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the money paid over and delivered to him? , the court cannot indulge in the presumption It is left entirely to conjecture. In the that acts were committed which constitute absence of any allegation to that effect, we a crime. The prosecuting witnesses herein cannot assume the prosecuting witnesses may by reason of such representations have were, by reason of the false representations, been induced to pay the money over to deinduced to pay their money to defendant in fendant as a contribution to some charitable consideration of a transfer by him to them object, in which case we do not mean to say of this promissory note and mortgage. Con- it would not constitute the offense charged. ceding the representations were, as believed, Section 952, Penal Code, requires a statement all true, why should they induce these per- of the particular circumstances of the offense sons to give their money to Rabild? That when they are necessary to constitute a they delivered the money to him relying upon complete offense. Measured by this prothe representation that he was Rabild is as vision, the indictment is insufficient, since inconceivable as that they should have paid it fails to disclose any natural or causal conit to him because of a false representationnection between the false representations that he was Dr. Cook and had been to the alleged and the delivery of the property to north pole.
defendant. "The indictment must show that the property The judgment and order from which the was obtained by means of the false pretense alleged. Accordingly, when there appears to be
appeal is prosecuted are affirmed. no natural connection between the pretense and
We concur: "CONREY, P. J.; JAMES, J. the delivery of the property, such additional facts as are necessary to show the relation must be alleged.” 19 Cyc. 429; People v. White, 7 Cal. App. 99, 93 Pac. 683.
PEOPLE v. TURNER. (Cr. 592.) In the absence of an allegation showing
ing (District Court of Appeal, First District, Cal
District that the prosecutors were induced to pur
ifornia. Nov. 12, 1915.) chase the note and mortgage or lend money
1. CRIMINAL LAW Cum 1186/APPEAL AND ERthereon, there appears to be no natural con
ROR-HARMLESS ERROR-STATUTE. nection between the false representations Under Const. art. 6, § 442, providing that and the delivery of the property to defend- no judgment shall be set aside in any criminal
case unless the court shall be of opinion that ant.
the error complained of resulted in a miscarriage 121. While such facts should be directly of justice, in a prosecution for libel, where, pleaded, nevertheless there may be averments at the conclusion of the preliminary 'hearing, from which the connection between the pre
the magistrate merely announced and caused to tense and the obtaining of the property can
be entered in his docket, without signing it, an
order that the defendant should be held to anbe inferred, as in the case of People v. swer in the superior court to a charge of libel, Donaldson, 70 Cal. 116, 11 Pac. 681; where fixing his bail," in contravention of Pen, Code, the defendant was charged with false pre
| $ 872, providing that, if it appears on exam
ination that a public offense has been committenses in obtaining from one Spence certain
ted, and there is sufficient cause to believe that hogs by falsely pretending to Spence that the defendant is guilty, the magistrate must he, the defendant, had in bank a certain sum make or indorse on the complaint an order of money for which he delivered to Spence
signed by him to that effect, it not appearing
that defendant was injured by the failure of the his check. So, in the case of People v. Haas, magistrate to make the required indorsement 151 Pac. 672, recently decided by this court, upon the complaint before the information was and wherein the court, through Mr. Justice filed, judgment of conviction after fair trial James, distinguished the facts therein from
will not be set aside for the omission.
1 [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal those in the Kahler Case, an examination of
Law, Cent. Dig. $8 3215-3219, 3221, 3230; Dec. the information upon which Haas was prose- Dig.'m1186.1 cuted exhibits facts from which the court 2. LIBEL AND SLANDER 145 CRIMINAL was fairly justified in inferring that the PROSECUTION-STATUTE"LIBEL.” money of the prosecuting witness was, by ,,
Under Pen. Code, & 248, declaring that a
libel is a malicious defamation, expressed by reason of the false pretenses, paid over to
printing, tending to impeach the honesty, integdefendant, in consideration of a transfer rity, virtue, or reputation of one, and thereby to her of certain property alleged to be expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridiowned by Haas. In the case of People v.
cule, where a newspaper proprietor published
an oath alleged to be required of all fourth deHines, 5 Cal. App. 122, 89 Pac. 858, cited by gree members of a fraternal association, which appellant, the information, by indirect alle. oath was of such a character as to impeach gations, disclosed the money of the prose the members' loyalty as citizens, though not di
rectly impeaching their honesty and integrity, cuting witness was paid over to defendant
| he was guilty of libel. in consideration of a conveyance of property
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Libel and which he represented he owned.
