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passengers and freight; in 1915 the general | items, sections, or parts of an act shall not delay law was amended so as to add to the powers

the remainder of that act from becoming operof a port, previously enumerated and defined

ative. The initiative and referendum powers

reserved to the people by this Constitution are by the act of 1909, the right to maintain hereby further reserved to the legal voters of boats for the transportation of freight and every municipality and district, as to all local, passengers; the legal voters of the port

special, and municipal legislation, of every charhave never held an election to decide whether

acter, in or for their respective municipalities

and districts. The manner of exercising said they desire to exercise the new power nam powers shall be prescribed by general laws, exed by the amendment; and the commission- cept that cities and towns may provide for the ers are acting on the assumption that the

manner of exercising the initiative and refer.

endum powers as to their municipal legislation, amendment of 1915 by its own force con- Not m

Not more than ten per cent. of the legal voters ferred upon all existing ports adequate au- may be required to order the referendum nor thority to engage in the transportation busi- more than fifteen per cent. to propose any meas ness.

ure, by the initiative, in any city or town.' On the facts narrated by the complaint.l [1, 2] That portion of section 2 of article the defendants argue that the Legislature

11 which deals with the liquor traffic, compossesses supervisory control over ports, and, mencing with the words "and the exclusive when exercising such control, has full au- power," was incorporated into the Constithority to regulate or enlarge or even to tu

tution in 1910; but all that part of the secwithdraw powers previously granted; that,

tion which precedes the words last quoted, as when the Legislature does speak through a well as section la of article 4 were adopted general law, which in any way affects exist

as ing ports, that general law by its own compel- they relate to the same subject-matter, must ling force immediately operates upon all ex- be

be read and construed together. McKenna v. isting ports: and that therefore the amend- | City of Portland, 52 Or. 191, 96 Pac. 552; Mcment of 1915 by its own vigor conferred

Minnville v. Howenstine, 56 Or. 451, 465, 109 upon the port of Astoria and all other like | Pac. 81, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 193; Branch v. corporations the right to operate boats for Albee, 7 Or. 188, 197, 142 Pac. 598; Duncan the transportation of passengers and freight.

v. Dryer, 71 Or. 548, 552, 143 Pac. 644; KalThe plaintiff takes the position that the port

ich v. Knapp, 73 Or. 558, 577, 142 Pac. 594, of Astoria is a municipality with a charter

145 Pac. 22; Robertson v. Portland, 149 Pac. which cannot be amended by the Legislature,

545, 547. As declared in Branch V. Albee, and that therefore the port cannot engage

supra: in the transportation business until the legal

"In construing a constitutional provision, the

whole provision is to be examined with a view voters first accept the privilege offered by to ascertaining the meaning of every part. The the act of 1915 and incorporate the addition presumption is that every clause has been inal power into the charter by an election held

serted for some useful purpose, and therefore

the instrument must be construed as a whole, for that purpose.

in order that its intent and general purposes The difference in the conclusions reached may be ascertained ; and, as a necessary result by the litigants is traceable to the wide of this rule, it follows that, wherever it is posdivergence of the opinions held by them sible to do so, each provision must be construed concerning the proper construction to be out distorting the meaning of any of such pro

so that it will harmonize with all others, withplaced upon section 2 of article 11 and sec- visions, to the end that the intent of the framtion la of article 4 of the state Constitution. ers of the provision may be ascertained and carThe storm center of the dispute between the ried out.' parties hangs around the organic law, and on While the prime purpose is to ascertain that account the two sections mentioned are and give effect to the intention as expressed here set down at length. Section 2 of article in the language employed, yet the two sec11 reads thus:

tions now being considered are designed to "Corporations may be formed under general | grant attributes of sovereignty to specified laws, but shall not be created by the Legisla- local subdivisions, and, such grant being a tive Assembly by special laws. The Legislative limitation on the power of the Legislature, it Assembly shall not enact, amend or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any munici

should be strictly construed as was properly pality, city or town. The legal voters of every held in Thurber v. MCMinnville, 63 Or. 410. city and town are hereby granted power to 414, 128 Pac. 43; and this rule of construcenact and amend their municipal charter, sub- tion must be applied here, notwithstanding ject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the state of Oregon, and the exclusive power

the suggestion broached in State v. Schluer, to license, regulate, control, or to suppress or 59 Or. 18, 27, 115 Pac. 1057, and regardless prohibit, the sale of intoxicating liquors there- of the inference that may possibly be drawn in is vested in such municipality; but such mu- l from Schuhel v Olcott 60 or 602 51

from Schubel v. Olcott, 60 Or. 503, 515, 120 nicipality shall within its limits be subject to the provisions of the local option law of the state

Pac. 375. of Oregon.'

