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PARKER, J. This is an action to recover | buildings declined to act as arbiter, and that a balance due upon a building contract in- therefore there is no question of the necescluding compensation for extra work and sity of submitting any disputed matter to material. The case was tried before the him. court without a jury, resulting in findings and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, from which the defendant has appealed.

[1] We are not able to gather from the language above quoted an intention on the part of the parties thereto to make the archiIn April, 1913, respondents, Russell & Gal- tect the arbiter of the questions here involvlagher, entered into a contract with appel- ed, since there is not here involved any queslant, Yesler Estate, Incorporated, agreeing tion of the proper performance of the work to construct a certain portion of a building or the proper quality of the material enterabout to be constructed upon one of its lotsing into the structure, but only the question in Seattle. The provisions of the contract, of the value of the extra work and possibly so far as here necessary to notice them, are the quantity thereof, and the demurrage, all as follows: of which questions seem by the terms of the "That the said party of the first part [respond-contract to be subject to arbitration before ents], for and in consideration of the payments to be made to them by the said second party as hereinafter provided, do hereby covenant, contract, and agree to do and fully complete, by the 10th day of June, 1913, all of the digging, trenching, cribbing, pumping, cleaning, excavating, and build the foundation and basement walls, piers, and posts for a building to be erected, on the site described in the specification, according to the plans, specifications, and drawings (which are declared to be a part of this agreement), made by A. Wickersham, architect (acting as agent for said owner), in a good, substantial, and workmanlike manner, to the satisfaction of and under the direction of

said architect. * *

the superintendent of buildings. It seems to us that the language of the contract referring to such arbitration negatives the idea of the power of the architect in that respect, not only as to the value of the extra work, but also as to the amount of the demurrage, if any, chargeable to the respondents. It is in any event not at all certain that the parties to the contract agreed to make the architect the final arbiter of any of the questions here involved. This of itself would entitle respondents to resort to the courts.

case of Van Horne v. Watrous, 10 Wash. 525, at page 527, 39 Pac. 136, at page 137, Judge Stiles, speaking for the court, observed:

"It is also further agreed that the said party [2] While the law favors the settlement of of the second part may make all alterations by disputes by arbitration, it will compel paradding, omitting, or deviating from the aforesaid plans, drawings, and specifications, or ei- ties to resort thereto only when the terms of ther of them, which it shall deem proper, and their contract are clear and certain in showthe said architect shall advise, without impair-ing they have such intention. In the early ing the validity of this contract, and in all such cases the said architect shall value or appraise such alteration, and add to or deduct from the amount herein agreed to be paid to the said first party the excess or deficiency occasioned by such alteration, but should any dispute arise respecting the true value of any works added or omitted by the contractor, the same shall be arbitrated by appealing to the superintendent of buildings for the city of Seattle, who has been hereby mutually selected and whose decision shall be final and binding on all parties, each party paying one-half of the fee. It is further agreed that in case any difference of opinion shall arise between said parties in relation to the contract, the work to be or that has been performed under it. or in relation to the plans, drawings, and specifications, the decision of the said architect shall be final and binding on all parties hereto.

* *

*

"It is further agreed should the contractor fail to finish the work at the time agreed upon, they shall pay to or allow the owner. by way of liquidated damages, the sum of $20 per diem, for each and every day thereafter the said works shall remain incomplete, subject to the right of arbitration above mentioned."

The real controversy is over claims of respondents for extra work and material required of them because of change in plans of the structure, and also a claim of demurrage made by appellant against respondents because of delay in the completion of the work. It is contended by counsel for appellant that under the terms of this contract the architect became the agreed arbiter of the disputed items of charge claimed by respondents, and also the disputed item of demurrage claimed by appellant against respond

"Courts will enforce contracts to arbitrate disputes and make the decision of arbitrators final where the parties to a contract make it clearly to appear that such was their intention; but whenever they leave it doubtful whether such a method of settling a disputed question was intended to be left to the final decision of arbitrators, the construction is in favor of the right to resort to the courts for redress in the usual manner."

