Court of Second Judicial Dist. in and for Sil- but to arise by implication of law from acts
ver Bow County, 154 P. 200.
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and conduct consistent, in honesty and fair deal-
ing, only with a trust.-O'Donnell v. McCool,
154 P. 1090.
79 (Wash.) Trust held not to have resulted
in favor of plaintiff in whole of land in defend-
ant's name, defendant having paid part of pur-
chase price, but to have resulted as to interest,
which, without injustice, might be concluded to
be a half interest.-O'Donnell v. McCool, 154
P. 1090.
Trust held to result in favor of party furnish-
ing aliquot part of money for purchase of land
for common account of himself and another,
who, in violation of the agreement, takes exclu-
sive title.-Id.
83 (Kan.) A parol agreement between an
optionee and another that the latter would buy
the land, taking title in his own name, and on
resale pay the optionee one-half the profit, held
not to create, in favor of the optionee, an im-
plied trust under Gen. St. 1909, § 9701.-Grant-
ham v. Conner, 154 P. 246.
36 (Okl.) Where merchandise is traded for
land and the difference paid in notes secured by
chattel mortgages, and where the mortgagor
sells the mortgaged property at public sale, and
the mortgagee acting as clerk of the sale re-
tains the proceeds, held that, in an action for
conversion of such proceeds, evidence of the en-95 (Cal.App.) Where, by fraud, defendant
tire transaction is admissible.-Swain v. Arch-
er, 154 P. 644.
See Garnishment.
TRUST FUND DOCTRINE.
See Corporations, 545.
See Appeal and Error, 150; Assignments
for Benefit of Creditors; Charities.
I. CREATION, EXISTENCE, AND
LIDITY.
(A) Express Trusts.
obtained money from plaintiff and therewith
paid part of the purchase price of an automobile
for a contract of sale to him on the installment
plan, plaintiff could impress a constructive
trust, arising from defendant's fraud, upon such
contract.-Carter v. Holt, 154 P. 37.
100 (Mont.) An agreement by a bank to lend
money to a wife and to buy in property of her
husband, which was to be sold on mortgage fore-
closure, raises, under Rev. Codes, § 4538, a re-
sulting trust in favor of the wife, where the
bank acquired the property and refused to con-
vey it to the wife.-Marcellus v. Wright, 154
P. 714.
II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA-
(B) Estate or Interest of Trustee and of
Cestui Que Trust.
VA-135 (Cal.) Trust in real and personal prop-
erty for benefit of trustor during life and on
her death to nominees in her will, or to her
heirs, held not a dry trust, but an active trust,
in the exercise of which the trustee, under Civ.
Code, § 863, took the whole legal title.-Gray v.
Union Trust Co. of San Francisco, 154 P. 306.
17, 18 (Kan.) A parol agreement between an
optionee and another that the latter would buy
the land, taking title in his own name, and on re-
sale pay the optionee one-half the profit, held
not to create a valid express trust in favor of
the optionee.-Grantham v. Conner, 154 P. 246.
17, 18 (Or.) As under L. O. L. § 804, a parol
trust of land is invalid, no trust in the proceeds
of land held under a parol trust agreement can
arise, unless after sale the trustee has made a
declaration of trust.-Johnson v. McKenzie, 154
P. 885.
17, 18 (Wash.) An express trust in real es-
tate cannot be proven by parol.-Smith v. Im-
hoff, 154 P. 793.
140 (Cal.) Under Civ. Code, §§ 769, 773,
781, trust in real and personal property to pay
income to trustor for life, and to nominees in
her will, or to her heirs under law in force at
its creation, held to create vested remainders
in heirs subject to divestiture by trustor's nom-
ination by will.-Gray v. Union Trust Co. of
San Francisco, 154 P. 306.
III. APPOINTMENT,
QUALIFICA-
TION, AND TENURE OF
TRUSTEE.