[3] Prior to 1906 the Legislature was Section la of article 4 declares that:

granted authority to create a corporation for “The referendum may be demanded by the

municipal purposes by special laws. Until people against one or more items, sections, or that time section 2 of article 11 read thus: parts of any act of the Legislative Assembly in

e Assembly in "Cor

"Corporations may be formed under general the same manner in which such power may be laws, but shall not be created by special laws, exercised against a complete act. The filing of except for municipal purposes. All laws passed

vot

ed, or repealed, but not so as to impair or de- and towns may provide for the manner of exstroy any vested corporate rights."

ercising the initiative and referendum powers Under the present form of the organic law,

as to their municipal legislation." The cirhowever, the Legislative Assembly is pro

cumstance that the initiative and referendum hibited from creating any kind of a corpora- | powers are conferred upon all the lega tion by a special law, but it has the power

ers of "every municipality and district" with to provide for the formation of corporations permission granted to none of such municiunder general laws. whether such corpora- palities or districts, except the single class tions be private or public, essentially proprie

of cities and towns, to prescribe their own tary, or purely municipal, since section 2 of procedure for exercising the granted powers, article 11 opens by stating:

only accentuates the idea that this section of "Corporations may be formed under general

the Constitution embraces not only cities and laws, but shall not be created by the Legislative

towns, but also a class of institutions which Assembly by special laws.”

are municipalities within the meaning of the

organic law, although not cities and towns. See Farrell v. Port of Columbia, 50 Or. 169,

If a city or town does not adopt a method of 173, 91 Pac. 546, 93 Pac. 254; Straw v. Har.

its own for the exercise of the right to initiris, 54 Or. 424, 431, 103 Pac. 777; Branch v.

ate and refer municipal legislation, such muAlbee, 71 Or. 188, 194, 142 Pac. 598; Kalich

nicipality may make use of a general law env. Knapp, 73 Or. 558, 567, 142 Pac. 594, 145

acted by the Legislature; but the initiative Pac. 22; State ex inf. v. Gilbert, 66 Or. 434,

and referendum powers lie dormant, and can439, 134 Pac. 1038; State v. Hall, 73 Or. 231,

not be availed of by a municipality, which 239, 144 Pac. 475.

is not a city or town, except in the manner The first sentence of section 2 of article 11

prescribed by general laws, because cities and employs the word "corporations," and there.

towns are the only municipalities which are fore that comprehensive term, as used in the

authorized to provide for the manner of exopening sentence of that section, includes pri-ercisir

ercising the powers, McKenna v. Portland, vate corporations. Both the permission to 52 Or 191 19

52 Or. 191, 195, 96 Pac. 552; Kiernan v. Portprovide for the formation of corporations un-land. 57 Ör 454 459 11

ns un, land, 57 Or, 454, 459, 111 Pac. 379, 112 Pac. der general laws and the prohibition against 402, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 339; State ex rel, v. the Legislative Assembly creating them by Kelsey, 66 Or. 70, 78, 133 Pac. 806; Long v. special laws apply to private as well as to City of Portland, 53 Or. 92, 96, 98 Pac. 149. other corporations; but, turning to section 1111; McBee v. Springfield, 58 Or. 459, 462, la of article 4, it will be observed that there

114 Pac. 637; Schubel v. Olcott, 60 Or. 503, private corporations are in no way referred 508 120 Pa

| 508, 120 Pac. 375; State ex rel. v. Portland to. It must also be noted that section la of

| Ry., L. & P. Co., 56 Or, 32, 37, 107 Pac. 958; article 4 speaks of "municipalities and dis-Duncan v. Dryer, 71 Or. 548, 552, 143 Pac. tricts," while section 2 of article 11 uses the

