Supreme Court, January, 1922. [Vol. 117. defendants under the strike of the drivers that was called on October 31, 1921. The preliminary injunction that was obtained by the plaintiff companies dealt with this phase of the situation and forbade the defendants from attempting to interfere with the plaintiffs" by collecting moneys from any customers of the plaintiffs on account of sales of milk made to said customers on behalf of any of the plaintiffs and by destroying or defacing the route books which may be in the custody or possession of said local unions Nos. 584, 147 or 125 or any of their officers or members." And in the complaint, the prayer for judg ment contains the following: "That defendants be required to surrender and deliver all route books in their custody and possession to the respective plaintiffs issuing them." It appears that the members of Local Union No. 584, who went on strike have, with substantial unanimity, refused to turn in the route books. The total number of books so withheld, according to one affidavit, is 2,200 books. The total number of customers on said books is over 400,000. The amount of uncollected accounts is stated to be over $1,500,000. On an average, about 225 customers, with their addresses, should appear in each individual book. It is obvious that a serious situation arises because the plaintiff companies are powerless, by not possessing these books, to know who their customers for the month of October were and what the amount of the individual indebtedness of each customer was. It is apparent that the individual members of the unions cannot be punished for contempt in case any order of the court should be made directed against them unless the court is satisfied that they have knowledge of the injunction, it being conceded that none of the individual drivers have been served and that the Misc.] Supreme Court, January, 1922. president of the union alone has appeared. If, however, the court is satisfied that such defendant drivers have knowledge, it would seem that they would be amenable to punishment. The unionization of labor has developed rapidly in the last few years and the organizations have become more elaborate as well as more extensive. The court must assume that in such labor unions there is complete organization as would be expected in such elaborate associations, that members are amenable to discipline and that members are subject to notice from their officers. It is inconceivable, after the publicity given to the injunction order of Mr. Justice Kelby, that any member of these unions is ignorant of its provisions. The injunction here runs against the president named and each and every one of its members. In the case of People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr, 181 N. Y. 463, which involved punishment for contempt in violating a strike injunction, the court said in part: "The Iron Moulders' Union was a party to the action and the mandate was addressed not only to it and its each and every member,' but to all the defendants, their agents, representatives and coadjutors, as well as to those connected with them. The appellants were members of the union, were employed by it to act as pickets around the plaintiffs' plant, and each was paid at the rate of a dollar a day for his services in that capacity. They were parties to the injunction because they were mentioned therein as members of the union. They were the agents and employees of a party, eo nomine, engaged in doing its work and subject to the same. punishment as if they had all been formally named as parties defendant." There are other cases, such as Russell & Sons v. Stampers & Gold Leaf Local Union No. 22, 57 Misc. Rep. 96; Bossert v. Dhuy, 166 App. Div. 251, 253, and in the United States court in the case Supreme Court, January, 1922. [Vol. 117. of Wallace v. Adams, 204 U. S. 415. In the New York cases, knowledge on the part of the persons not made parties by name seems to be an essential element, as is set forth in People ex rel. Stearns v. Marr, supra, and Rigas v. Livingston, 178 N. Y. 20, and Matter of Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, where it is said: "To render a person amenable to an injunction, it is neither necessary that he should have been a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have been actually served with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have had actual knowledge." The gist of the bill of complaint is conspiracy. It is urged that the members of Local Union No. 584 are conspiring together to withhold the route books. Another Union Local No. 147, upon direction of its president, immediately delivered the route books to the respective employers. I, therefore, feel that a mandatory injunction is proper, but I also feel that each of these drivers by virtue of the entries made by each one of his October sales, has also a property right or interest in the book issued by the respective plaintiff companies, and it is for that reason that I modify the relief demanded by the plaintiff companies and direct that the defendant local unions, their officers, agents, and each and every member thereof who have not returned their books to the respective plaintiff companies shall deposit said books in this court, where either side may have such proper access to them under order of the court, as may protect the interests that each may have therein. Motion granted. Misc.] Supreme Court, January, 1922. BERNARD MECHLER and AMELIA MECHLER, Plaintiffs, v. FRANK DEHN and ELIZABETH DEHN, Respondents. (Supreme Court, Queens Trial Term, January, 1922.) Boundaries - ejectment disputes as to location of boundary line conveyances according to map - generally excess should be divided or deficiency borne by all lots proportionately, but where map of plot shows lots of regular size and a few of irregular size the lots of irregular size are deemed remnants and bear the shortage. Where land is conveyed by reference to a plan or map, and there is more or less in the entire tract which has been divided than the map shows, no grantee is entitled to any preference over the others and the excess should be divided among or the deficiency borne by all of the lots in proportion to their area. Where, however, a map shows a plotting of a considerable tract and the creation of lots of regular width and depth, if a few of them are of irregular dimensions they are deemed to be the remnant of what remained of the entire tract after plotting the regular lots, and if there is a shortage in the entire frontage, the irregular sized lots must bear it, this, upon the assump. tion that it was the intention of the owner to get as many regular sized lots as possible and that whatever remained of the frontage was to go into the irregular shaped plot, and hence if he had more or less than the map showed, the difference in the frontage would affect only the irregular lots. A map of a tract of land filed by the owner in the office of the county clerk showing 500 lots or more disclosed that it was his intention to create lots regular in shape with a width of 25 feet and a depth of 100 feet. According to the map the frontage of one of the blocks bounded north by a turnpike, east by an avenue, south by a street and west by the land of another owner, and in which lies the property of plaintiff and defendant, is 211 feet 3 inches along the avenue, but as matter of fact the block measures only 206 feet 2 1/8 inches. The owner laid out four lots fronting on the avenue and then, in the belief that there remained 111 feet and 3 inches, he made that the depth of the lot laid out as fronting on the turnpike. All deeds of the property in question, including those from the common owner, referred to the map, and it clearly appeared Supreme Court, January, 1922. [Vol. 117. that neither the plaintiffs nor their predecessor obtained title to a plot that extended 111 feet and 3 inches along the avenue. Held, in ejectment, a dispute having arisen as to the location of the boundary line between plaintiffs' and defendants' properties, that plaintiffs did not own 111 feet and 3 inches on the avenue but only 106 feet 2 1/8 inches, and that defendants were entitled to judgment, with costs. ACTION in ejectment. Joseph Danziger, for plaintiffs. Leonard J. Langbein, for defendants. CROPSEY, J. A dispute as to the location of the boundary line between plaintiffs' and defendants' properties in this ejectment action arises from the fact that the former owner of the entire tract thought there was a greater frontage in the block than in fact there was. In 1881 a party named Morton, owning a tract of land at Middle Village, Queens county, caused a map to be made plotting it into lots. Ten years later this map was filed in the clerk's office. The map shows some 500 lots or more. From it it is evident that it was the intention to, wherever possible, create lots regular in shape with a width of 25 feet and a depth of 100 feet. The properties in question lie in one of the blocks shown on this map. That block is bounded on the north the north by the Williamsburg and Jamaica turnpike, on the east by Morton avenue, on the south by Steuben street and on the west by property of another owner. According to the map the frontage of this block along Morton avenue is 211 feet 3 inches. As matter of fact the block measures only 206 feet 2 inches. The land facing the turnpike is laid out into lots fronting thereon. The lot on the corner of the turnpike extends south along Morton avenue, according to the map, 111 feet 3 inches. The map shows four lots each 25 feet wide and 100 feet deep fronting on Morton avenue between the south |