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the so-called deed of January, 1906, is an ab- 4. CRIMINAL LAW 1028--APPEAL-SCOPE solute grant of a right of way for railroad| OF REVIEW-SUFFICIENCY OF EXCEPTIONS.
The question of defendant's connection with purposes, and parol evidence is not admiss the offense cannot be considered on appeal, not ble to vary or contradict its terms.
having been presented to or decided by the trial I deny: First, that the agreements of Jan court. uary, 1906. and May, 1888. show an absolutel. (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal grant for railroad purposes; and, second, 100%',
Law, Cent. Dig. 88 2619, 2620; Dec. Dig. Om that there is an attempt here to vary or contradict the terms of a written agreement. Department 2. Appeal from Superior To contradict a written agreement is one Court, Whitman County; R. L. McCroskey, thing. To admit evidence to enable the court Judge. to ascertain the real intention and agreement Wallace Ketterman, alias Jack Long, was of the parties and enforce it accordingly is convicted of receiving stolen goods, and he another thing. The first may not be done; appeals. Affirmed. the second may, either by reforming the in- Charles R. Hill and 0. H. Horton, both strument itself or by treating it as reformed. of Colfax, for appellant. R. M. Burgunder
Those are, in the main, the reasons why I and Thomas Neill, both of Colfax, for the cannot concur. More time might enable me state. to make them plainer. I have, however, said enough to indicate the ground of my dissent PARKOR. J. The defendant
w without attempting to show the extent to Ketterman, was charged by information filed which the facts and law sustain my views. in the superior court for Whitman county CHADWICK, J., concurs with Judge
with the crime of receiving stolen goods. MORRIS.
His trial before the court and a jury resulted in verdict and judgment against him, from
which he has appealed to this court. STATE V. KETTERMAN. (No. 12900.) Counsel for appellant first contend that the (Supreme Court of Washington. Jan. 11,
trial court erred in overruling their demurrer 1916.)
to the information, which reads, in part, as 1. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS 7-INFORMA
“Wallace Ketterman, alias Jack Long, • • • Under Rem. & Bal. Code, $ 2601, making did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feguilty of “larceny" every person who with in- loniously, with the intent to deprive the owner tent to deprive or defraud the owner thereof: thereof, and knowing the same to have been (1) Takes the property of another; (2) obtains stolen, receive at substantially the same time, from the owner his property by aid of any or- from some person whose name is unknown to the der for payment, knowing it to be false; or (3) prosecuting attorney, and withhold, one saddle having property in his possession and secreting and bridle, the personal property of Ivan Marsh, it or appropriating it to his own use; or (4) of the value of $30, one saddle, the personal havi
received property by mistake with knowl-property of J. H. McCroskey, of the value of edge thereof, withholds or appropriates it to $25, and one saddle, the personal property of his own use, and (5) every person who, know- William Horton, of the value of $25." ing the same to have been "so appropriated," shall receive or aid in selling or withholding any
This was intended to charge the crime as property wrongfully appropriated—the words defined by section 2601, Rem. & Bal. Code, "so appropriated" refer to the manner of the which reads: original larceny in each of the preceding four
"Every person who, with intent to deprive or subdivisions.
defraud the owner thereof (1) Shall take, lead [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Receiving
or drive away the property of another; or (2) Stolen Goods, Cent. Dig. 88 9–14; Dec. Dig.
Shall obtain from the owner or another the pos
session of or title to any property by color or For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, aid of any order for the payment or delivery of First and Second Series, Larceny.)
property or money or any check or draft, know2. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS 7-INFORMA ing that the maker or drawer of such order, TION-SUFFICIENCY.
check or draft was not authorized or entitled In charging the offense of receiving stolen to make or draw the same, or by color or aid goods it is not necessary to allege the facts of of any fraudulent or false representation, perthe original unlawful taking.
sonation or pretense or by any false token or [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Receiving
writing or by any trick, device, bunco game or Stolen Goods, Cent. Dig. 88 9-14; Dec. Dig.
fortune telling; or (3) Having any property in 7.)
his possession, custody or control, as bailee, fac
tor, pledgee, servant, attorney, agent, employé, 3. CRIMINAL LAW m 695 – TRIAL - CHAL trustee, executor, administrator, guardian or of LENGE TO SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-DEF- ficer of any person, estate, association or corpoINITENESS.