Slander, Cent. Dig. $ 404; Dec. Dig. Om 145.  It is a well-settled rule that an indict For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, ment or information must set forth all the First and Second Series, Libel.] facts and circumstances necessary to consti- 3. LIBEL AND SLANDER 145 - CRIMINAL tute the crime sought to be charged. In the
PROSECUTION – LIBEL UPON MEMBERS OF
FRATERNAL ORDER. absence of such allegations, or statements " *
Where a newspaper proprietor published from which such facts may be fairly deduced, I a libel in the form of an oath alleged to be
required of fourth degree members of a fraternal | Ralph H. Smith, of Santa Cruz, and Aaron organization, although the publication was in- L, Sapiro, of San Francisco, for appellant. tended to apply only to persons who were candidates for public office at the time, it was libel- u.
WhenU. S. Webb, Atty. Gen., and Frank L. Guerous as to all members of the order of the de-ena, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the People. gree named, since a libel may be upon a class of persons if the tendency of the publication is to stir up riot and disorder.
KERRIGAN, J. The defendant was chargEd. Note. For other cases, see Libel anded by information with the crime of libel, Slander, Cent, Dig. 8 404; Dec. Dig. Om145.] and was tried and convicted. This appeal is 4. CRIMINAL LAW Om 824 - TRIAL-INSTRUC from the judgment of conviction, and from TIONS-REQUESTS.
an order denying defendant's motion for a In a prosecution for libel, where no in
new trial. struction was requested or given on the subject of privileged communication, the omission to Upon his arraignment the defendant movspecifically instruct the jury as to defendant's ed the court to set aside the information upcontention that, since his publication related on the ground that he had not been legally to an election, it was privileged under Pen. Code, 8 256, was not ground for reve
committed for trial by a magistrate. The as the jury are judges of both the law and the motion was denied. Such denial is the first facts in criminal libel cases, the defendant of the grounds urged by the appellant for the should have requested a specific instruction if
reversal of the judgment. he desired to have the jury more directly advised as to his contention in regard to privilege
 Section 872 of the Penal Code prothan it was by the evidence or argument of vides that, if it appears upon an examination counsel.
that a public offense has been committed, (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal and there is sufficient cause to believe that Law, Dec. Dig. Om824.)
the defendant is guilty thereof, the magis5. LIBEL AND SLANDER 148 - CRIMINAL trate must make or indorse on the complaint PROSECUTION-PRIVILEGE-LIBEL OF CANDI
an order, signed by him, to that effect. UnDATE FOR OFFICE-STATUTE.
Pen. Code 8 256. providing that a communi. der the authorities, in so far as the section cation made to a person interested in the com- requires that the order shall be indorsed upmunication by one who was also interested, or on the complaint, it may be regarded as who stood in such relation to the former as to
directory; and it is sufficient if the indorse. afford a reasonable ground for supposing his motive innocent, is not presumed to be mali- ment be reduced to writing and signed by the cious, and is a privileged communication, did magistrate and entered upon his official dockuot render privileged a libelous publication in a
et, or upon the complaint or deposition. Peo newspaper impeaching the loyalty of citizens who were candidates for public office, since a ple v. Tarbox, 115 Cal. 57, 46 Pac. 896: Peocandidate for office is as much entitled to pro- ple v. Wilson, 93 Cal. 377, 28 Pac. 1061. In tection from defamation as any other citizen, this case the order of commitment was neiand a public journal or individual who indulges the
ther indorsed upon the complaint or deposiin defamatory assertions in respect to him is equally responsible for his acts with those com
tion, nor was the entry of such order in mitting the same offense against private individ- the magistrate's docket, made by his stenoguals.
rapher, signed by the magistrate until after [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Llbel and
the motion to dismiss the information was Slander, Cent, Dig. 88 407-411; Dec. Dig. Om 148.)
