1827. The KING v. SLYTHE. mations in the nature of Campbell (with whom was Patteson) shewed cause. The objection intended to be raised against the defendant's title is, that Seckump and Hammond, the persons before whom he was admitted and sworn, were not de jure the bailiffs of the borough, not having been legally elected to that office. In the first place, Clark, the present relator, is not competent to raise that objection, because, as he was present and voted at their election, he cannot now impeach it, either directly as against themselves, or collaterally by impugning the title of a Rex v. Tre Adam, contrà. The general rule, as laid down in the case cited, that a corporator who has concurred in an election is estopped from afterwards impeaching it, cannot be denied; but it does not apply to this case. Rules for quo warranto informations have already been made absolute against Seckamp and Hammond, so that the relator here is not originating a measure to disturb the peace of the borough, which it is the object of the rule to preserve, but is merely following up, and rendering more effectual and complete, that which the Court has already done. There is nothing to shew that he knew of any objection to Seckamp and Hammond at the time of the election of bailiffs in September, 1825, and his concurrence in that election having been bonâ fide, and in ignorance of its invalidity, ought not to operate to his prejudice now. In the two following cases a similar question being raised, the Court reserved their opinion upon this, until they had heard the arguments upon those. The KING V. LANE. The KING V. COBBOLD. 1827. The KING v. SLYTHE. SIMILAR rules had been obtained against these defend- A corporator ants, the bailiffs of the same borough. They had been who has voted at an election elected at a court holden on 8th September, 1826, at of corporate officers, is not which Seckamp and Hammond presided. One Monk a competent was the relator in these cases. The objection raised relator to im peach that election on the ground of an objection to the presiding officer; at least without shewing that he was ignorant of the objection when he voted at the election. (a) 2 B. & A. 339. 1827. The KING v. SLYTHE. against the title of the defendants was, that they had been elected before Seckamp and Hammond, and that the latter were not good presiding officers. It appeared in these, as in the former case, that the relator had attended and voted at the election in September, 1825. Campbell and Putteson, against the rule, were stopped by the Court. Tindal, S. G., and Alderson, in support of the rule. The title of Seckamp and Hammond was faulty from the beginning. The objection to it arose at their election in July, 1825, at a meeting assembled together in obedience to a mandamus from this Court. Batley presided at that meeting, and he was a common-councilman, who had no power or authority to preside or act as returning officer on the occasion. But there is nothing to shew that Monk, the present relator, attended the meeting called in pursuance of the mandamus, or took any part in that election; nor does it appear that when he concurred in the subsequent election of Seckamp and Hammond in September, 1825, he knew of the objection previously existing against them. It should, therefore, seem, upon the principle acted upon in Rex v. Morris (a), that his concurrence in that second election does not estop him from coming forward as a relator on the present occasion. ABBOTT, C. J.-It is a general rule of corporation law, that a corporator is estopped from coming forward as a relator to impeach a title conferred by an election in which he has concurred, or the titles of those mediately or immediately claiming through that election. In the cases cited, Rex v. Morris and Rex v. Trevenen, the point (a) 3 East, 213. now relied upon was considered, and some importance does appear to have been attached to the question whether the person coming forward as a relator were or were not cognizant of the particulars of the case at the time when he voted at the former election. In many cases, however, it would be impossible to ascertain whether the relator had acted with knowledge or in ignorance of the particular facts, and to allow such an inquiry to be made in every instance, would, as it seems to me, be productive of great inconvenience, without any corresponding advantage. I think every corporator may fairly be presumed to be cognizant of circumstances which have recently occurred in the corporation to which he belongs; at least until he shews the contrary. The relators in these cases both concurred in the last election of Seckamp and Hammond; and the question is, whether we shall allow them thus indirectly to raise the question of the validity of that election. It has been contended that they did not concur in the prior election; and perhaps they did not: but still it must be presumed, the contrary not being shewn, that they were cognizant of the circumstances under which it took place. For these reasons I am of opinion that these relators are estopped, and, therefore, that these rules must be discharged. But as I feel anxious to prevent any misunderstanding upon this point, I think it right to add, that if a party should concur in an election, in honest ignorance of some circumstance rendering that election void, and should afterwards come before the Court and shew that such an objection exists, that it came to his knowledge after the election, and that it is a matter deserving of inquiry; I would by no means have it inferred from the present decision that such a party ought not to be heard. 1827. The KING v. SLYTHE. Monday, January 29. Where a certiorari was granted on the and one of fore the matter came on for Court heard The KING . The JUSTICES of the NORTH RIDING of ON shewing cause against a rule nisi, obtained last term, for a certiorari to bring up an order of petty sesapplication of sions, for allowing the accounts of the surveyors of the two parties, highways of the township of Fylingdales, in the parish them died be- of Whitby, in the North Riding of Yorkshire, in order that the same might be quashed for want of jurisdiction argument, the in the justices, it appeared from the affidavits, that on the 13th October last there had been a parish meeting, withstanding at which the surveyor of the highways accounts were The petty sessions have submitted. After investigating them, it was agreed by no jurisdiction the vestry, that the surveyor should go before a single accounts of the magistrate next day, to have his accounts verified, pursurveyor of suant to the Highway Act, 13 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 48. On der 13 Geo. 3, the following day the surveyor attended before a single the case not to allow the highways un c. 78, s. 48, where the parties have been before one justice, who had not gone into the accounts, but referred the case to the petty sessions. |