imposing pen- alties on delinquent taxes and providing for dis- position thereof, held constitutional.-Id.
908 (Okl.) Laws 1895, c. 43, art. 3, § 2, amending St. 1893, § 5643, and Laws 1897, c. 32, art. 9, § 3, providing that all interest, pen- alties, and forfeitures on delinquent taxes shall be paid into the county sinking fund, were not repealed by Laws 1897, c. 32, art. 4, § 1, amend- ing Laws 1895, c. 43, art. 3, § 2.-Hunter v. State, 154 P. 545.
See Municipal Corporations, 422, 493; Public Lands, 185.
914 (Okl.) Under Sess. Laws 1895, c. 43, art. 3, § 2, amending St. 1893, § 5643, and un- der Sess. Laws 1897, c. 32, art. 9, § 3, all inter- est, penalties, and forfeitures on delinquent tax- es should be paid into the county sinking fund. See Logs and Logging. -Board of Com'rs of Custer County v. City of Clinton, 154 P. 513.
914 (Okl.) Under Laws 1895, c. 43, art. 3, § 2, amending St. 1893, § 5643, and under Laws 1897, c. 32, art. 9, § 3, interest, penalties, and forfeitures on delinquent taxes should be paid into the county sinking fund.-Hunter v. State, 154 P. 545.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES. See Injunction, 85; Licenses, 7.
I. ESTABLISHMENT, CONSTRUCTION, AND MAINTENANCE.
See Appeal and Error, 353, 564, 797, 1243; Brokers, 50; Divorce, 170; Excep- tions, Bill of, 41, 42; Execution, 295; Judgment, 211; Mechanics' Liens, 132; Mortgages, 599; New Trial, 117; Sales, 334; Vendor and Purchaser, 76.
10 (Kan.) In view of Gen. St. 1909, §§ 5251, 5338, 6343, under a life insurance policy giv- ing one month-not less than 30 days-grace in the payment of premiums, where the last day of grace falls on Sunday, the insured has the fol- 15 (Kan.) Where a team of horses were kill-lowing day in which to make payment.-Light- ed by lightning while standing at the roadside ner v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 154 P. under a telephone wire which sagged within 4 feet of the ground, the lightning having first struck a pole 150 feet distant, held, that the negligence, if any, in maintaining the wire so close to the ground, was not the proximate cause of the injury.-Simon v. Missouri & Kan- sas Telephone Co., 154 P. 242.
II. REGULATION AND OPERATION.
33 (Kan.) If a noncompensatory rate may be enforced as to a specific service by reason of some controlling consideration of public policy, the furnishing of a party line telephone is not of such a peculiar character as to place it in the exceptional list.-Emporia Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Kansas, 154 P. 262.
A court without power to fix a rate to be charged by a telephone company in the future cannot accomplish that result indirectly by en- joining interference with a rate found to have been unassailable in the past.-Id.
Where a court having jurisdiction determines that a telephone rate fixed by Laws 1911, c. 238, § 39, and approved by the Utilities Commission is confiscatory, the telephone company may op- erate under such rate as it may establish until a new one has been fixed by the Commission. -Id.
TELEPHONES.
See Telegraphs and Telephones.
TENANCY IN COMMON.
See Husband and Wife, ~14.
II. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF COTENANTS.
19 (Cal.) A cotenant, who may not pur- chase and assert an outstanding title against his
See Abstracts of Title; Adverse Possession; Escheat; Quieting Title; Religious Societies, 18; Taxation, 796-831; Vendor and Purchaser, 54, 214.
See Action, 48; Collision; Corporations, 491; Death; Fraud; Husband and Wife, 102; Libel and Slander; Municipal Cor- porations, 7452-821; Negligence; Nuis- ance; Principal and Agent, 147-160%; Replevin; Trover and Conversion; Weapons, 18.
See Municipal Corporations.
IV. FISCAL MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC DEBT, SECURITIES, AND TAXATION.
54 (Okl.) Under Rev. Laws 1910, §§ 7376, 7380, the total township levy for current ex- penses cannot exceed 3 mills in one year and the 10 per cent. which the excise board may add for delinquent taxes, must not, when added to the sum necessary for current expenses, in- crease the levy beyond the three mill limit.- Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Walker, 154 P. 343.
TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES. III. REGISTRATION, REGULATION, AND OFFENSES.
47 (Idaho) Where it is alleged and proven that a policy does not truly state the contract made or the facts on which it was based, a court of general jurisdiction may in one action
reform the contract to make it express the in-statement unless it was supported by evidence. tention of the parties, and enforce it as so re- -Godley v. Gowen, 154 P. 141. formed.-Carroll v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 154 P. 985.
VI. TAKING CASE OR QUESTION FROM JURY.
(A) Questions of Law or of Fact in Gen- eral.
139 (Okl.) A verdict should be directed only where the evidence for the adverse party, to- therefrom, could not authorize a verdict for gether with all inferences reasonably deducible such party.-Case v. Posey, 154 P. 1165.
