1827. The KING v. LIVERPOOL. for the distinction which has been taken with respect to those parts of the property rated which are rented by the dock company, because if there is no beneficial occupation it must be wholly immaterial whether the occupier is the owner or not. Then upon the main question, I consider the case of Rex v. The Commissioners of Saltersload-sluice (a), as decisive of the present. There the tolls received were by act of parliament directed to be applied to the purposes of the act, and to and for no other use or purpose whatsoever. It is true that in this case the act of parliament under which the present dock rates are levied does not expressly declare that they shall be applied to the purposes therein specified, and no other; but it directs that certain debts shall be discharged out of them, and then provides for the application of the surplus, by directing that the dock rates shall be lowered: so that any application of the dock rates to any purpose not specified, would clearly be a violation of the act of parliament. Nothing of that sort is suggested, and therefore there is not in reality any difference between this case and the former. The principle of not rating property of which no person is the beneficial occupier, is not confined to docks and canals, or to property of that nature. Thus it has been held, that the trustees of a Quakers' meeting-house, of which no profit is made, by letting the pews, or otherwise, are not rateable; Rer v. Woodward (b); and the same rule would apply to a chapel with the rites of the Church of England, or to a dissenting meeting-house. On the other hand it has been held, that where the pews of such a meeting-house are let, and a profit thereby made, the trustees are rateable, although they receive the rents, not for their own benefit, but for that of the minister: Rex v. Agar (c). (a) 4 T. R. 730. (c) 14 East, 256. And see Robson v. Hyde, Cald. 310. In this case the trustees are not occupiers in the ordinary sense of the word, and no profit is received for the benefit of any person. If private property belonging to the trustees in their character of the Corporation of Liverpool is improved by means of the docks, that property may be rateable for the improved value. The other Judges concurred. Order of Sessions confirmed (a). (a) See the next case. 1827. The KING บ. LIVERPOOL. The KING v. The Trustees of the River WEAVER. ON appeal against a rate for the relief of the poor made Trustees are by the overseers of the poor of the township of Moulton, not rateable to in the county of Chester, upon the trustees of the river spect of the Weaver, the sessions confirmed the rate, subject to the tolls of a naopinion of this Court upon the following case:— vigation re- By 7 Geo. 1, entitled "An Act for making the river plus of which Weaver navigable from Frodsham Bridge to Winsford is by statute made applicaBridge in the county of Chester," it was enacted," that ble to the refrom and after the said work shall be finished, and all the pair of public bridges and charges thereof, &c. fully paid, that then the clear pro- highways. duce of the rates and duties shall, from time to time, be employed for and towards amending and repairing the public bridges within the county of Chester, and such other public charges upon the county, and in such manner as the justices at the Michaelmas quarter sessions shall yearly order, direct and appoint." And, after reciting that the roads leading to the river would be much injured by the increased traffic upon them, it was provided, that so much of the rates as the justices might 1827. The KING v. WEAVER TRUSTEES. think fit should be expended in repairing those roads, and that if any surplus remained, it should be expended in repairing such other highways in the county as the justices in sessions should appoint. By 33 Geo. 2, further provisions as to the navigation were made, but it directed that the surplus duties, after payment of the expenses of the navigation, should be applied to such public purposes as before mentioned. The tonnage rates and duties upon the Weaver are not charged by the mile, but 1s. per ton is charged upon the whole line of river; and a vessel navigating the whole or any part of the length of the navigation is subject to the same charge. This tonnage is paid quarterly at the River Weaver Navigation Office in Northwich, which is a distinct township from Moulton. The annual accounts up to the 5th of April in each year are regularly audited by the clerk of the peace, and filed at the Michaelmas quarter sessions, when the balance arising from the rates and duties in the hands of the treasurer, over and above the necessary charges and expenses for the maintenance and support of the navigation, is directed by the magistrates there assembled to be paid, and the same is invariably paid to the county treasurer, to be applied for the general purposes of the county, according to the acts of parliament, and to none others. The township of Moulton rated the trustees as follows: The amount at which the trustees are assessed in the said rate, provided they are rateable at all, is correct. Alderson, Brown and Trafford, in support of the order of sessions. The question is, whether these trustees are beneficial occupiers. It is submitted that they are. They need not enjoy the benefit: if benefit accrues to any person, that makes the property rateable. In such a case the trustee and the cestui que trust are one. In Rex v. Agar (a) the trustees of a Methodist chapel were held to be rateable for the pew rents, though the surplus, after payment of the current expenses, was paid over to the minister. It cannot be said that the surplus profits here are to be applied to the purposes of the public, and that therefore the trustees are not rateable. They are to be applied to the purposes of the county, not of the public; and being so applied, they relieve the county rate pro tanto, and confer a benefit upon every landholder in the county. That is a private benefit, and the principle of exemption does not apply except in cases of public benefit, that is, a benefit conferred upon the public at large. Rex v. The Commissoners of Saltersload-sluice (b) and Rex v. Sculcoates (c) are both distinguishable from the present case. In the first, all the money received was to be applied in the drainage of the lands adjoining the navigation. Those lands would become rateable for the improved value so conferred upon them; so that if the money had been rateable in the hands of the commissioners, it would, in effect, have been rateable twice over. In the second case, no person derived any benefit within the parish from the lands used for the purposes of the drainage. 1827. The KING บ. WEAVER TRUSTEES. 1827. The KING บ. WEAVER TRUSTEES. Nolan and Cottingham, contrà. The trustees must derive some private and personal profit from their occupation, in order to render them rateable: Rer v. Terrott (a). They derive none such. They have no interest in the soil; it is not vested in them by the acts of parliament. The tolls are payable for the right of passage, not for the use of the soil; therefore they are not rateable: Rex v. Nicholson (b), Williams v. Jones (c), Rex v. Bell (d), Rex v. Tynemouth (e), Rex v. Coke (ƒ), Rex v. Fowke (g). Besides, these tolls are applicable entirely to public purposes, and upon that ground they are not rateable. Rex v. The Commissioners of Salters-loadsluice (h) and Rex v. Sculcoates (i) are express authori ties upon this point, and cannot be distinguished from the present case. This case was argued at a former sittings in Banc, when BAYLEY, J. delivered himself to this effect:-There is not any clause in the acts of parliament set out in the case which vests the soil of the river Weaver in the trustees; they cannot, therefore, be rateable to the relief of the poor in respect of the tolls. Upon this point we are all agreed upon the other point we prefer postponing our judgment until the case of The King v. The Inhabitants of Liverpool (k) has been argued. |