59 (Cal.) Under Civ. Code, § 2280, trust in
real and personal property, created by instru-160 (Or.) If, there were no Churches of
ment not reserving any power of revocation,
held irrevocable by any act of the trustor.-
Gray v. Union Trust Co. of San Francisco, 154
61 (Cal.) When the parties interested in a
trust apply to a court of equity, the court if
a decree terminating it is proper, is not re-
quired to terminate it, but has the discretion
to do so, and, conversely, under Civ. Code, §
2280, if all the parties in interest are not be-
fore it, it has no power to terminate it.-Gray
v. Union Trust Co. of San Francisco, 154 P.
306.
(B) Resulting Trusts.
6334 (Wash.) Resulting trust held never to
arise out of enforceable contract or agreement,
Christ Scientist in Portland qualified to take
the reversion of the stock of a corporation as
provided by will of the donor, the courts would
not allow the trust to fail for want of a trustee.
Carson v. Schulderman, 154 P. 903.
IV. MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL
OF TRUST PROPERTY.
198 (Cal.) The inhibition upon a trustee
from purchasing at his own sale is removed by
the determination of a court of equity that he
may be such purchaser, and a sale to him is not
a sale by the trustee, so that there is nothing
to prevent him from becoming a purchaser.-
Plant v. Plant, 154 P. 1058.
For cases in Dec. Dig & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
VII. ESTABLISHMENT AND EN-
FORCEMENT OF TRUST.
(B) Right to Follow Trust Property or
Proceeds Thereof.
356 (Cal.App.) Where the assignee of a con-
tract of sale of an automobile on the installment
plan took the same with knowledge that it had
been paid for with funds fraudulently procured
from plaintiff, his position as to money loaned
or paid on the contract to the assignor was that
of a second lienor subordinate to the rights of
the defrauded party.-Carter v. Holt, 154 P. 37.
371 (Cal.App.) In an action to impress a
constructive trust upon a contract of sale of an
automobile on the installment plan, the com-
plaint, in the absence of special demurrer, held
sufficiently to allege that before defendant as-
signee acquired the automobile and contract
from the defendant charged with fraud, he had
knowledge of plaintiff's rights.-Carter v. Holt,
154 P. 37.
372 (Cal.App.) In an action to impress a
constructive trust on a contract of sale of an
automobile as against the purchaser's assignee,
evidence held sufficient to show that a new deal
between the seller, the original purchaser, and
his assignee, purporting to cancel the assigned
contract and to make a new contract of sale
direct with the assignee, was a mere subter-
fuge.-Carter v. Holt, 154 P. 37.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY OF
CONTRACT.
3 (Or.) Where upon part payment of his
option to purchase land involving assumption
of mortgage plaintiff obtained supplemental
agreement allowing him to anticipate the con-
tract and obtain good and sufficient deed to such
portion of property as he might select upon pay-
ment therefor, such agreement was a unilateral
option entitling plaintiff on compliance with its
terms, to a deed to selected portion free from
incumbrance of prior mortgage.-Lombard v.
Kies, 154 P. 757.
16 (Utah) Where defendants agreed to sell
their lots, reserving the right to remove a trap
therefrom, and the purchaser struck out the
reservation clause, the contract as modified could
not be enforced, in the absence of ratification
by the defendants, there being no meeting of the
minds.-Moon v. Bollwinkel, 154 P. 939.
33 (Wash.) Relative to right to rescind, the
purchaser of land several hundred miles distant
had a right to rely on the vendors' representa-
tions.-Van Horn v. Chambers, 154 P. 1084.
Such right was no less because his attorney
warned him to examine it.—Id.
37 (Okl.) False representations positively
made, constituting an inducement to purchase
property, and relied on, vitiate the contract,
though innocently made, regardless of the rule
of caveat emptor.-Chisum v. Huggins, 154 P.
1146.