139 (Wash.) The weight of the testimony is for the jury.-Donaldson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 154 P. 133.
140 (Mont.) Where a witness on cross-ex- amination changed his testimony as to a state- ment made to him by deceased, and testified that he did not know whether he had mentioned such statement in an affidavit wherein it should have been mentioned, and there was no other evidence as to the statement having been made, held, that the question of the witness' credibility was for the jury.-Alexander v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 154 P. 914.
140 (Wash.) The credibility of witnesses is Co., 154 P. 133. for the jury. Donaldson v. Great Northern Ry.
143 (Kan.) Refusal to direct a verdict for a street car passenger injured in attempting to alight held not error, where the evidence was conflicting as to negligence and contributory negligence.-Christian v. Union Traction Co., 154 P. 271.
48 (Wyo.) Although the court may do so, it is not bound, where an offer contains admis-143 (Okl.) An issue reasonably sustained by sible and inadmissible evidence, to separate the evidence and receive that which is admissible. -Reynolds v. Morton, 154 P. 325.
plaintiff's evidence is for the jury, though de- fendant's evidence conflicts therewith.-Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 154 P. 1161.
(B) Demurrer to Evidence.
mits all facts which the evidence tends to prove 156 (Okl.) A demurrer to the evidence ad- and all inferences reasonably deducible there- from.-Rose v. Woldert Grocery Co., 154 P. 531.
(D) Direction of Verdict.
169 (Okl.) A verdict should be directed for defendant only when the evidence, with all in- ferences reasonably deducible therefrom, is in- sufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff.--St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Clampitt, 154 P. 40.
VII. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY. (A) Province of Court and Jury in Gen-
194 (Wash.) As to defendants, charged only of a manhole into which plaintiff fell, an in- with negligence in the manner of maintenance struction that there was no evidence of fault in construction is not objectionable as a com- ment on the facts.-Jensen v. Schlenz, 154 P. 159.
84 (Mont.) Where the only objection to the testimony of a witness was that it was irrele- vant, as referring to another conversation than that testified to by another witness, who was sought to be impeached, that objection was not sufficient to raise the question of proper foun-200 (Okl.) The court should instruct as to dation for the impeachment.-Doichinoff v. Chi- the law applicable to the issues of fact raised by cago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 154 P. 924. the evidence.-Missouri, O. & G. Ry. Co. v. Da- vis, 154 P. 503.
105 (Cal.) Where the certificate of sale re- quired by Street Opening Act to be executed by the street superintendent is admitted in evi- dence without objection, its insufficiency may be reached by an attack on the findings.-Tilton v. Decker, 154 P. 860.
V. ARGUMENTS AND CONDUCT OF COUNSEL.
(C) Form, Requisites, and Sufficiency.
242 (Wash.) Instructions in an action for breach of contract held not erroneous as preclud- ing the jury from finding separately upon each cause of action.-Auwarter v. Kroll, 154 P. 438. (D) Applicability to Pleadings and Evi- dence.
1082 (Wash.) There is no error where in- formation of defendant carrying liability insur-251 (Mont.) It is not error, in an action for ance comes to the jury only as an incident to the death of a servant, to refuse instructions on a lawful inquiry by counsel on examining a contributory negligence, where the complaint * juror. Jensen v. Schlenz, 154 P. 159. was based on the theory of last clear chance; that necessarily involving an admission of con- tributory negligence.-Doichinoff v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 154 P. 924.
133 (Wash.) Statement of counsel in his opening statement that defendant had discharg- ed plaintiff and refused to pay his doctor's bill held not prejudicial, where the court, on objec-252 (N.M.) Where in a railroad employé's tion made, told the jury not to consider the action for injuries there was no evidence tending
to establish defendant's liability under the doc- trine of last clear chance, it was error to submit such issue to the jury.-Thayer v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 154 P. 691.
IX. VERDICT.
(A) General Verdict.
337 (Colo.) In suit for malicious prosecu- held, that a verdict for plaintiff would not be tion, defended on ground of advice of counsel, set aside as in disregard of an instruction as to the facts necessary to constitute such defense.- Mullen v. Griffin, 154 P. 90.
252 (Okl.) A refusal to instruct that before the plaintiff broker could recover he must have procured a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy on the terms agreed upon, held not er- ror where such instruction had no application to the facts proven that the sale was actually made on such terms.-First Nat. Bank of Cow-ed eta v. Brumbaugh, 154 P. 1172.
A refusal to instruct that before the plaintiff broker could recover he must have procured a written enforceable contract from the purchas- er, binding him to take the land on the terms agreed upon, held not error where the sale had been completed.-Id.
339 (N.M.) After a verdict has been receiv- and entered, and the jury dismissed, they cannot reassemble and alter their verdict.- Murry v. Belmore, 154 P. 705.