644; State ex inf. v. Gilbert, 66 Or. 434, 134 terms "corporations," "municipality, city or town," and makes no mention of "districts." There is yet additional evidence that muBoth sections of the organic law do, however, nicipalities other than cities and towns are occupy common ground when municipal cor- included within the embrace of the Constituporations are considered. An analysis of the tion. It is interesting to note that ever since two sections will make it reasonably clear Oregon was admitted to statehood section 9 that two classes of municipalities are embrac- of article 11 has formed a part of the state ed: (a) Cities and towns, or pure municipal- | Constitution, and the language of that se ities, as we know them in this jurisdiction; tion recognizes the existence of municipalities and (b) all institutions which, though not other than cities and towns, for the wording cities and towns, are nevertheless municipal- is, “no county, city, town or other municipal ities within the purview of the Constitution. corporation"; and it is proper to add the obIn the second sentence of section 2 of article servation that in Cook v. Portland, 20 Or. 580. 11 the Legislative Assembly is prohibited 584, 27 Pac. 263, 13 L. R. A. 533, this court, from interfering with any charter or act of when speaking of section 9 of article 1 incorporation for any “municipality, city or clared that: town," while the succeeding sentence grants ! "Here is a direct interpretation from the Conthe power to enact and amend their munici- stitution itself. A municipal corporation is pal charter only to the legal voters of every

of every not necessarily a county, city or town.” "city and town." and thus by implication de Furthermore, the existence of the two nying the right to enact or amend a charter classes of municipalities has been recognized to the legal voters of municipalities which do by the judiciary, not only before 1906, but not rise to the dignity of a city or town. The since the adoption of section 2 of article 11 suggested classification of municipalities is and section la of article 4 of the Constitustill further emphasized by section la of ar- tion. Acme Dairy Co. v. Astoria, 49 Or. 520, ticle 4; for there initiative and referendum 524, 90 Pac. 153; Schubel v. Olcott, 60 Or. powers are reserved to the legal voters "of 503, 510, 120 Pac. 375. We conclude, thereevery municipality and district." The man- fore, that the Constitution is not confined in ner of exercising the conferred powers "shall its operation to cities and towns, but that the

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sequently includes institutions other than the state of Oregon to the legal voters of every cities or towns.

municipality and district as to all local, special, [4] It will now be necessary to determine

and municipal legislation of every character in

and for their respective municipalities and diswhether the defendant port is a municipality tricts the president of the board of commissionwithin the meaning of the organic law. ers of said corporation shall exercise the duties While we recognize the difference between a

of mayor of a city or town and the secretary

shall perform the duties of auditor or recorder corporation organized "for municipal pur

of a city or town, and the attorney of the corposes," as was permitted by section 2 of arti poration shall perform the duties of the attordle 11 prior to 1906. and a pure municipality ney of a city or town, and if there be no attorlike a city, still the test for determining the

ney of said corporation then the duties required

of attorney shall be performed by the secretary existence of a municipality is as prescribed

of such corporation." in Cook v. Portland, 20 Or. 580, 586, 27 Pac.

The Legislature has therefore viewed a 263, 13 L. R. A. 533, where this court held

port as a municipality: (a) By defining it to that the port of Portland was created for

be a municipality; (b) by granting authority municipal purposes, and that it was there

to exercise functions of government, to enact fore such a corporation as the Legislature

certain laws, and to provide fines, penalties, could create by a special law.

and punishments for violations; and (c) by "The test of a corporation for municipal pur

al pur making provisions for the operation of the poses adopted by this court seems to have been the right or power to exercise some of the func

initiative and referendum powers. This tions of government, and this we apprehend is court has confirmed the views of the lawthe true test."

makers by classing a port with municipal The Legislature has accorded to ports corporations. Straw v. Harris, 54 Or. 424, some of the qualities of municipal corpo - 430, 103 Pac. 777; State ex rel. v. Port of rations; for we read in the first section of Bay City, 64 Or. 139, 143, 129 Pac. 496; Cook chapter 39, Laws 1909 (section 6114, L 0. y. Portland, 20 Or. 580, 27 Pac. 263, 13 L. L.), that:

R. A. 533; Kiernan v. Portland, 57 Or. 454, "Municipal corporations designated as ports 466, 111 Pac. 379, 112 Pac. 402, 37 L. R. A. may be incorporated * * * in manner as in

(N. S.) 339; State ex rel. v. Swigert, 59 Or. this act hereinafter provided."