In Sweatt v. Bonne, 60 Wash. 18, 110 Pac. 617, we said:

be as an agreed arbiter between an owner and
"Whatever the authority of an architect may
a contractor, the law will not regard the owner
bound by a decision of the architect, except in
so far as the owner has unmistakably agreed
Long v. Pierce County, 22
to be so bound.
Wash. 330, 61 Pac. 642; County of Cook v.
Harms, 108 Ill. 151; City of Elgin v. Joslyn,
136 Ill. 525, 26 N. E. 1090; Chicago & E. I.
R. Co. v. Moran, 187 Ill. 316, 58 N. E. 335;
Fay v. Muhlker [1 Misc. Rep. 321], 20 N. Y
Supp. 671; Fuller & Co. v. Young & Co., 126
Fed. 343 [61 C. C. A. 245].”

This observation is, of course, applicable to the rights of the contractor as well as to those of the owner.

All other questions here involved are of fact only. We think it would be unprofitable to analyze the evidence in detail, and feel that we are not called upon to say more than that we have painstakingly reviewed all of the evidence found in the statement of facts, and

in favor of the conclusions reached by the trial court both upon the question of respondents' claims for extra work and material and upon appellant's claim of demurrage. In any event we cannot say that it preponderates to the contrary. We think the case does not call for further discussion.

The judgment is affirmed.

one claiming the benefit of the transaction to
explain it by clear and satisfactory evidence.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent
Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 801, 802; Dec. Dig.
278.]

6. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 259-CON

VEYANCE TO WIFE
STATUTE.

BURDEN OF PROOF

Rem. & Bal. Code, § 5292, putting the burden of proving good faith of the transaction upon a wife to whom a husband has conveyed,

MORRIS, C. J., and BAUSMAN, MAIN, does not exempt the transaction from the ordiand HOLCOMB, JJ., concur.

CRANDALL et al. v. LEE. (No. 12877.) (Supreme Court of Washington. Jan. 7, 1916.) 1. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 230, 241REMEDIES OF CREDITORS-EXECUTION.

A creditor may levy an execution upon the property theretofore conveyed in fraud of his rights and sell it without resort to a creditor's bill, and without having an execution returned nulla bona.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. 88 660-664, 694, 696726; Dec. Dig. 230, 241.] 2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES ACQUIRED AT EXECUTION SALE TION AND PROOF.

nary rules of pleading by one questioning the
deed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent
Conveyances, Cent. Dig. 88 756, 757, 764-766,
769, 770; Dec. Dig.259.]

7. FRAUD 41-PRESUMPTION.

Fraud is never presumed, and the burden of pleading fraud is always on the one who asserts it.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Fraud, Cent. Dig. §§ 36, 37; Dec. Dig. 41.]

8. APPEAL AND ERROR 889 AMENDMENT

ON APPEAL-STATUTES.

Under Rem. & Bal. Code, § 307, providing that the court shall in every stage of an action disregard any defect in the pleadings not affecting the substantial rights of the adverse 264-TITLE party, and section 1752, providing that the SuALLEGA- preme Court shall hear and determine all causes upon the merits and shall consider all amendA creditor suing to quiet title acquired at ments which could have been made, the coman execution sale must go further than to assert plaint in a suit by the purchaser at a creditor's merely that the sale was made in fraud of his execution sale to quiet title as against an outrights, and must allege and prove that the gran- standing deed in the debtor's wife, where the tor had no other property out of which he could complaint did not state facts to constitute a have satisfied the judgment. cause of action, and where the trial court made no findings of fact, would not deem the pleadings amended to conform to the proof, since, where there are no facts, there can be no amendment.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 767, 768; Dec. Dig. ~~264.]

3. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 263—PurCHASE AT EXECUTION SALE SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT.

In a suit by the purchaser at an execution sale to quiet title to the land as against an outstanding deed to the debtor's wife, the purchaser must plead the facts upon which he relies, and a complaint in no way describing the deed, although it was a matter of record showing the relationship of the parties, or charging actual or constructive fraud, did not state a cause of action so as to put the defendant to the burden of proof.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. 88 771-774, 776-779, 781; Dec. Dig. 263.]

4. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

AND SALE BY CREDITOR-EFFECT.