373 (Cal.App.) In an action to impress a 44 (Colo.) Evidence in a suit to quiet title
constructive trust upon an assigned contract of in a purchaser from the patentee held to sup-
sale of an automobile on the installment plan, port the finding that there had been no purchase
finding held sufficient to negative the issue ten- by plaintiff.-Slack v. Anderson, 154 P. 89.
dered by the answer that the assignee purchas-44 (Utah) In an action for breach of an
ed the car from the seller by an independent
contract after it had repudiated the original con-
tract.-Carter v. Holt, 154 P. 37.
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executory contract for the sale of land wherein
the seller reserved certain rights, and the pro-
spective purchaser struck out the reservation
clause, plaintiff has the burden of showing by
clear and convincing evidence that the modifica-
tion was ratified by the seller.-Moon v. Boll-
winkel, 154 P. 939.
II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA-
TION OF CONTRACT.
54 (Or.) A bond for deed transfers equita-
ble title, leaving in vendor the legal title as se-
curity.-Lyons v. Chaffee, 154 P. GSS.
58 (Or.) Where a contract for the sale of
lands on installments required purchasers to
pay installments under penalty of forfeiture,
and the vendors to deposit in escrow a deed
and an abstract showing good title, the obliga-
tions are correlative, and neither party, having
failed in performance, can complain that the
other has failed. Decker v. Jordan, 154 P. 431.
See Public Lands, 35-140; Removal of 76 (Or.) A contract for the sale of lands
Causes.
See Banks and Banking, 270.
I. USURIOUS CONTRACTS AND
TRANSACTIONS.
(B) Rights and Remedies of Parties.
119 (Okl.) Whether a collateral instrument
or commissions were taken and reserved with
intent to charge usury, and whether the trans-
action was a device to evade the law against
usury, held to be a question of fact, where the
principal instruments were valid on their face.
-Garland v. Union Trust Co., 154 P. 676.
See Dismissal and Nonsuit, 43; Judgment,
344, 381; Judicial Sales, 38.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
See Assignments, 20; Corporations,
426 Exchange of Property; Sales; Specific
Performance; Taxation, 831.
upon deferred payments held to obligate the
vendors to execute a warranty deed and deposit
it in escrow with an abstract showing good title
in themselves before maturity of deferred pay-
ments. Decker v. Jordan, 154 P. 431.
80 (Utah) Receipt of party with whom
down payment on property was deposited.
though not authorized or ratified by vendor, held
evidence of purchaser's understanding as to am-
biguity, with respect to size of lot and title to
be conveyed.-Tyng v. Constant-Loraine Inv.
Co., 154 P. 767.
In action to recover down payment on land,
held that evidence would not justify finding
that defendant, by ambiguous contract, intended
to convey 55 feet by warranty deed, it having
only quitclaim deed to 12 feet thereof.-Id.
III. MODIFICATION OR RESCISSION
OF CONTRACT.
(C) Rescission by Purchaser.
112 (Or.) Where plaintiff failed to specify
in writing portion of land he desired to purchase
as provided for in a supplemental option to pur-
chase land obtained upon part payment under
a prior option, he was not entitled to a rescis-
sion of main contract on ground of defendant's
refusal to furnish good title to portion specified.
-Lombard v. Kies, 154 P. 757.
that a default in any of the terms should work
a forfeiture, judgment for the plaintiff for pos-
session of the property necessarily involved
judgment of forfeiture by defendants.-Id.
(B) Actions for Purchase Money.
Where, after plaintiff's partial payment under
option to purchase land, a new highway was
located through the tract within 50 feet of the
dwelling desired for summer residence, the high-302 (Nev.) Under Rev. Laws, § 5501, limit-
way was an incumbrance in breach of defend-
ant's contract, entitling plaintiff to rescission.
-Id.