132, 133, 116 Pac. 440. When speaking of A port exercises some of the functions of

the port of Toledo in Mackay y. Port of Togovernment. Among the powers enumerated ledo, 152 Pac. 250, 252, this court says: the port is authorized

"It must be conceded that defendant is a mu"to make, establish, change, modify or abolish nicipal corporation” within the meaning of secsuch rules and regulations for the use or naviga- tion 358, L. O. L. tion in such harbors and rivers, or the placing of obstructions therein or the removal of ob

| [5] While a port is neither a city nor a structions therefrom, as it may deem conven- town, and although it is not necessary to atient, requisite or necessary or in the best inter- tempt the solution of any problem growing ests of the maritime shipping and commercial in- l out of the use of the initiative and referenterests of the said port, and the * * * rules and regulations so made by it to be enforced / dum powers when exercised by cities and by such fines, penalties, and punishments as it towns, nevertheless à survey of our own juin the exercise of sound discretion may deem dicial utterances made concerning pure munecessary; and the fines or penalties so im- Inicipalities

nicipalities, when considered in their relation posed or levied shall be recovered in the name of said corporation in any court of this state to the Legislature, may afford some aid in having jurisdiction of actions for the recovery reaching a correct decision of the instant con. of fines and penalties imposed by state laws, and troversy. Powers exercisable by cities and shall inure and belong to said corporation, and all punishments so imposed shall be enforced

towns may be placed in two separate classes, in the name of said corporation in any of the which, for the sake of brevity and the want courts of this state having jurisdiction of crimes of better terms, will be designated as: (1) and misdemeanors under said laws."

Intramural; and (2) extramural. When the It is true that "rules" and "regulations" are legal voters of a city enact municipal legisthe terms employed; but the mere names lation which operates only on themselves and are not conclusive, because the thing named for themselves, and which is confined within is described in detail, and from the descrip- and extends no further than the corporate tion the substance is known, and the thing limits, then such voters are exercising incalled a "rule" or "regulation" is, in fact, tramural authority. When, however, the lean ordinance or a municipal law carrying a gal voters of a city attempt to exercise aufine or penalty or punishment for a violation, thority beyond the corporate limits of their It is clear then that a port possesses at least municipality, they are using an extramural some of the characteristic qualities even of power a pure municipality.

[6] By the plain provisions of the ConstiThe act of 1909 gives further recognition tution the Legislature is prohibited from ento ports as municipalities by carefully pro-acting, amending, or repealing a city charter viding for the operation of the initiative and by a special law. The language employed in referendum. It is set forth in section 6124, section 2 of article 11 has been the subject of L. O. L. (section 8 of chapter 39, Laws of much discussion, resulting in a contrariety of 1909), thus:

opinion as to whether the Legislature pos"In the exercise of the initiative and refer- sesses authority to enact a general law when endum powers reserved under the Constitution of it has the effect of amending the charters of cities and towns. Even this court has not, Pac. 637, Ann. Cas. 19140, 483; Riggs . followed an unswerving course when consid- Grants Pass, 66 Or. 266, 268, 134 Pac. 776; ering the right of the Legislature to enact Couch v. Marvin, 67 Or. 341, 345, 136 Pac. 6; general laws affecting the intramural powers City of McMinnville v. Howenstine, 56 Or. of cities. Opinions which either hold or as- 451, 466, 109 Pac. 81, Ann, Cas. 1912C, 193. sume that the Legislature is permitted to The opinion of Mr. Justice King in the lastpass general laws regulating intramural au- mentioned case is not in harmony with what thority appear in many adjudications. Straw is said here, but the reasoning of that opinv. Harris, 54 Or. 424, 437, 103 Pac. 777 ; Kier-ion has never been followed, and is now disnan v. Portland, 57 Or. 454, 467, 111 Pac. 379, approved, although a correct result was 112 Pac. 402, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 339; State reached. Precedents have firmly established ex rel. v. Port of Tillamook, 62 Or. 332, 341, the rule that extramural power cannot be 124 Pac. 637, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 483; Churchill employed by cities and towns unless a law V. Grants Pass, 70 Or. 283, 288, 141 Pac. 164; exists permitting it, and some prior adjudiState ex inf. v. Gilbert, 66 Or. 434, 439, 134 | cations have advanced a step further and Pac. 1038; McMinnville v. Howenstine, 56 held that a general law enacted by the LegisOr. 451, 457, 109 Pac. 81, Ann. Cas. 1912C, lature permitting the exercise of extramural 193; State ex rel., v. Swigert, 59 Or. 132, 135,

power does not by its own force ingraft that 116 Pac. 440; West Linn v. Tufts, 146 Pac.