ration, or as a public officer, or a person authorIn a prosecution for receiving stolen goods, ized by agreement or by competent authority to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, take or hold such possession, custody or conconsisting only of a motion to withdraw the case trol, or as a finder thereof, shall secrete, withfrom the jury and to instruct the jury to re- hold or appropriate the same to his own use or turn a verdict of not guilty on the evidence pre- to the use of any person other than the true sented by the state, was insufficient to raise owner or person entitled thereto; or (4) Having the question of defendant's connection with the received any property by reason of a mistake, crime charged.
shall with knowledge of such mistake secrete, [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal withhold or appropriate the same to his own use Law, Cent. Dig. 88 1633-1638; Dec. Dig, om or to the use of any person other than the true
owner or person entitled thereto; and (5) Every
person who, knowing the same to have been so for." State v. Tamler, 19 Or. 528, 25 Pac. 71, appropriated, shall bring into this state, or buy, 9 L. R. A. 853; 12 Cyc. 596. sell, receive or aid in concealing or withholding |
r4l To now
 To now rule upon these motions conany property wrongfully appropriated, whether within or outside of this state, in such manner
trary to the ruling of the trial court would, as to constitute larceny under the provisions of in effect, be ruling upon a question not fairly this act-steals such property and shall be guilty
presented to that court. of larceny."
The judgment is affirmed.  The theory of counsel's contention touching the sufficiency of the information MORRIS, C. J., and BAUSMAN, MAIN, is not made very clear to us, but it seems
and HOLCOMB, JJ., concur. to be: (1) That the words "so appropriated," in the fifth subdivision above quoted, refer only to property appropriated in the manner specified in the fourth subdivision im
UNION MACHINERY & SUPPLY CO. v. mediately preceding; and (2) that the in
DARNELL (No. 12721.) formation is defective, in that the manner
(Supreme Court of Washington. Jan. 11, 1916.) of the original larceny is not charged as being that defined in the fourth subdivision.
1. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF 33 - PROMISE TO
PAY DEBT OF ANOTHER-ORIGINAL PROMISE. As to the first, we are of the opinion that
A promise for a valuable consideration the words "so appropriated,” in the fifth sub- made by one person to another to pay such othdivision, refer to the manner of the original er's debt to a third person is an original un
dertaking of the promisor, and not a promise to larceny of property specified in each and all me
pay the debt of another within the statute, of the preceding four subdivisions.
though resting in parol.  As to the second, it is the law that: [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Frauds, Stat"It is not necessary to allege the facts going ute of, Cent. Dig. 88 50-53, 56; Dec. Dig. Om to constitute the original unlawful taking or 33.) embezzlement, as would be required in case of 2. CONTRACTS Omw187-PROMISE FOR BENEFIT prosecution therefor." 34 Cyc. 520.
OF THIRD PERSON-RIGHT OF ACTION. Our own decisions in State v. Druxinman,
Where one promises to pay another's debt 34 Wash. 275, 75 Pac. 814, and State v. Ray,
to Porto a third person, such third person may sue
directly upon the promise. 62 Wash. 582, 114 Pac. 439, lend support to [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Contracts, this view, though not directly in point. We Cent, Dig. $8 798–807; Dec. Dig. Oma 187.) conclude that the information is sufficient.
3. EVIDENCE 441 - PAROL EVIDENCE  It is further contended that the trial
TERMS OF CONTRACT. court erred in overruling the challenge to the As between the parties to a formal written sufficiency of the evidence to support con- contract parol evidence is inadmissible to prove viction, made by counsel for appellant in any additional promise for the benefit of a third
person which would tend to contradict or entheir motions for directed verdict of acquit
ct or, acquito large the terms and purpose of the written contal. These motions were made at the close tract. of the state's evidence and at the close of all [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, the evidence. The first was simply:
Cent. Dig. 88 1719, 1723-1763, 1765-1845, 2030"If the court please, at this time I move that
2047; Dec. Dig. Om 441; Contracts, Cent. Dig. the case be withdrawn from the jury and the
$ 1616.) jury instructed to return a verdict of not guilty 4. EVIDENCE 419_PAROL EVIDENCE-ADon the evidence presented by the state."
DITIONAL CONSIDERATION. The second was no more specific. Neither
Though an additional consideration not in
consistent with that expressed in a written conwas argued by counsel. It is plain from the
tract may usually be shown by parol evidence, record that this is not a case of no evidence. it is not competent to ingraft parol conditions The evidence was ample to show the com- upon a contract complete and unambiguous on
its face under the guise of proving an additional mission of the crime, though not very cer
consideration. tain as to appellant's connection therewith.