filed. In other words, the record discloses
that prior to the filing of the motion the mag6. CRIMINAL LAW 116642 - APPEAL AND
istrate did nothing more at the conclusion of ERROR – HARMLESS ERROR - REMARK OF COUBT.
the preliminary hearing than to announce In a prosecution for libel, where the court, and cause to be entered in his docket an in the presence of the jury, stated that the pub order that the defendant should be held to lication might fairly be interpreted to state that all persons admitted to the fourth degree of a
answer in the superior court to a charge fraternal order had taken the published oath,
of libel, and fixing the bail. which was libelous, and then explained to the While it is no doubt true that the terms jury that the remarks were not directed to them, l of section 872 of the Penal Code should be but solely to counsel incidentally to the denial of a motion to dismiss. repeatedly admonishing complied with before the district attorney is the jury thereafter that they were not in any warranted in filing an information against a way to be influenced in reaching their verdict person, still it does not appear that the deby the court's observations, that they were
fendant was deprived of any substantial the sole judges of the facts, and that the interpretation of the language of the publication was
right by reason of the omission of the magisa matter for them, the error in the court's state trate. If the motion had been granted, anment was harmless.
other preliminary examination could have [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal
been held under the provisions of sections Law, Cent. Dig. 88 3114-3123; Dec. Dig. om 116642.]
997-999 of the Penal Code (Ex parte Baker,
88 Cal. 84, 25 Pac. 966; People v. Breen, 130 Appeal from Superior Court, Santa Cruz Cal. 72, 62 Pac. 408), wherein the omission County; W. A. Beasly, Judge.
now complained of could have been supplied. Hepry S. Turner was convicted of libel, Under the provisions of section 442, art. 6, of and from the judgment and an order denying the Constitution, it not appearing that the his motion for new trial, he appeals. Judg. defendant was injured by the failure of the ment and order affirmed.
magistrate to make the required indorsement
upon the complaint before the information the Roman Catholic Church, he will no longer was filed, we cannot now, after a fair trial, | rest easily in his present peaceful slumber.”
set aside the judgment of conviction because it would seem that a mere statement of · of such omission.
the published oath, coupled with an aver Defendant demurred to the information ment that it was false and malicious, would on the ground that it did not state facts suf- by sufficient to bring the publication within ficient to constitute a public offense. The de- the terms of section 248 of the Penal Code. murrer was overruled, and he now challenges It would be a severe reflection upon the conthe correctness of such ruling.
dition of the law of libel if it permitted to go The question presented is whether or not uncondemned the publication of articles such the publication complained of comes within as this, if false. It is clear that the pubthe definition of the offense found in section lished oath, if believed by the community to 248 of the Penal Code. That section, in so be taken by the members of the fourth degree far as it is pertinent to the offense here in- of the Knights of Columbus, would have a volved, declares:
tendency to expose those persons to hatred, "A libel is a malicious defamation, expressed contempt, or ridicule. While the publication * * * by * * * printing * * * tending * * * to impeach the honesty, integrity, vir
may not, as claimed by the defendant, directtue, or reputation * * of one **'*ly impeach their honesty and integrity, it and thereby expose him to public hatred, con | does in a most direct and vital way assail tempt or ridicule.”
their loyalty as citizens by charging them The information charges that the defend with the taking of an obligation which is in ant, the proprietor and publisher of a cer itself a violation of their oath of allegiance tain newspaper called the “World-Issue," and of the essential duties and bonds of committed the crime of libel, in that on the American citizenship, and thus in a general 22d day of August, 1914, he unlawfully and sense impeaches their reputations, and exwrongfully caused to be printed and published poses them to those attitudes of public feelin said paper in Santa Cruz county, of and ing described in the section of the Penal concerning the prosecuting witnesses, who Code. lived in that county, and who were mem- |  At the time of the publication of the bers of the fourth degree of that certain article in question it appears from the record fraternal organization known and called the that there was a political campaign in progKnights of Columbus, the following article: ress in Santa Cruz county, where the article
"Can you vote for a man for public office who was published; and perhaps it is fair to insubscribes to the following?
fer from the record that some of the candi“Knights of Columbus Oath.
dates for election were members of the "(Extracts-4th Degree.)