230-LEVY

A creditor may levy an execution and sell property assumed to be conveyed in fraud of creditors, but such proceeding will not remove the cloud of an outstanding deed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 660-664; Dec. Dig. ~~230.]

5. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 278-CONVEYANCE FROM HUSBAND TO WIFE-PRESUMPTION.

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A complaint in a suit by the purchaser at
a creditor's execution sale to quiet title to the
land as against an outstanding deed in the
debtor's wife, merely asserting such hostile title,
did not show that the foundation of the foreign
judgment on which execution was had was either
an existing debt or an existing equity at the
time the deed was executed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent
Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 756, 757, 764-766,
769, 770; Dec. Dig. 259.]
10. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

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295-EVI

- SUFFICIENCY - EQUITY OF PLAIN

sale to quiet title to the land as against an out-
In a suit by the purchaser at an execution
standing deed in the debtor's wife, evidence held
insufficient to show that plaintiff stood in the
shoes of a creditor having an existing equity
at the time the deed to defendant was made.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent
Conveyances, Cent. Dig. §§ 867-875; Dec. Dig.
295.]

Department 1. Appeal from Superior
Court, Kitsap County; Walter M. French,
Judge.

In view of Rem. & Bal. Code, § 8766, providing that every deed from a husband to his wife shall divest the property from any claim as community property and vest it in the grantee | as separate property, and that such conveyance shall not affect any existing equity in favor of the creditors of the grantor, a deed from a husband to his wife is not presumptively Suit to quiet title by W. F. Crandall and fraudulent, either as matter of substantive law others against Elizabeth M. Lee. Judgment or of pleading, but may be questioned as any other deed, and, if attacked by a sufficient plead- for defendant, and plaintiff's appeal. Afing and preliminary proof, the burden is on the firmed.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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Shorett, McLaren & Shorett, of Seattle, for | ings amended to conform to the proofs. Apappellants. Thomas Stevenson, of Bremerton, for respondent.

CHADWICK, J. On Feb. 6, 1911, the appellant W. F. Crandall and another brought suit against Milton S. Lee, husband of the defendant, in the district court of New Mexico. Judgment was rendered in the courts of that state on April 20, 1911. On February 1st Milton S. Lee conveyed the land now in controversy to respondent by deed sufficient in form. The property is situate in the county of Kitsap, in this state. At the same time Lee conveyed to respondent 480 acres of land in the state of Arkansas. The deed to the Kitsap county land was recorded in the office of the auditor on the 7th day of February, 1911.

On June 19, 1911, the judgment creditors began an action upon the foreign judgment, making Lee and his wife defendants. The Lees are nonresidents. Service was obtained by publication after the lands had been subjected to an attachment. The defendant Elizabeth M. Lee, respondent here, made answer, tendering the general issue, and that the court rendering the judgment had obtained no jurisdiction over her or the subject-matter of the action. Judgment was entered on June 29, 1912, against Milton S. Lee and the community consisting of Milton S. Lee and Elizabeth M. Lee. The property was thereafter sold at sheriff's sale to these appellants. The sale was confirmed and a sheriff's deed executed. Thereupon appellants brought an ordinary suit to quiet title to the land as against the outstanding deed

of the defendant.

After a trial upon the merits the court, following the case of Wagner v. Law, 3 Wash. 500, 28 Pac. 1109, 29 Pac. 927, 15 L. R. A. 784, 28 Am. St. Rep. 56, as we are told, held that plaintiffs could not recover under their complaint. It is not clear from the record, but it would seem, that the court treated the action as a suit by creditors to subject land alleged to have been conveyed in fraud of their rights to the payment of their claims, and, under the authority of the case mentioned, held that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to allege and prove that the debtors had no other property subject to execution at the time the conveyance was made, and rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant upon the theory that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

Appellants contend: First, that they are within the rule of Wagner v. Law, if it be in point; and, second, that it is not in point, for the reason that in that case the conveyance was not made by a husband to a wife, and therefore "presumptively fraudulent" as to creditors; and, further, that the case went off on demurrer, whereas the present case was tried upon its merits, and we will, under

pellants brought their action, alleging no more than that they were the owners in fee of the property, that defendant claimed some right or title in it adverse to them, the exact nature of which they could not aver, and prayed that she be required to come in and set up her interest, if any, and that title be quieted in them.