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, This is the particular defect now for the Cent. Dig. 88 1912–1928; Dec. Dig. 419.] first time urged by counsel for appellant. 5. EvIDENCE Om419-PAROL EVIDENCE-DEED Answering a similar contention in State v. -CONSIDERATION. Hyde, 22 Wash. 551, at page 564, 61 Pac.
The primary purpose of a deed being to
convey title, explanation of variation of the con719, at page 723, Judge White, speaking for
sideration expressed, short of proving that the the court, said:
deed was without consideration, does not tend "This motion is a general one, and only chal- to defeat its purpose and is admissible. lenges the general sufficiency of the evidence; | [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, that is, says, in effect, there is a total failure Cent. Dig. 88 1912–1928; Dec. Dig. 419.) of evidence. Upon a motion of this kind. the lev
he 6. MORTGAGES Cm137–NATURE AND EFFECT. only question raised is whether there is any evidence tending to prove the crime charged, not
In Washington a "mortgage" is not a conwhether the evidence fails in some particular
| veyance with a defeasance as it was at common matters. The record fails to disclose that the
law, but is the mere written evidence of a conobjection to the evidence in the particular mat
tract of security, the prima facie purpose of ter, as to the kind, amount, and value of money,
which is to secure a debt. was called to the attention of the court, and in [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages. a case of this kind the motion should direct the Cent. Dig. 88 270-276; Dec. Dig. Eww137. attention of the court and opposite counsel to! For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, the precise point made and the grounds there- / First and Second Series, Mortgage.]
7. EVIDENCE 419 – PAROL EVIDENCE - ELLIS, J. Action upon an alleged promMORTGAGE-CONSIDERATION.
ise of the defendant to pay to the plaintift A mortgage to defendant to secure the pay
$1,000 on an indebtedness owing from John ment of $4,000, with interest, according to the terms and conditions of three promissory notes
and George England, loggers, doing business of specified dates and amounts and times of as England Bros., to the plaintiff. The matepayment, covering the mortgagor's described | rial facts are as follows: In the year 1912. realty and providing against foreclosure within two years, under seal, signed by the mortgagors,
the England , Bros., were engaged in logging executed on the same day with an agreement be certain lands in Pierce county. To finance tween plaintiff, a creditor, and the mortgagor,
these operations they borrowed from the deand defendant, the mortgagee, and with a chat
fendant Darnell $4,000, evidenced by three tel mortgage on timber executed to plaintiff, in the absence of fraud or mistake, could not be promissory notes--one for $1,500, dated June varied or enlarged by showing that defendant, to 14, 1912, due one year after date, with inobtain his additional security, promised the terest at 7 per cent pavable semi-annually. mortgagors to pay $1,000 on their indebtedness to plaintiff, in view of the fact that the purpose
one for $1,000, dated July 1, 1912, due on or of the mortgage was not to convey with a de- before one year after date, with interest at feasance, but to evidence a contract of security, 7 per cent. per annum, payable at maturity; as the contract itself might be resorted to as the
and the third for $1,500, dated October 2, source of authority for receiving parol evidence, and since it showed a formal and deliberately
| 1912, due six months after date, with intercomplete agreement, parol evidence to enlarge est at 8 per cent. per annum, payable at maits scope was inadmissible.
turity. The first two notes were executed [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, by both of the Englands and their respec Cent. Dig. SS 1912–1928; Dec. Dig. Om 419.]
tive wives, the third by George England and 8. MORTGAGES C.37 - PAROL EVIDENCE - 1 wife. At the time of the giving of the first DEED AS MORTGAGE.
of these notes the England Bros. gave a bill It is competent to prove by parol evidence that a deed absolute on its face was intended as
of sale of the timber to the defendant, by a mortgage, that being an exception to the gen the terms of which they were permitted to eral rule against excluding parol evidence. cut and remove the timber. Operations con
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, tinued under this agreement and a suppleCent. Dig. 88 97-107; Dec. Dig. 37.]
mental agreement of May 26, 1913, not now 9. EVIDENCE C 433, 434-PAROL EVIDENCE- material, until the middle of June, 1913, but WRITTEN CONTRACT-FRAUD OR MISTAKE.