345 (N.M.) Error could not be predicated on the court's action in permitting the jury to reassemble to correct the verdict, where the complaining party's attorney had purposely and without objection permitted the reassembling of the jury and correction of the verdict.-Murry V. Belmore, 154 P. 705.
(B) Special Interrogatories and Findings,
252 (Utah) In action for injuries to girl eight years old, evidence held to raise question making instruction hypothesizing fact that she was above standard of ordinary children of her age in understanding, knowledge, and apprecia-348 (Okl.) Under Const. art. 7, § 21, a de- tion of circumstances applicable.-Thomas v. fendant is not entitled to have special inter- Oregon Short Line R. Co., 154 P. 777. rogatories submitted to the jury in addition to the general verdict.-St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Clampitt, 154 P. 40.
252 (Wash.) Where the evidence did not present the question, held, that the court prop- erly refused to instruct that an injured em- ployé cannot recover where he has chosen an unsafe way to perform an act and there was a safe way which a reasonably prudent person would have taken.-Godley v. Gowen, 154 P.
(E) Requests or Prayers.
260 (Okl.) Refusal of instructions fairly covered by those given held not error.-St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Clampitt, 154 P. 40; Mis- souri, O. & G. Ry. Co. v. Davis, Id. 503.
260 (Or.) In passenger's action for injury when thrown from street car by its sudden jerk while he was alighting, given instructions as to negligence and contributory negligence held to fairly cover plaintiff's requested instruction thereon, so that its refusal was not error.-Mc- Gilchrist v. Portland, E. & E. Ry. Co., 154 P.
260 (Wash.) Instructions held sufficient to present issue of broker's right to recover com- mission so that it was not error to refuse his requested instruction defining real estate bro- ker and stating the law as to when he was en- titled to his commission.-Payzant v. Caudill, 154 P. 170.
260 (Wash.) The refusal of a requested in- struction in effect the same as an instruction given upon the issue was not error.-Hargrave v. City of Colfax, 154 P. 824.
(G) Construction and Operation. 295 (Idaho) The instructions must be con- strued together to determine their correctness. -Cady v. Keller, 154 P. 629.
That an isolated paragraph of an instruction is obscure or incomplete will not require a reversal, where the instructions taken as a whole correctly state the law.-Id.
295 (Or.) In action based on the Employ- ers' Liability Act, instructions as to care re- quired by the employer held not erroneous when the instructions were considered as a whole.- Hudson v. Brown Lumber Co., 154 P. 533.
295 (Wash.) An instruction will not be iso- lated for the purpose of criticizing it, but will be kept in its setting and construed with refer- ence to and in relation to the other instructions. -Jensen v. Schlenz, 154 P. 159.
295 (Wash.) In an action for temporary damages to plaintiff's trees and crops, and per- manent damages to his realty, instruction as to measure of damages for injury to land held not to mislead the jury into awarding double dam- ages, when taken in connection with other in- structions as to measure of damages to trees, crops, etc.-Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 154 P. 450.
X. TRIAL BY COURT. (A) Hearing and Determination of Cause. 370 (Okl.) In cases wherein the parties are not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right, the court may submit to the jury a part only of the questions of fact.—Parker v. Hamilton, 154 P. 65.
375 (Or.) Where the land in suit is viewed by the court or jury, a judgment must be ren- dered, not on the view had, but on the evidence introduced as explained by the view.-Molalla Electric Co. v. Wheeler, 154 P. 686.
(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
388 (Idaho) There need be no findings where there is an agreed statement of facts, the ques- tion being then what law applies to such facts. -McKune v. Continental Casualty Co., 154 P. 990.
Where the court makes findings though there is an agreed statement of facts, an objection that they are not justified by the evidence can- not be sustained if the law applicable to the agreed statement supports the judgment; the judgment being tested by the agreed statement and not by the findings. Id.
397 (Cal.) In an action for the killing of one on defendant's street car tracks, where the pleadings raised the question whether deceased was guilty of contributory negligence proximate- ly causing death, the failure of the court, the action being tried without a jury, to make a finding responsive to this issue, was error.- Tucker v. United Railroads of San Francisco, 154 P. 835.
400 (Idaho) Under Rev. Codes, § 4439, after findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree have been made and filed, and judgment entered, they cannot be changed or modified, except as to clerical errors, otherwise than by granting a new trial.-Lawrence v. Corbeille, 154 P. 495.
Where findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree have been entered, it is reversible er- ror for the court, on motion for new trial and of its own motion, to set aside the judgment and substitute new findings, conclusions, and decree, without granting a new trial.-Id.
404 (Kan.) A general finding for a party finds for him every issuable fact on which the judgment might rest. Brady y. Farmers' Co- Op. Creamery & Supply Co., 154 P. 220. XI. WAIVER AND CORRECTION OF
IRREGULARITIES AND ERRORS.
419 (Mont.) An exception to an order over- ruling a motion for nonsuit is not waived by proceeding with the trial.-State v. District
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