[1, 2] The case of Wagner v. Law settled two legal propositions. They are: A creditor may levy an execution upon property theretofore conveyed in fraud of his right and sell it without resort to a creditor's bill and without having an execution returned nulla bona; and, second, if he brings an action to quiet the title acquired at an execution sale, he must go further than to assert merely that the sale was made in fraud of his rights, as was done in Wagner v. Law. He must allege and prove that the grantor had no other property out of which he could have satisfied the judgment. The case has been followed in: Hamilton Brown Shoe Co. v. Adams, 5 Wash. 335, 32 Pac. 92; Samuel v. Kittenger, 6 Wash. 266, 33 Pac. 509; Sawtelle v. Weymouth, 14 Wash. 21, 43 Pac. 1101; Preston Parton Mill Co. v. Dexter Horton Co., 22 Wash. 236, 60 Pac. 412, 79 Am. St. Rep. 928. In the latter case the court said of Wagner v. Law:

"A careful examination of this case shows that it was an action by the judgment creditor to set aside a fraudulent conveyance which was alleged to be a cloud upon plaintiff's title. The plaintiff was a creditor, and had, under execution, purchased the property. The real question in the case seemed to be that the judgto set aside the fraudulent conveyance after ment creditor had a right to maintain his action he had enforced his execution under his judgment; that it was not then too late for him to maintain his action. The suit was between the judgment creditor and the fraudulent grantor and grantee. But it was also held in that case that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, when it failed to allege that there was no other property of the judgment creditor at the time of the conveyance out of which the creditor could satisfy his judgment."

It is clear that appellants' complaint is bad under the doctrine of these cases, unless, as it is contended, the burden was upon the defendant wife to come forward and plead and prove that the deed was executed in good faith, or that appellants were not creditors having an existing equity.

[3, 4] After mature consideration and a rereading of the cases referred to, we are inclined to hold that one who questions a deed must plead the facts upon which he relies. This must of necessity be so, unless we admit appellants' contention that a deed from a husband to his wife is "presumptively fraudulent." If it is not to be treated as a void thing as to third parties, the complaint is clearly insufficient. Appellants contend in their brief that it is a void deed. The complaint does not in any way describe the deed,

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veals the relationship of the parties. hold the complaint good would permit a plaintiff to claim title merely and put a defendant to the burden of setting up the deed which is assumed to be fraudulent and the facts which are relied on to exonerate it from an imputation arising from the single fact that the grantor was a husband and the grantee a wife.

If the law is as appellants inist it is, they would be entitled to judgment on the pleadings unless defendant had set up the good faith of the deed, although it is nowhere mentioned in the pleadings. On the other hand, if respondent had set up the deed and nothing more in answer to a complaint charging no fraud, but only title and an outstanding adverse interest, defendant would be entitled to a judgment on the pleadings, for the obvious reason, as we shall show, that the deed was neither fraudulent nor "presumptively fraudulent." In other words, respondent is not to be put to her burden of proof (there is no presumption; the difference in these terms is explained in Welch v. Creech, 153 Pac. 355) until a charge of fraud actual or constructive is made. This is but another way of saying that appellants' complaint does not state a cause of action.

We understand the rule governing the conduct of a creditor who questions a transaction of the kind now under consideration, as it is gathered from our decisions, to be: If he levies an execution and sells property assumed to be conveyed in fraud of creditors, he may do so, but such proceeding will not remove the cloud of an outstanding deed. If he does so sell, and would remove the cloud, he must make a direct attack upon the deed by alleging its fraudulent character, and by pleading and proving that his debtor has no other property out of which he can satisfy his debt.