nothing was realized over and above the exIt is competent to show fraud or mistake by parol evidence opening the door to the fullest
pense of operation to apply on the indebtedinvestigation as to the real intention of the par ness. ties to a written contract, and so defeat or re In the meantime the Englands had become form it; that being an exception to the general
indebted to the plaintiff Union Machinery & rule excluding parol evidence. [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Evidence,
Supply Company for logging equipment in a Cent. Dig. 88 1990–2020; Dec. Dig. 433, sum approximating $3,000. The plaintiff was 434.]
urging payment. Shortly prior to June 16, 10. EVIDENCE 419 – PAROL EVIDENCE –
1913, the defendant's notes being wholly unMORTGAGE-ADVANCES.
paid, except six months interest on the first, When a mortgage is given to secure a sum the first and last notes being due, and much of of money, the receipt of which is acknowledged
the timber having been removed, the defendgenerally, parol evidence is admissible to show that it was given to secure future advances and
ant went to John England's home and had a the actual amount of such advances, or to other conference with England and his wife, which wise explain the nature of the debt to be se resulted in their giving to the defendant a cured.
mortgage on their home to secure the three [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. 88 1912–1928; Dec. Dig. Om419.]
notes. This mortgage was executed on June
16, 1913, and, omitting caption and acknowl. 11. EVIDENCE Cww 419 – PAROL EVIDENCE – CONSIDERATION OF MORTGAGE NOTE.
edgment, reads as follows: Where a mortgage is given to secure a
"The mortgagors, John England and Mary E. specific note described therein, parol evidence is
England, his wife, mortgage to Jas. K. Darnell admissible to prove the true consideration of the
to secure the payment of $4,000 lawful money of note and what debts the note is intended to evi
the United States, together with interest there.
on at the rate of 7 and 8 per cent. per annum dence.
until paid, according to the terms and conditions [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence,
of three certain promissory notes, dated June Cent. Dig. $8 1912–1928; Dec. Dig. Om 419.] 14, 1912, July 1, 1912, and October 2, 1912, re
spectively for $1,500.00, $1,000.00 and $1,500.00 Department 1. Appeal from Superior
respectively payable on or before one year after Court, King County; King Dykeman, Judge. date on or before one year after date and on or
Action by the Union Machinery & Supply before six months after date, respectively, with Company against James K. Darnell. Judg- Lorder of Jas. K. Darnell the following described
interest at 7%, 7%, and 8% respectively to the ment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. real estate lot thirteen, block eleven in Seaview Reversed and remanded, with direction to Park situated in the county of King, state of dismiss.
"This mortgage shall not be foreclosed before Brightman, Halverstadt & Tennant. of Se-two years from this date.
"Dated this 16th day of June 1913. attle, for appellant. Walter S. Fulton, of
"John England. [Seal. ] Seattle, for respondent.
"Mary E. England. [Seal.)”
On the same day and admittedly for the, ment was inadmissible in that it tended to purpose of enabling England Bros. to con- change, vary, and enlarge the terms of a tinue their logging operations the England written contract complete and unambiguous Bros. and the defendant entered into an on its face. agreement in writing with the plaintiff, [1, 2] 1. The law is well settled in this signed by all of them, which, after reciting state that a promise for a valuable considthe indebtedness of England Bros. to the eration made by one person to another to plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had declined pay such other's debt to a third person is an to extend further credit without security, original undertaking of the promisor, and provided as follows:
is not such a promise to pay the debt of an"That the boom of logs now in the water ad- other as to come under the ban of the statjacent to said camp may be sold by them and ute of frauds, though resting in parol. Nordthe proceeds employed in the liquidation of cur-ho
| by v. Winsor, 24 Wash. 535, 64 Pac. 726; rent labor bills.
"That the next three booms of logs shall be Dimmick V. Collins, 24 Wash. 78, 63 Pac. handled by the Union Machinery & Supply Com 1101. It is also well settled that in such a pany, sold by them, and out of the proceeds they case the third person may sue the first dishall retain $1,000'in cash on each of said three
rectly upon the promise as one made for his booms, and that after paying the expenses of transportation and sale the balance shall be paid benefit. Nordby v. Winsor, supra; Johnson by the Union Machinery & Supply Company to v. Shuey, 40 Wash. 22, 29, 30, 82 Pac. 123. the order of said England Bros. and J. K. Dar- The A
The first point raised is without merit. nell. "Said $3,000 shall apply on the indebtedness
 2. But it does not follow that every of England Bros. to the Union Machinery & such promise may be proved by parol eviSupply Company."