fourth degree of Knights of Columbus, but “'I do now denounce and disown any alle- / none of the prosecuting witnesses were such giance as due to any heretical king, prince or candidates. With the record in that condistate, named Protestant or Liberals, or obedi- ' tion defendant contends: First that the pubence to any of their laws, magistrates or officers. “ 'I do further promise and declare that I will
lication was not of and concerning the prosehave no opinion or will of my own or any mental cuting witnesses; and, secondly, that the alreservation whatsoever, even as a corpse or leged libelous matter applies to a class or cadaver (perinde ac cadaver), but will unhesitatingly obey each and every command that I
| generally to all of the members of the fourth may receive from my superiors in the militia of degree in the fraternal order mentioned, and the Pope and of Jesus Christ.
therefore has no individual application, and “'That I will in voting always vote for a that for these reasons the judgment of conKnight of Columbus in preference to a Protes
viction cannot stand. tant-especially a Mason--and that I will leave my party to do so; that if two Catholics are While the published matter may have been on the ticket I will satisfy myself which is the intended to apply only to persons who were better supporter of Mother Church and vote
and vote candidates for office at that election, neveraccordingly. " "That I will not deal with or employ a Pro
theless, in terms and in effect, it refers to testant if in my power to deal with or employ a each and every member of the order of the Catholic. That I will place Catholic girls
degree named. It is undisputed that the pubProtestant families of the heretics. ""That I will provide myself with arms and
lication was false, that the prosecuting witammunition that I may be in readiness when nesses were wembe
nesses were members of the society of the the word is passed, or I am commanded to de degree in question, and the inevitable confend the church as an individual or with the mil-clusion to be drawn from the article is that itia of the Pope. "To the quiet, law-abiding, liberty-loving
every member of the order of the fourth deAmerican citizen it is almost unbelievable that gree had taken and subscribed to the publishany fellow citizen or body of them can serious- ed oath. The article asperses the character ly undertake or hope to overthrow our present of such members, and ascribes to them base form of government and replace it with an absolute monarchy. It is still more unbelievable
and dishonest motives, and as to them its that such a proposed monarchy should be dom- publication constituted criminal libel, whethinated by a foreigner, and that such a change er at that time a candidate for public office be brought about under the guise of religion. or not. The points presented by defendant Yet if such a citizen will but open his eyes to the condition existing under his very eyes, and might be urged with some force in a civil not believe they are good in a criminal pros- | Am. Rep. 757; King v. Root, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) ecution for libel, for, as is said in the case of 113, 21 Am. Dec. 102; McAllister v. Detroit State v. Brady, 24 Pac. 948, 949:
Free Press Co., 76 Mich. 338, 43 N. W. 431, “The law is elementary that the libel need not 15 Am. St. Rep. 318 and cases noted. In the be on a particular person, but may be upon a present case it is not disputed that the pubfamily or a class of persons if the tendency of
Oplication was false. It was therefore not the publication is to stir up riot and disorder and incite to a breach of the peace. It is ob- | privileged. vious that a libelous attack upon a body of men,  During the trial of the case, in denying though no individual may be pointed out, may
a motion made by the defendant to dismiss, tend as much or more to create a public disturbance as an attack on one individual, and a the court gave his reasons therefor in the doubt has been suggested whether the fact of presence of the jury, and, among other numbers does not add to the enormity of the things, said that, examining the publication act.'”
by its four corners as one would a contract, This statement is a correct exposition of
it might fairly be interpreted to state that the law and of the causes of its existence.
| all persons who were admitted to the fourth People v. Crespi, 115 Cal. 50, 46 Pac. 863.
degree of the Knights of Columbus had tak[4, 5] The defendant next contends that the
en the published oath; "in fact, the court court erred in denying his motion for a new
thinks the paper is fairly interpreted to mean trial. He argues that the record supports
just that." This remark, defendant insists, the theory that the publication was made for
constituted error on the part of the learned the purpose of enabling the voters at the ap
trial judge, for which the case must be reproaching election to cast their ballots more
versed. At the time, upon attention being intelligently, and that therefore, under the
called to the apparent inadvertence, the court terms of section 256 of the Penal Code, the
explained to the jury that the remarks were publication must be deemed a privileged com
not directed to them, that they were addressmunication. That section provides:
ed solely to the counsel in the case, and made “A communication made to a person interested in the communication, by one who was also in
incidental to the denial of the motion before terested or who stood in such relation to the
the court. Subsequently in the instructions former as to afford a reasonable ground for the jury were repeatedly admonished that supposing his motive innocent, is not presumed
they were not to be in any way influenced in to be malicious, and is a privileged communication."