[5] Expressions to the effect that a deed from a husband to a wife is "presumptively fraudulent" have crept into some of our opinions. Dill v. Carver, 70 Wash. 103, 126 Pac. 86; Patterson v. Bowes, 78 Wash. 476, 139 Pac. 225. In its proper setting of fact this statement may be true, but it cannot be laid down as a fundamental either of substantive law or of pleading. Such a deed may be questioned as any other deed, and, if attacked by a sufficient pleading and preliminary proof, the burden is upon the one who claims the benefit of the transaction to explain it by clear and satisfactory evidence. One who would do so must be a creditor having an existing equity-a cause of action-at the time of the transfer, and he must allege the relationship, the transfer, and that the grantor is without other property to satisfy his debt. Whenever the question has been squarely put up to the court, it has held that a deed from a husband to his wife carries no presumption of fraud. Such deeds have the sanction of the statute (Rem. & Bal. Code, § 8766).

"As between the parties [husband and wife] the conveyance was absolute and good as against tinues, "no interest, legal or equitable remained the grantor," so good in fact, as the court conin the grantor upon which a lien of a judgment subsequently rendered could attach." Sawtelle V. Weymouth, 14 Wash. 27, 43 Pac. 1101.

The effect of such deeds has been considered by the court in Klosterman v. Harrington, 11 Wash. 138, 39 Pac. 376; Hayden v. Zerbst, 49 Wash. 107, 94 Pac. 909; Shorett v. Signor, 58 Wash. 95, 107 Pac. 1033; Powers v. Munson, 74 Wash. 237, 133 Pac. 453; Smith v. Weed, 75 Wash. 452, 134 Pac. 1070.

In Malloy v. Benway, 34 Wash. 315, 75 Pac. 869, the court said, in considering the effect of a deed made by a husband to his wife:

"We think that it is a safe general rule to asby proper motives; that therefore good faith sume that parties in their dealings are actuated with regard to such dealings will be presumed until the contrary is alleged or made to appear."

If any effect at all is to be given to the statute, it should follow that one who questions a deed from a husband to a wife should at least plead the making of the deed and a plain and concise statement of the facts that give him standing to question it. Otherwise we would be put to the holding that a defendant might be put to the burden of pleading no fraud where none is alleged.

[6] The statute relied on (section 5292) puts the burden of proving the good faith of the transaction upon a wife who is the grantee of her husband, but it nowhere exempts the transaction of the ordinary rules of pleading.

[7] Fraud is never presumed. The burden of pleading fraud is always on the one who asserts it.

It is said in Wagner v. Law, supra, there is no substantial distinction between a case that is brought before and one that is brought after a sale, and, further, that it is better to have a uniform practice, regardless of the particular proceeding adopted by the creditor.

[8, 9] In this connection it is not out of place to say that it may well be doubted whether appellants' complaint sets up an existing equity. The mere assertion of a hostile title-the complaint goes no furtherwould hardly fall within the definition of the term.

"One must be said to have an existing equity when he has an existing right to future payment, though it be contingent, of which it would be inequitable to deprive him." Sallaske v. Fletcher, 73 Wash. 596, 132 Pac. 648, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 320, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 760.

Nor do we think that appellants can recover under our holdings that, where a trial has proceeded on the merits, we will deem the pleadings amended to conform to the proofs. Sections 307, 1752, Rem. & Bal. Code. This case comes to us upon disputed facts, and to apply the rule of the statute we must find that the party who invokes it has sustained his right to maintain the case by competent evidence. If there are no facts, there can be no amendment. The trial court made no

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Granting that, if the proofs were otherwise sufficient, we would hold that we would consider the pleading amended so as to allege that Milton S. Lee had no other property out of which the debt could be satisfied, appellants still could not attack the deed to respondent or invoke the aid of the statute of amendments unless they first show that the debt which is the basis of their claim was that of a creditor having an existing equity at the time the deed was made. Otherwise the deed is good as between the parties and as against all the world. It is not "presumptively fraudulent." It may be actually or constructively fraudulent as to such creditors as the statute makes the object of its solicitude, and who have proved themselves to have sufficient standing to put the respondent to her proof. The true rule can be best stated by resort to two of our former decisions.

"While it may be true that a conveyance from a husband to a wife is not of itself a badge of fraud, either under the rule of the statute or the general rule cited, it is nevertheless a fact, which naturally awakens suspicion, lends greater weight to other unfavorable circumstances, and will be for that reason set aside upon less proofs of fraud than will a transaction between parties not having the same confidential relation." Bates v. Drake, 28 Wash. 456, 68 Pac.