dence. If the promise is asserted to have On the same day the England Bros. and been made as a part of a transaction which Darnell gave to the plaintiff a chattel mort- is evidenced by a formal written contract gage on the timber in question. Apparently complete and unambiguous upon its face, it is Darnell signed this agreement and chattel elementary that, as between the parties to mortgage to give them precedence over his the writing, parol evidence would be inadprior chattel mortgage on the timber. There- missible to prove any additional promise after the Englands sold one boom of logs, the which would tend to contradict, vary, or enplaintiff a second boom, and the third was large the terms, scope, or purpose of the disposed of by the Seattle Merchants' & written contract, Ross v. Portland Coffee & Credit Men's Association by common consent Spice Co., 30 Wash. 647, 652, 71 Pac, 184; of the creditors of England Bros., including Allen V. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 76 the plaintiff. On July 17, 1914, plaintiff Wash. 51, 58, 135 Pac. 621. The same rule brought this action, alleging that on June 16, excluding parol testimony which applies as 1913, when John England and wife gave the between the parties to a written contract apabove-mentioned mortgage to the defendant plies with like force to a third person whenas additional security for the three notes, the ever he claims as a beneficiary under a condefendant, for the purpose of securing such tract, bases his claim upon it or seeks to asadditional security and keeping the logging sert rights which originate in the contractucamp running, promised England and wife to al relation created by it. All rights primaripay to the plaintiff the sum of $1,000 to ap- ly arising from the negotiations on which the ply on their indebtedness to the plaintiff. written instrument rests, by whomsoever asThis alleged promise is the basis of the ac-serted, are merged in the writing. The fountion. At the trial the plaintiff was permitted, tain cannot rise higher than its source. In over objection, to introduce the testimony of such a case the third person who claims that John England and wife and their daughter the promise was made for his benefit is afto the effect that as a consideration for the fected by the same principles of estoppel to execution of the mortgage the defendant vary the contract as evidenced by the writpromised to pay $1,000 of the indebtedness | ing as affect the party who claims to have of the England Bros, to the plaintiff. The de- paid the consideration for the promise. fendant denied that any such promise was Jones, after indicating that the general rule made, and testified in substance that the excluding parol testimony to vary a written mortgage embodied the whole agreement be contract does not apply as against strangers tween him and the Englands, and that the to the instrument, says: contract and chattel mortgage above referred “It is to be observed, however, that the right to embodied the whole agreement between of a stranger to vary a written contract by him and the plaintiff. The trial resulted in
parol is limited to rights which are independent
of the instrument. So that where one, although a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. not a party to the instrument, bases his claim The defendant appeals.
upon it, and seeks to render it effective in his The record and the assigned errors suffi
favor as against the other party to the action,
by enforcing a right originating in the relation y present two contentions: (1) That the established by it, or which is founded upon it, alleged contemporaneous agreement contra- | the parol evidence rule applies." 3 Jones, Comvened the statute of frauds in that it was an mentaries on Evidence, g 449, p. 220. undertaking to answer for the debt of an- The following authorities amply sustain other and was not in writing; (2) that the and exemplify the exception as stated: Sayre Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., , eration clause is of no greater force than a 55 Minn. 236, 56 N. W. 815, 22 L. R. A. 390; separate receipt for the money; hence it is Current v. Muir, 99 Minn. 1, 108 N. W. 870; open to explanation by parol evidence. 3 Schneider v. Kirkpatrick, 80 Mo. App. 145; Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, 8 469. Selchow v. Stymus, 26 Hun (N. Y.) 145;  This is because the prime purpose of a Hankinson v. Riker, 10 Misc. Rep. 185, 30 deed is to convey title, and any explanation N. Y. Supp. 1040; Schultz 7. Plankington or variation of the consideration expressed, Bank, 141 Ill. 116, 30 N. E. 346, 33 Am. St. short of proving that the deed was without Rep. 290; Wodock v. Robinson, 148 Pa. 503, consideration, does not tend to defeat that 24 Atl. 73. For an antithetical case stating purpose. Ordway v. Downey, supra; Windthis exception and illustrating its limits, see sor v. St. Paul, etc., Ry. Co., supra. The our own decision in the case of Ransom v. same rule and reason applies in case of a Wickstrom & Co., 84 Wash. 419, 146 Pac. bill of sale of personalty. Don Yook v. 1041.