IV. PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT.
(B) Conveyance.
ing a mortgagee's remedy to an action in fore-
closure, a vendor of land which retained title
and reserved the right to sue for foreclosure of
the agreement and of the purchaser's equity of
redemption, the purchaser going into possession
pursuant to the contract, could maintain a per-
152 (Utah) If ambiguous contract was un--Southern Pac. Co. v. Miller, 154 P. 929.
sonal action for the unpaid balance of the price.
derstood by purchaser as agreement to convey
whatever property vendor owned, held, that ten-
der by vendor of deed warranting title to 53%
feet, and quitclaiming as to 12 feet, constituted
performance.-Tyng v. Constant-Loraine Inv.
Co., 154 P. 767.
V. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
PARTIES.
303 (Nev.) In an action by the agreed ven-
dor of realty for the unpaid balance of the price,
the averment in the complaint that plaintiff was
and had been ready to convey, as agreed, upon
performance of the contract by defendants, with
an offer to deliver conveyance into court, was a
sufficient tender.-Southern Pac. Co. v. Miller,
154 P. 929.
VII. REMEDIES OF PURCHASER.
(A) Recovery of Purchase Money Paid.
(B) As to Third Persons in General.
214 (Nev.) The assignee of purchasers of
land by contract providing that it should bind334 (Utah) If purchaser understood ambig
their successors, heirs, and assigns, who was not
a party to the contract, and did not execute or
receive it, was not liable to the vendor for the
unpaid balance of the price.-Southern Pac. Co.
v. Butterfield, 154 P. 932.
231 (Okl.) Under Comp. Laws 1909, § 1195,
held that, where the purchaser had actual
knowledge of the existence of a mortgage, the
fact that the mortgage as recorded did not show
the notary's seal, and that the original mort-
gage may not have contained the seal, did not
give him rights superior to the mortgage.-Rol-
low v. Frost & Saddler, 154 P. 542.
uous contract as agreement to convey 55 feet
by warranty deed, held, that there was no meet-
ing of the minds, and down payment could be
recovered.-Tyng v. Constant-Loraine Inv. Co.,
154 P. 767.
341 (Colo.) Allegations in purchaser's ac-
from defendant the amount paid to defendant on
tion held to state a cause of action to recover
a contract to convey land.-Jones v. Ceres Inv.
Co., 154 P. 745.
34! (Utah) Evidence held not so conclusive
in action to recover down payment that pur-
chaser understood ambiguous contract in dif-
of verdict.-Tyng v. Constant-Loraine Inv. Co.,
ferent sense from vendor to justify direction
154 P. 767.
I. NATURE OR SUBJECT OF ACTION.
240 (Okl.) One claiming as innocent pur-
chaser of land, without notice of outstanding 5 (Cal.App.) An action will not be consid-
title, must allege and prove facts making him ered a real action for the purpose of determin-
such purchaser.-Bruce v. Overton, 154 P. 340. ing its venue unless title or interest in real
245 (Okl.) Under conflicting evidence in a
property is involved.-Terry v. Rivergarden
controversy between a purchaser and mortgagee, Farms Co., 154 P. 476.
held, that the questions whether the original
mortgage bore a seal, no seal being shown by
the mortgage as recorded, and whether the pur-
chaser had actual knowledge of the mortgage,
were for the jury.-Rollow v. Frost & Saddler,
VI. REMEDIES OF VENDOR.
(A) Lien and Recovery of Land.
273 (Or.) It is unnecessary for vendor to
tender deed and demand price as condition pre-
cedent to suit for strict foreclosure of the equi-
table title of vendee under bond for deed.
Lyons v. Chaffee, 154 P. 688.
285 (Or.) In suit by vendor for foreclosure
of bond for deed the court may require payment
of entire price as condition of avoiding fore-
closure.-Lyons v. Chaffee, 154 P. 688.
299 (Cal.App.) The owner of realty had a
cause of action in ejectment whose contract to
sell provided that the buyer, by failure to com-
ply with its terms, should forfeit all rights to
the property, which buyer's assignee failed to
make a payment of $600 due under the contract,
and refused to surrender possession.-Sweet v.
Richvale Land Co., 154 P. 608.