reaching their verdict by the observations of Assuming for the moment that this publica
the court, that they were the sole judges of tion comes within the privilege of that sec
the facts in the case, and that the interpreta
tion of the language of the publication was a tion, still we are satisfied that this case
matter to be wholly determined by them. It should not be reversed upon the ground stat
will, of course, be presumed in this behalf ed. No instruction was requested or given
that the jury followed the plain admonition upon the subject of privileged communications of the sort defined by that section, but
of the court, and hence that in the matter the record shows that the defendant was su
od suggested the defendant suffered no injury. relying upon this form of privilege in present
Other points made by the appellant relate ing his defense, and, since the jury are the
to the admission or rejection of evidence, and judges of both the law and the facts in crim
to instructions given to the jury. We have inal libel cases, the defendant should have re
examined them, but without finding therein quested the specific instruction if he desired
anything upon which to ground appellant's to have the jury more directly advised as to
argument for a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment and order are affirmed. his contention than it was by the evidence, or argument of counsel. We are further satisfied, however, that section 256 of the Penal
We concur: LENNON, P. J.; RICHCode has no application to cases of this char
ARDS, J. acter. Whatever the rule may be in other jurisdictions, it has been expressly decided in this state that a candidate for office is as CARTER v. HOLT et al. (Civ. 1766.) much entitled to protection from defamation (District Court of Appeal. Second District Col. as any other citizen, and that a public jour-lifornia. Nov. 16, 1915. Rehearing Denied by nal or an individual who indulges in defama-l Supreme Court Jan. 13, 1916.) tory assertions about candidates for office is 1. TRUSTS 93—CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST-Conequally responsible for his acts with those | TRACT AS SUBJECT-MATTER. who commit the same offense against private Where, by fraud, defendant obtained money individuals, and that such libelous matter
from plaintiff and therewith paid part of the
purchase price of an automobile on a contract published against a candidate for a public of of sale to him on the installment plan, plaintiff fice is not a privileged communication. Jar could impress a constructive trust, arising from man v. Rea, 137 Cal. 341, 350, 70 Pac. 216; defendant's fraud, upon such contract, since in Edwards v. San Jose Pr. & Pub. Co., 99 Cal.
proper case there is no reason why a contract
or lease, as well as any other property, may not 431, 34 Pac. 128, 37 Am. St. Rep. 70; Aldrich | be subject to a constructive trust. v. Press Pr. Co., 9 Minn. 133 (Gil. 123), 86 Am.Ed. Note. For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dec. 84; Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, 31 | Dig. $$ 145–147; Dec. Dig. Om95.)
2. TRUSTS 371 – GENERAL DEMURREB –, that a new deal between the seller, the original CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST.
contractor for the car, who had paid part of In an action to impress a constructive the price with money fraudulently obtained from trust upon a contract of sale of an automobile plaintiff, and his assignee, purporting to cancel on the installment plan, the allegation of the the assigned contract and to make a new concomplaint that an assignment was made to a tract of sale direct with the assignee, was a mere defendant by the defendant who fraudulently ob- subterfuge. tained money from plaintiff without considera- | JEJ. Note.For other cases. see Trusts. Cent. tion "after knowledge by (the assignee) that | Dig. SS 600-603: Dec. Dig 372.) said automobile had been purchased with plaintiff's money and funds," was sufficient, in the absence of special demurrer, as alleging that pri- Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles or to the assignee's acquisition of the automo- County; Chas. Monroe, Judge. bile and contract of purchase he had knowledge Action by Grace M. Carter against Ira W. of plaintiff's rights.