Washington Mill Co., supra; Van Lehn v.  As to the foregoing propositions there Morse, 16 Wash. 219, 47 Pac. 435; Gilmore can hardly be a divergence of opinion. But v. Skookum Box Factory, 20 Wash. 703, 56 the respondent contends that the real con- | Pac. 934. It is a matter of common knowlsideration for a written contract can always edge that in conveyancing, the acknowledg. be shown, that evidence of the parol con ed consideration in the deed is often, and it temporaneous promise of the mortgagee in may be said, usually not the real considerathis case to pay $1,000 of the mortgagor's tion paid or agreed to be paid. McCrea v. debt to it as an additional consideration for Purmort, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 460, 30 Am. the mortgage, was therefore admissible, or | Dec. 103. as respondent, in substance, puts it: The (6, 7] But where, as in this state, a mortexecution of security for appellant's notes gage is not a conveyance with a defeasance as was the consideration for the promise, which it was at common law, but is the mere written comes to the same thing. Though an addi- evidence of a contract of security, its prime tional consideration not inconsistent with purpose being to secure a debt, it seems to that expressed in the written contract may us that when the parties have specifically usually be proved by parol evidence, it is described the debt by stating the amount, as not competent as between the parties to a evidenced by specific notes, rate of interest, writing, under the guise of proving an adtime of payment, and all the terms essential ditional consideration, to ingraft upon a
to a complete and unambiguous agreement, written agreement, complete and unambigu- the recital of the amount and character of ous on its face, new terms, conditions, and the debt should be held as invulnerable to covenants by parol. Smith Sand & Gravel | parol attack as any other of the terms of Co. v. Corbin, 81 Wash. 494, 500, 142 Pac. the instrument, so long as the integrity of 1163; Morris v. Healy Lumber Co., 46 Wash. the instrument is not assailed for fraud nor 686, 691, 91 Pac. 186; Gordon v. Parke & a reformation sought for mistake. Such reLacy Machinery Co., 10 Wash. 18, 38 Pac. citals as those found here are not mere "in755; Kingsland v. Haines, 62 App. Div. 146, attentive recitals common in conveyancing." 70 N. Y. Supp. 873; Adams v. Watkins, 103 They evidence, by their very particularity of Mich. 431, 61 N. W. 774; Jackson v. Chicago. description of the notes secured, a contracetc.. R. Co., 54 Mo. App. 636; Walter vi | tual intention as binding as any other conDearing (Tex. Civ. App.) 65 S. W. 380; Kahn tract. v. Kahn, 94 Tex. 114, 58 S. W. 825; 17 Cyc. "It is a universal rule that the written conp. 659.
tract itself must be resorted to as the source of As sustaining the admissibility of evidence
authority for receiving parol evidence, and
ce where, as here, the contract shows a deliberate of a contemporaneous parol agreement as an agreement complete in itself and formally exeadded consideration of a written contract, cuted, parol evidence to enlarge its scope or vary respondent cites four of our own decisions:
its terms is never admissible." Allen v. Farm
ers' & Merchants' Bank, 76 Wash. 51, 58, 135 Don Yook v. Washington Mill Co., 16 Wash. Pac. 621, 624; Gordon v. Parke & Lacy Ma459, 47 Pac. 964; Johnston v. McCart, 24 chinery Co., supra; Farley v. Letterman, 152 Wash, 19, 63 Pac. 1121; Ordway v. Downey,
1121: Ordway y Downey | Pac. 515. 18 Wash. 412, 51 Pac. 1047, 52 Pac. 228, 63 To this rule neither a deed nor a mortgage Am. St. Rep. 892; Windsor v. St. Paul, etc., is any exception. 6 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law Ry. Co., 37 Wash. 156, 79 Pac. 613, 3 Ann. (2d Ed.) p. 775. Even in case of a deed when Cas. 62. An examination of these cases dis- the statement of the consideration passes closes the fact that the first two involve beyond the mere recitative acknowledgment bills of sale of personalty, and the last two of payment of money, common in conveyancdeeds conveying real estate. The tendency ing, and enters into specific details and conof modern authority is towards the doctrine ditions stipulating special terms evidencing that the effect of the acknowledgment of not merely an intent to convey land, but payment of a given consideration in a deed to contract with reference to the considerais only to estop the grantor from asserting tion, such recitals bind the parties, and it a total lack of consideration, and thus de- complete on their face, can no more be alter