In ejectment by the vendor of realty against
the assignee of the buyer and others upon de-
fault in payment, where the contract provided
Though plaintiff joined with a personal action
under Code Civ. Proc., § 392, should be tried in
an action involving title to real property, which,
the county where it was located, such joinder
does not deprive defendant of its right to have
the personal action tried in the county of its
III. CHANGE OF VENUE OR PLACE
OF TRIAL.
36 (Cal.App.) The nature of the action on
a motion for change of venue is determined
from the allegations of the complaint and char-
acter of the judgment which may be rendered
on default.-Terry v. Rivergarden Farms Co.,
154 P. 476.
40 (Cal.App.) An action to set aside a con-
tract for the conveyance of land, wherein the
principal relief sought was return of the pur-
chase money, held a personal action, and de-
fendants entitled to have the venue changed to
the county of their residence. Terry v. River-
garden Farms Co., 154 P. 476.
Where an action seeking a cancellation of a
contract for the purchase of land was purely
personal as to one of defendants, the only re-
lief sought being a money judgment, such de-
fendant is entitled to have the venue changed
to the county of its residence, though the title
to real property be involved.-Ia.
See Covenants, 100, 102; Principal and
Agent, 104; Sales, 261, 285, 428-442.
WATERS AND WATER COURSES.
See Drains; Judgment, 518; Navigable
Waters; Negligence, 39.
V. SURFACE WATERS.
119 (Wash.) Where a railroad company con-
structed a trestle in place of a solid roadbed to
allow flood waters to escape through bed of a
creek which was ordinarily dry, it was not liable
to adjacent landowners whose property was in-
jured by such waters, when the waters were not
deflected.-Bonthuis v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
A landowner may hurry the outflow of surface
waters from his property.-Id.
124 Nev.) That waste water from defend-
ant's land flowed without interruption across
the land of a third person to reach plaintiff's
land, did not deprive plaintiff of his right to
enjoin defendant from flowing such waste wa-
ter upon his lands.-Ramelli v. Sorgi, 154 P. 73.
126 (Wash.) Evidence held insufficient to
show that a railroad company left saplings and
débris at a place where they could accumulate
and dam a creek or that any such dam was form-
ed causing flood waters to inundate plaintiff's
property.-Bonthuis v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
154 P. 789.
Where an adjacent landowner claimed that a
railroad company unfairly turned surface waters
off of its premises onto his own, he has the bur-
den of proving such unfair diversion.-Id.
VI. APPROPRIATION AND PRE-
152 (Colo.) In an action by a junior appro-
priator of irrigating waters for an adjudication
of priority, alleging abandonment of their prior
rights by defendants, the owners of all junior
priorities in the water district were not, in the
absence of statute, necessary parties.-Affolter
v. Rough & Ready Irrigating Ditch Co., 154 P.
738.
Where senior appropriators of irrigating wa-
ters, holding under decree, abandoned and fail-
ed to use the waters for 29 years, the failure for
such time of a junior appropriator to sue for a
judicial decree of abandonment was not laches,
barring such a suit, which need not be brought
until some one again claims the abandoned wa-
ter right under the decree.-Id.
In an action by a junior appropriator of ir-
rigating waters against senior appropriators to
decree an abandonment of their rights under a
former decree whereby they were entitled to
16.70 customary inches, an amount in excess of
the 16.70 cubic feet per second, which the ref-
eree concluded was all they had not abandoned,
it was unnecessary for him to determine the ex-
act amount in cubic feet of the original decree.
-Id.
In an action by a junior appropriator of irri-
gating waters against senior appropriators to
decree an abandonment, evidence that the wa-
ter was at times run in sections did not over-
come the evidence of intent to abandon in the
fact of nonuser by the seniors for many years
of water in excess of the carrying capacity of
the ditch, less than their adjudged rights.-Id.