power upon the charter of a city, but the 986, 987. See, also, California-Oregon Power

general law may be likened to a continuous Co. v. City of Grants Pass (D. C.) 203 Fed.

offer of a power which nevertheless cannot 173, 175; Portland Ry., L. & P. Co. v. City be used until the legal voters of the city have of Portland (D. C.) 210 Fed. 667, 672; and

accepted the offer by amending their charter the dissenting opinions in Kalich v. Knapp,

so as to include the proffered power. Riggs 73 Or.558, 142 Pac. 594, 145 Pac. 22. The right

v. Grants Pass, 66 Or. 266, 270, 134 Pac. 776; of the Legislature to amend municipal char

Kalich v. Knapp, 73 Or. 558, 564, 142 Pac. ters by general laws has been squarely denied

594, 145 Pac. 22. While it may be dictum, in Branch v. Albee, 71 Or, 188, 142 Pac. 598;

still it would seem that there is much force Kalich v. Knapp, supra; Pearce v. Roseburg,

| in the contention that, if a city cannot exer150 Pac. 855, 859.,

cise a given power unless permission is first The legal voters of cities and towns are

granted, and if the Legislature can lawfully not obliged to look to the Legislature for the

che grant that permission, then the Legislature right to exercise any intramural power; but ma

may with equal right regulate and supervise the whole sum of intramural authority is

the power granted or, unless prevented by set at large, and the legal voters may exer- the intervention of vested rights, withdraw it cise all of that authority or only such part of entirely. if as they may desire, subject, of course, to

[7] We have determined that a port is a the Constitution and criminal laws of them

of the municipality within the meaning of the Constate, and subject also to the right of the stita

O, the stitution, although it is not a city or a town, people of the commonwealth to amend char- | but we have yet to ascertain the relations ters or enact supervisory legislation by the

subsisting between a port and the Legislause of the initiative. Robertson v. Portland,

ture, Ports cannot be created by the Legisla. 149 Pac. 545, 547. Extramural authority,

ture by special laws (Farrell v. Port of Cohowever, is not available to the legal voters of cities and towns, unless the right to exer

lumbia, 50 Or. 169, 91 Pac, 546, 93 Pac. 254), cise it has first been granted either by a gen

but they may be formed under general laws eral law enacted by the Legislature or by

(Straw v. Harris, supra). All corporations legislation initiated by the people of the

may be formed under general laws. All corwhole state. The right to employ intramural

porations cannot, however, enact or amend authority finds its source in the language of

their own charter or acts of incorporation. the Constitution, because the legal voters of Only one class of corporations is authorized cities and towns are by that instrument pr. to enact or amend a charter. The right of pressly empowered to enact and amend their

a city or town to enact or amend its charter own charters: but permission to employ ex- exists only because the third sentence of tramural authority must be granted to cities section 2 of article 11 of the Constitution and towns before the privilege can be exer- creates the

creates the right; and the language which cised. One power coexists with the Consti- confers the privilege by necessary implicatution, while the other power does not exist tion excludes all other corporations. Cities at all, unless the people of the whole state and towns are not the only corporations either grant the authority themselves by the embraced by section 2 of article 11 because initiative or extend the privilege through private corporations are included in the first their representatives, the Legislature. Thur- sentence, nor are cities and towns the only ber v. McMinnville, 63 Or. 410, 415, 128 Pac. municipalities mentioned in that section of 43; Branch v. Albee, 71 Or. 188, 205, 142 Pac. the organic law. At the time of the adop598; Coleman v. La Grande, 73 Or. 521. 525, tion of section 2 of article 11 municipalities 144 Pac. 468; Kalich v. Knapp, 73 Or. 558, other than cities and towns were in actual 578, 142 Pac. 594, 145 Pac. 22; State ex rel. existence, and the very section of the organic