Holt and others. From a judgment for plain[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. 88 588–599; Dec. Dig. 371.]
tiff, and an order denying a motion for new 3. TRUSTS 356–CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST-NO
trial, defendant Linney appeals. Judgment TICE TO ASSIGNEE OF RES-EFFECT.
and order affirmed. Where the assignee of a contract of sale of
| Robt. T. Linney and Kendrick & Ardis, all an automobile on the installment plan took the same with knowledge that it had been paid for of Los Angeles, for appellant. Ralph W. with funds fraudulently procured from plaintiff, Schoonover and Harriman, Ryckman & Tuthis position as to money loaned or paid on the tle, all of Los Angeles, for respondents. contract to the assignor thereof was that of a second lienor, subordinate to the rights of the defrauded party.
SHAW, J. The complaint shows that by [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. means of fraud and false representations deDig. 88 529–538; Dec. Dig. 356.]
fendant Holt obtained from plaintiff the 4. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT Cm 88 RIGHT OF
sum of $1,151.37; that he entered into a conATTORNEY TO CONDUCT OWN CASE. Where an attorney who was sued appeared
tract with an automobile company for the in court by an attorney of record who conducted purchase of an automobile for the sum of the case to a point where defendant proposed to $1,375, and of the money so fraudulently obcross-examine plaintiff's witness, it appearing tained from plaintiff he paid thereon $695 : that he would be a witness in his own behalf, the court properly denied him the right to cross
that thereafter, and before the filing of the examine,
complaint herein, Holt was arrested, charg[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Attorney and ed with the embezzlement of said sum of Client, Cent, Dig. $$ 161–163; Dec. Dig. 88.] money so procured from plaintiff; that he 5. APPEAL AND ERROR 1170 - REVIEW -employed defendant Linney as attorney to HARMLESS ERROR.
defend him upon said charge of embezzleUnder Const. art. 6, 8 412, providing that no judgment shall be set aside or new trial ment, and to whom he assigned said contract granted for any error in procedure, unless, aft- for the purchase of the automobile upon er the court shall be of opinion that the error which he had paid $625 of plaintiff's money ; complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice, where an attorney. defendant in an action. / “that said assignment was made without conwas represented by an attorney of record who sideration and after knowledge by said Linconducted the case until defendant desired to ney that said automobile had been purchased cross-examine a witness, which leave was refuged him because it appeared that he would testify
with plaintiff's money and funds as aforein his own behalf, the action of the court, if said"; that the automobile is in the posseserroneous, was not reversible error.
sion of Holt and Linney. In addition to gen[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and eral relief asked, the prayer of the complaint, Error, Cent. Dig. 88 4032, 4066, 4075, 4098, 4101, 4454, 4540-4545; Dec. Dig. ew1170.)
so far as appellant is concerned, is that plain
| tiff be declared the owner of said contract 6. TRUSTS 373 - CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS SUIT TO ENFORCE-EFFECT OF FINDING.
and automobile to the extent of the appliIn an action to impress a constructive trust | cation of plaintin
ust cation of plaintiff's money in the purchase upon a contract of sale of an automobile on the thereof so made by Holt. installment plan, the court's finding that when
| The court, among other things, found that the assignee of the contract presented the assignment to the seller, it recognized and approv- plaini was enuted to an equitable hen uped the same in writing, whereupon the assignee on the automobile to the extent of $625 so paid the installment due, and that thereafter the invested therein, and that Linney held the seller with knowledge that the money paid it by the purchaser was plaintiff's money, attempted
car charged with such lien. Judgment folto rescind the contract, was sufficient to nega lowed, from which, and an order denying tive the allegation of the answer that the as- his motion for a new trial, Linney appeals. signee purchased the automobile from the com
[1, 2] Appellant's first contention is that pany by an independent contract after it had repudiated the assigned contract.
the complaint (to which no demurrer was in[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. terposed) fails to state facts sufficient to Dig. 88 604-606; Dec. Dig. 373.]
constitute a cause of action against him. 7. TRUSTS 372 - CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST - This for two reasons: First, it is not allegSUBTERFUGE IN SALE-SUFFICIENCY OF EVI ed that title to the automobile passed to DEN CE.
Holt, but that he merely held a contract in In an action to impress a constructive trust on a contract of sale of an automobile on the
the form of a lease for its purchase. No installment plan, evidence held sufficient to show ground is assigned for this contention, and