152 (Utah) In suit to quiet title to the use
of water, which plaintiff claimed he had de-
veloped, while defendants claimed that it was
part of a natural stream, general affirmative
judgment for defendants was not too sweeping
in that it denied plaintiff the right to use any
water at any time, even for culinary or other
domestic purposes, though all the water was
not used by defendants.-Mountain Lake Min-
ing Co. v. Midway Irr. Co., 154 P. 584.
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156 (Colo.) Where defendant knew of the
maintenance of an irrigation ditch over lands
which he purchased, but erroneously deemed
that the license was revocable, he took the land
subject to the burden of the ditch.-Graybill v.
Corlett, 154 P. 730.
157 (Colo.) License to maintain irrigation
ditch held irrevocable, it having been maintain-
ed with the consent of the owner of the land and
his predecessors for over 16 years.-Graybill v.
Corlett, 154 P. 730.
VIII. ARTIFICIAL PONDS, RESER-
VOIRS, AND CHANNELS, DAMS,
AND FLOWAGE.
179 (Nev.) That persons not parties to the
action contributed to the damage done to plain-
tiff's lands, held not to render erroneous for
want of necessary parties, a decree enjoining
defendant from permitting waste water to flow
from his land upon that of plaintiff.-Ramelli
v. Sorgi, 154 P. 73.
IX. PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY.
(B) Irrigation and Other Agricultural
Purposes.
216 (Or.) L. O. L. § 6186, relating to the
assessment of taxes for the payment of bonds
issued for the construction of irrigation works,
is constitutional.-Cannon v. Hood River Irr.
Dist., 154 P. 397.
231 (Or.) A complaint seeking to restrain
the collection of an irrigation tax under L. O.
L. § 6186, held insufficient as not particulariz-
ing the grounds upon which payment is resist-
ed.-Cannon v. Hood River Irr. Dist., 154 P.
397.
Though an irrigation district, at the time
that its boundaries were fixed, included land
the title to which was in the United States, an
assessment of an irrigation tax on such land
after the title had passed to an individual is
valid.-Id..
In a suit to restrain the collection of an ir-
rigation tax, legality of the organization of the
irrigation district will be presumed, in the ab-
sence of any charge to the contrary.-Id.
Where land is not susceptible of irrigation,
the owner must petition the district board to
since it affects no vested rights.-Barber v.
Brown, 154 P. 1156.
set it apart from the district, before equity will
restrain the collection of a tax thereon.-Id.
254 (Wash.) Where an irrigation company's 25 (Okl.) A Chickasaw freedman's will
deed to lands clearly agreed to supply them with made August 4, 1904, and conveying her allot-
water, but fixed no time within which it was to ment, held to legally devise her property, where
be furnished, the company was under duty to she died in September, 1906, after she was given
furnish water within a reasonable time, con-authority by Act Cong. approved April 26, 1906,
sidering the facts contemplated by the parties to devise her allotment.-Barber v. Brown, 154
when the contract was made.-Huschke v. Ar- P. 1156.
cadia Orchards Co., 154 P. 800.
263 (Wash.) In an action for failure to fur-
nish water by the grantee of one whose lands
defendant had contracted to supply, where the
injury was destruction of and damage to fruit
trees, the measure of damages was the difference
betwen the value of the trees had water been
furnished as agreed and their value without
water.--Huschke v. Arcadia Orchards Co., 154
P. 800.
17 (Okl.Cr.App.) Where the evidence in a
prosecution for pointing a pistol tended to show
self-defense and defense of habitation, it was
error to refuse a requested instruction thereon.
-Doud v. State, 154 P. 1008.
18 (Or.) Where the complaint of one who
claimed he was negligently shot averred that de-
fendant carelessly cocked a shotgun in his
hands, defendant is entitled to rebut such claim
by testimony that when he received the gun
it was already cocked.-Gibson v. Payne, 154 P.
422.
V. PROBATE, ESTABLISHMENT,
AND ANNULMENT.