961.

"Thereupon the plaintiffs introduced as plaintiffs' Exhibit A the deed of purchase issued by dall covering the premises described in plainthe sheriff of said county to the plaintiff Crantiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs also introduced as plaintiffs' Exhibit B all of the records and files in cause No. 2637 in said Kitsap county entitled 'William Crandall and J. Ñ. Conn, Plaintiffs, v. Milton S. Lee and Wife, Defendants,' including also the depositions in said cause of the said defendants Lee and wife. The dence as defendants' Exhibit 1, the deposition defendant herein thereupon introduced in eviin this cause of the defendant herein, Elizabeth M. Lee, the wife of said Milton S. Lee, and also introduced, as defendants' Exhibit 2, the certain deed to the said premises in controversy executed by the defendant Milton S. Lee to his said wife Elizabeth Lee."

The findings of fact in the action in which the sale was had recites no more than the rendition of the judgment in the courts of New Mexico upon the 20th day of April, 1911, and the judgment, no more than that:

"The same is hereby established and declared to be a valid lien upon all the interest of the defendant Milton S. Lee individually, and the community interest of Milton S. Lee and Elizabeth M. Lee, his wife, in the lands," etc.

We know of no rule that would bind the respondent beyond the terms of the judg ment. It is clear, therefore, that appellants have not proved that they stand in the shoes of a creditor having an existing equity at the time the deed to the respondent was made under the doctrine of Henry v. Yost, supra, and Eggleston v. Sheldon, 85 Wash. 422, 148 Pac. 575.

Affirmed.

MORRIS, C. J., and MOUNT, ELLIS, and FULLERTON, JJ., concur.

"To attack the validity of a conveyance, the person asserting the fraud must be one who has been injured by the fraud; and accordingly a creditor of the debtor may so attack the conveyance. A conveyance made without consideration is presumptively fraudulent as to existing creditors of the grantor. However, there is no presumption that such a transfer was made with a view to defraud subsequent creditors. It becomes material, then, to determine TRIANGLE TRADERS et al. v. CITY OF whether Henry was a creditor of Yost and wife when the deed to Schroeder was executed." Henry v. Yost, 152 Pac. 714.

It will be seen, therefore, that there is no place to apply the rule, for appellants have not proven the debt which was the foundation of the foreign judgment to have been either "an existing debt" or "an existing equity" at the time the deed was executed. For these reasons the cases relied upon by the appellants, Brown v. Baldwin, 46 Wash. 106, 89 Pac. 483, Plath v. Mullins, 151 Pac. 811, and Benham v. Hawkins, 82 Wash. 390, 144 Pac. 532, are not in point.

If, after a trial upon the merits, the court can find from the facts or from the fair inferences of facts that a material fact has been proven, although not pleaded, the court will readily apply the rule of these cases, but in none of our decisions, do we apprehend, has the court ever substituted for a material fact the grace and favor of the stat

ute.

[10] After reciting the appearances, the trial judge certifies the course of the trial to be:

BREMERTON.

In re TRUNK SEWER, LOCAL IMPROVEMENT DIST. NO. 62. (No. 12701.) (Supreme Court of Washington. 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Jan. 11, 1916.) 514-PUBLIC

IMPROVEMENT ASSESSMENT. In view of Laws 1911, § 42, p. 469, declaring that, when any assessment, whether the same shall be an original assessment, an assessment upon omitted property, a supplemental assessment, or reassessment, shall be declared void, the council of such city or town shall make

a new

assessment or reassessment upon the the improvement, a city is entitled, an assessproperty which has been or will be benefited by ment for a public sewer having been set aside because the provisions of Laws 1911 relating to publication and the spreading of the assessment were not strictly followed, to make a reassessment.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1207-1215; Dec. Dig. 514.]

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 562-PUBLIC

IMPROVEMENTS-SETTLEMENTS.

Where a contractor for the construction of a sewer was under the contract entitled to compensation for extra work, a settlement for

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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