right to enact and amend their own charters, the manner of exercising those powers thus also recognizes that other municipalities than granted. All classes of municipalities may be cities and towns did exist, and when a formed under general laws, but none except particular class of municipalities, as cities cities and towns are favored with the priviand towns, was selected from municipalities | lege of enacting or amending their own in general and favored with a specified charters or acts of incorporation. It seems privilege, the single act of selection was of clear then that municipal legislation, within itself equivalent to saying that no other kind the meaning of section la of article 4, when of municipalities could exercise the same applied to municipalities, other than cities privilege. The argument has been made and and towns, refers to legislation which is perapproved in at least one case that the mitted and made necessary for carrying into amendment of a charter is municipal legis- effect a lawful power previously granted. lation within the meaning of section la of It must be remembered, too, that "municipal article 4, and that the right to enact munic- legislation” does not embrace every step takipal legislation included the right to amend en or act done by a municipality. Long v. City a charter or act of incorporation of a port.

of Portland, 53 Or. 92, 101, 98 Pac, 149, 1111. Farrell v. Port of Portland, 52 Or. 582, 98 A nort has no ri

A port has no right to legislate unless that Pac. 145. As already noted, both sections of right is first created by a law; but, when the organic law must be construed together. the right to legislate is conferred, then secBoth sections were adopted at the same time. tion la of article 4 immediately operates, and It is plain that section 2 of article 11 gives the initiative and referendum are at once cities and towns power to enact or amend

made available, and the exercise of such their own charters, while other municipali

power to legislate is municipal legislation. ties are excluded; and, construing the two

If it does not rise to the dignity of a city sections of the Constitution together, it can

or town, a municipality cannot take unto not be said that section la of article 4 was

itself and exercise any power whatever, undesigned to grant a power which a compan

less the right is first granted by a law passed ion section purposely withholds. It is in

by the people of the whole state or by a congruous to assert that the power to amend

general statute enacted by the Legislature. is granted by section la of article 4 and

The fact that a port cannot exercise any prohibited by section 2 of article 11. Both

power at all unless permitted by some law sections of the Constitution operate with |

passed by the Legislature or enacted by the equal force; one is not more potent than the other. However, there is no conflict in

people of the whole state with the aid of the organic law. By the terms of section

the initiative, and the circumstance that la of article 4 every municipality, whether it

a port is not a city or town, and therefore

cannot amend its own charter or act of inbe a city or town, or whether it be a port, has the right to employ the initiative and

corporation, lead with a compelling force referendum powers “as to all local, special,

to the conclusion that the Legislature has and municipal legislation,” and this means

ample authority to amend laws previously that such municipality may apply the initia

passed by it concerning ports. Moreover, tive and referendum powers when enacting

saying that a port cannot exercise any power municipal legislation to carry out and make

unless expressly permitted by the Legislature effective an authority previously granted.

or allowed by the people of the entire state, A city is chartered to improve streets, to as

and stating that a port cannot amend its sess the cost of the improvement against add cwn charter or act of incorporation, when joining property, and to enact ordinances for

taken together, are equivalent to a declaracarrying out the granted power. The or

tion that the Legislature possesses ample dinances which are enacted in the exercise of authority to adopt amendments which at the power to improve constitute municipal once operate on all ports. The Constitution legislation. It is true that amending a char does not carry any inhibition against the ter may in an enlarged sense constitute munic- Legislature enacting general laws which ipal legislation ; but the power to enact that regulate or even withdraw powers previously kind of municipal legislation is confined to granted by that body of lawmakers to municicities and towns, and exists only because of palities, which are not cities or towns, unsection 2 of article 11. A port is granted less vested rights create an insurmountable power to adopt rules and regulations carry-obstacle. When the Legislature grants a ing fines, penalties, and punishments, to be power to ports, that power is not irretrievimposed for any violations; and when the ably lost to the Legislature; but the same port, in pursuance of the previously granted lawmaking body may afterwards by a generpower, prescribes rules and regulations with al law regulate, add to, lessen, or even withfines, penalties, or punishments, it is adopting draw that power to the same extent as bemunicipal legislation within the meaning of fore 1906. A striking illustration of the resection la of article 4. All municipalities are sults which would be worked out by the granted the initiative and referendum pow- argument of plaintiff is furnished by the ers, but none except cities and towns are statute providing for the formation of ports.

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