302 (Wash.) That an alleged forged signa-
ture is a fac simile of an admittedly genuine
signature, is strong and well-nigh conclusive
evidence of forgery.-In re Connolly's Estate,
154 P. 155.
(I) Hearing or Trial.
318 (Okl.) The verdict of the jury to which
the superior court submits issues involved on
appeal in a will contest is merely advisory.—
Parker v. Hamilton, 154 P. 65.
VI. CONSTRUCTION.
(A) General Rules.
437 (Okl.) A will must be construed by the
laws existing at testator's death, rather than
by the laws in force at execution of the will.-
Barber v. Brown, 154 P. 1156.
487 (Cal.) In construing a will, a former
will which was revoked cannot be considered.-
In re Vanderhurst's Estate, 154 P. 5.
VII. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF
DEVISEES AND LEGATEES.
In an action for damages for injuries re-
ceived when he was struck by shot from gun
discharged by defendant, the question of defend- (A) Nature of Title and Rights in Gen-
ant's negligence held for the jury.-Id.
Instructions, in an action for injuries receiv-719 (Cal.) Opposition to a plea for distribu-
ed by plaintiff who was shot while out hunt- tion, on the ground that petitioners were not
ing, held not to impose upon plaintiff the bur- entitled to share under the will, held a proceed-
den of establishing his want of contributory ing for the construction of a will and not a
negligence.--Id.
contest precluding opponents from taking un-
der the will.--In re Vanderhurst's Estate, 154
P. 5.
Instruction that a loaded shotgun was a dan-
gerous weapon, and that the law charges each
member of a hunting party with such knowl-
edge, and that it is the duty of each to use
such degree of care as any reasonably prudent
man would use under the circumstances, cor-
rectly states law applicable to firearms.-Id.
In an action by one shot while out hunting,
the question whether he was contributorily neg-
ligent in preceding the hunting party into a
field held under the evidence for the jury.-Id.
WEBB-KENYON ACT.
See Commerce, 14.
WILLFUL MISCONDUCT.
See Master and Servant, 872.
(C) Advancements, Ademption, Satisfac-
tion, and Lapse.
759 (Cal.) Under Civ. Code, §§ 1351, 1397,
payments by testator of monthly allowances to
his daughters, which were not evidenced by
promissory notes, cannot be treated as advance-
ments, where the testator declared that advance-
ments to his children were evidenced by notes.
-In re Vanderhurst's Estate, 154 P. 5.
Advancements made before a will was execut-
ed cannot be considered in distributing the es-
tate, unless specified in the will.-Id.
761 (Cal.) Under a will held testator's books
of account, showing payment of allowances to
his daughters to whom he gave credits, prac-
tically balancing their accounts, were not ad-
missible to charge the daughters with amount
of advances without credits.-In re Vander-
Ex-hurst's Estate, 154 P. 5.
See Charities; Descent and Distribution;
ecutors and Administrators; Jury, 19;
Trusts; Vendor and Purchaser, 231.
I. NATURE AND EXTENT OF TESTA-
MENTARY POWER.
6 (Cal.) A husband canot by his will dis-
pose of the wife's right to one-half of the com-
munity property should she survive him.-In re
Whitney's Estate, 154 P. 855.
781 (Cal.) A will may be drawn so as to put
the widow to her election between taking the
benefits given her by the testator and claiming
her right of family allowance.-In re Whitney's
Estate, 154 P. 855.
782 (Cal.) To put the widow to an election
between her legal estate and that granted by a
will, it must clearly and unequivocally appear
that the provision made by the will was in-
tended to be in lieu of such rights as are given
by law. In re Whitney's Estate, 154 P. 855.
II. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY.
23 (Okl.) A statute, passed after the making
of a will but before testatrix's death, by which The mere fact that a legacy to the wife pro-
the law in force when the will was made was vides for payments at stated periods beginning
changed, will operate on the will; such con- from the testator's death does not deprive her
struction not making the statute retrospective, of the right to a family allowance.-Id.
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