1827. The KING v. REGENT'S land, whether covered with water or not, and for buildings, &c., then introduces an additional subject of rateability, but not absolutely and at all events, but only on condition that other property of the like description is COMPANY. rateable in the parish. It enacts "that the rates, duties, and other personal property of the company liable to be rated to the poor in any such parishes or places, shall be rated and assessed in the like manner and in the same proportion, as other personal property rateable in the said parishes and places respectively shall be rated and assessed." The introduction of the word "other," clearly shews that the rates and duties were contemplated by the legislature as a species of personal property, for there is this proviso contained in the clause, "that before such personal property should be rated, fourteen days' notice should be given in writing to, or left at the dwelling-house of the treasurer or clerk, or any other officer of the company residing in the parish or place where such rate should be intended to be made, by the respective overseers of the poor of the intention so to do." There are, therefore, three distinct subjects of rate; first, lands whether covered with water or not, secondly, dwelling-houses, warehouses, and other buildings, and, thirdly, rates and duties. The two former are rateable at all events, and the latter only on condition that personal property also is rated in the parish. Now the property described in the assessments Nos. 2, 3 and 4, seems to me to be nothing but land partly covered with water, and, consequently, is only to be rated in the same manner as other land of the same quality in the parish would have been, if it had not been converted into a basin or applied to the other purposes of the canal. If it had been intended by the legislature that the land should be rated according to its improved value by the construction of docks, basins, and the canal, I apprehend 1827. The KING v. REGENT'S this would have been distinctly expressed. It is clear that but for the exemption I have pointed out, there would have been no occasion, as far as the land is concerned, to have introduced such a provision, because the land would have been rateable according to its improved COMPANY. quality, by the construction of docks, canals and basins. What I have now said, is an answer to the objection to the assessments Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The remaining question is, whether the property which is the subject of the assessment No. 1, can properly be rated as a wharf? If it be a wharf, it must be so within the meaning of the act of parliament. Now the word wharf is classed in the act with all those things which are artificial and requiring expense in their erection. The words are "dwelling-houses, wharfs, lock-houses and other houses." Clearly this piece of land is not that description of wharf upon which any expense has been incurred. It is merely made use of as land in its character of land, applicable certainly to the purposes of landing customable goods and for other public purposes. The term "wharf" in its ordinary signification imports a place built or constructed for the purpose of loading or unloading goods. The act of parliament itself contains some clauses referable to wharfs in this sense, and it appears to me from the language of those different clauses, that the legislature contemplated something made and erected according to the general meaning of the word wharf. These clauses have been pointed out and dwelt upon by Mr. Brodrick in his argument. Looking to the language of the act of parliament, and considering those different clauses together, it appears to me, that this is not to be considered as a wharf, but at the utmost as a landing-place. For these reasons, it appears to me, that the whole of the property comprised 1827. The KING V. REGENT'S CANAL COMPANY. in the four assessments can only be rated as land, and that the assessments must be reduced accordingly. HOLROYD, J.-For the reasons so fully stated by my brother Bayley, I am also of opinion that the assessments must be reduced. The exempting clause in favour of the company would be wholly inoperative if the land occupied by their canal, docks and basins, were rateable in respect of the beneficial improvement of the land by the creation of the works in question. It appears to me, that the property comprised in the several assessments can only be rated as land. I also think that the slip of land comprised in assessment No. 1, is not a wharf in common intendment, nor a wharf within the meaning of the act of parliament. LITTLEDALE, J.-I am of the same opinion. It appears to me that the slip of land in question is not a wharf. It is not an artificial construction so as to make it in common parlance a wharf. But it is said, that inasmuch as it is used as a landing-place, it must be treated as a wharf. It is, however, not used properly as a wharf, for the goods are landed by means of stages. Goods may be, and frequently are, landed on the seabeach, but it does not, therefore, follow that the seabeach is a wharf. If this were a wharf, it might reasonably be expected that the company would charge wharfage dues, but no remuneration whatever is paid to the company for the use of the piece of land specifically, though they do receive wharfage dues for the use of other premises. It is clear, from the act of parliament, that by the wharfs thereby contemplated are meant artificial buildings, constructed by the hand of man, and not pieces of land which may be used for the purpose of landing goods. Then as to the property comprised in the as sessments Nos. 2, 3 and 4, I think it ought to be rated merely as land. The Regent's Canal Company take up a great quantity of land for the purposes of their canal, and they incur great expense in the making of it. The act of parliament, however, makes a marked distinction between lands and houses and the rates and duties, as the subjects of assessment to the poor. Lands and houses are rateable as lands and houses of the same description in the parish, but the canal rates and duties, which are the profits arising from the particular use of the land, are to be rated in the parish. Now if the land is to be rated as land, according to the value which it has acquired in consequence of the purpose to which it has been applied by the company, and which value arises from the canal duties, then if other personal property in the parish happens to be rated also, it might happen that the company would be liable to be rated twice over for the same property, once for the land in respect of its improved value, and a second time for canal rates and duties, but that, I apprehend, never could have been intended by the legislature. The rate must, therefore, be amended by reducing it. Rate amended by reducing it according to the directions of the Court. 1827. The KING . REGENT'S CANAL COMPANY. 1827. Where a county rate is have still the by the general act, 55 G. 3, c. 51, s. 14. The KING 7. The Justices of BUCKINGHAMSHIRE. BY the 54 Geo. 3, c. 103, a local act, the justices of made under a Buckinghamshire were empowered to make an equal local act giving county rate, and for that purpose to order certain returns, a limited right of appeal, par- after obtaining which they were required to assess and ties aggrieved tax every parish, &c. rateably and in due proportions. unlimited right By s. 10, if the churchwardens, &c. of any such parish, of appeal given &c. or any other persons, should think themselves aggrieved by any thing done in pursuance of the act, they might appeal to the general quarter sessions for the county, holden next after the cause of complaint should arise, upon giving a specified notice. The returns were made, and the proportion of the rate for each parish was fixed. At the Epiphany sessions, 1827, a rate was made, and a certain sum assessed upon the parish of Iver; and at an adjourned sessions in February, 1827, another rate was made and another sum assessed upon that parish. At the next Easter sessions the parish officers of Iver appealed against both rates, upon the ground that their parish was assessed higher than the parish of Langley. Fourteen days' notice of appeal and the grounds of it had been given to the parish officers of Langley, to the clerk of the peace for the county, and to the high constable of the hundred in which both parishes were situate. The sessions refused to hear the appeal, and a rule nisi for a mandamus having been obtained, Tindal, S. G. and Maltby shewed cause. The sessions were right. The appeal was clearly too late with reference to the local act, and Iver had no right of appeal under the general act, 55 Geo. 3, c. 51, s. 14. The words of that clause are undoubtedly large, for they empower parish officers to appeal against the county rate if |